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Abstract - "Migration, Nativism, and Party System Change in Western Europe"
By Christopher Wendt
Chair: Dr. Suzanne Berger, Department of Political Science
This project explains the growth of the West European Radical Right in the late-1980s
and early-1990s, using that explanation to model the growth of small, programmatically-
focused ("niche") parties in previously stable party systems.
I find that a key mechanism of niche party growth is the re-weighting of issue priorities
or social identities generated by unanticipated, high impact events, such as a severe
economic downturn, terror attack or ethnic riot. These "shocks" represent a perceived
threat to the economic security, physical safety or group position of some individuals,
increasing the attention (salience) they pay to a related issue or identity dimension, such
as the economy, domestic security, or one's feelings of national or religious belonging.
Niche parties grow when 1) the salience of the dimension they emphasizes increases and
2) the distribution of voter preferences gives them a comparative advantage if the
relevant dimension is salient (the niche party is an "issue owner" on the relevant
dimension).
My analysis focuses on the growth of West European anti-immigrant ("nativist") parties,
the major subset of the Radical Right, in the late-1980s and early- 1990s. Many countries
in Western Europe were faced with unprecedented, unsolicited migration during this
period, and immigration in these countries became a highly salient political issue.
Nativist parties, with a popular stance on immigration, leveraged increased salience into
significant electoral gains. The continued support for nativist parties, despite declines in
immigration, represents a durable (though limited) political realignment along a new,
ethnic dimension of political contestation, with nativist parties championing the demands
of the "native" ethnic group.
To generate my hypotheses and causal mechanisms, I conducted two years of research in
Germany and Austria, including an analysis of past public opinion research, a content
analysis of four regional newspapers (1960-2005), 185 elite interviews (50 with nativist
elites), and an analysis of nativist party literature. To test competing hypotheses I
constructed a cross-national dataset of nativist support in Western Europe (1973-2006),
as well as state- and local-level datasets in Germany and Austria.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction and Scope of Inquiry
The October 2007 national election in Switzerland saw the Swiss People's Party
(SVP) achieve the largest plurality (29%) of any Swiss party in the post-war era. What
makes this result most significant was the SVP's strategy during the election. The party's
signature campaign appeal was "Create Security," featuring three white sheep kicking a
black sheep from a Swiss flag.' The appeal highlighted a proposal by the party to deport
the families of underage immigrants convicted by a Swiss court. Detractors likened the
policy to Sippenhaft under the German National Socialist regime and the Swiss President
called it "inciting racial hatred."2 A poster from a recent SVP campaign had shown
several hands, yellow, brown or black, reaching into a candy bowl filled with Swiss
passports. These messages were consistent with an evolution of the party's central
worldview and strategy from conservative and agrarian to conservative and xenophobic.
The SVP consistently portrayed immigrants and immigration as destroying Swiss society
and abusing Swiss generosity.
The SVP's success, more than 25 years after the National Front first emerged as a
significant actor in French politics, confirms the durability of the contemporary European
Radical Right as a political phenomenon.3 By Right, I mean any party that is socially
conservative for its national context; economic conceptions of the Right fail to capture
the ideologies or strategies of many parties commonly associated with the Radical Right.4
1 The German word for sheep is "Schaf," a play on "create" (schaffen). The German National Democrats
(NPD) subsequently co-opted the image for a poster titled "We'll tidy up" ("Wir raeumen auf').
2 The Guardian, "Swiss party accused of racist campaigning," 9/1/07. Under Sippenhaft, or "kin liability,"
relatives of the convicted were punished equally for any crimes committed.
3 The Danish and Norwegian Progress Parties of the 1970s are not defined as Radical Right by this project
and their earlier successes are thus excluded; see Chapter 2.
4 Mudde (2007).
By Radical, I mean any party that advocates increasing the economic or social power of
its support base by permanently reducing or eliminating the rights of some or all of its
political or social opponents. In a liberal-democracy this includes parties that are entirely
anti-democratic (authoritarian; monarchist; fascist; totalitarian) or opposed to co-
operation or co-existence with some part of the population (religious fundamentalist;
racist; exclusionary nationalist; anti-immigrant). The inclusion of monarchism and
religious fundamentalism is a broader definition of the European Radical Right than the
conventional literature, which focuses heavily on extreme nationalism and xenophobia.
However, this definition builds a party family that bounds the phenomenon by identifying
a series of characteristics that clearly and consistently separates the parties of common
interest from all other parties.5
It is puzzling that any Radical Right party emerged in Western Europe after 1945.
Often associated in the public sphere with the democratic breakdowns of the 1930s and
the horrors of the 1940s, parties making Radical Right appeals were broadly unsuccessful
in Western Europe between 1950 and 1985. In some countries, these parties were stable
but relatively small and marginalized (the Italian MSI). In others, brief electoral spikes
were followed by a loss in support and organizational collapse or extended time in the
electoral wilderness (the French Poujadists, Swiss National Action or German NPD). By
2000, however, Radical Right parties routinely received at least 10% of the national vote
in six countries.6 This change in electoral fortunes was rapid and essentially
simultaneous, taking place between 1986 and 1994, but it was also uneven. In some
countries (Austria, Denmark, Norway) the Radical Right experienced significant growth,
5 Sartori (1976); von Beyme (1985).
6 Norway, Denmark, Austria, France, Belgium and Switzerland.
in others (Ireland, Spain, the United Kingdom) it was entirely marginalized or never
emerged. In still others (Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden), brief spikes in Radical
Right support were met with sharp reversals.
The issues bound in questions of Radical Right growth and success are about
more than the ability of one political party, or even a group of similar parties constituting
a party family, to pick up extra votes or seats. The growth of movements perceived as at
their core xenophobic, in a time when Western Europe is undergoing significant
transformations brought on by globalization, European integration and large-scale
immigration, raises three possibilities, two of which are considered normatively troubling
by many observers.
First, Radical or "extremist" parties, whether Left or Right, are commonly
associated with political instability as both an independent and dependent variable.
Scholars have long argued that the success of parties antagonistic toward liberal,
pluralistic democracy contributes to cabinet instability, political violence and at the
extreme political breakdown as these parties directly or indirectly undermine the
functioning of democratic systems. However, Radical parties might also be a symptom
of some acute or chronic dissatisfaction with the functioning of a political or social
system, or the performance of its established political actors. Over the past generation
Western Europe has seen indications of increased political instability. Electoral volatility
has increased and partisan identification has declined; the days of a "cradle to grave"
relationship between voters and parties appear over.7 While discontent with mass
democracy has not noticeably increased in recent decades, 12% of the West European
7 Dalton and Wattenberg (Eds.) (2000).
public is entirely dissatisfied with the functioning of democracy and a further 30%
generally dissatisfied.8 Popular discontent with the European Union is especially
prevalent, as evidenced by the 2005 rejection through referendum of the EU Constitution
in the Netherlands and France, despite the EU's increasing influence on social, economic
and foreign policy.
Second, it is possible that the recent growth of the Radical Right is not a cause or
effect of political instability, but rather that political volatility and the growth of a group
of parties with a similar set of campaign appeals across Western Europe are both
symptoms of a political realignment, a significant and durable change in the distribution
of party support. One form of realignment is a swing in support between major,
established political forces (the American Republicans and Democrats; the German
CDU-CSU and SPD). Another occurs when new or small parties, which describes the
Radical Right's position in the early 1980s, grows at the expense of some or all larger,
established actors, at the extreme replacing one or more of them as a dominant political
force.9
The importance of small or "niche" parties is not limited to studies of the Radical
Right. By niche parties I mean parties that target specific themes or vote bases, as
opposed to broad, established, catch-all movements attempting to appeal to nearly all
voters regardless of ideology or background.10 Niche parties sits at the heart of debates
about short-run voting behavior and medium- or long-run party system change. How do
8 Eurobarometer continuous reporting (1973-Present): "On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly
satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in your country?"
9 The largest pre-growth Radical Right party, the Swiss People's Party, received roughly 10-12% of the
vote before adopting appeals more consistent with the Radical Right and was only the fourth largest party
in Switzerland.
10 On niche parties, see Meguid (2005). On catch-all parties, Kirchheimer (1966).
niche parties, disadvantaged in terms of organization and resources vis-A-vis their
established competitors, make electoral inroads? Does this growth represent a temporary
expression of social frustration, or a permanent political realignment? What is the
relative importance of "demand" factors, structures or processes exogenous to the
political system, compared to "supply" factors, institutions or actor strategies endogenous
to the political system?" These questions speak to ongoing debates in the electoral
politics literature, but also broader debates in political science about social movements,
political development and the relative importance of actors, structures, institutions and
culture.
Finally, what makes the growth of the Radical Right especially troubling to many
observers is its frequent association with political or electoral appeals rooted in ethnicity,
usually described as extreme nationalism, xenophobia or anti-immigrant sentiment.
Ethnicity-based appeals divide society into categories based on traditionally descent-
based attributes that are non-random and relatively difficult to change, such as race,
nation, or religion, but not class or gender. 12 Ethnic appeals are often associated
theoretically with a number of unwelcome outcomes, including political violence and
democratic breakdown. Specifically, scholars and policymakers worry that societies
divided along unchanging ethnic lines lead to conflicts that "turn politics into a census"
and are irresolvable by non-violent means. 13 In studying a type of ethnic mobilization,
1 The "demand/supply" distinction comes from Eatwell, in Merkl and Weinberg (eds.) (2003).
12 Chandra (2005). "Non-random" refers to the probability that two individuals will always produce
children that share an attribute. For example, the four children of two white, Jewish, American parents will
be born as Jewish (religion and potentially nation), American (nation) and white (race) with a probability of
100%, but some children will be born as males and others females.
13 Rabushka and Shepsle (1972); Horowitz (1985). Chandra (2005), however, persuasively argues that
many of these observed outcomes are probably some combination of ethnicity and an unspecified omitted
variable or variables.
this project speaks to broader debates about how and when voters are motivated to
support ethnic appeals, and what the implications are for politics and society when ethnic
mobilizations occur. The ethnic politics literature on the developed world is sparse
(excepting the United States), but a diversifying Europe makes a broader understanding
of ethnic politics in advanced industrial countries increasingly relevant.
Moreover, most studies of ethnic politics focus on systems with a stable
distribution of ethnic attributes, the descent-based characteristics associated with an
ethnic identity or category.14 Recent research has convincingly shown that actors or
institutions can construct or deconstruct ethnic categories, change the degree of ethnic
salience in a society, or change the ethnic cleavages that are salient in politics." Yet
absent mass displacement or mass killing the distribution of ethnic attributes should
change relatively slowly, dependent on rates of ethnic exogamy and differential birthrates
among the holders of various attributes. Immigration, however, can rapidly transform the
distribution of ethnic attributes in a society, for example by changing a homogenous
society into one where multiple ethnic categorizations can arise and persist. Immigration
does not discriminate by region and is not a historically-specific phenomenon. It can
affect any country, developed or developing, at any time with little or no warning. While
most studies of ethnic politics are geared toward countries with latent or salient ethnic
divisions, understanding how immigration can transform a polity or society is relevant to
all countries.
Over the past 25 years in Western Europe, the relationship between natives and
immigrants has noticeably deteriorated. In Germany dozens of Molotov cocktail attacks
14 Chandra (2005).
15 Nobles (2000); Chandra (2004); Posner (2005); Yashar (2005).
were conducted against asylum centers and the homes of recent immigrants, with some
leading to fatalities. At the extreme, events in the German cities of Hoyerswerda (1991)
and Rostock (1992), in which thousands of rioters targeted asylum-seekers, resembled
pogroms or ethnic cleansing. In October-November 2005, rioting broke out across
France over the death of two Parisian, French-Tunisian teenagers avoiding what they
thought to be police pursuit. 16 The riots, which lasted three weeks and caused 200
million Euro in damages, hundreds of injuries and a national state of emergency,
highlighted the deep rift between native French and recent immigrants of North African
descent. 17 In the Netherlands, long perceived as a bastion of tolerance, the 2004
assassination of controversial filmmaker Theo Van Gogh led to a year of tit-for-tat
reprisals between Christians and Muslims, including arson attacks on mosques, churches
and religious schools on both sides.
Despite the focus on Europe, there is nothing essentially European about the
growth of Radical Right parties or niche parties; instances of niche party growth, political
realignment, xenophobia or the Radical Right can be found on every continent, in
developed and developing nations. Within 10 years of its formation the emergence of the
United States Republicans, initially a niche party associated with the opposition to
slavery, realigned the American political system and led to the replacement of one of the
two established political forces. In India, the emergence and consolidation of the Hindu-
nationalist BJP in the early 1990s ended the Congress Party's 40-year dominance of
national politics, leading to a durable political realignment and increased uncertainty
about electoral outcomes. The 1990s also saw the emergence of New Zealand First, an
16 New York Times, "Behind the Furor, the Last Moments of Two Youths,"l 1/7/2005.
17 Days of riots erupted almost simultaneously on the beaches of Sydney, Australia, when a rumor was
spread that several Middle Eastern youth had harassed and attacked natives.
anti-immigrant party ironically led by an indigenous Maori, Winston Peters. In South
Africa, riots in May 2008 claimed several dozen lives; the perpetrators were natives
motivated by resentment toward recent immigrants from Mozambique and Zimbabwe.
Since the turn of the century, debates over immigration have flared up in the United
States and Mexico, as both countries grapple with illegal immigration along their
respective southern borders.
Understanding why Radical Right parties grow or shrink, succeed or fail therefore
provides insight not only into events generating significant concern among European
publics, but also broader processes of interest to political scientists. These include party
competition, party system change, but also the growth of new social movements, as well
as the determinants of ethnic mobilization and ethnic violence.
Framing the Project: Nativist Parties
This project explains both cross-time and cross-national variation in the growth of
the West European Radical Right. Why did these parties rapidly grow when they did,
and why they grow in some countries but not others? Despite a vast literature on the
Radical Right, there is no consensus explanation, or even a consistently defined family of
parties on which inquiries can be focused. 18 The growth, emergence or breakthrough of
Radical Right parties should not be confused with their persistence.19 This project is
primarily interested in why Radical Right parties rapidly gain support in some countries
and not others, not why some parties are better at retaining their newly-gained supporters
than others. Moreover, growth is not synonymous with being large. By conceptualizing
18 Mudde (2007).
'9 Mudde (2007).
success as growth, a newly established party that gains 10% of the vote is conceptually
equivalent to one that grows from 10% to 20% and conceptually distinct from a party that
remains stable at 25% or declines from 30% to 25%. Parties might be large for a variety
of historical and institutional reasons unrelated to their current growth.
To address questions of growth, I adopt a strategy increasingly common in studies
of the Radical Right. This strategy acknowledges that the hypothesized party family is
fairly diverse, with subsets whose growth or stability may each be best explained through
its own variables or mechanisms.20 Specifically, I focus on the growth of nativist parties.
Nativist parties a) explicitly promise to champion the interests of "natives" as an ethnic
group, and make those appeals b) central to their strategy for mobilizing voters. While
the concepts of central and explicit are explored in Chapter 2, suffice it to say that
nativist parties frame themselves first and foremost as "the party of natives," just as a
Communist party might frame itself as the "party of the working class."
Narrowing the focus from Radical Right to nativist parties serves two purposes.
First, it captures most, but not all, of the prominent political movements associated with
recent Radical Right growth, such as the French National Front, Austrian Freedom Party
or Swiss People's Party. 21 In 1985, 11% of the seats in West European parliaments held
by parties associated with the Radical Right were held by parties coded as nativist (7 of
64). By 2005 fully 62% of these seats, and 72% of the overall growth in the Radical
Right, was attributable to nativist parties (181 of 291).22 Consequently, re-
20 Golder (2003); Carter (2005).
21 See Appendix 1 for the full list.
22 Author calculations. The 2005 total is dominated by the Italian National Alliance (99 seats), which this
project codes as neither nativist nor Radical Right; though using this project's proposed definition, 94%
seats held by the Radical Right in 2005 (181 of 192) were held by nativist parties. The Austrian Freedom
conceptualization does not rob this project of its ability to explain the changing fortunes
of the broader Radical Right. Second, re-conceptualization focuses the inquiry. A
unified explanation of the Radical Right would have to explain the growth of nativism,
monarchism, neo-fascism and religious fundamentalism, though each process might be
driven by its own explanatory variable(s). By limiting the focus to nativist parties, the
inquiry is empirically more manageable and theoretically more parsimonious.
By Western Europe, I mean the 16 countries 1) with the majority of their
landmass in the geographic area commonly associated with Europe (excluding Turkey or
Israel, but including Ireland); that 2) remained free of Communist control from 1945 to
1990 (excluding Russia or the former East Germany, but including formerly authoritarian
Spain or Greece); 3) with more than 1 million inhabitants (excluding Iceland,
Luxembourg and Malta). In limiting the scope to Western Europe, I focus on "advanced
industrial democracies," that is 1) mass democracies with 2) strong rule of law and 3) an
industrial or post-industrial economy. This has the advantage of controlling for a host of
political, social, historical and cultural factors, for example the wide divergence in
political, economic and social development between Western and Eastern Europe in the
20th Century that makes the comparability of political systems between regions
significantly more complex.
The Dependent Variable: Changes in Support
My dependent variable is conceptualized as changes in nativist party support;
departing from past scholars, I do not take a party's size to be reflective of its fortunes.
The dependent variable is measured as the aggregate change in vote share for all nativist
Party (12 seats) and the Swiss People's Party (25 seats) were not included in the 1985 figure, as the 1985
iterations of those parties are not commonly coded as Radical Right.
parties in a geographic area over their support in the last election, whether or not they
were a nativist party. I selected vote shares over seat shares, policy outcomes or public
opinion as the most objective measure of a party's support. Unlike policy outcomes or
public opinion, vote shares are readily accessible across countries and the degree of
agreement on their measurement is high. Unlike seat shares, vote shares are a less
distorted measure of a party's popular support. For example the French National Front
held 15% of the vote in the 1990s but only one seat, while the Dutch Center Democrats
held one seat with .8% of the vote.
In specifying the dependent variable as changes and moreover as aggregate
changes in support within a group of parties, I avoid three pitfalls. First, for countries
with multiple nativist parties much of the growth of any one party can be the result of
intra-family competition, rather than broader systemic shifts, accounted for by taking
aggregate trends. While voters might be switching between nativist parties and non-
nativist parties of the Radical Right, or between nativist parties and non-nativist center-
Right parties with similar appeals, this project is unable to systematically capture that
movement.
Second, by taking into account a party's change in support whether or not they
were nativist in the last election, I avoid conflating changes in support with changes in
strategy. This distinction begins from the understanding that party classifications are not
genetic. 23 Parties can choose to change their appeals, and consequently might switch
between the categories political scientists employ. For small or niche parties appeal
switching should be especially easy, as they do not have to fear alienating their small
23 Mudde (2000).
support base and have much to gain from adding appeals capable of attracting new
voters. While measuring changes in support disentangles shifts in support from shifts in
strategy, measuring levels of support treats a party's decision to enter an analytic
category as a success, irrespective of their actual electoral situation, or captures parties
when they were not part of the analytical category under observation. For example, in a
system with only non-nativist parties one party decides to engage nativist appeals,
because they believe it will be a superior strategy for mobilizing voters or through a
takeover by a faction of nativist functionaries. In the next election they contest, their first
as a nativist party, they have misread public opinion and lose support. To a scholar
interested in levels, the election represents a significant increase in nativist party support.
To a scholar interested in changes, the immediate consequence of the shift was failure, as
it likely cost the party voters. 24 In sum, the reasons for adopting a nativist appeal might
be unrelated to the reasons that nativist appeals work. For example, it may be that
nativist parties might adopt nativist appeals when there are many immigrants in the
country, though the number of immigrants already in the country is not a factor in their
growth.
Building on the second point, I make no claim that all of a party's support is
generated through the same process or set of processes. More specifically, because party
classifications are changeable, the reasons for a nativist party's recent size might be
unrelated to the reasons for their current growth. This should generally not be a problem
for studies of a party family or party category where all member parties, such as Socialist
or Green parties in Western Europe, basically originate at the same point in time and have
24 Though the party's shift in appeals may have resulted in vote gains that were offset by votes lost for
unrelated reasons.
the same opportunities for growth, with only the crucial explanatory variable varying.
The difficulty when studying nativist parties, or the Radical Right more broadly, is that
assumptions of a common origin and exposure to common opportunities to grow do not
hold. In some countries (Belgium, France, Germany), nativists built parties essentially
from scratch, while in others (Austria, Norway, Switzerland) non-nativist parties with a
substantial vote base were co-opted by nativist functionaries. Some nativist parties began
as regional parties (Belgium; Italy), others as tax revolts (Norway, Denmark), and still
others as conservative anti-Communists (France, Germany) or agrarians (Switzerland).
In short, nativist parties in the 1980s had a great deal of variation in the size of their
support base before their period of general growth. The method I utilize overcomes this
pitfall by using changes in support across time as observations, essentially considering
only the recent determinants of party growth. Moreover as these parties widely diverged
in their initial endowment of organization and resources, measuring changes in support
makes it possible to consider party organization as a competing explanatory variable.
Variation on the Dependent Variable
Nativist parties rapidly emerged in a number of West European states in the late
1980s and early 1990s. The idea of rapid emergence suggests that cross-time variation is
at least as important as cross-sectional variation and furthermore that the variation is
discontinuous; there is some equilibrium state, followed by a moment of change and then
the establishment of a new equilibrium. Figure 1.1, capturing changes in support for
nativist parties, suggests three periods in nativist party fortunes. The first (1946-1985)
was one of stagnation, though few parties contested on a nativist platform. 25 The second
(1986-1994), of the most interest to this study, is one of rapid and uninterrupted growth.
The final period (1995-2007) is still one of net growth, but this growth is far less
consistent.2 6 The spike in 2002, capturing the victory of the List Pim Fortuyn in the
Netherlands after its leader's assassination during the campaign, is the exception rather
than the rule.
Figure 1.1: Average Change in West European Radical Right, Nativist Support
Figure 1.2 displays this discrepancy as a rolling average of support for nativist
and Radical Right parties in national elections. As Figure 1.2 indicates, the major period
of nativist growth occurred in the late-1980s and early-1990s, when nativist party support
increased from 1% to 5% on average. There was a smaller but still noticeable spike from
1997 until 2000 (5% to 7% on average), with growth from 2000 inconsistent and nativist
parties across Western Europe averaging around 6%. While these figures seem low, they
represent a 16-country average; in some countries nativist parties received 20-30%
(Austria, Norway, or Switzerland) while in others they were well under 1% (Ireland,
Portugal, or Spain).
Figure 1.2: West European Radical Right, Nativist Support (16 Country Average)
Nativist parties also showed noticeable cross-sectional variation within this period
of change; in some countries (Austria, Norway) nativist parties saw exceptional growth,
in others (Germany, the Netherlands) they exhibited only minor growth and in still others
25 I show in Chapter 2, for example, that the Austrian Freedom Party was not contesting as a nativist party
when it made its first significant gains in 1986.
26 Only parties defined as nativist parties at the time of the election are included; see Appendix 1 for a full
list.
significant nativist parties failed to emerge. Figure 1.3 displays the relevant variation in
nativist support between the beginning and end of the period of consistent nativist
growth. To account for the possibility that processes of emergence and persistence might
be operating over a short time frame, the maximum level of nativist support (rather than
the end level) was captured. For example, Sweden had no identified nativist parties
contesting elections until 1988. By 1995 two parties (the Sweden Democrats and New
Democracy) stood at 1.49% of the vote, their 1994 combined election result. However,
this obscures New Democracy's dramatic rise in 1991, when the two parties received a
combined 6.83%, up from 0.02% in 1988 when the Sweden Democrats contested alone.
Nativist parties in Sweden experienced a breakthrough in 1991, followed for potentially
unrelated reasons by a failure in persistence in 1994.
Figure 1.3: Changes in Nativist Party Support, (Max. Growth, 1988-94 vs. 1987)
The Argument in Brief
I use the specific case of nativist parties in post-war Western Europe to advance a
general theory of niche party growth that explains discontinuities in support for new or
small parties and, in doing so, provides insight into party system change in established
mass democracies. I argue that a key mechanism of niche party growth and party system
change is the rapid re-weighting of issue priorities or social identities generated by
unpredictable, high impact events. The general theory can be summarized in two stages.
In the first stage some triggering event or Shock, such as a severe economic
downturn, oil crisis, terror attack or ethnic riot, unsettles individual expectations about
economic security, physical safety or group position for some part of the population.2 7
Shocks are unanticipated events that deviate significantly from observed structural
relationships, for example the rate of unemployment, the price of gas, or the frequency
and severity of terror attacks or inter-ethnic violence. The unsettling generated by a
Shock represents a threat (the prospect of negative consequences) and leads individuals
to increase the weight, or salience, that they place on a related issue or identity
dimension, such as the economy, energy policy, domestic security, or feelings of national
or religious belonging.
In the second stage, some subset of the population finds their priorities
sufficiently altered by the Shock to engage in acts of threat reduction. This might
include social mobilization around a common concern or even increases in violence if the
perceived threat is split along group lines, whether ethnic or non-ethnic. In a mass
democracy with strong rule of law, a chief means of threat reduction is elections, which
signals to established actors that some action is necessary or installs new actors
promising to resolve the threat. In an election, changes in salience are factored into a
voter's decision to support a party. Re-weighted priorities result in increased electoral
support for a niche party when 1) the salience of the dimension it emphasizes is high and
2) the distribution of voter preferences gives the party a comparative advantage if
elections are contested on the relevant dimension; the niche party is an "issue owner" on
the relevant dimension.28
27 Kuran (1998); Taleb (2007).
28 For theories of issue ownership, see Budge and Farlie (1983), Petrocik (1996), or Meguid (2005).
My model is fundamentally structural, focusing on sudden events and their capacity
to alter issue salience and voter calculations. The argument requires no change, short- or
long-term, in individual preferences. Furthermore, while political or social elites may
play a role in aggravating or mitigating a Shock's impact through the volume and tone of
their narratives, I argue that elite strategies as highly constrained by exogenous events.
Finally, while my primary interest is in Shock initiation and its effects on politics and
society, I suggest that Shocks might terminate for exogenous or endogenous reasons.
The triggering event might fade of its own accord, forces within the affected political
system could end undertake action to end it, or a niche party might fully mobilize the
voters capable of being convinced to support it as a consequence of the event. Should
none of these mechanisms occur, a niche party would be expected to continue gaining
support from the Shock in subsequent elections.
Figure 1.4: A Basic Shock Model of Niche Party Growth
Extending my argument to nativist parties Ethnic Shocks, seemingly unlikely,
high impact events related to some ethnic identity dimension, unsettle individual
expectations about the political, economic, social, or demographic dynamics between two
or more ethnic groups. This unsettling represents a threat that triggers rapid and
significant increases in the salience of the ethnic identity dimension (race; religion) itself,
or indirectly through some issue or issues related to an ethnic identity dimension (such as
immigration).
Specifically, I argue that a large, wholly unanticipated wave of migration to
Western Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s represented a triggering event capable
of generating an Ethnic Shock. This Shock unsettled the expectations of some subset of
natives about a host of economic, social and symbolic outcomes. It called into question
native prospects in job and housing markets. It raised the specter of social instability
through increased street crime, organized crime and political violence. At the extreme, it
generated concerns that an increased recognition of immigrant minorities, combined with
disadvantageous demographic trends, would lead to natives becoming "strangers in their
own land" (Fremd im eigenen Land). As a result, immigration became one of, if not the,
most salient political and social issues in a number of West European societies and
dominated state and national campaigns during this period. Nativist parties, promising
above all to preserve or enhance native privileges and position and holding a comparative
advantage on immigration policy in surveys of public opinion, leveraged increased
salience into significant electoral victories at the expense of established actors of the
center-Right and center-Left. Nativist parties in countries that did not receive this new
migration remained stagnant or did not form at all. The continued (if reduced) public
awareness of immigration and immigrants, and the elevated but static level of nativist
party support twenty years later, suggest that the Ethnic Shock had a durable effect on the
distribution of party support and issue and identity salience in Western Europe.
A theory advancing a causal link between objective immigration processes and
the growth of nativism seems initially intuitive, but must be placed in the context of the
existing literature on the West European Radical Right. Much of this literature
emphasizes the role of party competition (Kitschelt and McGann 1995), institutions and
systemic opportunity structures (Carter 2005; Givens 2005; Norris 2005), or attitudes
(van der Brug et. al 2005; Carter and Arzheimer 2006) over exogenous structural
processes. Even demand-based explanations tend to focus on economic dynamics like
unemployment (Jackman and Volpert 1996), globalization (Swank and Betz 2003) or the
emergence of post-industrial economies (Betz 1994; Kitschelt and McGann 1995). With
a few notable exceptions (Gibson 2002; Golder 2003), the literature on the Radical Right
claims that objective immigration processes play no role in Radical Right success, or that
immigration debates are a manifestation of underlying economic uncertainty or social
frustration. Those works that do focus on immigration tend to think in terms of the size
of the pre-existing immigrant population, which I argue is less important than how
immigrant populations change over time.
I forward two crucial hypotheses about the effect of changing rates of net
immigration on changes in nativist party support, based on the relationship between
structures, salience and voting presented in Figure 1.4:
Hypothesis 1 (The "Indirect" Hypothesis): Increasing immigration
leads to increasing support for nativist parties.
Hypothesis 2 (The "Direct" Hypothesis): The increasing salience of
native/immigrant issue or identity dimensions leads to increasing support
for nativist parties.
The salience hypothesis is labeled "direct" and the structural hypothesis "indirect"
to distinguish between their relative positions in the causal chain. Not every structural
change of the same magnitude will result in an equivalent change in salience. For
example, simultaneous structural changes along two dimensions might influence the
impact of each on the eventual change in salience, while any change in salience of the
same magnitude is expected to have roughly the same impact on voting, holding
institutions and actor strategies constant. Due to constraints in the availability of past
data, this project's systematic tests focus more heavily on Hypothesis 1.
I do not contest that other mechanisms of party system change (such as
generational replacement, institutional change or actor strategies) exist, or that change is
only driven by one mechanism. Nor do I argue that nativist parties benefit only from
Ethnic Shocks, or that immigration is the only capable of triggering an Ethnic Shock.
Rather, I argue that party system change can come from shifts in the distribution of
priorities generated by a sudden event and that one such event, a wave of immigration to
Western Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s, did lead to significant increases in
support for nativist parties.
Case Selection and Research Design
My project employs a nested analysis (Lieberman 2005), combining cross- and
sub-national (state and local level) large-N datasets with in-depth national studies. Mixed
research designs leverage the advantages of both approaches. A small-N analysis
generates theoretical insights, addresses spurious relationships and establishes causal
mechanisms, while large-N analyses quickly and systematically test alternative
explanations and mitigate degree of freedom problems.29 Additionally, disaggregating
cross-sectional observations into individual elections across time increases the number of
observations, while disaggregating to a lower level of analysis addresses ecological
fallacy.30 For example, if immigration drives nativist party support at the national level,
the mechanism could be objective (increasing immigration triggers a threat among
proximate natives) or perceptual (high immigration countries talk about immigration
more, triggering a threat among natives with micro-level attributes unrelated to
29 On the benefits of qualitative analysis, see Collier and Mahoney (1996) or Gerring (2007). On the
benefits of quantitative analysis, see Lijphart (1971) or Geddes (1990).
30 King, Keohane and Verba (1994); Freedman, in Lewis-Beck et al. (2001).
proximity). Disaggregating to the state or local level allows me to address whether threat
generation is more likely to be a structural/demographic process, or whether it is
primarily attitudinal.
I chose Germany and Austria as the countries for closer study based on the
maximum growth in Radical Right electoral support from 1985 to 2000, representing
selection on the dependent variable. My subsequent choice to focus the study only on
nativist parties does not contradict the initial selection, as captured in Figure 1.3. Cases
were selected by period, rather than individual election, to capture trajectories of growth
and avoid selecting outliers. The German case, while not at the extreme low end of the
dependent variable, had several attractive characteristics. First, it had the least successful
nativist movement to credibly contest elections during this period (>1% support at any
point). Second, there was sufficient organizational history to produce a robust secondary
literature and media coverage, and sufficient organizational density to allow for
interviews with party supporters and elites. This significantly reduced the costs of
generating party histories and provided key insights into hypotheses and mechanisms.
Third, there was sufficient sub-national variation in Germany for sub-national case
selection. Finally, a cross-national quantitative analysis captures the countries that failed
to generate a credible nativist party, thereby testing the hypotheses on the full range of
observations.
The cross-national quantitative data covers approximately 160 elections in 16
countries from 1973 to 2006.31 1973 represents the last year most West European
countries allowed large-scale, scheduled economic migration; this migration was
31 The list of elections, as well as some of the unemployment data, comes from Golder (2003).
perceived by European societies as controlled and theoretically reversible and
consequently would not qualify as a Shock by my definition. 32 Virtually all migration
after 1973, however, was perceived as unexpected, permanent and non-beneficial. The
cross-national dataset represents an improvement both in the analysis of new variables
(notably crime rates, conceptually linked to the Radical Right but not systematically
measured) and in its finer measurements of nativist party support and immigration,
resulting in the metrics used more closely matching the concepts under investigation. In
addition to the cross-national data, six sub-national datasets were constructed at the state
and local levels in Germany and Austria, to address ecological fallacy and re-test the
hypotheses using new data.33 The state level datasets cover all Austrian and West
German states, while the local datasets were constructed for the four states where
fieldwork was concentrated. Each sub-national dataset is entirely original, constructed
from official statistical websites and yearbooks and when necessary onsite research at
state and local agencies. Due to data quality, each dataset covers national election results
from roughly 1980 until 2005-2006.
The qualitative data was generated through 22 months of field research in
Germany and Austria, spanning June 2004 through June 2007. The fieldwork focused on
two states in each country (Baden-Wuerttemberg and Rheinland-Pfalz in Germany;
Vienna and Styria in Austria), in addition to national level interviews. In Germany, states
were selected based on nativist party success at the state level with an eye toward theory
building. Baden-Wuerttemberg, the only Western state where nativists received at least
32 Messina (2007).
33 "Local" in this case can mean electoral districts (Baden-Wuerttemberg), counties (Rheinland-Pfalz and
Styria) or city wards (Vienna). The geographic demarcation chosen depended on how state agencies
disaggregated the explanatory variables.
10% of the vote in a state election, was the "high" observation and Rheinland-Pfalz,
where nativists never entered parliament or reached more than 5% of the state vote, was
the "low" observation. 34 Both states held state elections in March 2006, allowing for the
direct observation of campaigns and rallies. East German states were excluded from the
selection process and the analysis, as they are not Western Europe by my definition. In
Austria, state selection occurred when the general theory was well established and was
based on the volume of immigration in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the explanatory
variable, with an eye toward mechanism building. Vienna represented a state with
relatively high immigration during this period and Styria a state with relatively low
immigration. Subsequent quantitative analyses at the state and local levels tested the
project's hypotheses and alternative explanations on the full set of observations.
In addition to a review of German-language secondary literature and a secondary
analysis of prior survey research in both countries, original qualitative data collection
focused on three efforts. The first was a content analysis of four regional newspapers
(one in each state) during state and national election campaigns from 1960 to 2005. This
analysis captured the salience of, and attitudes toward, immigration, as well as statements
by nativist parties and their detractors. The media analysis also acted as a contemporary
source to counteract retrospective bias. Second, several decades of nativist programs and
several hundred campaign appeals made by nativist parties (posters and newspaper
advertisements) were analyzed. Both programs and appeals provide a window into how
34 Bavaria, an alternative high state, was the birthplace of the German Republikaner and represented an
unusually strong organization; in every other state organizations were built from scratch at roughly the
same time. Unlike other low states (Nordrhein-Westfalen, Lower Saxony), nativists in Rheinland-Pfalz
were sufficiently organized to allow for interviews.
nativist parties frame politics, including whether they are nativist for any specific
election.
The final qualitative evidence comes from participant interaction. First, 185
interviews were conducted with political and social elites, including academics,
journalists, bureaucrats and representatives from social organizations, but primarily with
the national, state and local members of every major political party. Roughly 50
interviews were conducted with past and present nativist elites, from local politicians to
national party heads. Due to their traditionally antagonistic relationship with the media
and academia, nativist party elites are a group rarely interviewed in large numbers for
studies of the Radical Right. The interviews, semi-structured and lasting on average one
hour, provided insight into actor strategies, generated alternative hypotheses, data sources
and mechanisms and acted as a small survey of party perceptions of social priorities and
their solutions. Finally, I conducted two dozen unstructured observations of nativist party
events, from election night parties and local party meetings to mass rallies and
international conferences. These meetings provided insight not only into nativist
priorities and strategies, but also presented an opportunity for unstructured interactions
with nativist voters.
Empirical Background
In this section I describe three German 35 and two Austrian 36 parties active since
1973 and coded as at least ambiguously nativist for at some or all of the period 1973-
35 At least two other German parties, the Hamburg-based "Foreigner-Stop Movement" of the 1980s and the
Baden-Wuerttemberg-based "German League for Nation and Homeland (DLVH)" of the 1990s were too
small and geographically focused to be of interest. Another candidate party, the Hamburg-based Schill
movement notable for its 2001 showing in the 2001 local elections, was coded as non-nativist.
2006. The study of these parties and their fortunes represents the main thrust of my
empirical research.
The National Democratic Party of Germany (Nationaldemokratische Partei
Deutschlands or NPD) was formed in 1964 from a number of small German-nationalist
groups, primarily the German Empire Party (DRP).3 7 The NPD of the 1960s was
German-nationalist and anti-Leftist (opposed to Communism and the "1968
Generation"). The party called for an end to military occupation by the Allied powers
and USSR, a return to "law and order" and "traditional values," and German
Reunification, including East Germany but also territories beyond the Oder-Neisse line
separating Germany from Poland. While the NPD entered a number of state parliaments
in the late 1960s and nearly entered the national parliament in 1968, by the early 1970s it
had collapsed as a national movement. In the late 1970s, the rejection of immigration
became more prominent among NPD intellectuals and was a key component of NPD
electoral campaigns by 1980. While its support increased slightly in the 1980s and 1990s
in the former West Germany, the self-proclaimed "national, social" party remained
marginalized except for a handful of local mandates and was overshadowed by the DVU
and REP.
The second German party, the Republicans (Republikaner or REP), was founded
in 1983 by two former national parliamentarians of the Bavarian conservative-
confessional Christian Social Union (CSU). The two founders saw a loan by the West
German government (which included the CSU) to East Germany as a violation of the
36 Austria's National Democratic Party (NDP), founded in 1967 as a mirror of the NPD and banned by the
State in 1988 as an extremist organization, was too small to be relevant.
37 The DRP was notable as the home to many supporters of National Socialism who joined the NSDAP
before the Hitler regime and was the primary German-nationalist party active in the 1950s.
party's anti-Communist stance and sought to form a "true" conservative movement. By
the mid-1980s the party leadership had been fully captured by Franz Schoenhuber, a
journalist and television personality fired for a writing a memoir perceived as overly
sympathetic to the National Socialist era. Under Schoenhuber, the REP's conservative
platform (law and order, traditional values, anti-Communism) expanded to focus on an
opposition to immigration and by 1989 had become the party's chief identifiable position.
While the REP never entered the national parliament, their 2.1% vote in 1990 represents
the single best result for a nativist party in national elections since 1973. At the state
level, the REP spent one year in the Berlin local parliament and two terms (1992-2001) in
the Baden-Wuerttemberg parliament. Since its heyday (1989-1996) the party has become
increasingly marginalized and by the 2005 national election was limited to a steady base
of 0.6%, with its local mandates concentrated in urban areas in southern Germany with
relatively large immigrant populations.
A third significant group, the German People's Union (Deutsche Volksunion or
DVU), only formally qualifies as a party. Founded in 1987 by multi-millionaire
publisher and former NPD candidate Gerhard Frey, the DVU maintains no party
organization outside of its parliamentary clubs and a national office in Munich, and
largely exists as a vehicle for Frey to advance his German-nationalist, anti-immigration
views. Though it only sporadically contests elections, the DVU has been represented in
the Bremen parliament almost consistently since 1987 and gained representation in
Schleswig-Holstein for one term in 1992, as well as being represented in two East
German state parliaments for at least one term since 1998. From 2004 through at least
2008, the DVU and NPD maintained a coordination agreement in state and national
elections. While the REP consistently refused to take part in this coalition, leadership
battles within the REP have exposed elements that support coordination.
In Austria, the chief nativist party, and one of the most prominent nativist parties
in Europe, is the Austrian Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Oesterreichs or FPOe).
The FPOe was founded in 1956 from the from the remains of the Federation of
Independents (Verband der Unabhaengigen or VdU), formed in 1949 as a "national-
liberal" party representing National Socialists disenfranchised during denazification. The
VdU and the FPOe after it sought to be a "third camp" (Drittes Lager) in Austrian
politics, representing economic liberals and social conservatives (including German
Nationalists) at odds with Christian-democracy of the Austrian People's Party (OeVP)
and the social-democracy of the Austrian Social Democrats (SPOe).
Throughout its history, the respective strengths of the national and liberal wings
of the party ebbed and flowed and for its first 30 years, the party's main goal was to
secure enough votes to remain in the national parliament, which it did by consistently
receiving 5-8% support. Notably, the party's two moments of greatest influence before
1999 came during SPOe governments. From 1970 to 1971 the party, under the leadership
of former Waffen-SS officer Friedrich Peter, supported (Jewish) Chancellor Bruno
Kreisky's minority government. From 1983 until 1986 the party, led by the liberal
Norbert Steger, served as the junior partner in an SPOe-FPOe coalition.
With the 1986 election of Joerg Haider as party leader, the national wing won
decisive control of the FPOe. Haider sabotaged the governing coalition by attacking the
informal policy of patronage division between the two major parties (Proporz) and
making new overtures to the party's German-nationalist elites. This change in leadership
and strategy doubled the FPOe's support in an early national election in 1986 and led to a
string of strong showings in state elections from 1986 to 1989, culminating in Haider's
election as Governor of the state of Carinthia in 1989. In the 1990 national election
Haider, recognizing the change in social priorities brought on by increased immigration
to Austria, made the opposition to immigration a defining characteristic of the party. The
move, which included the "Austria First!" referendum petition calling for an end to
immigration, finally drove the liberal wing from the party to form the Liberal Forum in
1993 even as the FPOe's attacks on immigration made inroads into the working class,
robbing the OeVP and SPOe of supporters and swelling the party's ranks further. In
national elections in 1994, 1995 and 1999, the FPOe was sufficiently strong that Haider
became a legitimate candidate for Chancellor, though the party's support stabilized after
1994 at around 25% nationally. With the 1999 election the FPOe became the second
largest party (by less than 1000 votes), entered a governing coalition as the junior partner
to the smaller OeVP, where it remained from 1999 through 2005. The FPOe's
government experience was a disaster for the party and it fell to its 1986 level of support,
roughly 10%, in the 2002 national election.
Moreover, this period led to deep internal divisions in the party between the
strongly nationalist, nativist base (representing the mid-level functionaries) and the more
office-seeking, ambiguously nativist leadership (representing Haider and the Government
ministers). These divisions led Haider's faction to leave the party in 2005 and form the
Alliance for the Future of Austria (Buendnis Zukunft Oesterreich or BZOe). Though the
"moderate" BZOe retained control of the Carinthian organization, where Haider had been
re-elected Governor in 1999 after 8 years out of office, the "extremist" FPOe won the
immediate victory in terms of retained functionaries and voters. The FPOe arrested its
decline in state elections and bettered its national support in 2006, while the BZOe barely
entered the parliament with 4%, entirely on the strength of the Carinthian organization.
Both parties heavily emphasized immigration in 2006, though the BZOe chose to do so
late in the campaign and as of 2008 maintains an entirely non-nativist party program.
While the BZOe remained entrenched in the FPOe's traditional Carinthian stronghold,
the FPOe evolved into an urban party strongest in the working class neighborhoods of
Vienna.
Plan for the Dissertation
The remainder of my dissertation is divided into two parts. The first chapters
(Chapters 2-3) comprise the more theoretical effort. Chapter 2 addresses issues of party
classification and categorization. It asks what a nativist party is, what it is not and how
scholars can identify a nativist party with a high degree of reliability. Despite the vast
literature on the hypothetical Radical Right party family and its subsets, party
classifications remain contested.38 Chapter 2 offers a set of consistent, time- and context-
sensitive coding rules for identifying nativist parties based on their platforms and
campaign appeals. The method is illustrated using programs and appeals by parties of the
Right in the 2005 and 2006 state and national elections in Germany and Austria, as well
as historical programs and appeals for the five significant parties identified as nativist.
Chapter 3 presents the Shock model of niche party growth in full detail. The first
half of Chapter 3 defines and explores the Shock concept and offers a general theory of
voting behavior, vote switching and party system change using concepts and examples
38 Mudde (2000, 2007).
applicable to non-nativist parties. Niche parties increase their support when large,
unanticipated events unsettle individual expectations about economic, physical or social
outcomes, thereby generating threats. The second half of the chapter presents a specific
argument for the regarding nativist parties, including a series of hypotheses regarding the
expected political and social behavior of individuals affected by an Ethnic Shock. While
primarily interested in Shock initiation in stable democracies with permissive electoral
systems and strong rule of law, the chapter also offers several mechanisms for Shock
termination and speculative hypotheses about the effects of Shocks in countries when the
scope conditions are relaxed.
The next three chapters make up the more section of the dissertation. Chapter 4
explains the cross-time variation in changes in support for nativist parties in Austria and
Germany. Through an analysis of immigration flows, media coverage, issue salience,
anti-immigrant violence and election campaigns, the chapter argues that the
unprecedented increase in unexpected immigration in the late 1980s led to a significant
spike in the salience of immigration, which subsequently drove nativist victories in state
and national elections. Nativist parties were the main beneficiary of this salience not out
of protest, but because large sections of the population felt their positions on immigration
were correct. Moreover, the chapter argues that changes in the salience of immigration
were not driven by elites from nativist or non-nativist parties. While political elites may
have aggravated voter concerns through their heavy emphasis of the issue during the
immigration spike, they were in turn constrained by events and the reactions of voters to
those events.
Chapter 5 explains the variation in cross-national changes in support for nativist
parties in Austria and Germany during the observed immigration Shock. While both
Germany and Austria received relatively high levels of immigration for Western Europe,
the Austrian Freedom Party saw large, sustained increases in support, while the growth of
German nativist parties was comparatively stunted and temporary. Adopting the demand
/supply schema, the chapter uses survey research and elite interviews to identify three
factors that provided an advantage for Austrian nativists. First, the FPOe had an
additional advantage in issue demand (their attacks on Proporz), while in Germany a
competing Shock (Reunification) dampened concerns with immigration at a crucial
moment. Second, the capture of an established party organization (a supply factor)
facilitated the ability of Austrian nativists to conduct campaigns and select promising
functionaries. Finally, the decision of parties (on the Right and Left) to cooperate with
the FPOe signaled to voters that it could reliably enact legislation and represent its
constituents, whereas the hostility toward German nativists signaled that they were only a
vehicle to express immediate discontent.
Chapter 6 systematically tests the relationship between immigration and nativist
party support cross- and sub-nationally, controlling for other major issues
(unemployment; crime) and political opportunity structures (electoral rules; incumbency)
using the seven datasets constructed for this project. The analysis finds that while there is
an objective link between changes in immigration flows and changes in nativist support
and this relationship is confirmed at multiple levels of aggregation, there is no consistent
link between changes in nativist support and the prior distribution of natives and
immigrants. In addition, this chapter presents a competing measurement of immigration
38
that more closely captures the groups nativist parties mobilize against. Finally, Chapter 7
offers some extensions and broader implications for the model, offering some
speculations about the cause of nativist trajectories beyond Germany and Austria, several
predictions and policy implications for the future of nativist parties in Western Europe.
Chapter 1 Figures and Charts
Figure 1.1: Average Change in West European Radical
Right, Nativist Support
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Figure 1.2: West European Radical Right, Nativist
Support (16 Country Average)
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Figure 1.3: Changes in Nativist Party Support,(Maximum Growth, 1988-94 vs. 1987)
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Figure 1.4: A Basic Shock Model of Niche Party Growth
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Chapter 2 - "Unser Volk Zuerst!" Conceptualizing and Coding Nativist
Parties
At its core, an analysis of "Radical Right" growth is an analysis of a party family,
an analytic category of political organizations connected conceptually by some minimum
series of features distinguishing them from all other groupings of parties. 39 An implicit
understanding of what defines a party family and who its members are is present in any
comparative research on parties. Parties selected for comparison across countries
inevitably share some characteristic, whether distinguished by ideology, support base or
strategy, motivating their selection as a pair or group over the selection of any other party
or parties.40 Moreover, scholars studying cross-national party growth or success rely on
family membership to obtain values on the dependent variable. Consequently, accurate
classification becomes essential when choosing cases, minimizing measurement error or
drawing conclusions about outcomes or effects.
This chapter addresses issues of classification through the construction of a
consistent coding schema based on a party's formal and expressed positions. The chapter
proceeds in three sections. The first section explores the fallacies inherent in coding
parties as "Radical Right." It considers and rejects a number of alternative defining
characteristics before settling on two: the content of a candidate party's social program
and the candidate party's approach toward its opponents. 41 The second section
conceptualizes and creates a consistent set of coding rules to identify one important
39 Sartori (1976); Von Beyme (1985).
40 Mair and Mudde (1998).
41 For critiques in this vein, see Mudde (1995; 1996; 2000; 2007). Eatwell (1989) argues that it is
"impossible to fit [the Radical Right] neatly" into a single classification. Von Beyme (1985) argues that
while we cannot define why these parties are of a kind, we can generate a consistent list across scholars.
Radical Right subset: nativist parties, often referred to as "anti-immigrant" or
"xenophobic" parties. Nativist parties a) explicitly promise to champion the interests of
"natives " as an ethnic group, and those appeals are b) central to their mobilizing
strategy. The final section uses a combination of campaign appeals and party programs
to code parties of the Right in Germany and Austria as nativist or non-nativist. The
evidence is drawn from contemporary party programs and campaign appeals expressed in
elections in 2005 and 2006, as well as a historical analysis of programs and appeals for
the five parties in these countries commonly identified as Radical Right.
What is the Radical Right?
Why should party classification matter? In individual studies, ad hoc- or
misclassification affects how observations are selected and potentially introduces fatal
errors into research findings. In the aggregate, if researchers cannot agree on how to
measure the DV it becomes difficult to accumulate knowledge. Unfortunately, studies of
the Radical Right often fail to justify why the parties being studied were chosen. Nearly
every comparative study of the Radical Right today acknowledges this deficiency and
attempts to resolve it.42
Two fallacies are prevalent when classifying Radical Right parties without
establishing a prior conceptual framework. The first is the fallacy of common sense, or "I
know X when I see it." This fallacy occurs when including or excluding parties based on
what should be true, rather than proposing and defending objective classificatory criteria
and testing parties against those criteria. The second is the fallacy of myopia, or "once X,
always X." This fallacy occurs when a party is classified for all iterations of its existence
42 Gibson (2002); Golder (2003); Carter (2005); Mudde (2007).
based on observation at a fixed point, usually the present or recent past. Classifying a
party based on an observation at a fixed point denies the possibility that changes to a
party's personnel, support base or the broader political or social system can influence
party programs or appeals.
Why do these fallacies matter? The fallacy of common sense matters when
classifying borderline observations. A study can survive small misclassifications or
errors of omission; small parties are invariably missed even in single-country studies.
But consider the "size of the country's Radical Right" as a DV of interest. If one
excludes the Swiss People's Party, Switzerland's Radical Right is exceptionally small by
West European standards (<1%), but inclusion makes it the largest in Western Europe
(>29% as of 2007). Does Portugal have a Radical Right? Including the "borderline"
People's Party, Portugal's Radical Right is robust (7.3% as of 2005) while exclusion
finds it non-existent (0.02%). Errors in classification affect how observations are
selected and can ultimately introduce fatal error when explaining cross-national variation.
Including the center-Right Spanish People's Party, Portuguese People's Party or Italian
National Alliance under the Radical Right rubric would suggest that unemployment or an
authoritarian legacy are critical for the Radical Right's success. Excluding these parties
could point to competing explanatory factors, like immigration or crime.
Failing to correctly classify parties across time introduces similar issues. For
example, think of changes in Radical Right support between elections as the DV of
interest. In 1973 the Danish Progress Party, formed to contest the election, went from 0%
to 15.9% of the vote, the highest value of the DV since 1960. But in 1973 the Progress
Party mobilized voters with anti-tax, anti-statist slogans, while immigration and "law and
order," the issues most frequently associated with the contemporary Radical Right, were
entirely absent.43 If being a member of the Radical Right requires an ardent nationalism
or opposition to immigration, which the Progress Party would go on to adopt in the
1980s, the value of the DV for Denmark in 1973 is actually "0," as the Progress Party
was not a member of the party family. Even if parties that are neo-liberal or anti-
immigrant are included under the Radical Right umbrella, including both sub-groups in
the same empirical analysis makes little sense unless the same explanatory variables are
believed to be driving both outcomes.
Past decision rules used to establish Radical Right membership uniformly suffer
from one of three deficiencies: 1) they are atheoretic; 2) they contradict the actual appeals
of the parties they identify; or 3) they fail to create mutually exclusive party families.
The standard atheoretic classification relies on the placement of parties on a Left-Right
scale by experts or surveys of public opinion.44 Spatial decision rules often suffer from
the fallacy of common sense and may as a whole be tautological. If most voters self-
identify as being "moderate" and experts accept this assumption, any success by an
"extreme" party could influence future evaluations of that party's placement, rather than
call into question voter placement or a unidimensional Left-Right continuum.
Furthermore, spatial placements are not necessarily comparable across time or space.
What is "extreme" in one country or time period can be "moderate" in another. The
"fringe" ecological parties of the 1980s are established political actors today, though their
appeals are not substantially different.
43 Andersen and Bjorklund, in Hainsworth (2000).
44 For example, Jackman and Volpert (1996) define the Radical Right as the party furthest to the right in a
political system, as defined by country experts. This however created a category containing the majority,
"center-right" Spanish Popular Party and the "neo-fascist" German NPD.
A second atheoretic decision rule looks at a party's legacy, the organization the
party claims to originate from, or the origin of its functionaries. In the case of the
Radical Right, this equates to connections with the Fascist and National Socialist
movements of the 1920s and 1930s. However, classification by legacy falls under the
fallacy of myopia; there is no logical argument that today's party organization should
always bear a resemblance to prior iterations.
Most scholars agree that these atheoretic decision rules are insufficient or
endogenous to the phenomenon and that party ideology, the collection of ideas through
which parties view politics, or party strategy, the collection of appeals that parties utilize
when contesting elections, are a better basis for a decision rule.45 Of course, what
constitutes a Radical Right ideology is contested. Mudde (1995) identifies at least 26
different definitions of "Right Wing Extremism" using 58 identifiers, with only five
mentioned in at least half the proposed definitions.46 But even the identifiers consistently
mentioned frequently suffer from one of two shortcomings.
First, many popular identifiers fail to describe at least some of the parties
commonly associated with the Radical Right, making these identifiers insufficient to
describe the "family." Over time "fascist," "post-fascist," or "neo-fascist" have been
most frequently used identifiers.47 But fascist is itself a fuzzy classification containing a
number of characteristics, including extreme nationalism, rejection of democracy,
45 Mudde (1995, 2000); Ignazi (2003).
46 The five identifiers are nationalism, racism, xenophobia, rejection of democracy, and a strong state/law
and order.
47 For example see Lipset (1960) or Ignazi (1992).
rejection of pluralism and egalitarianism, social conservatism and a state-centered,
corporatist economy. 48
Two features of fascism are especially absent among the target parties. First, few
argue for a corporatist economic policy. For example, the Austrian Freedom Party or the
Danish Progress Party have consistently advocated reducing state control over the
economy, through the privatization of national industries. On the other hand, many paint
the "new Radical Right" as "neo-liberal," but this identifier is equally faulty.49 Most of
the parties in question do not reject the welfare state, but rather are domestic and
international welfare chauvinists. Welfare chauvinists argue that some portion of the
population deserves full economic and social protection by the State, while the rest
(foreigners or foreign capital) should be excluded to conserve scarce resources or ensure
a strong, independent national economy. 50
Second, "rejection of democracy" is both a component of fascism and a
frequently mentioned identifier in its own right.51 But opposition to democracy is illegal
and punishable by party ban in a number of European states, making explicit appeals
impossible for elites hoping to contest elections and avoid prison. Indeed, the parties in
question often reaffirm their commitment to democracy to avoid proscription, rebut
attacks from their detractors, or distance themselves from a frankly unpopular policy
position.52 While some argue that an anti-democratic discourse is implicit, imputing
party intentions runs the risk of undermining falsifiability. Furthermore the explicit, if
48 Hagtvet (1994); Karapin (1998). While "nationalism" is a key feature of "Fascism," "racism" or
"ethnocentrism" are not. These are instead features of "National Socialism."
49 Ignazi (1992); Betz (1994); Betz and Swank (1995); Kitschelt and McGann (1995; 2005); Betz and
Immerfall (1998); Karapin (1998).
50 Mudde (2000; 2007).
51 Ignazi (1992); Merkl and Weinberg (1993); Fennema (1997); Fieschi (2000).
52 Karapin (1998); Mudde (2000); Bale (2003); Ignazi (2003).
anti-liberal or anti-plural, acceptance of democracy as the "rules of the game" even
among "extremists" on "Left" and "Right" is an important development in European
political culture worthy of explanation in its own right.53
Apart from fascism, "racism" and "xenophobia" are the most frequently named
Radical Right identifiers. 54 Probably no term is more frequently leveled than "racism,"
often used interchangeably with "xenophobia" or "ethnopluralism" despite the conceptual
distinctiveness of each. This project conceives of "ethnopluralism" as the belief that
ethnic nations carry unique biological and cultural traits and capacities. "Racism" is
ethnopluralism with the additional belief that ethnic differences produce an inherent
superiority or hierarchy. 55 "Xenophobia" is the rejection of any elements deemed
foreign or "strange," which might include immigrants, religious minorities, foreign
capital, the homeless, gays and lesbians, the "counter culture," and so forth.
"Racism" as an idea in Western Europe shares a similar trajectory to "opposition
to democracy": fashionable in the 1930s, discredited in the 1940s, proscribed post-war
through laws against "inciting racial hatred" and subsequently taken off the table as a
legitimate political appeal. Even so, Carter's (2005) review of past research on Radical
Right ideology finds that certain parties, particularly fascist or post-fascist parties
53 Mudde (2007) argues that Radical Right parties are not opposed to democracy, but rather to liberal
democracy, with some minorities or "unwanted" elements stripped of the political rights and equal
protection that the "good, pure" national majority receives in full.
54 Husbands (1983), Hagtvet (1994), Mudde (1996; 2000), Bale (2003), Ryndgren (2004) and Carter (2005)
call "racism" and "xenophobia" key elements. Ignazi (1992) and Fieschi (2000) refer to "ultra-
nationalism" and "racism." Hainsworth (1992), Betz (1994), Kitschelt and McGann (1995; 2005), Betz
and Swank (1995), and Betz and Immerfall (1998) all refer to "xenophobia", meaning mainly anti-
immigrant sentiment.
55 Carter's (2005) definition of "racism," for example, is actually "ethnopluralism." "Incitement to racial
hatred" is illegal in a number of states, but the conceptual difficulty in identifying the term has made
successful prosecution difficult, despite nearly every major "Radical Right" party or its key functionaries
being charged at some point in the last twenty years.
Southern Europe, are neither racist, nor ethnopluralist, nor xenophobic, making all three
incapable of identifying a party family.
Fascism, neo-liberalism, racism and xenophobia all fail to accurately identify a
number of parties conventionally treated as Radical Right. But the identifiers that do
accurately describe the Radical Right often fail to create mutually exclusive categories,
meaning that members of one party family can be distinguished from members of all
others.56 One set of identifiers fails to distinguish the Radical Right from the "Radical
Left," usually referring to Communist, anti-Globalization or Ecological movements.
Identifiers such as "populist," "anti-establishment," or "anti-system" apply equally well
to parties on the Left and Right.5 7 Such classifications have an additional weakness in
that they identify a strategy rather than an ideology.58 Whether a party is "anti-system"
or "populist" may be endogenous to their position in the political system...whether they
are "outsiders" or "insiders" when it comes to forming governments or implementing
policy. For example, after joining the government in 2000 the Austrian Freedom Party
(FPOe) modified its attacks on its partner the OeVP and the political system it now
represented. 59 Like Left-Right placement, any identifier contingent on party success is
unsatisfactory.
Another set of identifiers, falling under the rubric of "conservatism," accurately
captures the Radical Right; this includes terms such as "social conservative," "ultra-
conservative," "family" or "traditional values," or "law and order." While relative
56 Carter (2005) applies this logic within the Radical Right "family," but not externally.
57 Sartori (1976); Andersen (1992); Betz (1994a); Betz (1994b); Betz and Swank (1995); Taggart (1995);
Kitschelt and McGann (1995, 2005); Betz and Immerfall (1998). Fieschi (2000); Ryndgren (2004). Sartori
describes "anti-system" parties as those that go against the views of all other parties in the system.
58 Pfahl-Traughber (1993); Carter (2005).
59 Luther, in Merkl and Weinberg (eds) (1993).
conservatism might be a necessary condition, it is not sufficient, as it fails to distinguish
the Radical Right from other "Right" party groupings (Christian-democrats;
Conservatives; Liberals); for example, the programs of the Christian-democratic CSU
and the "Radical Right" Republikaner (REP) both criminalize abortion and oppose civil
unions for gay and lesbian couples.60 "Tough on crime" appeals, such as tougher
sentencing for drug dealers or child molesters, opposition to needle giveaways for heroin
addicts, or more police on the streets, are similarly common among center-Right or Right
parties. Similarly "nationalism" (not to be conflated with ethnic nationalism), "jingoism"
or "ultra-patriotism," are not exclusively the domain of the Radical Right.61 For example,
in the 1960s and 1970s the Christian-democratic German CDU and CSU vehemently
attacked social-democratic SPD Chancellor Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik, which tacitly
recognized the borders of the former West and East Germany, on the grounds that Brandt
was betraying German national interests.
I take a first cut at a Radical Right party family using two characteristics. First,
any candidate party has to be socially conservative for its national context, making it
"Right." Economic identifiers are excluded as they consistently fail to capture the
ideologies or strategies of many parties commonly associated with the party family.62
Second, any candidate party must advocate increasing the economic or social power of its
supporters by permanently reducing or eliminating the basic rights of its opponents,
making it "Radical" or "Exclusionary." This includes parties that are entirely anti-
democratic (authoritarian; monarchist; fascist; totalitarian) or opposed to co-operation or
60 Abortion: CSU (1993), pg. 18; REP (2002), pg. 20; Civil unions: CSU (1993), pg. 12; REP (2002), pg.
19.
61 Fennema (1997); Merkl, in Merkl and Weinberg (eds) (2003); Minkenberg and Schain, in Merkl and
Weinberg (eds) (2003).
62 Mudde (2007).
co-existence with some part of the population (religious fundamentalist; racial
exclusionary; exclusionary nationalist; anti-immigrant). This characteristic captures
parties of the Right that challenge the "rules of the game," whereas parties of the center-
Right (whether classical Liberal or Conservative) accept that their opponents should
share roughly the same basic set of rights and privileges as their supporters. 63
The inclusion of monarchism and religious fundamentalism represents a broader
definition of the European Radical Right than the existing literature, which focuses
heavily on extreme nationalism and xenophobia. It also excludes some parties commonly
associated with the Radical Right, like the populist anti-statist Danish Progress Party of
the 1970s or hard line conservative Italian National Alliance. But this definition bounds
the phenomenon in a way that clearly and consistently finds common cause for the parties
within the party family, while building distinct barriers between the party family and all
other groupings of parties. In contextualizing the appeals by a country's status quo, this
definition is applicable to parties across countries and across time. It captures the
commonalities between the "old," fascist or authoritarian Radical Right and the
"modern," anti-immigrant Radical Right, while still distinguishing these parties from the
Radical Left and other parties of the Right.
What are "Nativist" Parties?
The diverse nature of the Radical Right party family has increasingly led scholars
to recognize that the most fruitful avenue of research involves identifying one or more
sub-groups, which are then studied in isolation to identify key causal factors. 64 This
63 Mudde (2007).
64 Most scholars, such as Ignazi (1992), Betz (1994), Fennema (1997), Fieschi (2000), and Golder (2003)
identify two sub-families, a "new" "neo-liberal", "populist" Radical Right and an "old" "authoritarian",
section focuses on perhaps the prominent sub-group in the modem Radical Right: those
parties making explicitly "anti-immigrant" appeals. 65 This sub-group was chosen for two
reasons. First, the "anti-immigrant" phenomenon carries its own important theoretical
and policy implications. Second, the historically major "anti-immigrant" parties (the
Austrian Freedom Party, French National Front, or Belgian Vlaams Blok) also drove the
growth of the Radical Right from the 1980s. Explaining the success of "anti-immigrant"
parties therefore explains much, but not all, of the increase in Radical Right support.
Rather than "anti-immigrant," this party terms this subgroup "nativist." Nativist
parties are those parties that make appeals to natives as an ethnic category central and
explicit in their campaigns and programs, primarily by offering to champion the interests
of the native ethnic majority. An ethnic party, refers to a party that makes 1)
championing an ethnic category (or categories) on an ethnic identity dimension central to
how they conceptualize politics; 2) makes appeals to this category or categories explicit;
and 3) excludes a salient ethnic category in their appeals. 66 Centrality refers to appeals at
the core of a party's strategy or ideology; these appeals are not "lip service." Explicit
appeals are those with no or minimal ambiguity about the ethnic categories a party
appeals to. An ethnic category "refers to the nominal members of an ascriptive category"
"fascist" Extreme Right. Kitschelt and McGann (1995) identify four categories (fascists, non-fascist
xenophobes, a "New Radical Right" combining xenophobia and neo-liberalism, and anti-Statists) and
Carter (2005) five, based on a combination of 1) racism; 2) xenophobia; or 3) anti-democratic appeals.
Some scholars, such as Ignazi (1992) or Hainsworth (1992) have explicit expectations about which sub-
family will do better, while others, such as Kitschelt and McGann (1995) or Golder (2003), argue that
certain sub-categories will do better under certain conditions.
65 Minkenberg and Schain, in Merkl and Weinberg (eds) (2003), Carter (2005) and Mudde (2007) use
identifiers similar to anti-pluralism, though Minkenberg and Schain refer to it as "ultra-homogenization,"
while Carter calls it "anti-egalitarianism" (of which anti-pluralism is a sub-set) and adds an anti-democratic
requirement.
66 Chandra (2004), pg. 2.
on a dimension of ethnic identity "such as race, language, caste, tribe, or religion."67 An
ethnic identity dimension represents a classification capable of capturing all conceptually
linked categories under a single rubric (race, language, etc.). Individuals qualify for
ethnic categories on a particular dimension by holding certain attributes; characteristics,
usually acquired through descent (such as ancestry, birthplace, skin tone, etc.) that are
commonly associated with an ethnic category.68 The nature of attributes is such that
individuals might qualify for multiple categories. For example, a child with one black
and one white parent may have attributes that qualify them as "white," "black," or
"mixed" on a racial identity dimension. Attributes are also contextual; a category on one
dimension might be an attribute on another. For example, "Prussian" is a historical
category on the ethnic identity dimensions "regions" and "German regions," while
"Prussian" would also represent a qualifying attribute for the category "German" on a
dimension capturing "nation."
An ethnic party's goals and strategy are straightforward: they explicitly offer to
advance the interests of a particular ethnic category. Their goal is to convince as many
members of category as possible to support the party, using negative or positive appeals.
They can offer benefits (which might be material or symbolic) that leave their target
voters no worse off in the aggregate than they were before the election. Or they can offer
to ensure that other ethnic categories are no better off in the aggregate than they were
before the election, thereby promising to make their target categories no worse off.
67 As does Chandra (2004), I differentiate "category" from "group" as "group" implies conscious
belonging, while "category" implies an attribution of belonging that can come from an individual or a
political or social system.
68 Chandra (2006).
An ethnic party is not synonymous with a nationalist party. An ethnic nation or
nationality is a nominal aggregation of individuals larger than a single community or
extended family sharing descent-based attributes associated with a common ancestral
origin. This definition is similar to past definitions of an ethnie and ignores additional
requirements, such a shared culture, location, language or religion.69 It also allows for
individuals to contextually associate with multiple nations. For example a Christian from
Flanders and a Jew from Wallonia may both identify as "Belgian," despite lacking a
shared language or religion, or they may choose to identify as "Flemish" or
"Wallonian." 70
A nation however represents a more or less static geographic space. Members of
the nation are those individuals formally recognized as belonging to the nation, for
example through citizenship. Irish-Americans, Japanese-Americans and Mexican-
Americans are all nationalities within the nation that is the United States. An ethnic
nationalist party in the United States might make appeals exclusively to Irish-Americans.
A nationalist or jingoist party, however, utilizes unwavering patriotism to mobilize State
and society (the "nation"), usually to overcome external threats. Jingoist parties can
therefore appeal to a "nation" without specifying an ethnic requirement for belonging, a
"civic" nationalism, determined by duration of residence in a particular territory or
adherence to a particular ideal rather than a set of descent-based attributes. 7 1 Indeed,
internal ethnic divisions might be actively downplayed by a jingoist party to remove
alternative sources of legitimacy to the State ("we need to set aside our differences for the
69 Smith (1986).
70 As Gellner (1983) notes, there are far more potential than salient nationalities; today there are for
example few or no individuals self-identifying as "Bohemians."
71 Brubaker (1992); Snyder (2000).
good of the country"). Finally, the threat a jingoist party mobilizes against might be
pitched in non-ethnic terms ("we must protect Germany against the threat of
Communism").
Of course, ethnic nationalists can also be jingoists, and vice-versa. Ethnic parties
representing categories in control of the State can argue that ethnic minorities need to
assimilate or be expelled to strengthen national unity. A party that is ethnic nationalist
and jingoist could make appeals to co-ethnics in neighboring states, such as Russian
parties promising to protect Russian minorities in South Ossetia. Finally, parties that are
jingoist and ethnic nationalist can pitch the threat in ethnic terms. The German NSDAP
made appeals to "Germans" as an ethnic category and pitching external threats on its
eastern border in ethnic terms (Aryans vs. Slavs). While the parties in question
frequently represent ethnic categories that control the levers of the State and are
frequentlyjingoist as well as ethnic nationalist, these categories are not synonymous.
"Anti-immigrant" parties are further distinguished from other ethnic parties by the
identifier "nativist." Nativist is a term of American origin, describing parties mobilizing
against Catholic and Irish immigrants in the 1830s. 72 But "nativism" fits comfortably
into an ethnic party schema. A nativist party is one that 1) makes the native ethnic
category central to how they conceptualize politics; 2) makes their appeals to this
category explicit; and 3) excludes some or all "non-natives" in their appeals. Like other
ethnic parties, nativist parties promise to leave natives better off in the aggregate, or at
least no worse off, than they were before the election. 73
72 Higham (1955) or Behdad (2005). See also the ongoing American debate over on Mexican immigration;
Tatalovich (1995); Knobel (1996); Perea (ed) (1997); or Fry (2001, 2007).
73 By promising to preserve the category's group position; Blumer (1958) or Fry (2007).
Similarly, "native" as a concept fits into the dimension-category-attribute schema
of identity, but unpacking which attributes constitute the native category is no small task.
Is a native an individual with citizenship? An individual whose parents were born in a
particular territory? This project takes a broad view, defining a native as any individual
who holds attributes that most other individuals in a territory regard as common to the
territory. These attributes almost certainly include birth in the territory or being descent
from individuals born in that territory, but may additionally require a shared language,
dialect, race, nationality, religion, culture, etc.74 This definition acknowledges that the
native category is contextual; a native is anyone who would typically be identified as
native by others (correctly or not) and not one definition will fit every context.
Moreover, like many ethnic categorizations native and immigrant are contested social
constructions. Both natives and immigrants can use juridical or institutional means to
officially revise who does or does not belong to a category, or they can use informal
campaigns to alter public perceptions. 75
Other simpler, less ambiguous decision rules for identifying natives can be
rejected on various grounds. Institutional categorizations, such as recognition of
citizenship or permanent residence, are clearly insufficient by themselves. It is clear that
naturalization is insufficient for nativist parties and their supporters to assuage their
opposition to immigration, unless that naturalization is accompanied by a full cultural
assimilation that borders on ethnic assimilation. 76 Indeed, nativists often argue that
naturalization laws are too relaxed and grant individuals who "do not belong" access to
74 We also note that a category on certain identity dimensions might be an attribute on others. For
example, "native" on a particular country's identity dimension category might include the attribute "white",
while "white" is itself a category on the racial identity dimension.
75 Blumer (1958); Fry (2001, 2007).
76 Horowitz (1985).
the rights and resources of the State. Similarly, birthplace alone is insufficient to classify
someone as a native. Individuals with attributes qualifying them for the racial category
"black" or the national category "Japanese" might be a German citizen, born in Germany
and fluent in German, though other Germans might regularly ask them "where [they]
learned such good German!" The reverse is also true; the child of diplomats or soldiers
could be born on foreign soil and raised abroad, only to be treated as a native when they
return to their parents' country of origin years or decades later.
That such "false positives" and "false negatives" occur suggests a disconnect
between the attributes held by individuals born in a territory and the attributes perceived
by society to be native. Part of this disconnect comes from social lag: it takes time for
the population to recognize that the attributes of a past migrant group are plausible for
natives to hold. In the mid- 19 th Century the attribute "Irish" would unambiguously
categorize someone in the United States as a "foreigner." By the mid-20th Century,
however, "Irish" would be insufficient without appraising further attributes (accent or
birthplace). It is likely that the more attributes one shares with other "natives," the better
able they are to pass. An American with "Germanic" attributes (blond hair; blue eyes)
living in Austria may be visually mistaken for an Austrian, but may still be categorized as
foreign by language. A German in Austria might pass even under verbal scrutiny, unless
differences in dialect are especially strong. Conversely there third generation Turks in
Germany are often still perceived as foreign. Why certain categories are more readily
identified as native and how that process occurs is beyond the scope of this project."
77 It could be that the number of shared attributes matters, or the duration or volume with which those
attributes are present in the main society, or that some attributes are more essential than others. Or it could
be that attributes are evaluated by what percentage of their holders are recent immigrants versus tenured
Just as ethnic nationalism can be disentangled from jingoism, nativist parties are
not necessarily ethnic nationalist or jingoist. Nationality refers to common descent and
traditions, while nativeness is tied to issues of territory. Conceivably, two individuals
could share a nationality but not a native land and nativists could mobilize against
immigrants from a common nation, for example a Japanese party mobilizing against
those returning from South America after several generations abroad. Weiner's (1978)
seminal work on nativism in India focused on processes that were entirely internal to one
nation (India), as the residents one sub-national region mobilized against migrants from
others ...nativism sans jingoism. Again, while historical factors have created a situation
where West European nativist parties are usually ethnic nationalist and jingoist parties,
one categorization does not automatically imply the others.
Finally, while scholars can make clean and precise statements about what it
means to be explicit regarding ethnic categories, the everyday social and political
discourse is under no obligation to adhere to such decision rules. For example, the
native/immigrant identity dimension should have at least two fairly straightforward
categories, "natives" and "immigrants" or "foreigners." However, consider three
statements:
* "We should reserve jobs for Germans."
* "German should be the national language."
* "No minarets on Austrian soil. Islamists out!"
Each statement identifies categories on an ethnic identity dimension other than the
native/immigrant (nationality, language and religion, respectively). But all three are also
settlers. For example, though individuals of Mexican descent have lived in the United States for over 150
years, individuals with attributes identifying them as "Mexican" are often perceived as "immigrants" by the
broader society.
attributes or nested categories associated with the native and immigrant categories in
Germany and Austria. In the case of natives, this shorthand refers to attributes used to
qualify for the native category, though these appeals might not exclude all immigrants.
An appeal to German [language] would capture all natives, but also recent immigrants
from Switzerland. Conversely, in the case of immigrants shorthand might refer to nested
categories within the larger immigrant group (Russian immigrants, Muslim immigrants)
that does not however exclude all immigrants. Finally, none of these appeals are coded.
While none of them directly refer to natives and immigrants, at the same time none of
them are ambiguously non-ethnic; the only decision to be made is which ethnic identity
dimension they are appealing on.
The ability to engage in "obvious" or "shorthand" nativist appeals suggests four
coding rules. First, if a category on the native/immigrant identity dimension is explicitly
named ("native"; "immigrant"; "foreigner"; "asylum-seeker"), the appeal is coded as
nativist. It is important to distinguish here between naming categories on this identity
dimension and naming issues related to the identity dimension. Terms such as
"immigration," "asylum" or "migration" are coded as ambiguous without further context,
as they refer to policies which may or may not have an ethnic component, rather than
categories of people identified by their descent-based attributes. Second, if the appeal
names a category on another ethnic identity dimension, but that category was not present
in significant numbers before any of the current residents were born (that is, it could only
refer to recent immigrants), the appeal is nativist (as well as ethnic on another identity
dimension). 78 Appeals that do not meet this condition are non-nativist, but are still
ethnic.
Third, if the appeal names a category on another ethnic identity dimension, but
that category represents attributes held by virtually every member of a territory before
any of the current residents were born (that is, attributes that could only be held by
natives), I code it as nativist, except as specified under the final rule.79 Fourth and
finally, when the formal name of a citizenry is synonymous with the name of an ethnic
category ("German" [citizenship] vs. "German" [nationality]), it is coded as ambiguous
and further modifiers are considered to establish whether it qualifies under rule #3.
Specifically, if the appeal refers to external political considerations (such as defending
Germans from Communism), it is coded as non-nativist but possibly ethnic (on another
identity dimension), whereas if the appeal could only refer to internal political
considerations (defending Germans from immigration), it is coded as nativist. If the
appeal refers to the "citizenry" (Buerger), "population" (Bevoelkerung) or "people"
(Menschen) it is coded as non-nativist, unless it refers to the Volk, which can mean nation
as populace (non-ethnic) or as ethnie (ethnic); in this case it is coded as ambiguous
without further context.
Rule #1 captures "obvious," non-contextual nativism. Rules #2 and #3 capture
nativism that is not obvious to someone observing a society from afar, but at the same
78 By this logic "Russian" or "Muslim" as excluded ethnic categories would be coded as nativist in
Germany, but "Jew" or "Sorb" (historic, internal ethnic minorities) would not. "Significant" is admittedly
contextual.
79 For example "German" [language]. On the other hand, "German" [nationality] in the former Austro-
Hungarian empire would not be coded as nativist, as it excludes significant portions of the past population
(such as Hungarians or Bohemians). One possible violation of this rule is the category Atheist [religion];
the emergence of Atheism as an identity alters a country's religious demography, but does not require
immigration. "Virtually every member" is contextual.
time is not coded for those living in the society; it captures shorthand nativism, where
terms are used to refer to multiple dimensions of ethnicity. Rule #2 captures ethnic
identifiers that could only be used to refer to recent immigrants, whereas Rule #3
captures ethnic identifiers that could only be relevant if changes to the distribution of
ethnic attributes generated by immigration were recent or ongoing. Rule #4 is a special
instance of rules #2 and #3. While complex, these four decision rules provide a basis for
capturing both obvious and shorthand nativism. At the same time, these rules exclude
more subjective coded appeals intended to activate ethnic frames, such as "drug dealers,"
"welfare queens," or "inner city youth."
The nativist definition requires two further clarifications regarding the way ethnic
parties (of which nativist parties are a subset) approach politics. First, ethnic parties are
by no means "single-issue" parties. Indeed, they may formulate complicated economic,
social or environmental policies; they simply frame some or all of these policies in ethnic
terms. While a non-ethnic party might promise to combat unemployment by deficit
spending, an ethnic party might promise to do so by giving job priority to co-ethnics.
Both means are proposed to resolve the same problem, but they approach the problem in
very different ways. Second, an ethnic party's appeals should not be assumed to be
wholly, or even primarily, negative; that is an ethnic party is not necessarily interested in
denying other categories resources or rights for the sake of doing so. Instead, ethnic
parties may see themselves as pro-ingroup, but competing in a zero-sum game between
ethnic categories. While an appeal may reject social benefits for foreigners, it is also
designed to preserve benefits for natives. Why negative or positive appeals are chosen
when both are available on most issues is beyond the scope of the project.
My definition of nativism has three implications for the way Radical Right
parties, ethnic parties and nativist parties overlap. First, not all Radical Right parties are
nativist, or even ethnic. South European monarchist and "post-fascist" parties of the
1970s and 1980s might be Radical Right and might share certain traits (social
conservatism, anti-pluralism) with nativist parties. But unless they forward policies
based on a division of society into natives and immigrants, their success or failure would
not be relevant to a study of nativism. By the same token, parties that abandon nativist
appeals would no longer be considered nativist in subsequent elections, though the
decision to abandon these appeals might itself be relevant. The reverse is also true: not
all ethnic parties are Radical Right parties. The Scottish National Party in Great Britain
or the South Schleswig Voters' Association (representing northern Germany's Danish
minority) certainly proclaim to champion a specific ethnic category and their appeals are
just as exclusive as other ethnic parties; they do not proclaim to represent the English, or
Welsh, or Germans. The appeals these parties make however are not necessarily
considered "radical" or "Right."
Finally, there is nothing preventing a party of the "Left" from adopting a nativist
appeal, though due to historical circumstances in Western Europe this category is an
empty set. For example, an indigenous ethnic category in South America with little
economic power might make appeals against recent West European immigrants who
monopolize a country's economic resources. The appeals these parties make could
therefore be "ethnic" and "nativist" (championing the ethnic category "indigenous") but
also "Marxist" or "socialist" (calling for economic redistribution).
Figure 2.1: Ethnic Parties and the Radical Right
In sum, nativism is an ethnicity-based movement with a worldview and appeals
based at least partially on dividing society into the categories native and immigrant or
foreigner. Natives and immigrants construct, and contest, the categories on the
native/immigrant identity dimension based on some series of attributes, possibly
including birthplace, ancestry, skin tone, religion, and/or language. Nativist parties
promise to leave the native ethnic category no worse off in the aggregate than they were
before an election. As a result of cultural and historical circumstances in Western Europe
nativist parties are probably, but not necessarily, also jingoist, ethnic nationalist and
socially conservative parties of the Right and possibly, but not necessarily, also fascist or
neo-liberal parties.
The Radical Right in Germany and Austria as Nativist Parties
This section analyzes two sources of data to create objective and replicable
standards for establishing whether a party is nativist. It establishes guidelines for coding
a party using either one of two sources: 1) party programs or 2) campaign appeals.
Considering the environment in which these parties operate (as the frequent targets of
invective), statements by other parties or indirect quotes in the media do not constitute
evidence. Evidence was collected for parties frequently associated with nativism. For
both countries, the main Christian-democratic party (the CDU in Germany and the OeVP
in Austria) was included as a contrasting observation.
One method for establishing a party's credentials is to code its official party
program. 80 Party programs are formal, observable statements of intent that are approved
by key functionaries and generally reflect the party's ideology. Programs are often
80 Which is distinct from a party's election program.
comprehensive, clearly explaining the party's worldview and policies on a range of
subjects. Despite their current ease of accessibility on the Internet, however, party
programs are not a document commonly transmitted to voters to establish the party's
priorities. Indeed, in many countries party programs are entirely unrepresentative of a
party's actual goals.81 Furthermore, programs tend to change slowly and may no longer
properly represent the image a party hopes to communicate; the parties in this analysis
publish a formal program of basic principles roughly once every two to three elections.
A preferred method of establishing a party's nativist credentials is to look at its
campaign appeals, specifically posters and print-media advertisements. 82 Campaign
appeals are reevaluated by party functionaries every election and only emphasize the
most important issues parties want to communicate to voters, thereby conveying the
party's strategy but also its recent ideological innovations. There are three difficulties in
coding campaign appeals. First, the limited space or time a party has to make an appeal
lends itself to ambiguity. Second, parties frequently vary their appeals during an election,
making them difficult to comprehensively catalog and evaluate. Finally, party appeals
are more difficult to catalogue across time, whereas programs are documents that lend
themselves to preservation by archives. To compensate for this last problem, historical
primary and secondary sources were drawn on to provide as accurate a historical coding
as possible for earlier election periods. For parties coded as contemporary nativist
parties, a search was conducted to establish the earliest period for which they can be
coded as a nativist party.
8s For example, party programs are completely unrepresentative of party appeals in India; Chandra (2004).82 The content of a party's radio or television transmissions could not be considered systematically across
parties or across time.
Two criteria were evaluated for each source. First, is the native/immigrant
identity dimension central to a party's appeals? Does the party make this dimension a
main focus of their ideology or campaign strategy? When considering campaign appeals,
centrality was a question of volume and weight; how many of a party's appeals reference
the native/immigrant dimension and how prominent were those appeals in the campaign?
Depending on the circumstances, one appeal might come to dominate a campaign despite
a party's effort to appeal to voters on multiple issues. When looking at party programs,
centrality was established by looking at the program's frame. A party'sframe appears in
its opening statement refers to the context for the party's foundation or its guiding
principles; a frame is a kind of ideological "mission statement. For example, a party
preamble that states the party was founded to "advance the cause of liberalism" should
advocate policies generally consistent with that goal.
Second, does a party explicitly include or exclude categories on the
native/immigrant identity dimension? Does a party purport to be the "party of natives" or
pitch themselves as the only party that can "protect our country from foreigners?" Does
the party use shorthand categories that could only refer to natives and recent immigrants,
for example calling for the primacy of the German language or the repatriation of Muslim
immigrants?
My analysis of a party's campaign appeals and platforms identifies at least three
distinct conceptual categories, presented in Table 2.1. Parties were coded using
campaign appeals as the default source and party programs as a backup if insufficient
information was available.
Table 2.1: Party Classifications Based on Nativist Content
Nativist
(Central and
Explicit)
Ambiguously
Nativist
(Central or
Explicit)
Non-Nativist
The party frames its program or campaign in terms of the
native/immigrant identity or issue dimension and the party explicitly
names ethnic categories (either categories that it seeks to mobilize or
categories that it seeks to exclude) when referencing native/immigrant
issues.
1. The party frames its program or campaign in terms of the
native/immigrant ethnic identity dimension, but does not reference
specific categories in its policy appeals (for example, "we need a smart
immigration policy" references the dimension but does not explicitly
defend or attack ethnic categories) (Non-Explicit); or
2. The party does not frame politics in terms of the native/immigrant
dimension, but refers to a policy or makes an appeal that explicitly
targets ethnic categories on the native/immigrant identity dimension
("we need to reduce the number of foreigners") (Non-Central).
1. The party frames politics with no reference to the native/immigrant
identity dimension and the party does not name categories on the
native/immigrant identity dimension (Non-Nativist 1); or
2. The party does name categories on the native/immigrant identity
dimension, but the party does not exclude any category in its appeals
(for example, "we believe all natives and immigrants should live in
peace") (Non-Nativist 2).
A party was coded as nativist for periods in which 1) its campaign appeals were
nativist; or 2) its campaign appeals were ambiguous but its program nativist. In the
second case, it may be that appeals are missing, which is especially likely for earlier
elections, or that that the party is interested in forwarding ambiguous formal appeals to
prospective voters while remaining clear in its convictions to its base. A non-nativist
program combined with nativist appeals was still sufficient to code a party as nativist; it
may be that the program is unimportant, or was not updated to capture recent strategic or
ideological shifts. Nativist is not meant to be pejorative; rather it is an accurate
categorical descriptor of a party's self-representation in its program or campaign appeals.
A party was coded as ambiguously nativist if its program and appeals were
ambiguously nativist for a particular period, or if the party ran an entirely non-nativist
campaign while maintaining an unambiguously nativist program. Some parties might
adopt a non-nativist worldview while at the same time strategically targeting nativist
voters with ambiguous appeals. This strategy is intended to avoid alienating established
supporters not interested in (or turned off by) nativist appeals while at the same time
appealing voters who might otherwise support a nativist party. For other parties, the
disconnect between program and appeals could suggest that the program is a relic of a
past ideology, or that nativism is a latent aspect of the party's views. While the cross-
national data quality is insufficient for ambiguous parties to be disentangled from nativist
or non-nativist parties in the empirical analysis in Chapter 6, these parties represent
analytical categories that are theoretically possible and potentially quite important. For
example, if a nativist party gains voters during elections in which the native/immigrant
identity dimension is particularly salient, does an ambiguously nativist party reap the
same benefit? If two parties are competing during an election, for example on nativist
party and one ambiguously nativist party on the Center-Right, does the presence of the
latter reduce the gains of the former?
Finally, a party was coded as unambiguously non-nativist if either its campaign
appeals or program were entirely non-nativist and the other source no more than
ambiguous. In both cases, a party might pay lip service to an issue or identity dimension
salient in the public discourse, but have no strong conviction about their appeal or
position. Or the party may choose to portray the native/immigrant dimension as entirely
non-ethnic, which is coded as at most ambiguous [non-explicit], focusing on the objective
economic, social or bureaucratic costs and benefits of immigration rather than targeting
specific groups in their appeals for inclusion or exclusion. "Non-nativist" is a residual
category, capturing social-democrats, Christian-democrats, monarchists, ecologists,
communists, fascists and neo-liberals. It also captures parties that are multi-ethnic
(Chandra 2004) or reconciliationist, parties that recognize the native/immigrant identity
dimension and make explicit appeals based on that dimension, but do not exclude any
categories in their appeals. The CDU's party program adopts a reconciliationist
approach, as did campaign appeals in 2006 by the Austrian Greens ("We can live without
hatred against foreigners").
Table 2.2: Assigning Values to Parties Based on Nativist Content
Campaign -+ Nativist Ambiguous Non-Nativist
Program I
Nativist Nativist Nativist Ambiguous
Ambiguous Nativist Ambiguous Non-Nativist
Non-Nativist Nativist Non-Nativist Non-Nativist
Campaign Appeals
The primary evidence of campaign appeals comes from the 2005 German national
election, the 2005 state election in Rheinland-Pfalz (Germany) and the 2006 Austrian
national election. In each case, the collection of campaign materials was exhaustive. The
German elections are considered together, as they were held within six months of one
another and the appeals made during the national election remained fresh in the minds of
voters. In addition, a historical database of campaign appeals by the five parties
hypothesized to be nativist was constructed, consisting of approximately 500 campaign
posters or print-media advertisements published since the late 1980s.83
83 My three sources are 1) the Austrian National Library's Poster Database, which has a large collection of
political posters since roughly 1990; 2) four regional newspapers (two in Germany, two in Austria), as well
as the FPO's party newspaper, all but one of which ran advertisements by the target parties; and 3)
evidence gathered by Verfassungsschutz reports in Germany. There are four imperfections in the data
collected. First, roughly 70-80% of the posters come from the National Library's database, and therefore it
is heavily skewed toward the FPO. Second, none of the sources necessarily represents a comprehensive
For the 2005/2006 election cycle in Germany, the REP contested alone while the
NPD and DVU formed a joint list for the federal election, the result of an alliance
agreement signed in 2004; a similar offer to the REP was made and refused. Over the
course of the federal and Rheinland-Pfalz elections, the REP and NPD/DVU released at
least 8 posters each, and the CDU at least 20.
The posters of the CDU and REP/NPD-DVU show a wide disparity in volume
and tone regarding native/immigrant issues. For the CDU, the federal election was
contested on sweeping statements about a "need for change" and a "better," "clearer
course." Of at least 14 posters published during the federal election only 5 advocated
specific policies, with 4 targeting the economy. The CDU's campaign in Rheinland-Pfalz
was more content-based, with 4 of 6 offering specific policies (on employment, crime,
and education). Only one of the 20 posters was even ambiguously nativist. Late in the
Rheinland-Pfalz election, the CDU published a poster stating that naturalization would
occur "only with course, test, oath," referring to German-language courses, a test on
German history and institutions, and a loyalty oath to the Federal Republic. All three
measures were part of a broader discussion about integration in the wake of the 2000
immigration law, which eased the requirements for naturalization. The poster appeared
toward the end of the 2006 state and local campaigns and political elites considered it a
last-ditch effort by the CDU to siphon support from nativist parties. The poster itself
refers to immigration policy without explicitly targeting recent immigrants. Overall, the
native/immigrant dimension was neither particularly central nor explicit in the CDU's
campaigns, which were coded as non-nativist.
collection of materials. Third, German posters were also collected directly from the party websites,
however these are not time-stamped. Finally, the Verfassungsschutz source should be biased toward
finding examples of extremist behavior to justify continued observation of the target parties.
In contrast, the native/immigrant identity dimension was central and explicit in
the campaign appeals of the REP and NPD/DVU. Of the eight appeals published by the
NPD/DVU, three referenced the native/immigrant dimension, with the remainder
attacking entrenched political elites, the EU, and the alliance between the post-
Communist PDS (from the former East Germany) and the social-democratic SPD
breakaway WASG (from the former West Germany). The potentially nativist appeals
were:
* "Work for Germans!" (ambiguous; Rule #4)
* "Stop 'Alien Workers'!" (nativist; Rule #1)
* "Have a good trip home!" (nativist; Rule #2)
Each appeal takes a different approach toward describing native/immigrant issues.
The first represents a positive appeal to Germans, though it was coded as ambiguous as it
could be referring to the state of the economy or to Germans as an ethnic category. The
second is a negative appeal on the same issue, playing on a controversial and widely-
discussed term (Fremdarbeiter) used by WASG leader Oskar Lafontaine during the
national election.84 This appeal has two aims; it makes a policy promise to the native
category (fewer foreign workers equaling more jobs for Germans), and it reminds voters
that other parties are adopting what the NPD has argued for decades. While the first two
appeals tied ethnicity to a specific issue, the third is a blanket rejection of at least some
immigrants using visual shorthand. The slogan is accompanied by a picture of four
obviously Muslim women; all four wear head scarves and non-Western dress. The
message is clear...individuals of Muslim or Arabic/Turkish descent are not Germans, and
Germany is not their home.
84 Controversial in that 'alien workers' (Fremdarbeiter) was a descriptive category used by the National
Socialist regime.
Surprisingly, considering the REP's German reputation as a "moderate" Radical
Right party, compared to the "extremists" in the DVU and NPD, the REP focused even
more heavily on immigration. Six of their eight published campaign appeals in
2005/2006 refer to native/immigrant issues:
* "Our Nation [Volk] First!" (ambiguous; Rule #4)
* "German is COOL!" (nativist; rule #3)
* "Islamists Out!" (nativist; Rule #2)
* "German instead of 'don't understand'." (nativist; Rule #3)
* "Social state instead of immigration." (ambiguous; Rule #1)
* Work for Olek - Hartz IV for Germans? (nativist; Rule #4 [excluded
category named])
The REP exclusively used shorthand for their ethnic appeals, describing the native
category by its linguistic or nationality-based attributes. When they refer to immigrants,
the REP make ambiguous appeals ("immigration"), or they target groups based on
specific issues. "Olek" (a traditional Polish name) is shorthand for "cheap Eastern
European laborers," reflecting German concerns in the wake of EU's eastward expansion
in 2004. The party also makes a blanket appeal against "Islamists," shorthand for
Muslim immigrants. Unlike the NPD/DVU, the REP are more likely to make positive
appeals (German is good; our own people should come first). They are also more likely
to make explicit comparisons between groups, or to identify what they want and what
they hope to avoid; German is good because it facilitates communication, or Eastern
Europeans are getting more jobs, while Germans are facing benefit cuts.85 Finally, the
REP's statements are zero-sum; one is for immigration or the welfare state.
Historically, nativist appeals by the three German parties go back at least to the
late-1980s; this is sufficient for the DVU, which only began contesting elections in
85 "Hartz IV" refers to the fourth round of social welfare cuts (here targeting the long-term unemployed) as
recommended by a labor commission led by Peter Hartz of Volkswagen.
1987.86 In the 1988 state election in Baden-Wuerttemberg, both the REP and NPD
published nativist advertisements in the regional Stuttgarter Zeitung. Of the party's 15
statements, "law and order" (crime, security) and immigration were the party's central
appeals and references to the native/immigrant dimension were explicit:
* "Against the abuse of the Asylum law!" (ambiguous; rule #1)
* "Against voting rights for foreigners!" (nativist; rule #1)
* "For the preferential allocation of open jobs to German workers!" 87
(nativist; rule #4 [explicitly internal politics])
Four days later, the NPD published 15 statements that closely mirrored the REP,
down to the specific policies advocated and the wording of the statements:
* "Asylum only for the personally persecuted!" (ambiguous; rule #1)
* "Voting rights and right to Homeland (Heimat) for Germans only!"
(nativist; rule #4 [explicitly internal politics])
* "Job preferences for Germans!"88 (nativist; rule #4 [explicitly internal
politics])
The NPD's nativist appeals certainly precede 1988. The title of the party's 1980
federal election program was "Germany - A Land of Immigration?", while their 1986
posters for the Bavarian election called for "Germany for the Germans" (Deutschland den
Deutschen).89 The evidence suggests the NPD's campaign appeals were nativist at least
since 1980, the DVU from its inception in 1987 and the REP at least since 1988.
In Austria, both the FPOe and the BZOe contested the 2006 national election.
During the campaign, the FPOe released at least eight posters, the OeVP at least seven
and the BZOe at least three nationally. The Kaernten BZOe, led by Joerg Haider,
produced several additional appeals and essentially ran a separate campaign. It was clear
86 See for example the Verfassungsschutz Baden-Wuerttemberg (1987) section on the DVU.87 Stuttgarter Zeitung, 3/11/88.
88 Stuttgarter Zeitung., 3/15/88.
89 Verfassungsschutz Baden- Wuerttemberg (1980), pg. 80; Verfassungsschutz Baden- Wuerttemberg (1986),
pg. 83.
from the campaign that the OeVP had no interest in native/immigrant issues, which were
never referenced. Indeed, the OeVP rarely mentioned specific issues, instead focusing on
the personality of the incumbent Chancellor, Wolfgang Schuessel ("Schuessel: because
he can") and Austria as a land of prosperity ("Austria: things are going well here").
In contrast, the native/immigrant identity dimension was central and explicit for
the FPOe. At least five of the FPOe's appeals referenced this dimension, and two
explicitly referenced out-categories:
* "Duel over Austria: OeVP Schuessel and SPOe Gusenbauer: Mass
immigration; record unemployment; Turkey in the EU;
"HC Strache: Social security; immigration stop; secure jobs; prevent
EU-entry." (ambiguous; rule #1)
* "At home ['Daham,' colloquial Austrian for 'Daheim'] instead of
Islam." (nativist; rule #2)
* "German instead of 'don't understand'." (nativist; rule #3)
* "Secure pensions instead of Asylum-millions." (ambiguous; rule #1)
* "Social state instead of immigration." (ambiguous; rule #1)
The FPOe was even more likely than the REP to use the "instead of/or"
formulation that combined positive and negative appeals. FPOe appeals were focused
not only on informing voters about what they were against (immigration, Islam) but also
what they supported (social pensions, cultural preservation). Each "instead of/or"
formulation suggests that native/immigrant relations are a zero-sum game. Immigration
and social welfare are incompatible. Islam and a feeling of being 'at home' in one's
(Western, Christian) country are incompatible. "Instead of" statements leaves no room
for compromise. Two of the FPOe's appeals are identical to those of the REP. Whether
the FPOe borrowed from the REP or vice-versa is unclear, but the formulation suggests
that nativist parties learn from one another cross-nationally. In short, though German
Radical Right parties are perceived as being more "extreme" than their Austrian
counterparts and do significantly worse in elections, at least in 2005/2006 no meaningful
difference in their campaign appeals despite substantial variation in their vote shares.
For the BZOe, one of its three national posters referenced the native/immigrant
identity dimension, calling for a 30% reduction in the foreign-born population (explicitly
"foreigners"), an end to asylum abuse, and the deportation of foreign criminals. The
"minus 30%" appeal came to dominate the BZOe's campaign in the late stages.
Furthermore, the party's 11-point electoral program placed native/immigrant issues first
("Austria First: Austria is not a country of immigration") and reiterated the "30% fewer
foreigners" promise, to be accomplished through immigration restrictions and the
deportation of foreigners who were 1) illegal; 2) criminal; 3) long-term unemployed; or
4) unwilling to integrate.90 The party argued that failing to control immigration and
integrate Austria's foreign residents would lead to conflicts threatening the entire
Austrian society. 91 The BZOe's reliance in the 2006 national election on the "classic"
themes of the FPOe constitutes a nativist strategy.
Historically, there has been a significant shift in the FPOe's campaign appeals,
based on roughly 350 historical FPO appeals collected from the Austrian dailies Kurier
and Kleine Zeitung, the FPOe's party paper (the Neue Freie Zeitung), and past campaign
posters collected by the Austrian National Library. Throughout the 1980s the FPOe's
mainly attacked the privileges of the political ruling class (the two major parties) or
called for lower taxes and a smaller state, an anti-statist or neo-liberal strategy. While the
FPOe continued using anti-statist appeals during the 1990 federal election, an
advertisement released in the daily Kurier expressed opposition to voting rights or early
90 BZOe Wahlprogramm (2006), pg. 8.
91 BZOe Wahlprogramm (2006), pg. 6.
naturalization for "foreigners." 92 Another advocated repatriating "more than 100,000
illegal foreigners" in order to aid in the rebuilding of post-Communist Poland.93 Indeed,
discussions of native/immigrant issues featured prominently in 4 of the 6 editions of the
party newspaper published (weekly) before the election and was a self-described
"recurring theme" in the party's campaign speeches. 94 During the 1986 national election
and the 1987 round of state elections, native/immigrant issues were mentioned exactly in
exactly one headline in the party paper.9 5 This suggests that the FPOe's appeals were
nativist at least from the 1990 federal election.
Party Programs
To conduct the analysis of party programs, the latest program was collected for
each party under analysis. For the historical coding, secondary sources describing past
programs or programmatic changes were used and earlier programs collected if possible.
Yearly reports by the German Verfassungsschutz (Office of Constitutional Protection),
which monitors potentially "extremist" movements in Germany, were especially useful:96
92 Kurier, 9/27/1990.
93 Kurier, 9/7/1990.
94 Neue Freie Zeitung, 9/27/90. The other themes named were taxes, fiscal austerity (deficits) and attacks
on the "Social Partnership" system.
95 A database was assembled consisting of Neue Freie Zeitung headlines for every election period (the six
weeks prior to an election) from 1981 to the present for national elections and state elections in Vienna and
Styria.
96 As the definition of political extremism in Germany includes parties or groups making "racist,"
"nationalist" or "xenophobic" appeals, or those who "over emphasize the interests of a race-based 'ethnic
community' [Volksgemeinschaft]," any party suspected of being nativist would almost certainly be
observed by the Verfassungsschutz; Stoess (2005).
Table 2.3: Campaign Programs Used for Contemporary Coding
Party Latest
Program
REP (Germany) 2002
NPD (Germany) 1997
DVU (Germany) 2005
FPOe (Austria) 1997
BZOe (Austria) 2006
OeVP (Austria) 1995
CDU (Germany) 1994
The NPD is a classic nativist party when coded by party program. Preservation of
the ethnic Nation (Volk or "ethnie") against "foreign rule, over-foreignization
[Ueberfremdung], exploitation and oppression" is central to the NPD's statement of
"Basic Principles." 97 The Volk is a biological entity, perpetuated by its constituent cells
(the family) through biological inheritance and cultural transmission. Members of the
Volk are born, not made and the preservation of ethnic identity is of the highest human
value, an "ethnopluralist" stance:
"National identity (Volkstum) and culture are the basis for the value of persons.
Therefore the State, whose function is the protection of human dignity, is
responsible to the Volk."
"Nations (Voelker) are the bearers of culture. Voelker differentiate themselves
through language, origin, historical experiences, religion, moral concepts and
their self-awareness.... The preservation of Voelker is the preservation of
culture. Societies whose highest value is material do not develop a culture, but
at best a civilization. "Multi-cultural" societies are in reality societies without
culture. The diversity of Voelker must be preserved...."
"Germany is the land of Germans and hence the home State of our Volk. The
preservation of our Volk and the protection of its parts are the highest goals of
German politics." (Basic Principles and Chapter 1)
All but one of the program's 11 sections (including the Basic Principles) refers to
the native/immigrant identity dimension and the responsibility of political and social
97 NPD (1997).
elites to the German Volk. Though the NPD talks about the family, economy, crime, and
the environment, all are referred to in an ethnic frame:
"The smallest community within our Volk is the family.... The family is the living
connection to our traditions. In the family the mother tongue is taught and culture and
customs transmitted. The family is the bearer of biological inheritance. A Volk that does
nothing as the family is destroyed or loses its strength will perish, because without
healthy families there is no healthy Volk." (Article 2)
"... the Volk does not serve the economy, but much more the economy must serve the
Volk .... " (Article 4)
"Every German has the right to work. Jobs are to be allocated to Germans first." (Article
5)
"Foreigners are to be divested from German social insurance systems...." (Article 7)
"In countless cities foreigner ghettos are being built, in which the German remainder is
becoming the minority in its own land. Life in these districts, their educational
infrastructure and the social environment are becoming unbearable." (Article 8)
The NPD's long history and close scrutiny by public authorities has generated a
significant secondary literature on its past programs. The NPD recognized the
native/immigrant identity dimension very early on. Their initial 1964 program associates
the party with German Volk in opposition to "foreign interests" and "the over-
foreignization through foreign Capital," suggesting at least jingoism (and likely ethnic
nationalism).98 By 1967 the NPD explicitly mentioned foreigners, rejecting parental
subsidies for foreigners as well as demanding job priority for "German workers" as
opposed to "foreign manpower." 99 The 1987 program (the first since 1973) was the first
to identify the Volk as a biological construct.100 The program emphasized the "Ethnic
Community" (Volksgemeinschaft) over the individual, taking a hard line on the "foreigner
98 Schmoellinger, pg. 1932 in Stoess (ed) (1986).
99 Schmoellinger, pg. 1937 in Stoess (ed) (1986).
100 Reflecting the influence of the French and German "New Right" of the late 1970s, formed to provide a
philosophical balance to the "New Left" of the 1960s. The "New Right" denied conventional "Left-Right"
distinctions, though observers associate them with the Radical Right. The key characteristics of the New
Right were ethnopluralism (recognizing inherent differences in ethnic nations and their capacities), ethnic
nationalism (the Volksgemeinschaft as an organism that should organize society, in opposition to class
conflict), environmentalism (out of respect for the Heimat) and welfare chauvinism (a "conservative
socialism," opposed to a pure market economy); Gessenharter and Pfeiffer (eds) (2004).
problem," the Aussiedler (individuals of German descent who migrated to Eastern Europe
or the former Soviet Union in the 1 8th and 19 th centuries) and "over-foreignizing" asylum
seekers (Asylanten) in the name of "German interests."' 0' The NPD's program in 1964 is
coded as ambiguously nativist, and nativist from 1967.
Similar to the NPD, the DVU and REP consider the native identity fundamental to
their basic principles. For the DVU, the native/immigrant identity dimension is both
central and explicit in the party's statement of basic principles. The DVU preamble
begins by referencing a national identity and claims that the main threat to that identity is
the "foreign-born population":
"Germany should remain the land of Germans. The German Volk must be entitled to the
same rights as all other Voelker. This includes the right to the inherited land, the national
identity and full self-determination.... From this follows: Limiting the foreign-born
population, stopping the increasing immigrant inflow, accelerating the Asylum process,
expulsion of criminal foreigners." (Article 1)
Though the REP treats the basis of the Volk as historical and philosophical, they
share the NPD's belief that the Volk represents an actual entity. Composed of individual
families,10 2 the Volk gives its individual members meaning, with the State and politics
vehicles to carry out the Volk's interests:
"The German Volk awoke in the wars of independence of 1813/1815 to political
awareness. [T]he State is more than the sum of its citizens, namely an organism, from
which the Volk builds a political community, having grown aware of their belonging to a
Volk. Individuals are bound to the welfare and the moral law of this community."
(Chapter 1, Article 1)
"...[w]ithin the Volk people find coherence and solidarity.... In a conglomeration of
people of different origins (multi-cultural society) there will be neither a sense of
togetherness nor a readiness to work together...." (Chapter 1, Article 5)
lo0 Verfassungsschutz Baden-Wuerttemberg (1988), pg. 73. Opposition to the Aussiedler (literally
"returnees") are an excellent example of an appeal that is nativist but not ethnic nationalist; Aussiedler are
part of the German Diaspora, but have not lived on German soil for at least several generations.
102 REP (2002), Chapter III, Article 3.
Like the NPD, the DVU and REP's appeals to ethnicity run through many of the
subsequent policy sections, though fewer sections explicitly reference ethnicity. In the
DVU's brief program, crime and unemployment are discussed without referencing
foreigners. Whereas the NPD refers to Germans only as the "Volk," the DVU will
occasionally use Buerger (citizens) or Menschen (people).
A thread that runs through all three programs is the danger of the native category
losing its "homeland" (Heimat, another ambiguously ethnic term), not to foreign
conquest but to foreign infiltration. The REP deal with this issue in depth:
"One can be expelled from their Heimat without changing their location: Through
cultural over-foreignization (Ueberfremdung) and the mass immigration of foreigners.
Those that want the development of a 'multi-cultural society', because they give no value
to Heimat, lack the authority to flout others' right to Heimat."
"Furthermore, from experience every multi-cultural society is a society of conflict."
"Germany's capacity has been crossed. The high share of foreigners has led in many
cities and neighborhoods to Germans falling into the minority, school classes consisting
only of foreigners and - above all with Turks - parallel societies developing. The
absorption capacity of foreigners from foreign cultures is worn out, partly already
crossed, and an integration has hardly taken place. Still more foreigners are especially
unnecessary to compensate for the population decline in Germany or to save the social
welfare system. In one of the most densely populated states in the world, facing large
environmental problems, a decline in population density would in a sense be a
blessing.... This is even more true, as foreigners do not relieve the burdens on the social
system, but rather add to them." (Chapter III, Article 1)
Unlike the NPD or DVU, which consider the rejection of foreigners a self-evident
position to preserve the identity and privileges of the native category, the REP
additionally use non-ethnic arguments (the environment, population density, the welfare
state, the quality of education) to justify a similar goal.
According to the Verfassungsschutz, there have been no major changes to the
DVU's program since its foundation in 1987.103 The REP, however, has undergone at
least a partial programmatic evolution over the course of at least five formal programs
since 1983. Though the party's first full program (1983) was not acquired (the REP were
not monitored by the Verfassungsschutz until 1992), Mudde (2000) describes the
document as jingoistic.'0 4 That the REP further references the "foreigner problem,"
makes the 1983 program ambiguously nativist (non-central), though the party appeared
more concerned with external politics. 105
With the 1985 "Siegburger Manifest," a partial program adopted at the party's
national conference, and certainly by the formal party program of 1987, the REP fully
accepted the Volk concept and its party program can be coded as nativist:
"The national situation ["nationale Lage"; taken to be non-ethnic] fills us with great
worry: unemployment, deficits, the selling out of German interests and not lastly over-
foreignization (Ueberfremdung) threatens our land... Therefore we Republikaner as a
party of democratic renewal, stay faithful to the commitment: We respect other Voelker,
ours however we love." (1985, Preamble)
"...the preservation of the continued existence and health of the German Volk and its
ecological living space is the overriding goal of domestic politics." (1987, Basic
Principles, Article 2)
Furthermore, the native/immigrant identity dimension is explicit; by 1985, the
foreigner "problem" has become the foreigner "flood," though the prognosis for
native/immigrant relations less grim than in later iterations of the program:
"Germany must not become a country of immigration."' 06
103 "The program of the DVU-Liste-D is relatively sweeping and carefully formulated... Conspicuous
remains in any event the Right-Extremist typical accentuation of "Germany First" ("Deutschland zuerst")
and the demands of actions against foreigners"; Verfassungsschutz Baden-Wuerttemberg 1987, pg. 96.
104 In Mudde's words the program is "nationalist" for describing German Reunification the party's central
goal.
105 Mudde (2000), pp. 42-46.
106Siegburger Manifest, pg. 1; from Mudde (2000), pg. 43.
"Foreigners are guests.... This precludes....indefinite job contracts... long-term
residence, family reunification and access to the social system."
"We reject voting rights and party membership for foreigners."
"Foreigners who violate the law will be, after a timely legal process, expelled without
delay." (1987, Article 3 Key Point 10)
In contrast with the target German parties, both Austrian parties introduce a new
concept into their basic frames: Freedom (Freiheit), a term associated with classical
Liberal movements. Unlike Germany, where the FDP served as the post-war home for
the Liberal movement, in Austria the VdU (later the FPOe) represented both Liberals and
German nationalists. The tension between freedom of the individual and the Volkish
organism has always been evident, as in the party's most recent statement of principles:
"Freedom is a person's highest commodity. Freedom means a maximum of guaranteed
self-determination. Freedom precludes oppression, be it physical, mental, religious,
political or economic, especially every form of State-based arbitrariness." (Chapter 1
Article 1)
"Family and Voelker are organically grown conditions that must find consideration in
politics. Voelker and ethnic groups are entitled to have their right to life guaranteed and to
enable the development of their characteristics in a peaceful manner." (Chapter 1 Article
2)
The FPOe's policies are explicit in separating natives and immigrants. Unlike the
German parties the FPOe relies on a legal justification, by arguing that the right to
"homeland" (Heimat) includes the State's indigenous nations. The State should thus
protect the culture of the native ethnic majority as it would any minority group; Austrian
law explicitly protects the right to culture and linguistic instruction for national
minorities'07:
"Our Heimat is understood as the democratic Republic of Austria and its states, its
historical Voelker (Germans, Croatians, Roma, Slovakians, Slovenians, Czechs and
Hungarians) and the resultant culture, whereby it is presupposed by the legal system that
107 "The idea of 'Homeland' will be defined by its territorial, ethnic (ethnisch) and
cultural aspects"; FPO (1997), Chapter 4, Article 1, Section 1.
the overwhelming majority of Austrians belong to the German Volk." (Chapter 4, Article
1)
"Thus the Heimat, its over centuries historically resident Voelker as well as their cultural
traditions, achievements and accomplishments as culture-bearers are objects of
protection." (Chapter 4 Article 1 Section 2)
Like the REP, the FPOe combines right to Heimat and the need to protect the
native culture with non-ethnic arguments justifying Austria's incompatibility with
permanent settlement by foreigners. Foreigners can become natives, but only through an
assimilation process that affirms the supremacy of the native culture in everyday life.
Though the FPOe refers to "immigration," it removes any ambiguity by pitching the
opposition to immigration in ethnic and cultural terms:
"The fundamental right to Heimat permits no unlimited and uncontrolled immigration to
Austria. The fundamental right to Heimat further clearly demands, that due to Austria's
limited habitable space, its population density and its finite resources, it cannot be a land
of immigration." (Chapter 4 Article 4 Section 1)
"An unlimited migration would overburden the resident population with respect to their
integration capacity and thereby endanger their right to ensure and protect their own
Heimat. We reject multi-cultural experiments, as they will be laced with wanton social
conflicts." (Chapter 4 Article 4 Section 2)
"The wage pressure and the housing market inflation that uncontrolled immigration
produces, constitutes a strain on the job and housing markets that endangers social peace.
For seasonal enterprises a seasonal model of limited and temporary employment of
foreigners should be possible." (Chapter 10 Article 8)
Historically, the FPOe's program underwent significant revisions. The 1964
"Salzburg Declaration" was predominantly anti-Statist, (opposing the post-sharing model
the two major parties had instituted) and stressed the freedom of the individual. 10 8 The
party declared itself as belonging to "the German national- and cultural community," an
108 Luther, in Dachs, Gerlich et al. (eds) (2006), pg. 377. Without explicit reference to immigrants and
without a distinct immigrant community (unlike Germany, guest workers in 1964 were an insignificant
minority in Austria), "German" no longer fulfills the conditions of Rule #3) and the FPOe's 1964 program
cannot be coded as nativist.
appeal that was ethnic nationalist but not nativist (fulfilling neither Rules #3 or #4).109
The tension between the liberal and national elements remained in future iterations, with
the 1973 "Manifesto of Social Policy" the first to explicitly reference the guest worker
(Gastarbeiter) "problem," pitching it ambiguously as a tradeoff between "momentary
economic profits" and "long-term economic, social and demographic burdens." The
1985 "Salzburg Program," considered a Liberal victory, upheld the idea that one's ethnic
identity is an organic entity deserving of protection, but greatly condensed the discussion
of guest workers and immigration.' 10 Paradoxically, though nativism was no longer
explicit in the FPOe's program it had become central. Consequently, the FPOe's
programs can be coded as ambiguous from 1973 onward and nativist from 1993 onward.
The BZOe's lone official program is the only coding that disconfirms the initial
hypothesis. " ' Indeed, the BZOe's program is conclusively non-nativist, reaffirming the
difficulty of relying on a single source when coding parties. Like the FPOe, the BZOe
focuses on the "Philosophy of Freedom" in political and social life, born in the national
revolutions of 1848, as its organizing principle. References to the Volk are absent in the
preamble. Indeed, the BZOe never references the native/immigrant identity dimension in
its policy statements. Throughout the program, the BZOe refers to the "citizens" and
occasionally the "people" rather than the Volk. The closest it comes to referencing
109 As early as the 1968 party program, the FPOe speaks explicitly of the "South Tyrol" question, referring
to the members of the German nationality living in the Italian province of Tyrol (Chapter: "Foreign
Policy"). These appeals are sufficient to code them as ethnic nationalist.
110 To two pages in an 18 page broadsheet document with four columns; Luther, in Dachs, Gerlich et al.
(2006), pg. 378. FPOe (1985), Part 1, Chapter 3 ("Volk undHeimat"). Again, the evolution of the FPOe
toward an ethnopluralist stance on ethnic identity is the result of the New Right's influence.
i Another program was under discussion as of 2007-8.
ethnicity is its discussion of the need to "protect the Heimat" without, however,
identifying the Heimat as an explicitly ethnic construct." 2
The first contrasting example is the Austrian People's Party (OeVP), Austria's
Christian-democratic party. While the OeVP's 1995 statement of basic principles
references the "Christian" principles behind the party, this appeal is at best ethnic
(religious). Austria has a long tradition of endogenous religious minorities (Jews),
disqualifying it from a nativist coding under Rule #3, and no explicitly immigrant
oppositional identity (such as Muslims) is named:
"We ground our socio-political principles in the Christian commitment to the dignity of
people.... We argue for the freedom of the individual and for the demand and recognition
of personal achievement." (Article 1 Section 1 Paragraph 1)
In the OeVP's statement of policies, the OeVP refers to "cultural identity" as a
fundamental human attribute, but this identity is balanced against tolerance and the
"peaceful cooperation of the different sexes, cultures, religions, ethnic groups and
lifestyles." 113 The party's concept of "culture" is not biological, but rather something an
individual can adopt over time, and the OeVP refers to "people" rather than the Volk.
Finally, the OeVP refers to the family as the basis for society, but not as the basis for an
ethnic category, a position distinct from that of nativist parties.
The OeVP does, however, explicitly reference the native/immigrant identity
dimension, and this discussion does qualify as exclusionary:
"We want to guarantee with our politics the right of Austrians to Heimat, cultural identity
and security. At the same time however we have in our society an appreciation for the
need to ensure the respect and compassion for foreigners and non-natives." (Article 6
Section 6 Paragraph 1)
112 BZOe (2005), Section: "Austria and Europe: Our Homeland."
113 OVP (1995), Article 3, Section 11, Paragraph 4.
"The right to integration for foreigners living in Austria sets forward however also the
acceptance of responsibilities. For instance the command of our language as well as
integration requirements such as the adherence to the Constitution and laws as well as
social mores and customs." (Article 6 Section 6 Paragraphs 7-8)
While the OeVP makes statements that call for the peaceful coexistence of natives
and foreigners, they also lay out explicit responsibilities for foreigners to integrate and
accept Austrian rules, without detailing the responsibilities of Austrians for
accommodating new residents. The contemporary OeVP program is therefore coded as
ambiguously nativist by program.
In contrast to the OeVP, the German CDU (Germany's Christian-democratic
party) fully confirms the hypothesized non-nativist coding. Like the OeVP, the CDU
sees itself as a party whose principles go back to a "Christian understanding of people
and their accountability before God." 14 However, the CDU explicitly explains that non-
Christians can subscribe to its politics:
"From the call to Christian convictions does not follow for us the claim, that within the
[CDU] only Christian accountability has an impact on our politics. The CDU is open for
anyone, who accepts the dignity and freedom of all people and hence the derived
principles of our politics. This is the basis for the mutual action of Christians and non-
Christians in the CDU." (Chapter 1 Section 1 Paragraph 2)
In its statement of policies on the native/immigrant identity dimension (which
comes 3 /4ths of the way through its long program), the CDU goes a step further than the
OeVP:
"We exert ourselves for the peaceful coexistence of Germans and foreign fellow citizens
(Mitbuerger).... Integration means for us, that people of other backgrounds fulfill the
requirements of coexistence in our society, and that the wish, one's own cultural,
linguistic identity and lifestyle to value, will be respected as a basic human concern. All
must be ready for integration and tolerance."
"The contributions of our foreign fellow citizens enrich our lives.... We have to combat
the causes of violence between Germans and foreigners. We are decidedly against any
form of discrimination and violence against foreigners.. .personal contact and exchange is
important." (Chapter 4 Section 3 Paragraph 117-118)
114 CDU (1994), Chapter 1, Section 1, Paragraph 1.
The CDU statements on native/immigrant relations separate themselves from the
OeVP by laying out the rights and responsibilities of both groups, explaining that both
groups have obligations for reaching an ideal coexistence and emphasizing that the
immigrant category has something valuable to contribute to German social life. The
CDU's program is therefore coded as non-nativist.
Conclusion
My analysis of campaign appeals and party programs distinguishes the
hypothesized nativist parties from other parties of the Right in their respective countries.
For an area of the world where there is a strong reluctance to discuss politics in terms of
"race," the appeals made by nativist parties are surprisingly explicit, freely naming ethnic
categories (particularly shorthand appeals referring to natives and immigrants by their
linguistic, religious or national attributes), as opposed to using coded ("the criminal
element") or ambiguous ("immigration reform") phrases. This strategy fits in well with a
self-portrayal as "taboo breakers" or parties willing to "say what others are thinking" and
is certainly not the catch-all strategy of parties like the OeVP or CDU. Nativist parties
were however by no means "single-issue" in their appeals; though immigration and
ethnicity were the main thrust of their campaigns, they consistently produced robust and
comprehensive programs and appeals addressing law and order and the economy.
Table 2.4: Coding Parties in Austria and Germany
Party Evaluation 2008 Historical Coding
Coding (1960-2008)
NPD Program: Nativist Nativist 1964-1966: non-Nativist
(Germany) Appeals: Nativist 1967-1979: Ambiguous" 5
1980-: Nativist
DVU Program: Nativist Nativist 1987-Present: Nativist
(Germany) Appeals: Nativist
REP Program: Nativist Nativist 1983-1985: non-Nativist
(Germany) Appeals: Nativist 1986-1987: Ambiguous" l6
1988-: Nativist
FPOe Program: Nativist Nativist 1960-1989: non-Nativist
(Austria) Appeals: Nativist 1990-: Nativist
BZOe Program: non-Nativist Nativist 2005: non-Nativist
(Austria) Appeals: Nativist 2006-: Nativist
OeVP Program: Ambiguous non- N/A
(Austria) Appeals: non-Nativist Nativist
CDU Program: non-Nativist non- N/A
(Germany) Appeals: non-Nativist Nativist
Table 2.4 displays the current and historical coding for each of the parties under
consideration. Of the five parties, the BZOe's coding is the most tenuous. Its 2005
program represented a clear break from the nativist politics of its predecessor, yet it
quickly returned to the well of nativist politics when a non-nativist strategy was not
resonating with voters in the 2006 national election. The BZOe's Grundsatzpapier,
published in November 2006 as a response to the new Grand Coalition, once again placed
native/immigrant issues in a subordinate role and did not refer to explicit categories.
While there is no question that the REP, NPD, DVU and FPOe are and will remain
committed nativists, the BZOe may continue its move towards an economically Liberal,
socially conservative party of "oversight and fairness." However, it could be that the
party's attempts to "modernize"" 7 its appeals will see further backsliding if no dedicated
115 In campaigns from 1967-1979, no evidence was found suggesting that the NPD focused on
native/immigrant issues, despite the presence of unambiguous nativism in its program.
116 Insufficient information was available on the REP's appeals in the 1986 Bavarian state election to
confirm the party as nativist.
117 As expressed in interviews with Haider's then Carinthian Press Secretary and later BZOe General-
Secretary, Stefan Petzner, 6/6/2007.
vote base interested in a non-nativist, conservative alternative to the OeVP and FPOe
presents itself.
More generally, in this chapter I have classified the "anti-immigrant Radical
Right" as a group of nativist parties on two grounds. First, the classification is precise; it
uses objective, observable features to create an analytical category. Nativist parties are
distinct from non-nativist parties in their core focus on a specific ethnic identity
dimension. Unlike most decision rules used to describe these parties, the goals nativists
profess and the appeals they make are visible and consistent. Nativist parties promise to
champion the position of the native ethnic category relative to all non-native ethnic
categories and their appeals (reserving resources for natives; removing problematic non-
native elements) further this agenda.
Second, while some or all of these parties might also qualify for other analytical
categories (ethnic nationalist; Radical Right; etc.), the nativist classification allows the
project to address the broader question of Radical Right growth in a manner that is
theoretically and temporally bounded. Rather than attempting to explain the growth of
Scandinavian anti-tax parties in the 1970s, post-authoritarian parties in Southern Europe
in the late 1970s and anti-immigrant parties in the 1980s and 1990s, the inquiry can focus
on establishing independent variables and causal mechanisms for explaining the growth
of one potential sub-group. As this sub-group likely represents the lion's share of
Radical Right growth in contemporary Western Europe, this analysis solves one puzzle
while shedding light on another.
Chapter 2 Figures and Charts
Figure 2.1: Ethnic Parties and the Radical Right
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Chapter 3 - A Shock Model of Niche Party Growth and Party System
Change
Duverger (1959) conceived of "minor" parties as those parties unable to form a
Government or capture 10% of the vote. More recently, Meguid (2005) identified
"niche" parties as new or small parties focusing on narrow issues that have been ignored
by the major, established actors, such as the environment or immigration. Minor or niche
parties lack access to the levers of power available to major, established parties, resources
that allow those parties to build durable relationships with constituents and interest
groups. Moreover, minor or niche parties lack the organization and funding of their
major, established competitors, hampering their ability to wage expansive, professional
election campaigns. How then do niche parties, at a significant disadvantage in an
established party system, gain new supporters? How do niche parties grow?
This chapter models party switching and party system change through the growth
of niche parties. Grounded in the American and European literature on voting behavior,
the model argues that niche parties rapidly gain support during Shocks. Shocks are large,
rapid, unanticipated events that unsettle individual expectations about some aspect of
their environment and, in doing so, re-weight voters' political or social priorities. A
niche party gains support when these new or latent priorities become highly salient and
are inadequately represented by established actors. Voters may select a niche party to
signal displeasure and express a preferred policy direction or to directly influence policy
by using their support to help a niche party expand their formal influence. Over time this
process can lead to durable party system change, as the niche party establishes a
relationship with its new supporters.
While the model can be applied to niche parties generally, I make a specific
argument explaining the growth of West European nativist parties, a subset of the Radical
Right. I argue that the growth of nativist parties is one, arguably the main, consequences
of a new, highly salient dimension of political contestation. I argue that changes in the
salience of issues or identities related to the native/immigrant dynamic are driven by
large, rapid, unanticipated changes in ethnic demography, a type of Shock. Re-weighted
priorities make nativist parties more attractive to some subset of voters who hold
proximate preferences on the relevant dimension but did not previously consider it
important, inducing party switching in subsequent elections. Events exogenous or
endogenous to the political system eventually terminate the Shock, stabilizing nativist
parties at a new level of support. Figure 3.1 illustrates the basic Shock model of niche
party growth.
Figure 3.1: A Basic Shock Model of Niche Party Growth
The next section reviews traditional models of party system change and Radical
Right growth. The third section uses those approaches to build a Shock model of niche
party growth and explore its implications for electoral competition. The fourth section
details the logic and properties of Shocks and argues that large, rapid immigration, an
event linked to the dimensions nativist parties contest on, can fulfill the prerequisites for
a Shock. Section five develops a series of hypotheses about the relationship between
changing immigration rates and support for nativist parties. Section six offers possible
mechanisms of Shock termination, while section seven suggests extensions of the model
to countries where the background conditions present in contemporary Western Europe
are absent. The final section provides a summary and some basic conclusions.
Theories of Party System Change
There are two broad approaches to party system change, which can then be used
to frame theories of niche party growth. This section lays out those competing
approaches and derives their predictions about when and why contemporary Radical
Right (and by extension nativist) parties grow in some contexts and not others. While the
approaches presented are not incompatible and many studies, including this one, borrow
from both, this review emphasizes their crucial differences.
The first theoretical approach is demand driven."1 8 In a demand model individual
preferences, or the salience of competing preferences, are altered by events exogenous to
the political system. Some subset of voters subsequently switches parties based on these
altered preferences or priorities. Demand models can be divided further into the type of
changes they privilege: long or short.
Long changes are rare, slow and essentially unidirectional, taking decades or even
centuries to develop. In the literature on Europe, the major long process is
modernization, where progressive changes to technology and social organization
(industrialization, urbanization, etc.) reshape social cleavages and consequently the issues
organizing political competition."19 More recently, scholars have argued that advanced
industrial societies undergo a later post-industrial or post-modem transformation. 120 Here
118 Eatwell, in Merkel and Weinberg (eds) (2003), was the first to frame Radical Right growth in terms of
demand and supply factors.
119 Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) major revolutions, the centralization of State authority and industrialization,
are aspects of modernization. See also Rostow (1960), Deutsch (1966), Pye (1966) or Inglehart (1997) for
formulations of Modernization theory. Modernization theory dates back at least to Marx's Kapital, with
the modernization of the means of production the determining factor in changing social relationships; pp.
296-300 in Tucker (1978).
120 Theories of post-industrial change are very much a continuation of Modernization theory. Bell (1973)
privileges the effect of changing means of production on political sophistication, as "manual" factory
workers are replaced by "intellectual" travel agents or doctors, while Inglehart (1977, 1990, 1997) focuses
some combination of increasing affluence, access to tertiary education or a transition to
service economies replace broad material issues (economic security, working conditions)
with narrower post-material issues (environmentalism, cultural identity). In a post-
modem party system, organizationally dense, bureaucratic parties are out-competed by
leaner, narrowly focused movements better adapted to capture voters who no longer
maintain a "cradle to grave" relationship with a social milieu. In a long-process model,
party system change comes rarely and from very few sources, but the effects of those
changes reshape the entire society.
In the 1990s, long process theories had the most influence on theories of Radical
Right growth. 2 1 Some saw these parties as an expression of post-industrial politics, a
coalition of economic neo-liberals and blue collar welfare chauvinists brought on by
changing preferences.122 To others they were short-term reactions to post-industrial
politics, a reaffirmation of traditional values in times of increasing uncertainty.123
However, long process models suffer from distinct empirical problems. The "New"
Radical Right's hypothesized strategy of economic neo-liberalism and social
conservatism has not been necessary for Radical Right success. Indeed, many parties that
experienced growth in the early 1990s abandoned neo-liberalism without suffering
negative consequences. 124 Furthermore, Radical Right support bases increasingly
on "value change" brought about by post-modernization processes. Dalton et al. (1984) focus on the
"dealignment" of voters from traditional social milieus, facilitating this realignment.
121 Betz and Swank (2003) see Radical Right growth as the result of economic insecurity caused by
globalization; Ignazi (1992), Betz (1994), Kitschelt and McGann (1995; 2005), Inglehart (1997) and
Minkenberg (2000) see Radical Right parties benefiting in some way from value change and/or the
emergence of post-industrial society.
122 Kitschelt and McGann (1995).
123 Ignazi (1992), Inglehart (1997). Kitschelt and McGann (1995) reject this premise, but accept that
hostility to post-material values makes up a portion of the Radical Right's appeals.
124 For example the French National Front, Danish People's Party and Belgian Vlaams Belaang all favor
"national" or "neo-mercantilist" policies, including protectionism and increased social welfare spending.
resembled homogenous, blue-collar parties rather than interest coalitions, though they
saw no decline in support; as white-collar voters fled these parties in the late 1990s, they
were replaced by new blue collar voters. 125 Finally, long process models cannot account
for the timing of changes in Radical Right support. Radical Right parties grew
simultaneously, despite post-industrial processes that started in the 1960s in some
countries and the 1980s in others.
In contrast, short process theories offer a far more discontinuous model of party
system change. Short processes are those exogenous events that produce effects over one
or a few electoral periods. These critical periods of brief but sharp change interrupt
longer periods of stability and realign political systems by altering voter priorities
through the introduction new or previously latent dimensions of conflict. 126 If no
established party takes advantage of the emerging dimension, niche parties fill the gap
and gain votes at their expense. 127 The system reaches a new equilibrium over several
elections as the voters who would realign do so and establish loyalties to their new party.
Not all new or newly salient issues are realigning. An issue must be significant to
at least a portion of the electorate. It must cut across support bases and contradict the
position of established actors in a way that cannot be subsumed under the current political
alignment or resolved through consensus. 128 Established actors must fail to resolve the
125 Ivarsflaten (2005); Mudde (2007). Eurobarometer surveys in 2004 indicated that manual workers and
low-education individuals are the most likely to rate economic policy as insufficiently protectionist.
126 Key (1955); Sundquist (1973); Clubb, Flanigan and Zingale (1980). Mayhew (2002) offers a critique,
but not a dismissal, of the "critical elections" literature. Mayhew refutes the periodicity of realignments
(that they occur every 30-40 years) and the idea that critical issues slowly accumulate through the system,
as opposed to quickly overwhelming them. For example, the Great Depression of 1929 realigned the
American political system in 1932.
127 For example if all established parties support the status quo, creating significant dissatisfaction within
each party but no established outlet for their concerns; Burnham (1970) or Sundquist (1973).
128 Schattschneider (1960); Sundquist (1973).
issue in a timely fashion because they are divided, lack information about the distribution
of preferences, or cannot reach an acceptable solution before an election allows niche
parties to benefit from their failures. 129 Finally, while niche parties have an advantage in
the lack of an established record to be held accountable to, they can also face significant
electoral, legal or financial barriers to party entry or party competition. 130
While Realignment theory and Modernization theory are not incompatible (most
of the identified critical junctures in the American literature are implicitly driven by
modernization), these models allow for any number of events (a Depression; a
catastrophic defeat in war; widespread corruption) to generate challenges sufficient to
realign the political order.' 31 In sum, short process models treat party system change as
potentially frequent and rapid, taking years rather than decades. Changes come from
many different sources and may be seemingly random, but they are neither necessarily
systematic (only a portion of the electorate may be affected) nor inevitable (not all issues
are realigning).
Realignment theories are best represented by models of Radical Right growth that
privilege changes in key structural variables, such as crime, immigration or
unemployment. High unemployment or conditions of depression, high crime rates or
endemic corruption, or high immigration rates generate dissatisfaction among voters,
inducing switching to niche parties if no established party is able or willing to resolve
129 Sundquist (1973) or Rosenstone et al. (1984). Mair, in Mair (ed) (1990) argues that rapid events have a
greater capacity to overwhelm established elites than long-term, predictable systemic tensions.
130 Wolinetz, in Mair (1990). At the extreme, barriers to entry might include physical or social
intimidation; Rosenstone et al. (1984) or Art (2006).
131 While the major issue during the American political realignment of the 1850s was slavery, the slavery
debate was itself partly driven by differential modernization; see Burnham (1970) or Sundquist (1973).
Duverger (1959), pg. 312 provides examples of Shocks unrelated to modernization.
them. 132 Besides points of disagreement about which factors are significant, short
process explanations generally fail to specify causal mechanisms. If voters are
responding to anti-immigrant appeals, are they doing so out of a perception of ethnic
threat, diffuse protest, scapegoating, or something else? If they perceive immigration as
some sort of threat, are they responding to economic concerns, cultural concerns, or both?
Thus far the emphasis has been on exogenous changes. Supply approaches focus
on endogenous changes, the "opportunity structures" that shape political competition. In
a supply model, no individual preference is altered. Rather, something endogenous to the
political system re-weights the attractiveness of niche parties. Switching might be driven
by institutional changes, 133 changes to the composition of the electorate 134 or the
changing strategies of political actors. 135 A supply side model would argue that changing
institutions or party strategies makes niche party entry rational or increase the reservoir of
voters willing to support the party. Supply side theories considers party system change to
be potentially frequent, depending on the fixity of institutions, and treats party systems as
relatively weak and unstable, especially in models privileging party strategies and
competition.
132 Jackman and Volpert (1996) emphasize the role of unemployment; Hainsworth (1992), Knigge (1998)
or Golder (2003) immigration; Gibson (2002) immigration and crime.
133 Downs (1957) or Cox (1997) argue that proportional electoral rules increase the willingness to support
narrowly focused parties.
134 Such as the expansion of the franchise in Europe in the early 20 th century (Downs 1957; Sundquist
1973), changes to a state's boundaries or waves of recently naturalized immigrant voters (Ware 1996).
135 In the Conditional Party Government (CPG) literature, parties alienate voters by implementing an
agenda reflecting the median of the governing party rather than the electorate, overshooting their mandate.
Subsequent elections are course corrections; Aldrich and Rohde (2000); Aldrich et al. (2002); Erikson et
al., in MacKuen and Rabinowitz (eds) (2003); Aldrich et al. (2004).
Endogenous theories of Radical Right growth focusing on political opportunity
structures have become increasingly popular in recent years. 136 Some models argue that
the Radical Right takes advantage of the convergence of established parties, attacking
their flanks. 137 Others argue that electoral rules, historical-cultural factors, or the
prevalence of certain individual-level characteristics make some Radical Right parties
more successful than others. 138 Finally, some argue that Radical Right entrepreneurs take
advantage of diffuse, short-term protest without regard to the appeals offered.' 3 9
While the opportunity structures literature offers appealing insights, most supply
models suffer from one of three basic deficiencies when trying to explain growth, and not
just differential levels of support. First, institutions and voter characteristics change too
infrequently to account for the size or scope of the observed changes. Second, many
opportunity structure models presuppose an exogenous shock; they explain why some
parties do better than others, but fail to address why the Radical Right emerges at all. 140
Finally, some opportunity structure models are threatened by endogeneity. Convergence
theories for example assume that voters decide to vote for a Radical Right party after
other parties converge, rather than perceiving the convergence of other parties based on
136 Political opportunity structures are "specific configurations of resources, institutional arrangements and
historical precedents for social mobilization" (Tarrow 1994).
137 Betz (1994); Kitschelt and McGann (1995; 2005); Betz and Immerfall (1998); Van der Brug, et al.
(2000; 2005).
138 Bale (2003), Meguid (2005) and Art (2006) all consider political competitors or historical-cultural
traditions important. Carter (2005) and Norris (2005) focus on a combination of institutions and party
competition, including ballot access, party organization and party financing. Jackman and Volpert (1996)
and Golder (2003) privilege district magnitude, though Carter (2002), Norris (2005) and Carter and
Arzheimer (2006) find no relationship between district magnitude and Radical Right support. Lubbers et al.
(2002) and Carter and Arzheimer (2006) focus on micro-level socio-demographic variables such as gender,
age, class and education.
139 Knigge (1998) or Betz (2002).
140Mudde (2007) distinguishes between questions of Radical Right emergence and questions of persistence.
Art (2006) for example takes the emergence of nativist parties as a given and focuses on persistence, while
Kitschelt and McGann (1995) pre-suppose post-industrial changes and Betz and Swank (2003)
globalization. Only Van der Brug et al. (2005) offers a truly endogenous model, focusing on a CPG logic
of inter-party competition.
the emergence of a strong Radical Right actor with substantially different policies on a
host of issues.141
A Shock Model of Niche Party Growth
This model niche party growth represents a short process demand approach.
Specifically, party switching and party system change are driven by shifts in the salience
of issue dimensions or social identities, while shifts in salience are generated by Shocks.
Shocks, explored in the next section, are large, rapid, unanticipated events that challenge
individual expectations about their environment and increase the attention devoted to
understanding or resolving the relevant issue or identity dimension. Niche parties take
advantage of the shifts in salience generated by Shocks when established parties are
unwilling or unable to address them; in this respect, the model agrees with Realignment
theories. Unlike long process models, which assume that changes are inevitable and
unidirectional, a Shock model does not treat party system change as teleological. Unlike
many Realignment models, a Shock model does not consider party system change to be
cyclical or critical issues to be a one-time conflict. Any election could be altered by a
Shock, while a system may undergo a Shock in one period and resolve it, only to undergo
a new Shock on the same dimension several elections later.
At the system level, the model assumes mass suffrage and strong rule of law.
Expectations about outcomes when these assumptions are relaxed are considered in a
later section on antecedent conditions.
141 For example, in 1990 the German Republikaner were given the same score on a Left-Right scale as the
conservative CSU in 1987 in Politbarometer public opinion surveys, with the CSU perceived as closer to
the center in 1990. This convergence might have occurred because voters (and experts) do not consider
contemporary parties in a historical or theoretical context, or restrict their evaluations to a fixed scale. It
was not necessarily true that the CSU moderated its program, but rather that before 1990 voters did not
imagine a significant party to the right of the CSU on a fixed 10-point scale.
At the individual level, each voter is assumed to have a most favored position or
preference on each dimension. 142 Each voter assigns each dimension a salience, the
weight given to that dimension relative to all others. Voters have a limited capacity to
juggle and process information and therefore tend to focus on some subset of all possible
dimensions when making decisions. 14 3 For example, voters in Germany in the 1960s
likely emphasized the economy far more than abortion in their voting decisions, though
they presumably had preferences on both. Because the capacity to process information is
limited, increasing the emphasis on any one dimension should reduce the emphasis on all
others. In an election, individuals generate a utility function for each party by
aggregating their preferences, weighted for salience, and comparing these preferences to
each party's package of stated policies and appeals.
Each party in the system is assumed to take a position on some or all dimensions
of contestation to appeal to voters. 144 On each dimension, the party or parties benefiting
the most if the election were only fought on that dimension are the "issue owner(s)." 145 If
preferences on a dimension are clustered rather than distributed, multiple parties might
own a dimension; a nativist party could hold the most popular anti-immigrant position,
while another owns the pro-immigrant position. While an optimal strategy would be to
assume a median (or at least modal) position on every dimension, parties are constrained
by the preferences of their internal interests and by their past actions. 146 Voters can take
142 Preferences might be continuous (immigration should be 10% lower) or more directional and ordinal
(immigration should be lower); Rabinowitz and Macdonald (1989).
143 Converse (1964); Converse (2000); Chong and Druckman (2007).
144 Presumably voters have shortcuts for imputing party positions on salient dimensions when parties are
not explicit in their position, such as letting other parties or the media define that position.
145 This is a departure from the issue ownership literature (Petrocik 1996; Meguid 2005; Belanger and
Meguid 2008). What Meguid calls "competence" this project considers the degree of agreement between
voter and party preferences, which is closer to Van der Brug's (2004) conception.
146 Fiorina (1981); Enelow and Hinich (1984); Bowler (1990); Iversen (1994).
into account the credibility of appeals and even if all parties announce the same position
one or more parties can benefit, at least in the short-term, from a comparative advantage
on a dimension of contestation. 147
Besides considering a party's positions, voters are assumed to evaluate parties in
two additional ways. First, voters assign some discount factor to each party's ability to
implement its proposals. Voters might discount a party's proposals due to pre-electoral
constraints like electoral rules, or post-election factors like coalition bargaining or
legislative effectiveness. 148 Second, voters assign each party some partisanship valence,
the preference for that party relative to all others. 14 9 While partisanship can be
established through early socialization, 15 it can also increase or decrease over time as a
party succeeds or fails in representing an individual's preferences; voters can keep a
"running tally" of party performance. 151 Voters reward parties that successfully represent
them with increased confidence in their future performance, and punish them for past
failures. 152 A partisanship bonus is therefore thought to accrue the longer an individual
sees their party as the party best able to represent their interests.
147 Budge and Farlie, in Daalder and Mair (1982); Bowler (1990). Bowler resolves the credibility gap by
introducing time horizons. Voters assess credibility based on the past few periods, while parties change
their positions and accept short-term punishment in the form of discounting in the hopes of long-term gains.
148 On pre-electoral factors, see Cox (1997). On post-electoral factors, see Grofman (1985) or Bargsted and
Kedar (Forthcoming).
149 This model broadly resembles Adams et al.'s (2005) "unified" model of voting. Voters care about
policies and weight those policies based on their importance, but they also care about non-policy factors,
such as partisan ties or social identities. In contrast, this model treats issue and identity dimensions as
interchangeable, rather than two categories competing for attention.
150 Campbell et al. (1960); Niemi and Jennings (1991). Socialization refers broadly to upbringing,
including both child-parent relationships and the groups or identities an individual acquires early on.
Changes in identity or group affiliation later in life might result in preference change through re-
socialization.
15' Fiorina (1981); Rosenstone et al. (1984); MacKuen et al. (1989); Popkin (1994).
152 Fiorina (1981). Voters are primarily interested in future decisions, but their best signal of a party's
likely performance is its past behavior.
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Four intuitions can be drawn from the model presented above. While the first two
are applicable to voting in general, the last two are especially relevant to the growth of
niche parties. For the sake of parsimony, it is assumed that all parties are fully able to
implement their appeals (there is no discounting); expectations about outcomes when
there is discounting are considered in the section on antecedent conditions.
First, if all dimensions are weighted equally a voter supports the party closest to
them in the aggregate, which agrees with the broader literature on voting behavior.
Second, the stronger a voter's partisanship, the easier it is to ignore differences in
preferences, though no assumption is made about the relative weights of partisanship and
preferences. 153
Coming to the third intuition, if one dimension is sufficiently salient, a voter will
support a party distant from them on all other dimensions so long as it is closest on that
dimension. The voter has preferences, but values agreement on important dimensions
over disagreement on unimportant dimensions. This intuition is essential for the growth
of niche parties. As the salience of issues or identities relevant to the niche party
increase, established party voters or non-voters that agree with the niche party on those
dimensions but disagree with them on all others will switch to the niche party. No
change in preferences is necessary; changes in salience alone are sufficient to induce
party switching.
153 Campbell et al. (1960) acknowledge that events generating significant deviations between party and
voter preferences lead to party switching. While dealignment (Dalton et al. 1984) might facilitate
switching by breaking down partisanship, it is neither necessary nor sufficient. It is not necessary, as
sufficiently large deviations between parties and voters induce switching regardless. It is not sufficient, as
it cannot explain why voters switch in a systematic fashion. Like electoral rules dealignment facilitates or
constrains, but does not drive, niche party growth.
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Finally, the longer a voter and its new party are aligned in their preferences, the
greater the partisanship valence that party acquires. This allows party switching to be
durable even if the salience of a dimension declines and preferences are fixed. The niche
party can attract voters based on a re-weighting of preferences, but lock them in through
increased partisanship as established relationships develop.
These four intuitions provide a basic model of rapid party system change. Party
systems can change slowly, as preferences shift with voter replacement or long structural
changes, for example increasing access to tertiary education, accrue over time. Party
systems can change with altered institutions, making some parties more or less attractive.
But party systems can also change rapidly, as events re-weight the dimensions voters
consider important.
Consider a stylized example of niche party growth, divided into three stages. The
model takes place across three elections and assumes that nothing varies besides the
salience of a single dimension relevant to the niche party's appeals.
* Event: In an election at T=O, the relevant dimension sits at a fixed level of
salience and the niche party registers static support. At T=O<X<1, some
exogenous event (the Shock) increases the salience of the relevant
dimension. Preference re-weighting through increased salience induces
some subset of voters to prefer the niche party, which has a comparative
advantage on the relevant dimension, over its competitors.' 54
* Election: Increased niche party support through increased salience on the
relevant dimension is registered in an election at T=l. Niche parties in
systems that do not experience the event see no change in support.
* Extinction: Niche party support continues increasing as more individuals
become concerned with the event until T=1<Y<2, when the event ends.
The new, stable level of support is registered in an election at T=2.
154 Niche support is treated as increasing throughout the duration of the Shock, as the duration itself (or
witnessing other voters "tip") might be sufficient to induce further shifts in salience. See the discussion of
tipping models in the section on Shock termination.
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While the model only considers salience change on one dimension, what if this
condition is relaxed? The baseline reaction to the event, described above, is represented
by Country B in Figure 3.2. When the salience of other dimensions varies, the crucial
intuition is that events on one dimension can be offset or reinforced by events on others.
For example two Shocks, a migration wave and an unrelated foreign policy crisis, occur
during the same election, while the niche party only holds a comparative advantage on
migration policy. While migration would dominate the election if it occurred in isolation,
voters must weigh the crises against one other, blunting the impact of migration (Country
B2) unless preferences on the two dimensions are perfectly uncorrelated and the voters
concerned with the foreign policy crisis would not have been attracted to the niche party
in any event.
Moreover, systems are dynamic. New concerns come to the fore, reducing the
importance of past issues or conflicts. These could be the emergence of latent
dimensions or the return of previously salient dimensions; with the migration crisis
resolved, concerns about the economy reassert themselves. Consequently, the salience of
the niche dimension might decline over time, leading some voters to lose interest in the
niche party after the event subsides (Country B3). Of course, either situation might
benefit a niche party. If the niche party holds a popular position on both the migration
and foreign-policy dimensions and preferences on those dimensions are not perfectly
correlated, they could attract more new voters than if the migration crises had occurred in
isolation (Country B4). As other dimensions become less important, for example through
a sudden improvement in the economy, the niche party's dimension could become more
important without any objective event occurring.
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Figure 3.2: Expanded Niche Party Outcomes
The remainder of the section unpacks four assumptions implicit in the model.
The first considers the relationship between issues and identities, the second the
relationship between issues and elites, the third the relationship between preferences and
salience and the fourth the relationship between parties and preferences.
First, dimensions of political contestation can be issue-based (the economy, the
environment) and relatively continuous in the positions parties and voters can take. Or
they can be identity-based (native, worker, Catholic) and relatively ordinal or
dichotomous. All individuals qualify for a category on each identity dimension; an
individual is at least "X' (1) or "not X" (0).' 55 All individuals have multiple identities
(one can be white, American, atheist and an academic with equal truth) and may even
qualify for multiple identities on the same dimension. For example, an individual with
one white and one black parent can identify as white, black, bi-racial, mixed, or brown.
Identities are consistent or contextual, and are constructed by the bearer and society to a
greater or lesser extent. 156 The above individual can choose to emphasize their whiteness
or blackness depending on their environment, though other members of society can
contest that categorization based on their own evaluation of the individual's attributes.
Identities can be latent and have no salience (an individual qualifies for an
identity but does not consciously recognize it) or active, with some non-zero salience and
a preference regarding that identity. For example, an individual is probably not
conscious of their "native-ness" in an environment without immigrants, while they are
155 Chandra (2004).
156 Kasfir (1979); Fearon (1999); Chandra (2001, 2004).
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aware and more or less favorable toward their "white-ness" and "Catholic-ness." This
nominally white, strongly Catholic individual could be opposed to a White Power party
but receptive to a Christian-democratic party, though both identities are salient.
Why are issue dimensions insufficient to understand voter motivations?
Fundamentally, active identities can influence preferences on issue dimensions and in
doing so influence vote choice. 157 An individual's "native-ness" might influence their
view on immigration or social welfare (if the two are seen as correlated), just as an
individual's "Catholic-ness" can influence their views on abortion or war. As a shortcut,
entrepreneurs can appeal directly to identities to bundle multiple issues into a single
appeal. By the same token, increased concern with an issue might heighten the salience
of a corresponding identity. Individuals concerned with immigration could come to
perceive a more fundamental threat to their native identity, just as adversarial labor
relations might influence an individual's identity as a worker.
In sum, identity dimensions and issue dimensions are comparable when
establishing individual utility and party preferences; a voter might support a party
because it emphasizes issue positions they support and consider important, identities they
support and consider important, or both. Conceptually, an event can affect vote choice
by changing the salience of an identity or the salience of an issue dimension related to
that identity, without scholars or the individual recognizing the exact process.
Second, the model assumes that preferences and salience are at least partly
exogenous to political competition. Preferences are probably formed to some degree by
157 Lipset and Rokkan (1967) or Lazarsfeld et al. (1968). For a model in which identities are funneled
through partisan affiliation to affect preferences, see Campbell et al. (1960).
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an individual's interactions with their environment, their socio-economic attributes or
group affiliations, and not solely by receiving signals from politicians or the media about
how they should interpret their environment. 158 The implication is that events, and not
just appeals, influence voter calculations about what is optimal (preferences) and
important (salience). 159
However, individual might have fixed preferences on some dimensions and weak
or no preferences on others, for example because they have fewer cues generated through
their background or experiences. 160 Here the role of opinion leaders or elites (specifically
the media or political entrepreneurs) in preference or salience formation is of increased
importance.161 Elites transmit information to the public about a dimension, suggesting its
importance (priming through the volume of discourse) and how an individual should feel
about that dimension (framing through the tone of discourse). 162 In short, elites likely
have some capacity to construct narratives that alter preferences or salience.
Most likely, events and appeals interact and elite capacities vary with an event's
magnitude. Elites are likely constrained by massive events, where direct experiences or
158 The role of experience is well established in the cognitive science literature (Druckman and Lupia
2000). An experience-based theory of preference formation fits on-line models in political science (Lodge
et al. 1989). Wildavsky, in Berger (ed) (1989) argues for a "cultural" theory of preference formation that
emphasizes the role of identities and social groups.
159 This model gives elites considerably less agency than Meguid (2005). Meguid argues that niche party
support declines if elites (meaning established parties) uniformly ignore a niche dimension (a dismissive
strategy; Table 2, pg. 350). I argue that a dismissive strategy is overwhelmed by sufficiently large events.
Second, Meguid argues that niche party support declines if established parties co-opt niche positions (an
accommodative strategy). I argue that co-opting raises a dimension's salience by signaling its importance,
increasing niche party support if they are the issue owner, in line with Belanger and Meguid (2008).
160 Zaller (1992); Druckman (2004).
161 In an accessibility model of preference formation, individuals do not have many established attitudes,
except for dimensions that are or have recently been salient; Iyengar and Kinder (1987); Aldrich et al.
(1989); Iyengar (1990); Kuklinski and Hurley, in Mutz et al. (eds) (1996).
162 Iyengar and Kinder (1987); Page and Shapiro (1992); Zaller (1992); Lupia and McCubbins (1998).
Essentially, public conceptions about politics come from elites and are internalized; an individual might
have socio-economic, cultural or psychological attributes that predispose them to nativism, but what
nativism entails is constructed by elites.
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the volume of alternative narratives limits their options. While elites might be able to
convince the public that terrorism is not a major concern in the wake of an event the
magnitude of the 2001 anthrax attacks, it is unlikely they could do so in the wake of an
event the magnitude of September 1 1th. On the other hand, elites in mass democracies
are unlikely to be able to construct narratives from non-events, where they are
constrained by the free flow of information. While elites might be able to convincingly
portray Iran or Iraq as a significant threat, it is unlikely they could do so with Canada.
Recent work suggests that the elite capacity to frame narratives is far stronger when the
discourse is uniform; when the discourse is divided, individuals can seek information that
reflects their prior beliefs. 163
Lastly, elites are not wholly exogenous to their political system. Elites are also
individuals, and their priorities will also be susceptible to influence by events.
Furthermore, unless elites are completely unresponsive to public opinion, increases in the
concern with certain issues or identities should provide an incentive for elites to alter the
volume and tone of their discourse, in the hope of acquiring some advantage vis-A-vis
their competitors. This advantage might mean more voters, by increasing the discourse
on the economy, immigration, or foreign policy, or more readers or viewers, by tackling
the issues or identities media consumers are interested in. Figure 3.3 presents a Shock
model of niche party growth that integrates elites and causal mechanisms.
Figure 3.3: A Full Shock Model of Niche Party Growth
163 Berinsky (2007). The literature on confirmation bias finds that individuals search for information that
confirms existing beliefs, rather than weighing confirming and disconfirming information equally; Lodge et
al. (1999).
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Third, the model assumes that preferences and salience are at least partially
independent; individuals can take a position on a dimension, without the prevalence or
extremity of that position driving its importance. 164 For example, an individual can be
strongly opposed to abortion, but emphasize the economy or foreign policy in their voting
decisions. They might do so out of necessity (an economic crisis is more pressing), or
because their views are already formally established as law. In terms of nativist parties,
if salience does not have an independent effect on vote choice nativist support should
reflect the presence of xenophobic attitudes, regardless of changes in salience brought on
by exogenous events. But the portion of the population attributing feelings of insecurity
to ethnic minorities in the EU in 2000 was a relatively weak (r =0.21) cross-national
predictor of nativist party support. 165
This does not imply that salience and preferences are completely independent.
Events certainly influence a dimension's salience, but they are also an experience and
might therefore also influence preferences. Consider an individual with no or weak
preferences on counter-terrorism funding. A major terror attack might not only make
terrorism highly salient, but also shift the preference on funding.
Finally, parties may act as an information shortcut facilitating preference
formation; parties are a type of affiliation and can conceivably influence preferences by
socializing supporters. 166 If niche party growth is initially driven by salience, the
intuition is that this support will be more stable even if salience declines, as niche parties
164 Erikson and Romero (1990); Edwards et al. (1995).
165 Attitudes: Eurobarometer 138 (2001), 4.2.2 Table 16; voting: author calculations from election results.
The Eurobarometer only covered EU-15 countries. The cross-national data on attitudes is admittedly too
sporadic and temporally bounded to offer a more systematic analysis; there were only three rounds of
questions on xenophobia from 1988 to 2000.
66 Campbell et al. (1960); Butler and Stokes (1969); Franklin (1984); Bartels (2002); Carsey and Layman
(2006).
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lock in new voters by increasing their partisanship, but also by using that partisanship to
align preferences on other dimensions. For example, a new niche party voter has strong
preferences on immigration, weak preferences on crime and does not care about the
economy. The niche party attempts to educate the voter about the party's positions,
counting on their affinity (partisanship) to make them a valued source of information. Of
the three, preferences on crime are the most susceptible to change; the voter already has
strong preferences on immigration and is wholly indifferent to the economy. 167
Summarizing the four assumptions, while changes in salience generated by events
are sufficient to induce party switching without changes in preferences and despite elite
narratives, elite narratives, partisanship and the impact of events on preferences may
facilitate or constrain an event's impact. Figure 3.4 provides a graphical representation
of this discussion.
Figure 3.4: How Nice Parties Gain and Retain Supporters
What are Shocks?
In this section, I explicitly define and expand on the concept of"Shocks": when
and why do changing conditions re-weight salience? How are Shocks identified without
engaging in circular reasoning...how are they identified a priori?
In economics, a Shock is some large, sudden, seemingly unpredictable event, such
as the sharp increases in oil prices in 1973, 1979, and 2007. More generally, Shocks are
events that unsettle individual expectations about some aspect of their environment.168
Implicit in this statement are assumptions about how individuals evaluate their
167 This can be interpreted as preferences updating; Zaller (1992) or Carsey and Layman (2006).
168 Taleb (2007) describes these events as "black swans," seemingly improbable or unthinkable events with
high systemic impact.
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environment. Individuals are assumed to generate, through constant experience and
stimulus, some set of expectations about their surroundings, such as "do I expect there to
be a Yugoslavia tomorrow?" or "do I expect gas prices to change?" For any single
expectation, individuals have a belief about the distribution of future outcomes based on
past experiences, with expectations updated as new information is acquired. Not all new
information is necessarily used for updating; individuals might choose to ignore outliers,
or information that contradicts established biases. In this model, Shocks are events
occurring "at the tails" of models of expectations. While individuals understand that their
models cannot perfectly predict outcomes, they tend to overestimate the completeness of
the information available to them. Consequently, individuals still widely overestimate
their predictive ability and are surprised by what they perceive as unlikely events.169
To be more specific, I conceive of an event as requiring three properties before it
qualifies as a Shock capable of affecting political or social outcomes. First, as discussed
above the event must be a significant deviation from established patterns; there must be
some reason to believe that the population perceives the event as noteworthy. A Shock's
unpredictability does not prevent it from being measured. For example, individuals have
some expectation about how gas prices change. In the last 20 periods (however defined),
gas prices were observed to increase by an average of $0.20 per gallon, with a standard
deviation of $0.05. While increasing gas prices (or crime rates, or terror attacks) might
not be optimal, past experiences have conditioned individuals to consider increases
normal. How should the individual react to changes in the next period? While they
probably will not distinguish between increases of $0.20 and $0.25, individuals will
169 In sum, individuals are bad at "predicting the unpredictable"; Taleb (2007).
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certainly notice a large deviation, such as an increase of $1.35. Though inter-ethnic
relations or inter-ethnic violence might seem less predictable than gas prices, they are just
as measurable through official statistics or personal observation. As with gas prices,
individuals have some expectation about the level of ethnic heterogeneity or inter-ethnic
animosity in their environment. They should further recognize when these dynamics
deviate from established patterns, for example during an ethnic riot.
Second, the event must have a perceived negative impact for some or all
individuals...it must represent a perceived threat. Political competition generally comes
in two "flavors," the material and the symbolic, and either can generate a perceived
threat.170 Material threats have some tangible negative impact on an individual. This
impact could be economic, such as job loss or higher prices. Or it could be physical, the
threat to physical safety generated by crime, ethnic violence, terrorism or environmental
degradation.
Symbolic politics refers to dimensions of political contestation with no material
stakes for a conflict's participants. 17 1 Whereas individuals engage in material politics to
maximize their economic or physical wellbeing, they engage in symbolic politics to
ensure that their environment reflects their beliefs about what is "good," "clean," or
"right."' 172 Individuals receive benefits (conceptualized as self-esteem or psychic
benefits) from knowing the State they live in reflects their culture, identities, norms or
values, 173 or conversely that it does not widely deviate from closely-held values or
170 Horowitz (1985); Sniderman et al. (2000).
171 Edelman (1964).
172 Gusfield (1963); Sears et al. (1979); Citrin et al. (1990a and 1990b).
173 Kemper (1991); Huberman et al. (2004).
norms. 174 For example, while most individuals have a preference on the legality of same-
sex marriage, the material impact is minimal or nil for 95% of the population. Debates
about same sex marriage, or the death penalty or the presence of the Ten Commandments
in a courthouse, are debates about norms and values. Symbolic threats therefore have a
perceived negative impact on the congruence between the values of an individual and
their political or social system.
However, the outcome a symbolic debate also signals the status of the debate's
participants, their relative rank in a hierarchy of prestige.' 75 Status, which political
authorities confer, is a valued object of political competition that carries cognitive and
material benefits. 17" Political authorities can determine the degree of permissible
Socialist association, the legality of alcohol, beef, or pork, or the language(s) of political
and business dealings. These cues signal the degree to which a State values a group's
traditions or norms, but also that group's ability to acquire political power or economic
security. 177 Symbolic debates can therefore become larger debates about inter-group
position and material competition. While the proposed ban on Socialist affiliation in
Imperial Germany in the 1880s was not directly material, it stood to significantly
influence the bargaining power of Capital and Labor. Official language laws or religion-
174 Cognitive Dissonance theory argues that individuals seek to act in ways consistent with their beliefs,
values or norms (Festinger 1957). As the State is an extension of its citizens, cognitive dissonance extends
to State actions. For example, individuals can refuse to pay taxes in opposition to a military conflict,
arguing that their funds are indirectly implicating them in an immoral act.
175 Ridgeway and Walker (1995). The Social Identity experiments of the 1970s found that individuals
engaged in favoritism toward in-groups constructed for the experiment, even if it left the in-group worse off
(Tajfel 1970; Tajfel et al. 1971; Turner 1975). Key (1949) found that poor Southern whites accepted
disenfranchisement through poll or literacy taxes with the understanding that doing so would maintain the
aggregate status of whites over blacks.
176 Brodie (1996). See also Lijphart (1968), Schmitter (1974), or Nevitte and Kennedy (eds) (1986) for the
State's role in conferring status in consociational, economic or ethnic conflicts (respectively).
177 There are economic, sexual and prestige advantages to being high status, which high status individuals
are well aware of; Lin (1990); Hacker (1992); Feagin and Feagin (1999); or Thye (2000). Because status
carries objective benefits, defending or overcoming the status barriers between groups is an object of
political competition (Park 1950).
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based prohibitions can asymmetrically influence the material prospects of ethnic groups,
such as those disproportionately involved in pork production or brewing in societies with
large Muslim populations. Politics come therefore in three flavors: the material, the
symbolic, and those with a mixture of both.
Returning to the initial discussion, if gas prices fall by $1.35 or ethnic groups in
conflict reach an accord, most individuals would recognize these events as significant but
would not consider them problematic or worthy of further attention. At the same time,
threats are contextual; while voters in Germany (an oil importer) would welcome falling
gas prices, they might seriously concern voters in Norway (an oil exporter). Regardless,
individuals have a rational incentive to resolve perceived threats. In an established
democracy with strong rule of law where parties can implement their proposals, the most
effective and efficient means of threat reduction on most dimensions will come from
controlling or influencing political institutions, with elections the most basic means for
individuals to signal their preferences or enact preferred changes.
Moving on to the third property required for a Shock, the event cannot be the
outcome of some consensual process on the part of most or all social forces in the
population. If a society broadly supports a $1.35 increase in gas prices as part of a
conservation tax, they have decided that the threat of change on one dimension is
outweighed by a greater benefit on others. Moreover, because it is controlled this sort of
event might be perceived even by its opponents as a one-off and ignored when generating
expectations about future changes. Figure 3.5 presents graphically what a Shock might
look like based on an individual's distribution of expectations for a particular dynamic.
Figure 3.5: Conceptualizing Shocks
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Finally, not all shocks will benefit niche parties. Established parties can take
positions on an emerging dimension in a manner that incorporates them into pre-existing
political conflicts. Established parties might recognize the Shock's threat to their
political position early on and resolve it quickly and consensually before niche parties
have an opportunity to benefit. A Shock might shift salience in a manner
disadvantageous to the niche party, if they are not an issue owner, and not every
individual experiencing increased salience will have their priorities sufficiently altered to
influence their voting behavior. Conceptually then, there exists some set of events in the
world. Of these events, some subset qualify as Shocks but do not realign a political
system, some smaller subset realign the system but do not benefit niche parties, and some
final, even smaller, subset realign a system and do benefit niche parties.
Can Immigration be a Shock?
As developed in Chapter 2, nativist parties champion the interests of a State's
native residents and in doing so organize politics around a particular understanding of
ethnic identity. This is not to say these are single-issue parties. Rather, nativist parties
frame multiple issue dimensions through the interests of a narrow identity category. But
is the native/immigrant dynamic really comparable to the economy, national security, or
the environment? Can immigration processes generate a Shock comparable to an oil
crisis?178
178 Kuran (1998) argues that economic, technological or demographic Shocks increase the utility of ethnic
appeals. Sniderman et al. (2000) concludes that exogenous shocks influence prejudice, though they were
unable to identify or measure the Shock. Olzak (1992) and Quillian (1995) argue that changing economies
or increasing migration trigger ethnic resentment and inter-ethnic competition, while Citrin et al. (1990) on
the English-first movement in the US and Lubbers and Scheepers (2000) on Republikaner growth in
Germany focus on changes in immigration rates.
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As argued above, an event is a Shock if it is 1) a significant deviation from past
experiences; that 2) threatens some or all in the population with the promise of a negative
outcome; and 3) was not the result of a consensus decision. Under certain circumstances
immigration can fulfill all three conditions, even in countries with strong borders and
restrictive immigration regimes.
While advanced industrial countries have relatively strong border integrity and
complex regulatory schemes governing migration and the resources to maintain their
border integrity, they can still be overwhelmed by illegal or legal migration. For
example, countries have regulations governing political asylum and family reunification,
but incomplete information about the demand for entry. Demand forecasts can be faulty
for normative or positive reasons; there can be incorrect expectations about preferences
("migrants prefer to return rather than send for their families") or a failure to predict
events with ramifications for immigration flows (a civil war or the fall of the Iron
Curtain). Compounding forecasting failures poor information, veto points or competing
interests can slow the legislative or executive action necessary to adapt to a changing
environment. 179 Finally, not all migration is regulated at the national level. International
accords prevent signatories from blocking the entry of refugees, or engaging in
involuntary repatriation; even if a petition for asylum is rejected, the receiving country
may still be obligated to retain and support the applicant.'18
179 For example, business leaders on the Right support immigration as a means of decreasing labor costs
(Money 1997), while Left-Libertarians support the promotion of multi-culturalism; both are likely to
oppose restrictions on immigration or immigrants, though for different reasons.
180 The principle of non-refoulement was first implemented into the Geneva Accords on the Protection of
Refugees; Muenz and Ulrich (1997).
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Furthermore, immigration conceivably generates all three categories of perceived
threats. Spikes in immigration might create resource pressure on natives, or at least the
perception of such pressure.' 81 This is particularly true for natives in low-demand
occupations at a competitive disadvantage with immigrants who have similar
qualifications but lower wage expectations. Though population increases generate
growth in the long-run by increasing the demand for goods and services, in the short-run
the number of jobs is fixed and particularly low-skill or involuntary immigrants have few
resources for consumption, meaning competition between natives and immigrants should
increase so long as labor markets are not perfectly ethnically segmented. 182 Other
resources, such as housing or social welfare, are finite in the short-term and become
increasingly scarce during rapid demographic shifts.'83 The resources immigrants tend to
compete for (low-income housing, unemployment benefits) are also the least attractive to
provide, particularly if the group controlling distribution believes that outgroups benefit
disproportionately from their provision. 184 Natives with reduced resource access might
resent that scarce goods are being provided to groups that have not "earned" the privilege
through birth or tenure in a territory. 185 Alternately, they might feel that removing a
perceived source of competition is the best means of reducing resource pressure.
Finally, natives might perceive immigrants as a source of physical insecurity.
Members of minority groups (internal or external) are often portrayed as the bearers of
181 Wiener's (1978) study of internal Indian migration found that natives in one state would mobilize
against migrants who they perceived as economic competitors, despite a shared national identity.
182 Angenendt (1997), pg. 61.
183 Olzak (1992).
184 For this argument as it relates to social welfare or public goods provision in societies where multiple
ethnicities are salient, see Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) or Alesina et al. (2001).
185 Perea, Ch. 1 in Perea (ed.) (1997). Ethnic groups frequently assert their legitimacy though a connection
to the soil; Horowitz (1985). Groups may claim tenure through the duration of settlement, or argue for
legitimacy based on the amount they've invested in that land; this Locke-ian argument was made for
example by early US immigrants vis-h-vis Native Americans; see Toft (2003).
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crime, disease or political instability. 186 Any increase in immigration could therefore be
considered "importing instability" by concerned natives.
Second, natives might perceive immigrants, frequently the bearers of a foreign
religion, language and cultural traditions, as a threat to their values or norms. Whether
school serves pork at lunch, a neighborhood is thought of as Chinatown or religious
symbols can be worn by civil servants has no material impact on most natives. But these
issues carry symbolic weight; for some, increasing ethnic or cultural diversity calls into
question a society's ability to cohere in times of crisis or maintain its cherished values
and traditions in times of peace.' 87
Finally, some symbolic policies can carry tangible material effects. Growing
immigrant communities might call for instruction in their native language or bilingual
civil servants. To a native either could be perceived as an inefficient allocation of
resources or as competition, though the changes are primarily aimed at increasing the
symbolic representation of a minority. Bilingual education reallocates scarce resources to
a service most natives cannot benefit from. Bilingual civil servants create a barrier to
economic advancement for some natives by adding job requirements they cannot or will
not meet. In sum, there is an argument for perceiving threats that are material, symbolic
and a mixture of both in native concerns with immigration. At the extreme, some natives
may conclude that changes in demography or differential birthrates signal a status
186 Higham (1955); Husbands, in Hainsworth (ed) (1992); Panayi (2000); Sniderman et al. (2000). This
perception extends to endogenous, low-status ethnic categories (Brown and Warner 1992; Gilliam and
Iyengar 2000).
187 Horowitz (1985); Citrin et al. (1990b); Huntington (2004). Sniderman et al. (2004) find that concerns
about national identity outweigh concerns about economic competition among anti-immigrant survey
respondents in the Netherlands.
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reversal and will relegate them to "strangers in their own land," no longer valued by their
own political or social system. 188
This is not to say that immigration always represents a Shock. If immigration is
perceived as fundamentally threatening by many individuals, heavy out-migration should
generally be perceived as a positive outcome. Even if increasing immigration rates
significantly deviate from past observations, it could be that the immigration was
solicited and consensual. For example, a receiving society might use scheduled or
temporary migration to overcome a labor shortage and sustain high economic growth
despite concerns about the cultural or physical impact. In sum, 100,000 immigrants
arriving as scheduled guest workers will not be treated the same by the receiving country
as 100,000 unanticipated refugees.
Whether and why immigration is perceived as threatening speaks to debates about
the motivations for ethnic mobilization. Implicit primordialists and soft constructivists
treat ethnicity as basically fixed and exogenous, the result of some distant past conflict,
historical process or institutional decision. 189 Immigrants are threatening qua
immigrants. In contrast, hard constructivists argue that ethnicity is fluid and endogenous
to political processes. Ethnic mobilizations occur when the benefits provided by
188 Status reversal is the idea that one group's increase in social or economic standing necessarily means
that another's decline; Tajfel (1971) or Horowitz (1985). "[F]remd im eigenen Land" is a classic refrain of
German nativists. Whether or not rational, threatened individuals may fear they will be "swamped" by an
ethnic outgroup, that their group will become hierarchically subordinate, and eventually that they will be
extinguished through violence or assimilation when relegated to the minority; see Horowitz (1985), pp.
175-189.
189 For examples of implicit primordialism, see Rabushka and Shepsle (1972), Geertz (1973), or Kaplan
(1993). For examples of soft constructivism, see Anderson (1983), Gellner (1983), Horowitz (1985), Laitin
(1986), or Huntington (2004).
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distributive coalitions along ethnic lines crosses some threshold.' 90 There is evidence to
support both claims. On the one hand, nativist parties argue that reducing immigration
will provide demonstrable benefits. The juridical assignment of "native" and
"immigrant" is a particularly convenient decision rule, as promising to redistribute from
individuals without voting rights can attract voters set to benefit without threatening vote
loss from the target population. Moreover, despite their blanket statements nativist
parties do not mobilize against all immigrants, but target the flows most associated with
negative outcomes. 19 1 On the other hand, the categories and potential for expropriation
associated with natives and immigrants has been available to, and used by, West
European entrepreneurs for decades, yet the utilization of these appeals has only resulted
in success under specific structural conditions. 192 This suggests that the change in
demand for certain appeals is at least as important as the change in supply of those
appeals.
For individuals who see immigration or immigrants as a pressing threat, there are
a number of political mechanisms for implementing threat reduction. Natives could use
legislation to increase their share of a country's resources through re-distribution,
whether positive (implementing programs with a preference for natives) or negative
(cutting programs perceived as benefiting immigrants). They could raise the barriers to
naturalization, stalling immigrant access to citizen-specific resources, or they could erect
barriers to preserve their status by restricting voting rights or making the native language
the official language of commerce or government. Natives can also use political
190 See for example Bates (1974 and 1983), Kasfir (1979), Bhabha (1994), Nobles (2000), Chandra (2004),
Posner (2004), or Yashar (2005).
191 Gibson (2002). See also Chapters 2 and 6 in this project.
192 Nativist mobilizations in the United Kingdom (National Front) and Switzerland (National Action) used
the same basic argumentation in the late 1960s.
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institutions to gain a demographic advantage by increasing their numbers or decreasing
the number of immigrants. They could raise the barriers to immigration or close
loopholes, provide incentives to increase the native birth rate, push assimilationist
policies, or physically reduce the immigrant population by carrot (economic incentives
for voluntary return) or stick (lowering the bar for deportation).
Most of these measures serve a dual purpose. They address the current threat, but
they also reduce the probability of future threats, whether exogenous (by strengthening
external barriers against future immigration) or endogenous (by decreasing the power,
status, or number of resident immigrants). 193 Should the native/immigrant dynamic
become salient and established parties unable or unwilling to engage in an individual's
preferred response, party switching to signal dissatisfaction or to increase the influence of
sympathetic actors becomes a rational response to a perceived threat.
Project Hypotheses
A Shock model of party system change generates four hypotheses about the
effects of immigration on nativist party support. The first hypothesis is the most basic
and the key hypothesis explored in this project.
Hypothesis 1 (The "Indirect" Hypothesis): Increasing immigration
leads to increasing support for nativist parties.194
Hypothesis 1 assumes that natives can identify changes in ethnic distributions,
that they perceive unsolicited increases in non-natives as threatening and that larger
193 Power is an instrument to secure benefits and a benefit unto itself, a means to prevent future threats;
Horowitz (1985), pg. 187. For an example of endogenous threat reduction, assume that ethnic group A
associates crime or inter-ethnic violence with ethnic group B. One means of reducing the expected amount
of crime or violence is simply to reduce the number of Bs in the area.
194 Net immigration is used rather than gross immigration, as net immigration is a better indicator of impact
if immigrants are considered interchangeable. For example, 200,000 immigrants entering and 400,000
exiting in a year is conceptually different than 200,000 entering with none exiting.
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changes are more likely to be perceived as threatening than smaller changes. Evaluations
of changing distributions are considered independent across periods; a change in the
immigrant population from 7-8% before the election at timet+l will be equivalent to a
change from 6-7% before the election at time,. Hypothesis 1 is "indirect" as the model
expects the effects of changes in objective conditions to be mediated by issue salience. If
there is no relationship between objective structural processes and party support, then
Shocks are either the result of elite manipulation (Hypothesis 2) or have no role to play in
the growth of nativist parties (if Hypotheses 1 and 2 are disconfirmed).
Hypothesis la (The "Additional Effects" Hypothesis): Increasing
immigration leads to increases in non-electoral forms of nativist activity,
such as social group formation, social group participation, or anti-
immigrant violence.
Hypothesis 1 a assumes that there are mechanisms of threat reduction that do not
require the ballot box. Some individuals could form pressure groups to influence
politicians, or build social organizations to provide co-ethnics with material benefits and
a sense of shared identity. Others might choose to engage in vandalism or violence
against perceived immigrants. 195 Ethnic violence is not exclusively the release of
personal frustration or scapegoating, though it may be that as well. While attacking
members of other ethnic categories to engage in forced redistribution or remake ethnic
demography is a high risk venture with little expectation of reward in societies with
strong rule of law,196 it can still be a prophylactic against demographic or status
195 Perceived, as ethnic violence often relies on visual cues, which can result in false positives.
196 Gurr (1970); Bates, Greif and Singh (2002); Acemoglu and Robinson (2006); Kalyvas (2006). The
ability to act without being punished is fundamental to the willingness to engage in violence, whether
ethnic (Horowitz 2001; Varshney 2002) or non-ethnic (Petersen 2001).
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change. 197 Areas with high, persistent levels of ethnic victimization can develop into no-
go zones or "spaces of fear" for the victimized category, preserving native position even
at the expense of the economic or social benefits of internal or external immigration. 198
While violence may not be strong enough to generate a full-scale security dilemma
between ethnic groups, it can certainly influence individual decisions. 199
Hypothesis 1 a is "additional" as electoral competition is considered the crucial
mechanism for individuals to express dissatisfaction with native/immigrant dynamics in
West European societies. As discussed below, when the scope conditions operating in
Western Europe are relaxed non-electoral activities might dominate the native reaction.
These additional effects are dependent variables, and not explanatory variables, as the
processes and mechanisms hypothesized to bring them about are the same.200 Different
nativist reactions (parties, social groups and violence) might not be independent, and
furthermore might be dependent in ways that aggravate or mitigate one another. Political
parties or social groups could direct ethnic violence, or successful social groups could
form a political party (and vice versa). On the other hand, the perceived effectiveness of,
or opportunity to engage in, one type of reaction might reduce the need for others. If
197 Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) treat all political violence as re-distributive. Lake and Rothchild
(1996), Fearon (1998) and Slack and Doyon (2001) consider ethnic violence, particularly in the former
Yugoslavia, as prophylactic. For Woodward (1974) or Olzak (1992), high status groups use violence as a
last resort for preserving established hierarchies.
198 A high probability of being attacked or seeing economic gains dashed, such as through harassment,
Vandalism or arson, should see most individuals unwilling to assume these risks. The concept of spaces of
fear comes from an interview with Thomas Buerk-Matsunami of the Institute for European Ethnology in
Berlin, 7/23/05.
199 Whether localized violence escalates seems to depend on the State's ability to guarantee internal
security (Fearon 1996). If the State is a) impartial and b) effective at enforcement, groups can use the State
as a credible commitment to peace. Widespread, uncontrolled inter-group violence can rapidly make the
relevant cleavage salient for all group members, as the expected disutility (death or serious injury) from
failing to treat that identity as salient easily outweighs the cost of preparing for conflict (Weingast 1998;
Fearon and Laitin 2000; Kydd and Walter 2002).
200 Of course, violence caused by immigrants could represent a Shock, as could social movements
organized by immigrants. In this project, actions natives take are considered dependent variables, while
actions that immigrants take are considered explanatory variables.
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natives feel they can achieve their goals through a low risk, low effort activity like
voting, there may be no need to engage in social group formation (low risk, high effort)
or violence (high risk, high effort). 201 For this reason, failing to confirm Hypothesis la is
not fatal to the model as presented.
Hypothesis 2 represents a hypothesis designed to test the relationship between
issue salience and nativist party support.
Hypothesis 2 (The "Direct" Hypothesis): The increasing salience of
native/immigrant issue or identity dimensions leads to increasing support
for nativist parties.
Hypotheses 1 and 2 are closely related. Hypothesis 2 is "direct" as compared to
objective demographic changes, there are fewer intervening variables between issue
salience and changes in party support; if there was perfect information on both changes in
salience and changes in demography, salience would be the better predictor of support.
This will be true as long the relationship of structural to salience changes is not perfect.
Unfortunately, compared to objective structural changes the data on issue or identity
salience is significantly weaker and any tests will necessarily be less systematic.
Finally, Hypothesis 3 considers the effect of the prior size of the immigrant
population on nativist party growth. While not crucial to the model (which privileges
changes, not levels), it addresses an interesting question: are changes in nativist party
support conditional not just on changes in the native/immigrant distribution, but also on
the prior distribution?
Hypothesis 3 (The "Xenophobia vs. Fertile Ground" Hypothesis):
Increasing immigration leads to greater increases in support for nativist
parties depending on the size of the prior immigrant population.
201 Minkenberg (1998).
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Unlike Hypotheses 1 and 2, there could be conflicting mechanisms at work in
Hypothesis 3. On the one hand, areas with previously low ethnic heterogeneity might be
more prone to reject ethnic groups they have no prior experience with, and nativist parties
should find more success in areas of low native/immigrant heterogeneity, holding net
migration constant (the xenophobia mechanism). 20 2 On the other hand, areas of high
heterogeneity increase the frequency of cursory contact, such as interactions in a market
or neighborhood, as opposed to friendships or family ties, which could allow economic
and social frictions to develop without developing mechanisms for increasing tolerance
(the fertile ground mechanism). 203 Consequently, nativist parties should find more
success in areas of high prior native/immigrant heterogeneity, holding net migration
constant.
Why do Shocks End?
Once a Shock unsettles expectations, how or why does it ever end? How or why
does niche party support ever stabilize again?204 This section briefly considers several
mechanisms of Shock termination. First, considering the hypothesized distribution of
individual expectations described earlier, a Shock ends when individuals observe the
relevant dimension as returning to something like their prior expectations. Eventually,
gas prices stop increasing, a major terrorist campaign ends or immigration declines to
202 Triandafyllidou (2001).
203 Allport (1954). Indeed, areas with high ethnic heterogeneity should be more prone to Shocks, as they
create additional opportunities for triggering events, such as inter-ethnic violence. Fearon and Latin (1996)
argue that inter-ethnic interactions lack the ability to acquire information about, and sanction, non-
cooperative ingroup members. Allport (1954) and Pettigrew (1998), find that equal status is important for
enhancing non-cursory inter-ethnic contact and reducing inter-ethnic tension.
204 In terms of ethnic politics, this question directly addresses ethnic outbidding models, in which the
introduction of ethnic politics into a political system leads ethnic groups to engage in progressively more
extreme and exclusionary actions until violence breaks out and the political system breaks down. See
Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) or Horowitz (1985).
124
previous levels. Of course it may also be that expectations are updated over time to
accommodate the new environment; individuals might become accustomed to terror
attacks or gas rationing.
For nearly any Shock, there might be exogenous or endogenous mechanisms of
termination. Immigration's push factors (famine, civil war, asymmetric economic
growth) could end, or the flow of individuals willing or able to migrate could be
exhausted. On the other hand, new laws or enhanced enforcement could reduce
immigration flows. There can be sincere and strategic incentives for established actors to
end a Shock as quickly as possible. Sincerely, established actors have their own
preferences and might see the Shock as a threat. Strategically, if established actors are at
a comparative disadvantage on the relevant dimension, additional delay will result in lost
votes and seats, which translates into lost financing, power and prestige. If they begin
with a comparative advantage, delays in resolving the Shock can erode their credibility
and open them to attacks by niche competitors.
Alternately, support for the niche party could stabilize when some natural
threshold is reached, as the willingness to re-weight salience or shift preferences might
not be infinitely flexible. Some individuals, such as pro-migrant activists, naturalized
immigrants or natives with immigrant spouses or children from mixed marriages, might
be unwilling to vote for a nativist party in a democratic system. Others might be
persuaded to switch their vote through a combination of their own concerns and the
recognition of the concerns in enough other, similar voters. Concern might also increase
with the duration of the Shock, as established actors seem increasingly incapable of
resolving the triggering event. The result is a "tipping" model, in which vote switching
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becomes self-reinforcing until some threshold is reached or the Shock ends.20 5 For
example, all of a country's meatpackers might have a similar but non-identical
willingness to tip. Some are motivated to switch through concerns about job loss, while
others tip after recognizing the growing concern among their colleagues. The actions of
meatpackers might have an influence on steelworkers, who recognize the potential for
similar conflicts, but not on the actions of lawyers, who see these concerns as too
removed to represent a significant threat.206
Finally, when the organizing conflict is focused on groups, an outgroup presence
might depress niche party support at the local level, even if that outgroup cannot vote.
For example, if primarily low-skill, blue-collar workers support nativist parties and all the
unmobilized low-skill residents in a district are immigrants (as a result of"white flight,"
chain migration, or ethnically-concentrated housing), nativists will eventually reach a
point where they are unable to mobilize new supporters.
Antecedent Conditions
Four antecedent conditions explicitly or implicitly delineate the model's external
validity: the archetypal system described above is thought to be 1) a mass suffrage
democracy with 2) strong rule of law and 3) proportional electoral rules where 4) parties
are efficacious at implementing their policies. With minimal exceptions, such as the
United Kingdom's majoritarian electoral system, these four conditions describe post-war
205 Kuran (1998).
206 An example of this logic is Petersen's (2001) study of cascade effects during insurgent mobilization in
the Baltics. In Petersen's model, villagers fell into groups (such as disaffected young men or clergymen)
with similar preferences and a tipping point based on the percentage of other villagers who mobilized. If
one cluster was large enough to cross the tipping threshold of the next, that cluster would mobilize and so
on, until there were no unmobilized villagers or the percentage of mobilized villagers failed to reach the
tipping threshold of unmobilized clusters.
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Western Europe. However, the processes identified here are neither historically nor
geographically bounded, and this section identifies expected outcomes when one or more
of these antecedent conditions does not obtain.
Non-Democracy/No Mass Suffrage
Mass democracies produce a relatively accurate pictures of public preferences,
though non-voting admittedly tends to be correlated with certain socio-economic
attributes. In non-democracies, there is no expectation that the Government or
distribution of legislative seats will reflect the views of the public. Consequently, there is
less likelihood that a Shock will be reflected in electoral results. On the other hand,
centralized systems provide a greater capacity for elites to manipulate information, which
could lead to increased public concern over non-events. Non-democratic regimes might
also facilitate violence against outgroups if they relax the penalties for engaging in that
violence. Finally, non-democracies unencumbered by veto points or competing interests
might be more effective at confronting Shocks quickly, before they can translate into
broader public concerns. All three intuitions should be applicable, albeit to a lesser
degree, in democracies with a limited franchise or limited civil liberties. In elite
democracies, the political system does not represent the full range of preferences held by
the public. If the excluded voting population is somehow correlated with a group
particularly likely to be affected by a Shock, there should be no or a reduced effect.
Weak Rule of Law
In societies with strong rule of law, parties are assumed to be able implement their
issue positions and the positions they take are therefore meaningful to voters. In weak
rule of law societies, however, voters assume that parties are incapable of implementing
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formal policies and discount the issue positions parties take.207 For Shocks generally, one
would expect that voters see parties as a poor outlet for their concerns and that social
mobilization or violence are more fruitful channels for engaging in threat reduction.
Violence might be especially pernicious in weak rule of law societies, where the benefits
are higher (permanent redistribution becomes possible) and the costs lower (it is less
likely the State can prosecute perpetrators).
For Shocks that impact identity categories asymmetrically, however, parties may
still have something to offer voters in a weak rule of law society. As post-election spoils
cannot be reliably distributed by elites through formal, indiscriminate policies, parties are
often only able to promise some coalition of voters preferential treatment (patronage) in
exchange for their vote. Under these conditions, identity categorizations, particularly
ethnic categorizations, are an effective technology for politicians to identify insiders and
outsiders when providing patronage, and for voters to identify credible promises when
evaluating parties.208 In Shock conditions, then, niche parties could prove attractive by
promising to preserve or increase the patronage funneled to a threatened identity.
Majoritarian Electoral Rules
In systems with low barriers to party entry or favorable formulas for translating
votes into seats, as in proportional representation systems, new or small parties should
have no difficulty forming or finding new supporters. In systems with high barriers to
party entry or majoritarian apportionment formulas, voters tend to defect from parties
207 On this point and more generally on the distinction between strong and weak rule of law societies, this
project is indebted to Ziegfeld (Dissertation).208 Fearon (1999); Chandra (2004); Caselli and Coleman (Working Paper).
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unlikely to win seats.209 Majoritarian electoral rules should therefore reduce a niche
party's ability to attract new voters, as individuals heavily discount the party's ability to
implements its policies by exerting legislative influence. One possible outcome is that
niche actors will form a faction aimed at affecting the policy of one or more established
parties, rather than engaging in party formation. Another is that niche party success will
vary with the level of aggregation; in regions or localities where the individuals most
impacted by a Shock are sufficiently concentrated, niche parties may operate as though
electoral rules were proportional. Finally, niche actors might decide to express
themselves outside of political competition, by forming interest groups or social
movements, or engaging in violence.
Non-Systematic Efficacy
Finally, rule of law assumes systematic party efficacy; all parties are equally
capable or incapable of implementing their stated positions. Efficacy, however, could be
non-systematic across parties in a system, or across parties in multiple systems. For
example, parties forming the Government tend to be more efficacious than parties in the
opposition. Due to the distribution of preferences or the nature of Government
formation, one or more parties might be consistently less effective at implementing their
policies, as they can never hope to be more than a junior partner in Government or might
be excluded from possible coalitions altogether. This could decrease niche party support
through strategic voting, or increase it as voters engage in compensatory voting to give
the niche party more bargaining power in a potential coalition.210 The balance between
209 COX (1997).
210 Fiorina (1996) and Kedar (2005) find that voters modify their policy expectations based on a party's
expected influence in office.
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the two mechanisms likely shifts as the size of the niche party or the likelihood of
entering a coalition increases.
Political competition might also make a niche party more or less efficacious. One
established party could attempt to undercut a niche competitor to preserve their own
support, while another attempts to strengthen them to weaken an established
competitor. 211 Some niche parties might hold positions normatively or strategically
unacceptable to all established actors and be entirely frozen out of the political system,
with established party signaling to voters that the niche party will be wholly ineffective if
elected. These "stigmatized" parties could still see their support increase during Shocks
as they serve in the short-term as a potent signal to established parties, who suffer losses
in funding and seats as niche parties succeed.212
The main intuition, however, is that stigmatized niche parties will have difficulty
retaining new supporters in the long-term. During a Shock, salience on the relevant
dimension could overwhelm the stigmatized party's high discount factor. Voters realize
that someone in the political system will record their displeasure and implement threat
reduction, but might not do so without punishment. That same discount factor makes the
niche party unattractive when the Shock subsides however; voters learn that the
stigmatized party is incapable of representing them in day-to-day matters. Stigmatized
parties could also find their gains from a Shock lower than expected if voters look
perceive a future inefficacy or fear the social pressure associated voting with a party that
is "beyond the pale." Finally, stigmatized parties could have difficulties attracting
competent, ambitious elites or running competitive campaigns, further reducing their
211 Meguid (2005).
212 In most European countries, parties are financed primarily by the State based on vote and seat shares.
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perceived efficacy and their ability to run credible elections. 213 Figure 3.6 displays the
expectations for niche parties that are perceived as inefficacious.
Figure 3.6: Niche Party Outcomes (Party Efficacy)
Conclusions
This chapter presented a theoretical framework for understanding one model of
niche party growth and party system change. High impact, unanticipated events (Shocks)
rapidly increase the salience of some dimension of political contestation for some subset
of voters that perceive the event as a threat to their material or symbolic well being.
Niche parties benefit from this salience increase when their position on that dimension
make them sufficiently attractive to the subset of individuals to induce vote switching
from an established party to the niche party, or from "non-voter" to the niche party.
Specifically, I argued that the growth of nativist parties can be explained by the
changing salience of dimensions of contestation related to the native/immigrant dynamic.
While I focused on one potential Shock (large, rapid, unanticipated immigration flows),
one can imagine multiple potential salience-altering events related to the
native/immigrant dynamic, such as increases in inter-ethnic violence, or major revisions
to immigration policy or the status recognition provided to natives or immigrants.
Moreover, the theory does not deny that other structural or historical processes, such as
electoral de-alignment or generational change, might facilitate party switching to nativist
parties, though it does contend that these processes are neither necessary nor sufficient,
while Shocks are both.
213 On these mechanisms as they relate to Radical Right parties, see Minkenberg (1998) or Art (2006).
At its core, the idea is highly parsimonious, requiring only the reasonable belief
that unusual events raise interest in the issues or identities related to those events, and that
elections are a key means of resolving political or social concerns. If good public opinion
data on individual salience, preferences, assumed party positions and partisanship were
available across elections, changes in salience would be sufficient to explain some
variation in observed vote switching, and changes in salience would in turn be explained
by some measurable, objective structural process. The model is not infirmed if weak
preferences do change with salience or elites are able to facilitate or constrain changes,
though these possibilities raise questions which attributes make certain individuals more
susceptible to preference change or elite narratives.
A Shock model of party system change and political competition is a compelling
advance in its comprehensiveness and flexibility. It explains periods of equilibrium and
disequilibrium. It emphasizes the possibility of multiple explanations for a party or a
system, rather than historically bounded, teleological processes. A Shock model can
explain the emergence and re-emergence of similar movements across a wide variety of
regional, institutional and temporal conditions. Finally, because the model is dynamic
and the competition between parties ongoing, there is no end state. Today's failed or
marginal niche party could succeed tomorrow under the right conditions, while structural
or institutional factors could rob today's successful niche party of support in future
elections.
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Figure 3.3: A Full Shock Model of Niche Party Growth
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Figure 3.5: Conceptualizing Shocks
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Chapter 4 - Earthquake: Explaining Cross-Time Nativist Success in
Austria and Germany
Thus far largely theoretical and conceptual, the next three chapters of my
dissertation turn to the data used to generate and further test my working theory. This
chapter focuses on the evolution of political processes in Austria and Germany after the
1973 oil crisis ended large-scale scheduled migration to Western Europe. In this chapter
I advance two related arguments. First, a spike in immigration in the late 1980s and early
1990s represented a Shock with far-reaching and measurable effects on both societies.
Before the late 1980s, Austrian and German elites rarely discussed immigration and the
public in both countries considered it a non-issue. At the height of the Shock, however,
more than 40% of the German and Austrian publics named immigration as the most
important national issue and immigration dominated the political discourse. Furthermore,
the Shock's effects on discourse persist despite a subsequent decline in immigration,
suggesting durable changes in the political and social salience of immigration in both
countries.
Second, I argue that the increase in salience of immigration generated by the
Shock drove some subset of natives to address their concerns by switching their support
to nativist parties in state and national elections. Increases in nativist party support track
empirically with cross-time variation in immigration and the salience of immigration in
both countries. It was exactly those elections where immigration was the most salient
that nativist parties saw their greatest increases in support. Nativist parties succeeded in
these elections because a significant portion of the population that had not previously
supported nativist appeals felt these parties were the best suited to deal with the emerging
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immigration issue. Changes in crime rates, unemployment, or party organization are
insufficient to explain the variation in nativist party growth across time.
The chapter proceeds in three sections. The first section describes patterns of
nativist party support in Germany and Austria since 1973. The second section establishes
the scope of the proposed Shock and connects it to three reactions in the native
population: a general increase in the salience of immigration, a significant increase in
support for nativist parties and a significant increase in anti-immigrant violence. Finally,
I consider the role of changes in the elite discourse about immigration in Germany and
Austria. I will argue that changes in elite discourse were driven by objective events and,
though this discourse probably acted as an intervening variable that increased public
concerns about immigration, these concerns were not the result of elite manipulation. An
explanation for the cross-national variation in the fortunes of nativist parties in Germany
and Austria is explored in the next chapter, while a systematic quantitative analysis of
nativist party support (cross- and sub-national) is presented in Chapter 6.
Patterns of Party Support
The dependent variable for this project is changes in nativist party support.
Variation on the dependent variable in both Austria and Germany is predominantly
temporal. Support for nativist parties in national elections reflected their average support
across state and European elections at the time; there was no systematic bias to suggest
that nativist voters used a particular administrative level for policy balancing or
signaling.21 4 Nativist parties in Germany succeeded in the Protestant north (Schleswig-
Holstein) and the Catholic south (Baden-Wuerttemberg). They saw above average
214 Kedar (2006).
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growth in areas where National Socialists in the 1930s had done poorly, such as industrial
cities like Mannheim, and failed in areas where they had done exceptionally well, such as
agricultural Lower Saxony. Nativist parties in Austria similarly succeeded in the Left-
leaning, Catholic east (Vienna) and the Right-leaning, more Protestant west (Carinthia).
Indeed, the only relevant geographic variation was an urban/rural split; nativist parties in
Germany and Austria tended to do better in metropolitan (Vienna, Frankfurt, Berlin) than
rural areas (Burgenland, Lower Saxony). This sort of variation fits well with a story
about immigration; immigration to Germany and Austria was overwhelmingly urban,
areas where immigrants could acquire low- or unskilled service or manufacturing jobs.
Even asylum-seekers, initially restricted in movement and occupation by the government,
had an incentive to migrate to the cities once their restrictions on work were lifted.
Cross-time patterns of electoral support for the five identified nativist parties (the
REP, NPD and DVU in Germany; the FPOe and BZOe in Austria) can be divided into
three periods in both countries over the past 35 years. In the first period, from the early
1970s through about 1986, these parties existed in an electoral wilderness. Since its
founding in the 1950s, the FPOe experienced a consistent decline in support and by 1986
was very close to the national electoral threshold (4%). The NDP, a small movement
founded in the 1960s to re-create the German NPD's success, never gained more than
.1% of the vote. In the former West Germany, the NPD never recovered from internal
crises preceding the 1972 national election. 215 Their decision to engage in nativist
appeals from about 1980 improved the party's fortunes but failed to push it above the .5%
necessary to recoup election costs through public campaign financing. The REP and
215 The NPD nearly reached the 5% threshold in the 1968 federal election, but initially chose not to contest
elections in 1972 to present a "unified front" against Willy Brandt's national SPD government.
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DVU were nascent parties in these years, with the only election seriously contested by
either a state election in the REP's home of Bavaria in 1986.
In the second period, from 1986/1987 until 1994, nativist parties in both countries
saw a rapid expansion in support. This success was more pronounced in Austria, where
the FPOe, despite remaining the third largest party, was the big winner of the 1986, 1990
and 1994 national elections and formed the government in the state of Carinthia in
1989.216 In West (later western) Germany, the REP and DVU entered 4 of the 11 West
German state parliaments between 1987 and 1993 and narrowly missed entering two
others, but failed to enter the national parliament in 1990 or 1994.217 Even the NPD saw
its best returns since the 1960s, gaining more than .5% in some state elections despite an
unaltered message or leadership. Unlike Austria, the success of nativist parties in
Germany was bi-modal, lasting from September 1987 (Bremen) to January 1989 (Berlin,
the year's only election) and again from September 1991 (Bremen) through 1993.
Finally, from 1994 in Germany and 1995 in Austria nativist parties entered a
period of consolidation or marked decline. In Austria the FPOe experienced continued
but reduced growth, with a brief surge in 1999 resulting in the formation of a national
government with the OeVP. From 2000 until 2005, the party collapsed to its 1986 level
of support in a series of disastrous setbacks. In the former West Germany, the REP re-
entered the parliament in Baden-Wuerttemberg in 1996, but the general trend since 1997
has been a decline into irrelevance. Only the NPD's recent successes in East Germany
have kept that party a relevant political actor nationally, while the DVU's existence relies
216 With party leader Joerg Haider elected governor through the backing of the Christian-democratic OeVP.
217 The four were Berlin (REP; 1989), Bremen (DVU; 1991), Baden-Wuerttemberg (REP; 1992) and
Schleswig-Holstein (DVU; 1992). Nativist parties just missed entering the parliament in Bavaria (REP;
1990) and Hamburg (REP and DVU; 1993).
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entirely on its aging founder, publisher Gerhard Frey, and his willingness to outspend the
other parties in targeted elections. The FPOe's defeats were concurrent with its time in
government and were only arrested in 2005 with the FPOe/BZOe split (and the FPOe's
subsequent return to the opposition), strongly suggesting that it was hampered by its
government responsibilities. 218 Though I am primarily interested in explaining the shift
from the first period to the second, an argument for the FPOe's persistence and REP's
decline after 1994, grounded in supply-side explanations of party organization and party
competition, is advanced in the next chapter.
One plausible alternative explanation is that nativist parties were simply better
organized in the late-1980s. But in Austria, the states where the FPOe saw the greatest
growth initially had some of the weakest party organizations. Vienna had the lowest
density of FPOe party members to population of any state in 1986.219 Moreover, that
organization was badly split by the 1986 national leadership conflict between the
national-liberal Haider and the classical liberal Norbert Steger, the Vienna party chair, to
the degree that Steger essentially ran a separate campaign in Vienna during the 1986
national election against Haider's preferred candidate, Helene Partik-Pable. 220 Yet
Vienna, along with Carinthia (Haider's stronghold) saw by far the largest gains for the
FPOe at the state and national level, to the degree that Vienna is today the FPOe's
primary support base. It was not that the Viennese organization had previously lacked
the resources to contest elections, but rather that some exogenous factor made the party
more attractive to the Viennese, increasing both its votes and its ability to invest in
infrastructure. In Germany, nativist parties were equally disorganized across states.
218 Luther, in Dachs et al. (eds) (2006).
219 FPOe membership from Luther, in Dachs et al. (eds) (2006); Austrian population from the 1991 census.
220 FPOe campaign ads, Kurier, 11/18/86 and 11/20/86.
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Aside from Berlin (where the party was banned), the NPD was equally weak across West
Germany. With the exception of Bavaria, where they originally formed in 1983 after
splitting from the CSU, the REP created state organizations more or less simultaneously
in 1987 and 1988. The DVU never bothered to engage in organization building, running
all local campaigns from Frey's office in Munich. Indeed, both the REP and DVU only
invested resources in a state after they won an election, usually by margins that surprised
even party elites.
The Shock and its Effects
Having framed the outcome of interest, this section argues that patterns of
changing nativist party support are best explained by extreme increases in unsolicited net
migration to Germany and Austria in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The section
proceeds in four parts. Part one describes the dimensions of this event, and suggests that
it was unique for the post-war period. Part two argues that this event led to a sharp
increase in the public's concern with immigration as an issue, an increase in the salience
of immigration. Part three connects changes in net migration and changes in the salience
of immigration to nativist party support. Part four connects changes in net migration and
the salience of immigration to a second outcome, increases in anti-immigrant violence.
The Shock
Migration to Germany and Austria in the post-war period can be separated into
periods, which vary by flow and intent. This section will briefly argue that only one of
these flows contained the properties I associate with a Shock in Chapter 3.
First, in the late-1940s approximately 12 million German "expellees"
(Vertriebene) fled or were repatriated from former German territories in Eastern Europe
(today parts of Poland, the Czech Republic and Russia) for West Germany, East
Germany and Austria. After the initial expulsion 3.9 million East Germans fled west
between 1949 and 1961, precipitating construction of the Berlin Wall. 221 Between 1/4th
and 1/3rd of West Germans were a Vertriebene or an Uebersiedler by 1961, but as recent
German citizens who were linguistically, culturally and economically indistinct from
their fellow citizens, the Vertriebene and Uebersiedler were accepted or even welcomed
by their co-ethnics. Uebersiedler in Germany received compensation for their lost
property, subsidized housing and education, professional retraining, and were even
entitled to pensions based on their previous employment in the GDR.222 Moreover the
Uebersiedler offered political benefits, as their flight undermined the legitimacy of the
East German regime. 223
By the 1950s, labor shortages in West Germany and Austria, previously met by
taking in Uebersiedler, were threatening to slow Central Europe's economic recovery
(the "economic miracle" or Wirtschaftswunder). The solution in both countries was to
agree to official quotas for temporary guest workers (Gastarbeiter) with Mediterranean
countries that had an oversupply of labor.224 These laborers were primarily employed in
"3D" (dirty, dangerous, demeaning) jobs, such as textiles, heavy manufacturing, mining,
221 Muenz and Ulrich, pp. 69-73 in Bade and Weiner (eds) (1997).
222 Muenz and Ulrich, pp. 74-5 in Bade and Weiner (eds) (1997).
223 Bade, pg. 22 Bade and Weiner (eds) (1997).
224 Green (2004), pg. 32. The primary sending countries were Spain, Italy, Portugal, Greece, Turkey and
Yugoslavia.
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construction, grave digging or sanitation. 225 The guest worker period was, proportionate
to the population, the greatest non-Germanic migration of the post-war period; in all,
Germany's foreign population grew from 700,000 in 1961 (1.2%) to nearly 4 million in
1973 (6.4%).226 Austria experienced a smaller proportionate migration, though its
foreign population tripled to 270,000 (3.9%) between 1961 and 1973.227 The agreements
lasted until the end of 1973, when they were promptly suspended during the first Oil
Shock.
The native community did not accept the newcomers unreservedly. In 1964, two-
thirds of the respondents to a German survey agreed that they would accept a one-hour
increase in the work week if it meant no more guest workers were accepted. 228 But
despite the size and pace of the guest worker migration it never aroused a significant
level of opposition from the public or from political actors. Even the NPD was silent;
while they criticized the necessity of these "visitors" in German society, the guest
workers played only a small role in the party's platform and appeals; the party was much
more interested in debt relief for farmers, opposition to the Left (both Communists and
the "1968 Generation"), the return of territories lost during World War II, and the return
of Germany as a Third Way between the United States and Soviet Union.229
I would argue that the failure of the guest workers to arouse native concerns
comes back to the nature of the migration. First, all of the relevant social actors (the
Government, trade unions and employers' associations) agreed to the program and had
225 Stuttgarter Zeitung, "Gastarbeiterwohnungen ergeben die hoechsten Renditen," 3/14/72; Bade, pp. 166-
7 in Bade (ed) (1987).
226 German Federal Statistical Office, www.destatis.de.
227 Austrian Federal Statistical Office, www.statistik.at.
228 Seidel-Pielen, pg. 82 in Lengfeld (ed) (1995).
229 Schmoellinger, pg. 1937 in Stoess (ed) (1986).
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input into its eventual shape. These agreements particularly took into account concerns
about job competition; the trade unions agreed to the programs on the condition that all
workers in an industry were paid equal wages regardless of their origin and that no guest
worker replaced a native worker.230 The belief was that while the guest workers were not
the optimal solution, they were necessary to maintain Central Europe's high growth rate;
the Austrian daily Die Presse argued just a month before the Oil Shock in 1973 that
"without the guest workers, [a high growth rate and a productive economy] can't
happen." 231 The guest workers took jobs for wages or conditions that most natives would
not accept and contributed to social welfare schemes without the expectation that they
themselves could benefit from unemployment or retirement insurance.232
Second, natives believed that the guest workers were only temporary and would
leave when the agreements ended.233 The German daily FAZ stated in 1959 that guest
workers were a positive development, as "by their eventual unemployment they can be
sent back."2 34 Just a year before the Oil Shock, German papers still stated that the guest
workers would only be allowed to stay in the receiving country so long as they were
economically beneficial.235 The native population shared this view, whether it was the
government, the press, the employers or the unions.236 Natives believed that once the
supply of work dried up, guest workers would have no incentive to pay the more
expensive cost of living and would choose return. These assumptions were for the most
230 Holzinger (1997), pg. 55.
231 Die Presse, "Ohne Gastarbeiter geht es nicht," 9/11/73.
232 Meier-Braun (2002), pp. 35-6.
233 Joppke (1999), pg. 65.
234 As cited by Seidel-Pielen, pg. 83 in Lengfeld (ed) (1995).
235 Stuttgarter Zeitung, "Gastarbeiter sind nicht nur Arbeitskraefte," 11/11/72.
236 Interview, Dr. Rainer Bauboeck, Institute for European Integration Research, 12/04/06; Interview,
August Gaechter, Centre for Social Innovation, 4/2/07.
party correct...of the 14 million guest workers who entered Germany 11 million (nearly
4 /5 ths) returned after two to three years.237
Ironically, it was the unintended consequences of certain native decisions that
made return less likely. Both the employers and the trade unions fought for longer
contracts and residence permits decoupled from employment; employers did not want to
engage in frequent re-training, while the unions feared that shorter contracts would lead
to wage competition.238 Second, restrictions on movement after 1973 made family
reunification the optimal compromise between access to a superior job market and the
desire to marry and raise children among co-ethnics. Both provisions created incentives
for migrants become long-term residents and in effect settle in the receiving country:
"[In 1974] the government decided that any non-Austrian leaving country
couldn't come back if they had [a certain type of passport]. Construction
workers used to leave for the winter, then get a reemployment certificate.
People realized they couldn't leave easily, so they would just bring their
families. The government didn't catch on until much later. They didn't
understand how their own regulations worked." 239
While large scale economic migration to Western Europe effectively ended in
1973, three channels of migration to Germany and Austria were not closed off for
political or legal reasons. First, both countries had a legal obligation to permit legal
residents to send for their immediate family. Second, both countries were signatories to
the 1951 Geneva Convention protocols governing refugees, and had formal programs for
the acceptance of asylum seekers. 240 Countries under the agreement are liable to provide
237 Green (2004), pg. 33.
238 Green (2004), pg. 34. The workers themselves were interested in longer stays, as they found they were
unable to save as much as they had hoped in only one or two years; Muenz and Ulrich, pg. 82 in Bade and
Weiner (eds) (1997).
239 Interview, August Gaechter, 4/2/07.
240 The groups are not equivalent: asylum seekers are victimized by their government by their political or
religious grounds, and their acceptance is determined on an individual basis. Refugees are those fleeing an
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for refugees, even if they are not accepted as asylum seekers. Finally, in Germany
Article 116 of the Basic Law guaranteed citizenship to any individual who could prove
descent from citizens living within Germany's 1937 borders, as well as start-up funds,
education and job training to facilitate their integration. The more time that passed since
1945, the less these Aussiedler (returnees) resembled the average native German and the
more tenuous their linguistic and cultural connection to Germany became.24 1 For
example, Article 116 allowed for the return of the Volga Germans, who had settled in
Russia and the Ukraine in the 1 8th Century. Despite their claimed ethnic connection, the
Aussiedler were thought of as "Russen-Deutschen" (Russian-Germans) by natives, or
more often just "Russians."
Over time, individuals utilized all three mechanisms in ever greater numbers.
From 1973, family reunification offset guest worker out-migration and fundamentally
changed the character of the immigrant population from a temporary, economic migration
to a permanent, settler migration. Between 1973 and 1980 the number of foreigners in
Germany increased from 4 to 4.5 million, while the number of foreign laborers decreased
from 2.6 to 2.1 million.242 Between 1953 and 1987, West Germany took in 37,000
Aussiedler a year, with the majority coming from Poland (62%) and Romania (15%).243
From 1953 until 1975, they averaged a bit more than 5000 asylum applications each year,
including spikes during the crises in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968-9).
Asylum seeking increased rapidly from 1976, when applications hit 10,000 for the first
time and briefly spiked at 100,000 in 1980, with the military coup in Turkey and the
environment of significant physical risk based on political, social, or ethnic dynamics and their status is
determined on a group basis.
241 Joppke (1999), pg. 96.
242 Joppke (1999), pg. 78.
243 Muenz and Ulrich, pg. 70 in Bade and Weiner (eds) (1997).
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imposition of martial law in Poland 100,000. Austria, with 1/8th Germany's population,
averaged about 4000 asylum applications between 1961 and 1980 and roughly 35,000 in
1981.
An even greater movement to both countries began in the 1980s, before
accelerating beyond all expectations with the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and
Yugoslavia between 1988 and 1993. Asylum applications did not return to previous
levels after the 1980-1 peak; applicants to Austria from 1982 to 1987 more than doubled
to 8900 annually, while the average application rate to Germany increased ten-fold to
50,000, with peaks of 70,000 and then 100,000 in 1985 and 1986. What the
disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, Soviet Union and Yugoslavia meant for Germany and
Austria was a massive wave of asylum seekers, refugees and Aussiedler on top of these
already elevated numbers. From 1988 until 1993, Germany received 1.4 million
applications for asylum, twice as many as the entire period 1953-1987. Austria only saw
110,000 new applications (compared to 160,000 from 1961-1987) during this period, but
received 80,000 refugees Yugoslavian refugees (primarily Bosniaks), equal to 1% of its
total population.244 Between 1988 and 1994, 1.9 million Aussiedler entered Germany,
50% more than the entire period since 1953. These newcomers came primarily from the
former Soviet Union (57%), Poland (32%) and Romania (11%).245
The net effect of this movement was the greatest non-Germanic migration to
Austria in at least 100 years, and the most rapid non-Germanic migration in modern
German history. Net migration to Austria in 1991 (+77,000) was equal to any two
previous post-war years combined, and each year from 1989 to 1993 was greater than the
244 Fassmann and Muenz, pg. 37 (1995).
245 Muenz and Ulrich, pg. 71 in Bade and Weiner (eds) (1997).
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entire period from 1974 to 1987; overall, net migration from 1989 to 1993 (285,000) was
substantially larger than the entire period from 1961 to 1988 (180,000). In Germany, net
migration from 1988 to 1993 (3.6 million) was nearly as large as the entire guest worker
period (1955 to 1973; 3.7 million), with the years 1989 through 1992 setting consecutive
single-year records.246 Net migration each year from 1988 to 1993 was greater than all
net migration from 1971 to 1987 combined.
Compared to migration at other times since 1973, migration in the late-1980s and
early-1990s represented a significant departure from established patterns. As Figure 4.1
indicates, this movement resulted in yearly net migrations of .8% the total population, at
times reaching 1%. In comparison, legal and illegal migration to the United States in the
early- 1990s and first years of the 2 1 st Century generated significant public debate despite
a yearly per capita increase of .3-.5%; the United States last saw net migration of 1%
before World War 1.247 Compared to a migration that produced notable political and
social consequences for the quintessential "country of immigration," two "countries of
non-immigration" received two to three times the inflow of new foreigners during
beginning in the late-1990s. 248
Figure 4.1: Net Migration, 1974-2006
Another way to think about this migration is in relation to past trends. Figure 4.2
transforms Figure 4.1 by taking a 20-year rolling mean of per capita net migration, then
246 All figures come from the respective federal statistical authorities. These figures exclude refugees from
the former East Germany, who were classified separately. Despite the similar aggregate numbers, net
migration to Germany was proportionately greater during the guest worker period.247 Calculations based on US Department of Homeland Security (2007).
248 Germany formally stated that it was "not a country of immigration" in its naturalization requirements in
1977; Geddes (2003), pg. 80.
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calculates the standard deviation from that mean.249 This produces a sense of just how
unusual each year's migration is. Figure 4.2 indicates that migration in the late-1980s
and early-1990s was extraordinary even when taking into account recent guest worker
migration, while earlier and later migrations fell below expectations by comparison. Net
migration to Germany from 1988 to 1993 was on average 1.43 standard deviations above
the rolling mean; no other year was more than .51 above average. Net migration to
Austria during this period was even more exceptional, on average 1.86 standard
deviations above the mean from 1989 to 1993.
Figure 4.2: Relative Net Migration, 1974-2006
Though this migration was legal, unlike the guest workers it was neither
consensual nor controlled. While Germany had rules governing the acceptance of the
Aussiedler, it could not anticipate demand a priori, and the established parties could only
agree to require these Spaetaussiedler ("late returnees") to apply from their country of
origin and eventually passed a high (225,000) yearly quota in 1992.250 Particularly the
CDU-CSU resisted further restrictions, seeing themselves as the party of returnees and
expellees. The German and Austrian governments were even more constrained by the
rules governing asylum and refugees. Once a refugee was on a country's soil, they were
that country's responsibility by international law.
Moreover, with full employment a thing of the past there was no demand for un-
or low-skilled labor, and migration in the late-1980s and early-1990s was perceived as a
material and a symbolic threat to the native population. While the effect of migration on
249 Due to data availability, the Austrian average begins at 13 years in 1974, increasing until there are 20
years of data.
0 Geddes (2003), pg. 85. Even then, the Spaetaussiedler quota was met year until the late-1990s; Jung et
al. (2000), pg. 20.
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wage competition is debatable, 251 in a 1997 Eurobarometer poll 65% of the EU-15's
respondents believed that immigrants took jobs from natives.2 52 Moreover, unlike the
guest workers the newcomers were perceived as a net drain on social welfare.
Governments were responsible for feeding, clothing and housing asylum applicants,
refugees and the Aussiedler, paid for by native taxes. 253 To prevent "asylum abuse,"
asylum seekers and refugees were not legally permitted to work for the first several years
of residence, adding the perception that they were living off the native population.254
Unable to house the newcomers, state and local governments were required to rent hotel
rooms, gymnasiums and riverboats. Worst were the hastily-constructed "container
communities," shipping containers modified as living quarters, which furthered the
perception that the new migrants were fundamentally separated from the native
society.255 Once allowed free movement, the new migrants became competition for
subsidized government housing in a scarce market, with Germany already in need of 3
million units and Austria 200,000.256 Even in the mid-1970s, Germans were worried
about the impact of migration on native resources and quality of life:
"More foreigners mean not only more apartments, schools, hospitals and
so on, but also for example more cars, air pollution, noise, traffic jams,
roads, more garbage, more sewage and so on."257
251 Grossman (1982) and Borjas (1987) find that migrants have a small but significant impact on the wages
of natives, but a large impact on the wages of other immigrants. Chiswick (1989) finds that migrants
decrease the wages of some natives, but provide indirect economic benefits to others. Winter-Ebmer and
Zweimueller (1996) find that migration has the strongest economic impact on geographically-fixed natives.252 Eurobarometer 47.1, "Racism and Xenophobia," 12/97.
253 Geddes (2003), pg. 84.
254 Jung et al. (2000), pg. 23.
255 Joppke (1999), pg. 91.
256 Joppke (1999), pg. 91; Kurier, "Einigkeit in der Auslaenderpolitik 
- SP fordert: 'Einwandererzahl je
nach Konjunktur'," 10/15/91.
257 Bavarian state minister Berta Huber, quoted from Meier-Braun (2002), pg. 43.
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Finally, unlike the (temporary) guest workers or the (German) Vertriebene, the
newcomers in the late-1980s and early-1990s were seen as a culturally foreign group that
would lead to permanent social problems through the creation of a "parallel society." 258
In a 1994 Austrian survey, 66% believed that bringing different cultures into contact had
negative consequences, and 43% of Germans in a 1991 Politbarometer survey believed
that migrants literally contributed to Ueberfremdung (over-foreignization or cultural
dilution).259 The newcomers were also associated with more pressing social concerns
such as increased crime, particularly petty theft, drug crime and organized crime; in the
2002 European Social Survey, a majority of the respondents across 18 countries agreed
that migrants increased crime. Natives also feared that migration imported ethnic and
political conflicts from the former Yugoslavia and Turkey. In Germany, a large influx of
politically active Kurds led to a number of street battles, riots and organized civil
disturbances in the 1980s and 1990s, particularly after the banning of the Kurdish
Worker's Party in 1993.260
In sum, the nature of migration to Western Europe in the late-1980s and early-
1990s was essentially unprecedented in modern times, combining an atypically high
volume with the perception that the newcomers represented permanent material and
social threats and not temporary economic inputs. Returning to the theory introduced in
Chapter 3, niche parties benefit electorally when Shocks, events that unsettle individual
expectations about some aspect of the environment and lead concerned individuals to re-
evaluate their political and social priorities, coincide with a niche party's focus. While
258 Jung et al. (2000), pg. 24.
259 The Austrian survey is cited in Holzinger (1997), pg. 165; the German data comes from Politbarometer
1977-2002.
260 Angenendt (1997), pp. 78-9.
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most every advanced industrial country receives positive net migration each year, the late
1980s and early 1990s represented a strong departure from past trends in both Germany
and Austria.
Salience
Moreover, this migration led to significant changes in the perception of
immigration as a political and social priority. The remainder of this section considers
changes to public salience and connects those changes to net migration and increased
nativist party support, while also exploring changing patterns of anti-immigrant violence.
Violence, like voting, is one potential means of addressing social concerns and one that
understandably receives significant attention from scholars and policymakers.26 1
Measuring public opinion is crucial when connecting plausible explanatory events
to electoral outcomes. If immigration spikes and the public fails to react, it is unlikely
that nativist parties generate support from increased concerns about immigration, despite
their campaign appeals. On the other hand, if there is no Shock but a significant increase
in public concerns, nativist voters might be reacting to the manipulation of public opinion
by elites. Public opinion was captured along two dimensions using established survey
research. First, surveys measured how the public perceives an issue or group (positive,
negative, or indifferent), thereby capturing attitudes. Second, surveys measured how
important the public regards a particular issue, thereby capturing salience.
261 A third means of establishing a public-level reaction was to examine changes in the volume or tone of
social movements (Tarrow 1994). Nativist social movements in both Germany and Austria emerged in the
early 1980s. However, these movements were either primarily intellectual or heavily penetrated by nativist
party elites to de-link appeals from unpopular party labels. As Putnam (2000) notes, associational
belonging is generally declining in advanced industrial countries and the failure of a significant nativist
social movement to emerge in either country may not be indicative of broader trends.
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German survey data comes from Politbarometer continuous reporting conducted
by the Elections Research Group (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen) of Mannheim. Since
February 1986, Politbarometer has asked respondents to name the two most important
issues in Germany. As the question is open, it provides a good comparison of salience
before, during and after a Shock. Figure 4.3 displays the relationship between net
migration to Germany and the salience of immigration. As Figure 4.3 indicates, the
salience of immigration increased significantly in 1989 and again in the summer of 1991,
before finally declining in late 1993 and 1994.262 Throughout 1989, and from September
1991 until July 1993, immigration was ranked the single most important issue facing
Germany. Furthermore, the salience of immigration declined much more slowly than it
increased; from 1986 to 1988 the average percentage of respondents calling immigration
important was 4.5%; that percentage did not drop below 10% until 2003 and immigration
remained one of the top three issues through 1996.
Increases in salience in Germany, particularly in the late 1980s, track with net
migration. The relationship is strong (yearly r=.57) and would likely be stronger due to
missing data; Politbarometer only provided measurements for early 1988, though
immigration was far more salient at the end of the year. Part of this discrepancy,
however, had to do with competing social priorities. At any moment an individual might
be confronted with the state of the economy, pensions, health care, the environment,
crime, immigration or foreign policy. If multiple significant events occur simultaneously,
individuals might prioritize one to the exclusion of another. The relatively low salience
of immigration in 1990 and 1991 is probably best explained by German reunification, to
262 "Immigration" is an aggregate of several possible responses, including asylum/asylum-seeking,
Aussiedler, immigration or "foreigners."
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be sure an extraordinary event. Reunification was the most important issue for Germans
in 1990 and early 1991.263
Figure 4.3: Net Migration and Issue Salience, Germany
In Austria, the private survey firm FESSEL-GfK (now GfK Austria) has
measured issue salience for the past 25 years. 264 Immigration emerged as a salient theme
in Austria in 1990. From 1990 through 1993, approximately 40% of the population
considered immigration an important issue, and the salience of immigration tracks well
with changes in net migration (yearly r= 0.67 for the period 1990-2002).265 While there
is no data on the salience of immigration before the Shock, there is also no evidence to
suggest that immigration was a salient theme prior to the initial wave of new migrants in
late 1989. As in Germany, the decline in the salience of immigration in Austria was
slower than its increase; immigration remained one of the 10 most important political
themes until roughly 2000, and the portion of the public naming immigration as
important did not drop below 15%. While immigration was never ranked higher than #2
among all political themes, FESSEL asks respondents for three (sometimes four) themes
in their survey, compared to two in Germany. As a result, rankings in Austria and
Germany cannot be directly compared; those choosing immigration might consistently
rank it #1, while an issue ranked higher in the aggregate might consistently be ranked #4.
263 And likely kept the REP from entering federal parliament; see Chapter 5.264 While this data is not available to the public, many thanks are in order to Professor Peter Ulram for
releasing the aggregate trends. The 1999 figure was interpolated based on reporting in 1998 and 2000.
265 Data: 1990: FESSEL-GfK, "Immigration Problem" (Auslaenderprobleme) telephone survey, taking the
percent referring to immigration and asylum as "very important"; 1992-2002: FESSEL-GfK,
"Representative Surveys" (Representative Umfragen) surveys, percent referring to immigration as an
important theme. Without the 1990 or 1991 figures, which come from a focused rather than an open-ended
survey, the correlation between salience and net migration is 0.42. The 1991 figure was interpolated based
on reporting in 1990 and 1992.
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In contrast to the findings on salience, the findings on attitudes are mixed. The
fundamental problem when measuring attitudes on a new dimension is that detailed
questions are generally not asked until it becomes salient. It is therefore difficult to test
the degree to which attitude formation is independent of a particular event.
What is known is that during the Shock, significant parts of the population in both
countries held negative attitudes toward the new arrivals. In Germany, Politbarometer
surveys in 1989 found that 86% of the population felt there were too many asylum-
seekers entering the country and 58% too many Aussiedler, theoretically ethnic Germans.
Half the West Germans surveyed in August 1991 were generally dissatisfied with the
immigration situation.266 Over time, however, the population expressing dissatisfaction
consistently decreased, to 30% by 1995. Much of the movement occurred between
September (50%) and October (34%) 1992, concurrent with increased violence against
foreigners. This shift could be sincere or strategic; it could be that the anti-immigrant
actions generated sympathy for foreigners, or that it became socially unacceptable to
openly express anti-immigrant sentiment. In either case, throughout the 1990s a third of
the West German population maintained a consistently negative attitude toward all
immigrants, a significant reservoir for nativist parties to draw from.
As in Germany, attitudes in Austria softened over time. FESSEL interviews found
that initial enthusiasm for the new immigrants gave way by early 1990 to concerns about
increased crime, illegal employment and failures in the State's ability to manage
immigration. 267 FESSEL-GfK reported that in 1990, 38% of the population strongly
266 Politbarometer survey instrument (1989, 1991-3, 1995): "Many foreigners live in Germany. Do you
find this situation [in order] [not in order] [no answer/no opinion]."
267 Plasser and Ulram, in OJP 1990 (1991).
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agreed that there were too many foreigners in Austria (67% at least somewhat agreed); by
2001 these figures had dropped to 26% and 59%, respectively. Again, these numbers
suggest a significant target audience for nativist appeals, though not every new FPOe
voter was necessarily concerned with immigration and clearly not every voter concerned
with immigration switched to the FPOe. Paradoxically, areas with some of the lowest
levels of anti-immigrant attitudes (Vienna, Berlin, Baden-Wuerttemberg) saw the
greatest increases in nativist party support, suggesting the distribution of attitudes is
insufficient to explain the sub-national variation in outcomes.268
Migration, Salience and Party Support
Extending the comparisons to include support for nativist parties indicates that
trends in nativist growth mirror trends in net migration and the salience of immigration in
both countries. Figures 4.4 and 4.5 display changes in nativist support compared to net
migration. Changes in party support are measured as the average change in support for
elections held during that year.
Figures 4.4-4.5: Net Migration and Changes in Nativist Support, 1980-2005
As shown here, nativist parties were failing in the 1980s and succeeding in the
early 1990s as expected, with three caveats. First, support for the FPOe increased earlier
than it would have if the party relied solely on immigration for new supporters. 269
Second, German parties were less successful than expected in 1990 and 1991, which can
be explained by concerns with German reunification; these concerns dampened the
268 Austria: Holzer and Muenz (1994), pg. 21; Germany: Politbarometer cumulative dataset (1977-2002),
response year 1991, variable 31 ("Many foreigners live in Germany...." See fn. 12).269 Though the Freedom Party before 1990 does not qualify as a nativist party, one must still consider their
electoral fortunes during that period to determine whether other causal factors are at work.
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willingness of voters to make decisions based on issues of immigration. 270 Finally, the
discrepancy between migration and nativist support in Austria after 1999 is particularly
strong and likely driven by the FPOe's stint in government, which began in early 2000.
An increase in immigration while the anti-immigration party was in power would likely
have been received poorly by the party's supporters. In Germany, the yearly correlation
between changes in nativist support and changes in net migration between 1982 and 2005
was 0.59; excluding the FPOe's time in government, the correlation in Austria was 0.74.
Moving on to the relationship between public opinion and nativist party support,
in Germany, Politbarometer tracks the declared support for political parties. The monthly
correlation between declared support for nativist parties and the salience of immigration
is strong (r = 0.75) and a gap in the data from March 1988 to February 1989, just as
nativist parties began consistently increasing their support, suggests that this relationship
is underestimated. This finding provides an insight into the failure of nativist parties after
1993 and their unexpectedly poor showing in 1990 and early 1991; nativist fortunes
declined with a decline in the salience of immigration.271 Based on month by month
trends in late 1991 and early 1992, increases in nativist party support lag behind salience,
suggesting that nativist parties are not driving concerns with immigration. Figure 4.6
tracks the salience of immigration and unemployment, as well as declared nativist
support, on a month to month basis in Germany from 1986 to 2003.
Figure 4.6: Issue Salience and Declared Nativist Support (Western Germany)
270 NO state or national elections were held in Austria in 1992.
271 All credit on this point to Juergen Falter (1994), the first to note this empirical pattern.
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Disaggregating public opinion using Forschungsgruppe Wahlen exit polls from
state elections, Nativist parties did exceptionally well in elections where immigration was
a salient theme (r=0.61). Figure 4.7 displays the relationship between the salience of
immigration and changes in nativist support in German state elections. Regressing the
salience of immigration on changing nativist support in state elections from 1986 until
2003 indicates that, on average, for every 6% of voters who considered immigration
salient nativist party support increased by 1%.272 There is still a positive, significant
relationship between changes in nativist party support and changes in the size of the
immigrant population but the causal effect is, as expected, reduced. 273 Normalizing both
variables, moving from the lowest level of salience to the highest results in a highly
significant 8.55% positive change in nativist support, while moving from the lowest to
highest level of net migration results in a still significant 4.22% increase in support.
Returning to the 1980 election, in which objective flows increased but nativist
party support did not, only 3.4% of exit poll respondents identified immigration as the
most important issue.274 It is an open question whether concerns with immigration were
overridden by concerns about the economy or the Cold War, or whether elites were able
to successfully defuse the issue. Considering the lag between increased net migration and
increased public concern in the late 1980s (a few months in Austria; up to two years in
Germany), it may also be that the spike in asylum flows was perceived as too temporary
or situational to generate public concern.
272 N= 50;fi=0.16;p= 0.00, r2 = 0.37; nativist party support constant=- -1.17. Removing the two
observations where immigration was exceptionally salient (Baden-Wuerttemberg and Schleswig-Holstein
in 1992) reduces the correlation to r=0.42 and r2 to 0.17, but does not alter the significance or size of the
effect (the coefficient drops from0. 17 to 0.16).
273 When net migration (foreign population) is specified as the explanatory variable, j=0.57 (with a
standard error of .29), p= 0.06 and r2=.07.274 Forschungsgruppe Wahlen (1980).
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Figure 4.7: Salience and Nativist Party Support (German State Elections)
In Austria, the increase in salience from 1990 to 1992 coincides with the period of
greatest growth for the FPOe. As the refugee situation became increasingly acute in early
1990, the FPOe's declared support jumped from 7% (January) to 12% (March). 27 5 Three
of the four state elections held in 1990 and 1991 were among the FPOe's four largest
electoral victories (in terms of increased vote share) from 1980 to 2006. The party's
average increase in support was almost 11% in these elections, and 1991 represented the
single most successful year for the FPOe in terms of the average change in vote share
(9.7%). Though no monthly data exists, the yearly correlation between nativist support
and the salience of immigration was 0.67 from 1990 to 2002.
In contrast, public concerns about the economy in both countries were at their
lowest from 1989 to 1993. In Germany, the Politbarometer data indicates a negative
relationship between the salience of unemployment and the monthly declared support for
nativist parties (r = -0.44). In Austria, the late-1980s and early-1990s was the only time
unemployment was not ranked the most important issue facing the country; in 1990 it
was not even in the top three.276
Trends in the salience of the economy match trends in objective economic
conditions in both countries; the moment when the German and Austrian economies were
at their strongest after 1973 was also the moment where nativist parties saw their greatest
growth. Austria's economy grew an average 3% between 1988 and 1992; the average
between 1974 and 1987 was 2.2%. In Germany, the mean GDP growth (3.8%) was more
275 Plasser and Ulram, in OJP 1990 (1991).
276 Plasser and Ulram (eds) (2002), pg. 152.
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than double the post-oil crisis period (1.6%).277 Indeed, 1988-1990 represented the three
years of highest economic growth since 1980 in Austria, as did 1989-1991 in Germany.
While the economic situation of the late-1980s was certainly not that of the 1950s or
1960s, full employment in advanced industrial countries has the exception rather than the
rule. Unemployment in Germany in 1990 and 1991 dropped below 5% for the first time
since 1980 (and the last time since). In Austria, one of the strongest economies in
Europe, unemployment was closer to 3.5%. Economic scarcity is a constant feature even
among the relatively wealthy and equal populations of Western Europe, yet nativist
parties seemed to grow when these countries were at their most prosperous.
In short, if economic scapegoating was driving native concerns, structural crises
in the early-1980s the late-1990s were far better environments for nativist growth. These
results do not imply that individuals could not have been concerned with immigration
and the economy, or that nativist voters were not primarily concerned with material
competition with immigrants. But they do suggest that absent actual changes in
demographic structures those concerns were not expressed as increased nativist support.
Violence
Not all individuals react to changing social environments at the ballot box. The
final part of this section considers one non-electoral means of expressing dissatisfaction
with an uncertain environment: violence. Violence is a clear if crude signal of social
frustration with a situation or group. But it can also be used to achieve micro-
(individual) and macro- (group) level social goals. Recent work on civil war (Kalyvas
2006) has found that violence is an excellent tool for achieving personal material or
277 Data from the University of Pennsylvania Penn World Table.
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political aims. Even in periods of relatively strong rule of law, geographically
concentrated violence can guarantee a group's material and symbolic position (as in the
American South from 1865 to 1965) or act as a prophylactic against further change.
In Germany, many immigrants and their descendents remain afraid to migrate to
the former East Germany, which has acquired a reputation ranging from unfriendly to
physically dangerous as gangs of young nativists (unaffiliated with any party) have used
attacks on foreigners to declare "national liberation zones" (National befreite Zone), areas
where ethnic homogeneity is enforced through intimidation and violence. One federal
bureaucrat in Berlin with a migration background stated that when they visit family in
western Germany, they lock their doors and do not stop for gas until reaching the old
international border.278 Similarly, a proposal to move the Green Party's political
foundation (the Heinrich Boell Stiftung) to the east Berlin suburb of Friedrichshain was
met with protests by its employees with migrant backgrounds, concerned for their safety
though the move would only have been a few miles east in the same city.279
Increasing concern with immigration should therefore lead to increases in anti-
immigrant violence, as some individuals attempt to prevent changes to their environment
through non-electoral means. This does not imply that violence is politically directed;
any party to do so in Germany and Austria would be proscribed by the State, and studies
have found that most violence against immigrants in Germany is spontaneous and carried
out by groups of young, apolitical males.2 80 Furthermore, not every individual who
commits violence against immigrants does so out of a nativist impulse; some may use the
278 Interview, German Federal Ministry of Refugees and Immigrants, 8/13/04.
279 Interview, Heinrich Boell Stiftung, 8/17/04.
280 European Forum for Migration Studies (2005).
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public opposition to immigrants to increase the acceptability of their actions, or reduce
the expected sanctions.
Reactions to the National Socialist past make Germany and Austria two of the
best countries in Europe at capturing ethnic violence. Both maintain an apparatus
monitoring right-wing extremist violence and an official component of right-wing
extremism is the willingness to evaluate an individual based on their "ethnicity, nation or
race...." 281 Consequently, nearly any crime against immigrants that references their
ethnicity, whether defacing a store with "Foreigners Out!" or coupling an assault with
ethnic slurs, is recorded by the State. Germany, with a longer history of significant
domestic political violence, has better longitudinal data, though Austria has disaggregated
data by the type of incident (violent, xenophobic, etc.) since 1992. Due to differences in
reporting, the German statistics capture physical violence, while the Austrian statistics
include all xenophobic incidents.
Trends in violence strongly resemble trends in net migration and the salience of
immigration. Between 1987 and 1992, the former West Germany saw a 15-fold increase
in anti-immigrant violence, from just under 100 attacks per year to nearly 1500; every
West German state except Bremen saw anti-immigrant violence peak in 1991 and
1992.282 While violence subsequently declined, it still occurs at roughly twice the rate of
the pre-1991 period, even excluding the former East Germany. Moreover, though right-
wing violence generally increased between 1980 and 2005, it was also increasingly anti-
281 Verfassungsschutz (2006), pg. 46.
282 Per capita, an immigrant is far more likely to be the victim of xenophobic violence in the former East
Germany; Verfassungsschutz (2005).
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immigrant; xenophobic violence made up 50% of all attacks from 1982-1990 but 81%
between 1991 and 1993, before declining to 58% since 1994.
Since Austria began explicitly tracking xenophobic crimes in 1992, the total
number of incidents (including violence) has never topped 73 (in 1995). While data from
the 1980s is not available, authorities describe a "new quality" to Austrian violence with
the new immigration in 1989, specifically attacks on asylum seekers, foreigners and their
property.283 Unlike Germany, where arson attacks against asylum seekers were noted in
the press from about 1980, coverage of significant attacks against immigrants did not
appear in the Austrian media prior to the early 1990s, nor have references to past
significant attacks been unearthed.284 In both countries, spikes in violence appear to be
driven in part by triggering events; the ethnic riots in Hoyerswerda (1991) and Rostock
(1992) in Germany and the letter bomb campaign of Franz Fuchs in Austria, peaking with
the death of four Roma in 1995.285
Cross-nationally, anti-immigrant crimes were undeniably less frequent in Austria
than Germany, though across time they tracked well with net migration. From 1994 to
2005 Baden-Wuerttemberg, with a similar population and economic structure, averaged
nearly twice as many violent xenophobic incidents (70) as Austria did all incidents (38).
This discrepancy supports Minkenberg's (1998) thesis that responses to social change are
dependent on exogenous forces and on one another. While violence does track with
changes in migration, in countries where the perceived efficacy of nativist parties is high
(Austria), the incentive to engage in protest or violence declines and the per capita
283 Verfassungsschutz Austria (1997), pg. 18.
284 Stuttgarter Zeitung, "Vietnamese bei Brandanschlag in Hamburg getoetet," 8/23/80.
285 Interview, Verfassungsschutz Baden-Wuerttemberg, 10/25/05.
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increase is lower. In a country (Germany) where the perceived efficacy of nativist parties
is low, violence becomes a more attractive outlet for frustration.
Elites as Intervening Variable...Elites as Cause?
This section addresses the role of elites in reacting to and interpreting the new
immigration in the late-i 980s and early-1990s. Elites refer to persons in positions of
political or social importance, here media sources and mid- to high-level functionaries in
political parties. The section has two aims. The first is to reinforce the idea that this
movement represented a Shock to German and Austrian societies. It does so by
presenting evidence that net migration took a latent dimension and pushed the issues
surrounding it to the forefront of elite discourse. Moreover, the dimension remained
active after net migration faded; 15 years later immigration remains a theme in the media
and election campaigns. At the same time, this section considers whether elites were a
cause of the Shock, entirely or in part. Elites are opinion leaders on political and social
issues and changes in the volume or tone of elite messages are one mechanism for
objective events to be transmitted to the public, who might have poor or imperfect
information. This section argues that elites represent an intervening, but not an
explanatory, variable; they may have framed the immigration debate, but in doing so they
were also constrained by exogenous events.
Media Coverage
As part of this project four regional newspapers were analyzed for their coverage
of immigration and nativist parties in state and national election campaigns from 1960 to
164
2006. 286 The papers chosen were the chief print media in their respective states and
represent a broad spectrum of political opinion.287 While an alternative strategy would
have been to analyze the "boulevard press" (Bild in Germany; Kronen Zeitung in
Austria), these are the papers expected to heavily cover immigration, either to forward an
editorial predisposition or to play on potential fears to sell papers. If the mainstream
press exhibits a similar trend, there is less reason to suspect elite manipulation and more
to suspect that elites are building on or reacting to exogenous events.
The coverage of immigration was measured along two dimensions. The first is
volume, capturing salience. To measure volume, every article was counted that had a title
or sub-title explicitly referencing immigration, integration, or asylum, or that named a
domestic ethnic group made up predominantly of recent immigrants.288 References to
Uebersiedler (immigrants from the former East Germany) were excluded, on the grounds
that they were 1) co-ethnics 2) living in a territory the German public identified as
German. The assumption is that Uebersiedler were not considered immigrants at all, but
rather prisoners of an occupying power. The second dimension is tone, capturing
attitudes. Attitudes were measured based on the content of articles referencing
immigration, coded as negative, indifferent or positive. Broadly, positive stories focused
on the material or social benefits of immigration or successes in integration, negative
stories on the problems or costs associated with immigration, and indifferent articles
286 Coverage was analyzed for the six weeks prior to the election. This represents the "hot phase" of
German and Austrian campaigns, the time when voters pay the most attention to elite statements and issues.
Sundays were not considered, as only some papers published Sunday editions.
287 They were the Stuttgarter Zeitung (Baden-Wuerttemberg), the Allgemeine Zeitung (Rheinland-Pfalz),
the Kurier (Vienna) and the Kleine Zeitung (Styria). National elections were analyzed for each paper,
while state elections were only analyzed in the corresponding regional paper. The Kleine is Christian-
Democratic, founded by a Catholic association, the Stuttgarter leans toward the economically liberal,
socially centrist FDP and the Allgemeine and Kurier are centrist or slightly left-populist.
288 See the Appendix for a comprehensive list and justification.
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offered statistics or statements without referencing costs or benefits.289 If the article
contained both statistics and a statement of costs or benefits, it was coded with a bias
against indifference.
In Austria, changes in volume strongly resemble patterns of immigration. In
Vienna, the most multi-cultural state in Austria, immigration and immigrants were barely
mentioned in the 1980s, but received almost three articles of coverage per day in 1990,
with coverage remaining relatively high through the 1994 national election. In contrast,
German coverage increases over time. After a spike in coverage generated by significant
events, here questions about the role of guest workers as economies slowed in the 1970s,
the asylum movement of 1980-1981, and immigration in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
coverage declines but does not return to its prior level. This broadly agrees with the idea
that there was no concept of Austria as a country of immigration before the immigration
spike and that net migration represented more of a shock to Austria than Germany.
Figure 4.8 displays variation in the coverage of immigration in state and national
elections from 1960 until 2002.
Figure 4.8: Media Coverage of Immigration (Elections 1960-2002)
Coverage also varied between "high" and "low" immigration states within each
country; during state and national election campaigns held from 1987 to 1994, the Vienna
paper averaged 2.05 articles on immigration each day and the Styrian paper 0.83, the
Baden-Wuerttemberg paper 1.73 articles, compared to 0.85 in Rheinland-Pfalz. 290 While
289 See the Appendix for examples of each type of story.
290 Author's calculations.
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every regional paper covers the same major national stories, regions more heavily
impacted by immigration have a local interest in, and capacity for, additional coverage.
In terms of tone, the main finding is the absence of change. As a sample of media
coverage across different periods indicates in Figure 4.9, the mainstream print media (and
not just the boulevard press) always portrayed immigrants in a negative light. In the
1960s, the dominant narrative in the mainstream media was that the guest workers were
wild and aggressive, physically and sexually. In a typical article in the 1960s a guest
worker, identified by their nationality even when irrelevant, would engage in some form
of robbery or violence, often against a "countryman" over a personal matter, such as a
fight over a woman.291 Narratives in the 1970s and 1980s, while more sophisticated,
were equally dire; German coverage emphasized problems with integration (poor
prospects for immigrants or language deficits in schools) or alarming trends in asylum
seeking. In Austria, crime and illegal employment remained the dominant themes
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, though coverage was sparse.
Figure 4.9: Media Attitudes towards Immigration and Immigrants (1970-2000)
In contrast, articles covering the Uebersiedler emphasized 1) the bravery of
individuals escaping an authoritarian regime, often including descriptions of the guards,
checkpoints or minefields evaded and 2) the generosity of the host society, which
frequently held fundraisers, donated goods or even willed their belongings to the new
arrivals. While asylum seekers escaping civil wars in Sri Lanka or Afghanistan faced
situations at least as perilous as the average East German, their stories inevitably begin at
291 For example the Kleine Zeitung, "Spielfeld endet die Flucht eines Linzer Messerstechers," 9/21/71 or
Stuttgarter Zeitung, "Italiener ersticht Landsmann," 11/17/1972.
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the European border when they made demands on the receiving society. Media coverage
(particularly in Austria) became more positive over time, though in both countries
positive narratives remained the exception.
Coverage of immigration during the Shock was a continuation of existing trends,
though new narratives emerged. Both countries were "boats," "fortresses," or "blessed
islands" (Inseln der Seligen) beset by "invasions," "waves," or "floods" of undesirable
newcomers overtaxing the social system.292 Coverage also emphasized failures in State
capacity. The unexpected volume of the migration, coupled with the dependence of
many immigrants on State resources led to a breakdown in the ability to process
applications or settle new arrivals; stories abounded of asylum seekers and Aussiedler
housed in hotels, jails, barracks, riverboats or entire communities constructed from
shipping containers modified for habitability. These stories only furthered the perception
that the new migrants were somehow fundamentally separated from the native society.293
In Austria, capacity also meant the State's inability to guard the "green border" against a
sharp increase in illegal crossings. Crime remained a salient theme throughout the 1990s.
In Germany, crime increasingly meant Kurdish political unrest and later the threat of
domestic Islamic terrorism. In Austria, the narratives focused on drug crime, organized
crime and human trafficking. Even when anti-immigrant violence was the focus, media
coverage consistently brought up themes of abuse of social services and crime committed
by foreigners, suggesting complicity in their victimization. 294
292 Jaeger and Link (eds) (1993). The German news magazine Spiegel famously declared during this
migration that "the Boat is Full"; Spiegel 8/14/89. Jaeger and Link (eds) (1993) notes that Spiegel began
emphasizing this theme more heavily in the Fall of 1987 and became progressively more anti-Asylum
leading up to the August 1989 coverage.
293 Joppke (1999), pg. 91.
294 Jaeger and Link (1993), pg. 234.
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Political Discourse
The political discourse regarding immigration in both countries can be separated
into three periods. The evidence, collected from contemporary media coverage,
secondary sources and elite interviews, suggests that immigration and asylum were at the
forefront of the elections where nativist parties were most successful, but that elites were
reacting to structural changes rather than creating public opinion.
In the first period, lasting until the mid-1980s in Germany (1990 in Austria), there
was a consensus on the part of non-nativist elites that immigration was an economic
phenomenon with no place in politics.295 After the October 1973 oil crisis, Social-
democratic governments in both countries promptly suspended their guest worker
programs, long before immigration could become socially contentious.2 96 Even with
asylum increasing during the 1980 national election, the major German parties agreed
that immigration was a bureaucratic and not a campaign issue,2 97 though leading
politicians publicly acknowledged that asylum needed to be addressed after the
election.2 98 While immigration was not a campaign theme in the early-1980s it was still
contentious; from the early 1980s the CDU-CSU openly discussed changing the national
immigration policy and the CDU-CSU, social-democratic SPD and FDP debated whether
Germany had become a "country of immigration."2 99 In Austria, with its smaller
immigrant population, there is no evidence that any discussion took place until late 1989.
295 Hammar (1985); Messina (2007).
296 Muenz and Ulrich, in Bade and Weiner (eds) (1997); Hansen (2003).
297 Stuttgarter Zeitung, "Kein Wahlthema," 9/25/80.
298 Stuttgarter Zeitung, "'Konzertierte Aktion fuer Auslaender'," 9/25/80.
299 Stuttgarter Zeitung, "'Bundesrepublik kein Einwanderungsland'," 9/4/80; Stuttgarter Zeitung, "Die
Bundesrepublik - ein Einwanderungsland?" 9/12/80.
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Beginning in the late 1980s, political actors in both countries integrated
immigration into their campaign appeals to the degree that the issue completely
dominated a number of elections. Each country is considered in turn.
The Discourse in Germany
With the Bavarian state election in 1986, the conservative CSU began calling for
immigration restrictions and in the 1987 national election the CSU and more centrist
CDU (representing Germany's non-Bavarian Christian-democrats) explicitly called for a
revision to the Basic Law (the German constitution) with regard to asylum, which the
SPD, FDP and Greens rejected.300 The CDU-CSU's emphasis on immigration declined
in 1990 and 1991, but would return at a fever pitch in 1992.
As they had since 1980, nativist parties in the late-1980s continued to utilize
immigration in their campaigns. The REP, NPD, DVU and Baden-Wuerttemberg-based
German League for People and Homeland (DLVH) concentrated almost exclusively on
this issue, with crime a subordinate but notable theme. 301 However, unlike elections in
the late 1980s, where immigration and asylum were referenced but unemployment and
the environment were the central issues, by the 1992 state campaigns immigration and
asylum had become the dominant election themes. 302 High net migration, media
coverage, public concern, nativist party victories in 1991 and a sharp increase in anti-
immigrant violence all contributed to the emerging "asylum debate" between the CDU-
CSU, SPD and FDP.
300 Jaschke (1990), pg. 67; Stuttgarter Zeitung, "Koalition weiterhin ueber Asylrecht uneins," 1/9/87.301 Stuttgarter Zeitung, "'Richtige Rechte' schielen nach links," 3/20/92.302 Forshungsgruppe Wahlen (1987); Forschungsgruppe Wahlen (1988); Stuttgarter Zeitung, "Streit um
Asylrecht wird haerter," 2/21/92.
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In 1992, the Baden-Wuerttemberg CDU opened the "hot phase" of the election by
officially placing immigration at the center of its campaign, while downplaying the
chances that a debate would benefit its nativist competitors. 303 The CDU's appeals,
emphasizing the costs of asylum abuse, intensified as the campaign drew to an end when
it became apparent that the REP might enter parliament. 304 In response the SPD, FDP
and Greens attacked the CDU (and the media) for politicizing immigration. 305 The SPD's
explicit strategy was to demobilize voters by ignoring the issue, as their "experience from
earlier campaigns was that the [nativist party] strategy was... to maneuver themselves
into an underdog situation...to appeal to voters, that themselves often feel like
underdogs." 306 The FDP saw the CDU's campaign as legitimizing nativist parties
through similar appeals. 307 In contrast, the CDU's strategy was designed to co-opt
potential nativist voters, assuming that a failure to address an important issue "on the
streets" would allow nativist parties to expand beyond an "extremist" core. 30 8
Both strategies failed. The 1992 elections in Baden-Wuerttemberg and
Schleswig-Holstein were a "fiasco" for the CDU and an "earthquake" for the German
political system.309 Nativist parties in Baden-Wuerttemberg achieved the single best
state-level result for the German Radical Right since 1945 (over 12%) and the REP and
DVU (in Schleswig-Holstein) entered state parliament. The Baden-Wuerttemberg result
was the worst for the CDU in 30 years and necessitated the formation of a Grand
303 Stuttgarter Zeitung, "CDU laeutet heisse Wahlkampfphase ein:," 3/5/92; Huh (1996).
304 Huh (1996), pg. 46.
305 Stuttgarter Zeitung, "Nur die Christdemokraten wollen das Grundgesetz aendern," 2/26/92; Stuttgarter
Zeitung, "FDP strebt Koalitionsregierung mit CDU an," 3/29/92; Stuttgarter Zeitung, "Rechte Stimmen,"
3/31/92; Schmidt (1997), pg. 92.
306 Schmidt (1997), pg. 91, quoting the SPD Chief of Staff in Schleswig-Holstein.
307 Schmidt (1997), pg. 92, quoting the FDP Chief of Staff in Schleswig-Holstein.
308 Stuttgarter Zeitung, "Die Rechten sehen sich auf dem Sprung in den Landtag," 3/27/92; Stuttgarter
Zeitung, "Mayer-Vorfelder: 'Eine katastrophale Niederlage'," 4/6/92.
309 Stuttgarter Zeitung, "Erdbeben," 4/6/92.
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Coalition with the SPD. Both the REP and DVU were disproportionately strong in urban
areas with low- or unskilled workers and significant immigrant populations. 310 Exit
polling by Forschungsgruppe Wahlen found that immigration was the election's salient
theme; 43% of all voters in Baden-Wuerttemberg and 75% of REP voters called it
important. 311
With varying degrees of reluctance, the 1992 elections convinced the major
parties to end their stalemate on asylum, leading to a revision of federal asylum laws
finalized in July 1993 (the "Asylum Compromise"). To the established parties, the
results confirmed that voters perceived them as unwilling or unable to solve a major
social issue. 312 Especially chastised were the SPD; after the election, SPD voters
confronted party elites for their failure to propose a solution to immigration.313 Both the
major parties and the media saw the results as part of a broader European protest; the fear
of economic insecurity among low-skilled workers combined with increasing competition
with immigrants for jobs and housing.314
The Discourse in Austria
In Austria, the first major debates over immigration did not come until the end of
1989 and were only fully realized in the 1990 national election; indeed, these debates
were entirely absent from the Austrian political landscape until this moment.31 From the
310 Such as the industrial town of Pforzheim, where Nativist parties received over 20%; Stuttgarter Zeitung,
"'Republikaner' nur in Suedbaden schwach," 4/7/92.
311 Forschungsgruppe Wahlen (1992), pg. 46.
312 Stuttgarter Zeitung, "Fiasko fuer CDU - Triumph der 'Republikaner'," 4/6/92; Stuttgarter Zeitung,
"Parteien machen Asylstreit fuer Rechtsruck verantwortlich," 4/6/92; "Mayer-Vorfelder: 'Eine
katastrophale Niederlage'," 4/6/92; "Voscherau: Notfalls Grundgesetz aendern," 4/8/92; Schmidt (1997),
pp. 262, 269, interviews with SPD, CDU.
313 Stuttgarter Zeitung, "'Wo war unser Asyl-Plakat?"' 4/9/92.
314 Stuttgarter Zeitung, "Rechte setzen auf Aengste und haben Erfolg," 4/6/92.
315 Reinfeldt (2000), pg. 139.
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beginning of the 1990 campaign the media saw the "foreigner discussion" as objectively
important, especially in Vienna (close to the border and the most attractive economic
environment for immigrant settlement) and especially as it related to crime and illegal
entry.316 Stories were published daily on the increase in illegal crossings, with flows
peaking at least at 200 daily, the equivalent of 1% of the national population every six
weeks.
Though Austrian elections in 1990 and 1991 continued existing trends of FPOe
growth, there was a shift both in the party's strategy and its support base. Specifically,
the FPOe moved away from promoting itself as a party of "fresh air," attacking the
corruption and waste of the established parties, and toward advocating explicit policy
goals and making inroads into traditional social-democratic strongholds. 317 Specifically,
the FPOe brought immigration to the fore of their 1990 campaign. Throughout the 1990
national election, the FPOe attacked the other parties on immigration. For example,
when Interior Minister Loeschnak (of the SPOe) implemented a mandatory visa for
Polish citizens in the opening days of the campaign, the FPOe immediately took credit
for advancing the proposal a year earlier.318
Indeed, after the FPOe, the SPOe was the party most visibly critical of the new
immigration, with the party's then-General Secretary Marizzi claiming "the boat is
full."319 As the head party in a Grand Coalition, the SPOe's strategy was to use action by
the Executive to increase its perceived bureaucratic competence without proposing
316 Kurier, "Auslaenderdiskussion wird wieder heiss," 8/31/90.
317 Kraeh (1996); Plasser and Ulram, in Scharsach (2000); Minich (2003).
318 Kurier, "Massnahmenpaket gegen Zuwanderer," 9/5/90; FPO ad (Kurier), "Endlich Visapflicht fuer
Polen!" 9/7/90.319 Plasser and Ulram, pg. 316 in OJP 1990 (1991).
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significant policy changes. At the beginning of September, the Interior Ministry sent
Army units to reinforce local border authorities and at the beginning of October (two
weeks before the election), the Ministry emphasized its efforts to prevent "foreigner
crimes" through a series of new police actions. 320 The Christian-democratic OeVP, the
coalition's junior partner, took a neutral position, attacking the SPOe for its failure to
control immigration, while not proposing an immigration policy of its own.321 The
Greens were the only openly pro-immigrant party, calling for every community to take in
1% of their population in refugees each year. 322 The results of the election saw the FPOe
make by far the greatest gains of any party, with those gains concentrated in Carinthia
(where Haider was Governor) and Vienna.323 At the local level, the FPOe tended to gain
the most support in metropolitan areas (the Ballungszentrum) and along the eastern
border, areas where immigration was the "explosive" theme.324
As the center of immigration to Austria, the 1991 state election in Vienna only
magnified the immigration debate. From the beginning the FPOe seized the issue that
"really touched the voters," calling for zero immigration until housing shortages and
unemployment were reduced.325 Unlike 1990, the OeVP increased its profile on
immigration by taking a more vocal stance. The FPOe and OeVP's immigration
proposals did not discriminate by the origin of the immigration; proposed quotas placed
refugees and asylum seekers in direct competition with foreign doctors or students. 326
320 Kurier, "Bundesheer stoppt Fluechtlings-Invasion," 9/2/90; Kurier, "Innenminister ordnet nun 'Aktion
scharf an," 10/4/90.321 Kurier, "Koalitions-Debatte ueber Fluechtlingszahl," 9/27/90.
322 Kurier, "Gruene kritisieren Auslaenderpolitik," 8/29/90.
323 Plasser et. al, pg. 110 in OJP 1990 (1991).
324 Plasser et. al, pp. 137-8 in OJP 1990 (1991).
325 Kurier, "Dritter Platz?" 10/1/91; Kurier, "Einigkeit in der Auslaenderpolitik 
- SP fordert:
'Einwandererzahl je nach Konjunktur'," 10/5/91.
326 Kurier "FP-Haider schimpft Busek 'Pharisaeer'," 10/2/91.
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The FPOe attacked the OeVP for its "hypocrisy" (attacking the FPOe as xenophobes
while proposing similar policies) and for their failure to address immigration earlier. The
SPOe's retained its national strategy; acknowledging the issue and offering a bureaucratic
response. After the FPOe won two state elections in two weeks in Styria and Upper
Austria just prior to the Viennese election, the national Government promised to reform
existing immigration laws, particularly related to asylum, in early 1992.327
The three state elections in 1991, and particularly the Viennese election, were
described as an "earthquake" by political commentators. The FPOe became the second
largest party in the city and the SPOe failed to achieve an absolute majority in votes for
the first time since 1949.328 More respondents called immigration an important theme for
the election than any other issue (63%).329 The four greatest increases in FPOe support
came in areas with a disproportionately large immigrant population (Rudolfsheim,
Ottakring, Leopoldstadt and Favoriten).330 While the OeVP blamed the results in Vienna
on the Grand Coalition, the SPOe interpreted them as a signal that the major parties
needed to address immigration and hardened their stance, leading to a series of changes
to immigration and asylum laws over the next two years.331 After the Viennese election,
one SPOe functionary opined that the major parties needed to begin dealing with salient
issues like immigration "more than six weeks before the election." 332
Elites in both countries acknowledged that the new immigration raised immediate
(how to deal with the newcomers?) and long-term (how to integrate them?) concerns,
327 Kurier, "Neues Asylgesetz ab Fruehjar 1992," 10/11/91.
328 Kurier "Politisches Erdbeben nach der Wiener Wahl ," 11/11/91.
329 Plasser and Ulram, pg. 97 in OJP 1991 (1992).
330 Author calculations from the Statistisches Jahrbuch der Stadt Wien 1991 (1992).
331 Kurier, "Triumph fuer die Blauen aber Ratzenboeck bleibt ," 10/7/91; Kurier, "'Der Scheidungsanwalt
liegt schon unterm Bett'," 10/8/91; "'Fulltimejob' Klubobmann," 10/16/91.332 Kurier, "Politisches Erdbeben nach der Wiener Wahl," 11/11/91.
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though at the same time they blamed the media or each other for using immigration
instrumentally:
"We went from the end of Western Europe to the gateway. Vienna
especially was overrun by Czechs, Hungarians...100,000 people would
come in a weekend. Really they were just walking around, enjoying the
city. But for the people of Vienna this was frightful. There was a fear of
what these events would mean.... The FPO picked up on this mood,
supported by the Kronen.... Then the 1991 war in Yugoslavia brought 80-
100,000 refugees...and the Government didn't know how to deal with
them...333
"At the same time [as Reunification], there was a massive storm of
Asylum seekers, up to 250,000 [yearly]. There were massive problems
with people from the East Bloc, Uebersiedler, Russendeutschen. And
there was simply a reaction.... The perception of the public was 'You talk
a lot, but do nothing'." 334
Events in both countries present a very different picture than convergence theories
of niche party growth, which would argue that niche parties succeed as established party
policies become less indistinguishable. While the major parties in Germany and Austria
may have converged on policy overall since the 1970s, they diverged on immigration as
it became more salient in the late- 1980s and early-1990s. In both countries the Center-
Right's policy became more restrictive, while the Center-Left tried to de-politicize
immigration until election results suggested this stance was untenable. Both co-option
and de-politicization were clearly ineffective strategies in stymieing support for nativist
parties. While the latter's failure might be the result of mixed signals, with the Center-
Right giving the issue credibility by emphasizing it, why did efforts to co-opt nativist
positions fail? Why would voters consistently choose a smaller party with more
333 Interview, Anneliese Rohrer (domestic politics editor for Die Presse 1987-2001), 11/27/06.
334 Interview, FDP Baden-Wuerttemberg, 10/31/05.
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"extreme" views but less likelihood of enacting their policies over a major party
promising "moderate" restrictions more likely to be passed?
The answer in Germany and Austria is that many voters simply preferred the
nativist party's position or felt their appeals were more credible, making them the "issue
owner" of the contra-immigration stance.335 The survey evidence in both countries
suggests that nativist parties were considered credible on immigration policy by far more
than their hardcore supporters. As Table 1 indicates, with the exception of 1990 the
FPOe was rated the party best able to deal with immigration, receiving a bonus far in
excess of its voter base.336 As noted earlier, the changing salience of immigration in
1990 makes this figure suspect; immigration became more salient as the year progressed.
Voters may have been indifferent to the parties on immigration early, when it was not
salient, with the FPOe's bonus emerging as voters started paying attention when the
issue's salience increased. During the 1991 Viennese election, 49% of survey
respondents called the FPOe the most competent party on immigration. 337 While the
FPOe was awarded a competence bonus on immigration policy and fighting corruption
by the Austrian electorate, they were unsuccessful in persuading prospective voters of
their competence on crime, the economy or taxes, all campaign themes in the 1990s.
335 Petrocik (1996); Meguid (2005). "Issue ownership" models of voting argue that parties have
"comparative advantages" with the electorate on certain political issues. Empirically, candidates tend to
focus on the issues of the day regardless of their advantage (Aldrich and Griffin 2003).
336 FESSEL-GfK Representative Surveys 1987-1999 (N=1-2,000).
337 Plasser and Ulram, in OJP 1991 (1992).
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Table 4.1: FPOe Issue Competence (in %, rank among parties)
Issue 1990 1994 1995 1999
(Avg. 91-94) (Avg. 96-99)
Corruption/ 11% 35% (1st) 33% (1st) 36% (1st)
Privileges
Waste of public 23% (1st) 24% (1 st) 29% (1st) 30% (1st)
funds
Immigration 16% (2 nd) 29% ( st) 33% (1st) 38% (1 st)
Jobs 5% 4% 5% 9%
Pensions 4% 3% 5% 6%
Taxes 7% 9% 11% 15%
Crime - 13% (3 rd) 1 8% (3rd) 18% (3"d)
Vote Share 17% 23% 22% 27%
Source: Mueller, pp. 36-7 in Plasser et al (2000) from FESSEL-GfK, "Representative
Surveys."
In Germany survey researchers tend to exclude nativist parties on questions of
party competence. However, Forschungsgruppe Wahlen's 1989 Berlin local election
survey asked voters if they agreed with the REP's immigration policy; 13% did, though
only 7.5% voted for the party.338 In 1998, respondents were again asked to choose the
best immigration policy; 5% responded REP and a further 1% "other" (possibly including
the DVU and NPD), though nativist parties were polling roughly 2% nationally.339
In sum, for many voters concerned with and opposed to immigration, nativist
parties represented the most attractive alternative. In Austria, the FPOe was large enough
from 1990 to have a real chance of entering or even forming a Government and
implementing its policies. Even if the Center-Right refused to work with the FPOe, REP
or DVU, support for these parties served as the ultimate poll on immigration policy, a
signal with tangible penalties for the failure to act. For the Center-Left and Center-Right
338 Forschungsgruppe Wahlen (ZA Nr. 1766) (1989), variable 40: "And how do you feel about the foreigner
policy of the Republikaner?"
339 Politbarometer (1998), variable 179: "Which party's immigration policy makes the most sense to you?"
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every election without addressing immigration was another election of lost votes, which
meant lost seats, less maneuverability in forming a government or enacting their
preferred policies (by increasing the size of parties they preferred not to work with) and
lost state financing. Nativist parties were likely only aided by the attacks of their
detractors; being consistently portrayed as the "anti-immigrant" party served as an
additional signal to concerned voters that only nativist parties were truly interested in
addressing immigration.
Political Discourse as Cause?
The elite discourse on immigration clearly shifted in the late 1980s and early
1990s. But were changes in public salience during these elections in part or in whole the
result of elite manipulation, the changing strategies of political actors? After all,
significant actors in both countries made a decision to emphasize immigration in the late
1980s and early 1990s, when public salience did change, but not in the 1980 German
elections, when objective flows changed but there was no nativist mobilization. While
the changing elite discourse probably aggravated existing concerns, there is reason to
believe that elites were at the same time constrained by and reacting to exogenous events.
In Germany, the Center-Right preferred not to emphasize immigration, except as
a reaction to public concerns or an emerging nativist party perceived to be a direct
competitor. In Germany, the same leadership that introduced immigration as an issue in
the late 1980s (Helmut Kohl; Franz Josef Strauss) explicitly chose not to do so in the
early 1980s. When that leadership did integrate immigration into its 1987 campaign, it
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produced no visible effect on the salience of immigration.340 Immigration was absent
from the CDU-CSU's national election campaign in 1990, which focused instead on
concerns with reunification and CDU Chancellor Kohl's competence. 34 1 The only
incentive for the CDU-CSU to emphasize immigration came from the challenge posed by
the REP. The CSU began emphasizing immigration with a strong REP challenge at the
state level in 1986, and the CDU after the shocking REP victory in Berlin in 1989 and in
anticipation of a strong REP challenge in 1992. In Austria, there was an obvious
incentive for the Center-Right to politicize immigration; the OeVP could have used the
issue to try to overtake the SPOe and form a government in 1990. But party leaders
failed to utilize the issue until after the election, when it became apparent that they were
losing votes to the FPOe. In both Germany and Austria, the decision to change
immigration policy came reluctantly, and only after significant defeats at the hands of
nativist challengers sent an undeniable signal on the popular mood.
Nor was it the introduction of immigration into electoral campaigns by nativist
parties that motivated the public. The REP had engaged in the same campaigns with the
same political entrepreneurs since 1986. Their turning point was the 1989 Berlin election
(7.5%), where they were outspent by the CDU 5.8 million to 200,000 DM. The REP
spent a similar amount per resident in Bavaria in the state election in 1986, where they
were best organized, yet only received 3% of the vote.342 The REP's transformative anti-
immigrant TV advertisement during the Berlin election captured the electorate's fears,
rather than creating them. Moreover, any success on the REP's part after early 1989
came despite their inability to influence public opinion through the media. While the
340 Politbarometer (1987).
341 Semetko and Schoenbach (1994), pp. 11-13.
342 Calculated from campaign finance reports mandated by the Federal Republic.
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media initially covered the REP after their January 1989 victory in Berlin, from April
1989 the German press reached a tacit consensus to only focus on the party's scandals
and internal conflicts. 343
For Haider's FPOe, so consistently willing to look elsewhere for political
innovation, the decision not to emphasize immigration before late 1989 suggests the party
was taking advantage of exogenous events, rather than trying to shape public opinion.344
The French National Front (1986, 1988), the REP (early 1989) and the Danish (1988) and
Norwegian Progress parties (1989) had all shown that immigration could be a vote-
winning issue in state or national elections. Yet the FPOe waited until structural
conditions in Austria were favorable before emphasizing immigration:
"Vienna was a pleasant surprise [for the FPOe] in 1990. Haider realized
there was a potential that he'd missed before in those districts with lots of
immigration." 345
Moreover, if concerns about immigration were purely elite driven, salience should
have remained elevated after net migration declined as elites continued bringing
immigration into campaigns. With the September 1 1th terrorist attacks fresh in the public
memory (several of the hijackers had lived in Hamburg), the SPD-controlled German
Interior Ministry conducted a series of raids against groups and individuals with
suspected ties to Islamic extremism three days before the 2002 national election.346
During the 2006 state and local elections, the CDU in Hessen and Baden-Wuerttemberg
called for strict integration tests for potential citizens ("Naturalization only with Course,
343 Albes (1999).
344 For example the influence of United States Congressional Republicans on the 1995 "Contract with
Austria."
345 Interview, Lothar Hoebelt, 12/22/06.
346 Stuttgarter Zeitung, "Schily geht gegen Islamisten vor," 9/20/92.
Test, Oath").34 7 Nativist parties remained active during these elections; the REP were a
significant actor in Baden-Wuerttemberg at least until 2001 and the FPOe continued
transmitting essentially the same appeals with a higher public profile. That similar
campaigns across elections were not matched by similar levels of salience suggests that
appeals alone were insufficient to trigger public concern.
The media coverage of immigration confirms this trend. Every article that
referenced immigration was coded to determine whether the impetus for the article was a
statement or appeal by a political party. For example, stories focusing on a party's call
for a 50% reduction in immigration or a State Minister's call for official action on
immigration were coded as political, while an article seeking a party's reaction to
immigration numbers or covering the scheduled report by a state or national agency were
not. As Figure 4.10 indicates, the politicization of immigration in the media (measured
as a percentage of all articles) did not decline after the immigration spike, and in
Germany it increased.348
Figure 4.10: The Politicization of Immigration, 1970-2000
In conclusion, while the willingness of political elites to engage in immigration
debates possibly aggravated public concerns, elites themselves were constrained by
exogenous factors. Nativist parties in Germany that manufactured immigration as an
issue early on did not see their greatest success until structural conditions were more
favorable. Nativist parties in Austria never thought to emphasize immigration until there
was some belief that it was a pressing theme that could win votes. The volume and tone
347 Die Zeit Online, "30 Fragen fuer den Pass," 2/06.
348 The 1980 numbers in both countries can be discounted, as parties were explicitly depoliticizing
immigration; in Austria the percentage is a function of the low volume (seven articles total).
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of the discourse from non-nativist parties reflected a reaction to ongoing events, popular
concerns and nativist successes in the early going, rather than a predatory, pre-emptive
public opinion strategy.
Conclusions
This chapter presented two arguments, both related to the impact of immigration
on contemporary German and Austrian politics and societies. First, I argued that a spike
in immigration in the late 1980s and early 1990s led to significant and durable changes in
the way those societies perceived the immigration issue dimension at the elite and public
levels. In the 1970s and 1980s, the native/immigrant dynamic remained latent. The
seeds for conflict certainly existed in areas with an oversupply of low- or unskilled labor,
an undersupply of affordable housing and the failure to sufficiently develop plans for
integrating existing immigrant communities. But neither elites nor the public saw
native/immigrant issues as pressing in a time of economic restructuring, emerging
environmental awareness and a still-relevant Cold War.
With an immigration-generated Shock in the late 1980s, the perception of
immigrants and immigration changed dramatically; immigration was or was one of the
top issues motivating elites and the public between 1989 and 1994. Its emergence as an
issue can be readily observed in radically altered media coverage, public opinion and the
conduct of election campaigns. Even the decline of immigration from the mid-1990s was
insufficient to erase the issue dimension from the public consciousness. Though it
receded in importance, issues related to the relationship between natives and immigrants
(asylum and entry quotas, but also integration, crime and racial profiling, religious
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tolerance and the threat of domestic terrorism) remain durable themes for politicians, the
press and the person on the street.
Second, this chapter presented evidence that nativist parties in both countries
directly benefitted from the emergence of immigration as a salient theme. Throughout
the 1970s and early 1980s, nativist parties were broadly unsuccessful, remaining small or
losing votes. What the Shock did was provide these parties with an issue that they could
"own," an issue on which they best represented the views of some voters who had not
previously supported them. In the state and national elections where nativist parties saw
their greatest gains between 1989 and 1994, immigration was the salient theme. With the
end of the Shock in the mid-1990s, these parties were no longer able to generate the same
level of electoral enthusiasm, though the FPOe successfully maintained their base and to
a lesser extent increased their vote share in 1999. In sum, the fundamental impact of the
Shock was to take a latent social issue in Austria and Germany, dramatically increase its
salience and durably reorganize some aspects of political contestation, voting behavior
and social priorities.
Chapter 4 Figures and Charts
Figure 4.1: Net Migration (1974-2006)
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Figure 4.2: Relative Net Migration (1974-2006)
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Figure 4.3: Net Migration and Issue Salience,
Germany
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Source: German Federal Statistical Office (Migration) and Politbarometer cumulative reporting (Salience).
Figure 4.4: Net Migration and Changes in Nativist
Support, Austria (1982-2005)
2 0 % .............................. ............. ......... ................. ............. ................................. ............... ..................................... ......................... 1 2 0
1.00
15% 0.80
10% - 0.60
,0.40
. 5% 0.20 o
> 0% -0.00
c %-0.40 a
a -10%-- -0.60
-0.80
-15%
-1.00
-20% .................................. -- --- 1.20
m Average Change In Support (State and National Elections) --- Net Migration Per 100 Pop.
Source: Austrian Federal Statistical Office (Migration) and federal and state Statistical Yearbooks
(Elections).
186
Figure 4.5: Net Migration and Changes in
Nativist Support, Germany (1982-2005)
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Figure 4.6: Issue Salience and Declared
Support (Western Germany)
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Figure 4.7: Immigration Salience and Nativist Support
German State Elections, 1986-2000
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Figure 4.8: Media Coverage of Immigration
(Elections 1960-2002)
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Figure 4.9: Media Attitudes Towards Immigration &
Immigrants (1970-2000)100 -
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Source: Author calculations from Stuttgarter Zeitung and Kleine Zeitung coverage.
Figure 4.10: Politicization of Immigration Coverage,
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Chapter 5 - Riding the Wave: Explaining Cross-National Variation in
Nativist Support in Austria and Germany
Cross-National Variation: A Puzzle
The cross-time variation in nativist party support in Austria and Germany shows
that sharp increases in support followed massive increases in unsolicited migration in the
late-1980s and early-1990s. This rapid growth in native/immigrant heterogeneity
increased the salience of the native/immigrant dynamic for voters in both countries. For
many voters concerned with and opposed to the new migration, nativist parties were
considered the most compelling electoral alternative and their vote shares increased.
In this chapter, I address two questions. First, what explains variation in the
growth of nativist parties in Austria and Germany? As Figure 5.1 indicates, patterns of
migration explain some of this variation. Controlling for parties that were making both a
nativist and a regionalist appeal (the Lega Nord; the Vlaams Blok), a very limited (N=16)
linear regression suggest that changes in ethnic heterogeneity account for 46% of the
cross-national variation in nativist growth in the late-1980s and early-1990s. 349
Figure 5.1: Cross-National Nativist Party Growth, 1987-1995
Though Austria received approximately 33% more net migration per capita than
Germany, given the West European average migration to both countries was relatively
high during this period. Yet while the Austrian Freedom Party (FPOe) predictably saw
the greatest nativist growth of any West European country given their high rate of
349 13= 2.21; P-Value= 0.059. The regression specified as OLS in Stata 9, with robust standard errors.
Removing the Austrian case, the coefficient remains positive but is significantly reduced (.62) and is no
longer significant.
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migration (indeed they outperformed their predicted growth), Germany's nativist parties
were less successful at achieving growth than those in any other country where nativism
emerged, despite a more favorable migration environment than any country other than
Austria. Why then was the FPOe so much better at taking advantage of the new
migration than its German counterparts?
Second, even after a disastrous tenure in government from 2000 to 2006 and a
split with the Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZOe) in 2005, the FPOe and BZOe
were still polling 15% in the 2006 election, up from 10% in 1986. In western Germany
nativist parties, which entered four western German state parliaments between 1987 and
1992, lost their parliamentary footholds and were marginal political actors in the former
West Germany by 2002.350 Why were nativist parties in Austria far better at
consolidating their gains, at persisting, than their German counterparts?
Though cross-time patterns in nativist support in both countries are best explained
by changing patterns of migration, following Art (2006) I argue that the most compelling
explanation for the cross-national divergence in nativist party growth and persistence is
the configuration of opportunity structures in each society. By opportunity structures, I
mean factors largely endogenous to the political system that facilitate or constrain the
ability of political or social actors to achieve their goals. The classic example of an
opportunity structure is electoral rules; the electoral system chosen by a country affects
the ability of new or small parties find voters, functionaries or funding. 35 1
350 Only in Bremen did nativists consistently enter parliament, due to a favorable electoral system; even
under these conditions, they have been limited to one seat (of 80-100) over the past 15 years and play no
role in the legislature.
351 Cox (1997).
Focusing on Austria and Germany, Art (2006) argues that debates in the 1980s
about the National Socialist past "shaped the reactions of political parties, the media, and
civil society" to the Radical Right. In Germany, mainstream elites reached a consensus
that a clear rejection of the National Socialist past (and ultra-nationalism more generally)
was fundamental to the German conception of democracy. In contrast, in Austria elites
were divided on the lessons to be learned from the past and no unified norm rejecting
ultra-nationalism emerged. When Radical Right parties came onto the scene in the late-
1980s, the media and the Center-Right in Austria facilitated the Freedom Party's success
by failing to condemn them (and in the case of the Kronen Zeitung serving as free
advertising) while the unified response of mainstream actors in Germany prevented the
Radical Right from achieving a permanent foothold.
In this chapter I depart from Art's argument in two respects. First, while Art
treats the configuration of opportunity structures in western Germany and Austria as a
political culture that arose from ideological debates in the 1980s, I argue that they were
actually informal strategic institutions that emerged in the immediate post-war period and
evolved into Art's norms over time.352 Elites in Germany and Austria faced two
challenges at the end of World War II. First, they had to construct a system of norms and
institutions to manage the domestic conflicts between the Left and Right during the
interwar years, which contributed to democratic breakdown and a disastrous war.
Furthermore, both countries faced the prospect of indefinite occupation or division by the
Allies, and domestic elites sought to design a system capable of minimizing external
influence. The prerequisites for minimizing this influence were convincing the Allies
352 Art (2006), pg. 9.
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that they could 1) minimize their domestic conflicts and 2) manage the nationalist forces
which had initiated a global war.
Elites in Austria and West Germany developed two very different systems for
dealing with these challenges, partly to fulfill their own goals and partly due to the
international constraints they faced. Germany's size and the Allied judgment that it was
solely responsible for the crimes of National Socialism made a continued Allied presence
a fact beyond the control of domestic elites. 353 Moreover, as the leaders of the National
Socialist regime originated in Germany and their rise was seen as aided by the presence
of anti-democratic forces on the Left, West German elites felt a responsibility to
aggressively defend their conception of liberal democracy to preserve the new Federal
Republic. The confluence of these two factors was a system where political and social
groups associated with extremism (on Left and Right) were aggressively combated
through formal institutions, including reducing the proportionality of the electoral system
and liberal laws for banning extremist groups, and informal agreements among the
established elites. At the same time, the guaranteed presence of 200,000 American
occupation troops meant there was no need for a broader set of institutions to manage
conflicts between mainstream conservatives and social-democrats. 354
In Austria, the situation was exactly reversed. Austria's small size and the
agreement at the 3" Moscow Conference in 1943 that it was National Socialism's "first
victim" rather than a willing participant meant that a continued Allied presence was
353 Rogers (1995).
354 Heritage Foundation, "US Troop Deployment Dataset,"
http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/ cda04-1 1.cfm.
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possible but not assured.35" Moreover, because National Socialism was considered a
German political movement, Austrian elites felt no responsibility to deny Radical Right
elements a role in everyday politics. As a result, Austrian elites developed a system with
minimal formal or informal constraints on nationalist actors, though they were still
required by the Allies to ban explicitly National Socialist or fascist successor parties. 356
Though they might have found the politics of Radical Right parties distasteful and some
mainstream political actors were more reluctant to cooperate than others, in general elites
from the established parties cooperated with the Radical Right when they felt there was
some benefit in doing so. However, because they preferred not to have a continued
Allied presence to ensure stability and because they feared the broad social divisions of
the interwar period, Austrian elites instituted an informal system of consensus designed
to minimize the conflict between the Catholic and socialist milieus.357
Second, whereas Art only considers the effects of broad systemic norms on
Radical Right success, I argue that there were actually three separate factors, all
generated by early post-war decisions, that independently affected nativist fortunes in
Germany and Austria. I conceptualize these factors along two axes. First, following
Eatwell (2003) some factors are largely exogenous to the political system (the demand
factors that shape individual preferences or priorities), while others are largely
endogenous to the political system (the supply factors that increase the willingness to
vote for a party, without altering individual priorities). Second, following Mudde (2007)
some factors contribute to a party's ability to grow while others contribute to its ability to
persist when the conditions for growth are absent.
355 Barker (1973), pp. 154-164.
356 This requirement was formalized in the 1995 State Treaty, which returned Austrian sovereignty.
357 Plasser and Ulram (eds) (2002), pp. 18-22.
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The first factor I identify is the favorability of the immediate issue environment:
are the issues that nativist parties emphasize salient, and is the nativist party considered
the party most competent to address those issues? In addition to migration, discussed at
length in Chapter 4, I emphasize two issues that were a legacy of the early post-war
period: the presence and continued functioning of a system of patronage, and concerns
about German reunification. Both issues were generated by elite decisions in the early
post-war era to manage domestic conflict and to prevent the return of a system-
threatening Germany military, respectively.
While the issue environment depends on the public's preferences and priorities (a
demand-side consideration), the remaining factors focus on the characteristics of the
nativist parties and their party systems (supply-side considerations). The second factor is
the strength of organization transmitting the nativist appeal, which I divide into two
arenas. On the one hand, parties with plentiful resources before an election (good
funding, many dedicated activists) are in a better position to transmit their message when
the issue environment is favorable. On the other hand, a stable of professional
functionaries socialized to agree with the party's agenda are essential for avoiding
infighting and charges of incompetence, keeping the party functioning when the issue
environment is no longer favorable. The final factor I identify is the strategy other parties
in the system adopt with respect to the nativist party, affecting its ability to represent its
voters and advance the careers of its functionaries. In Germany and Austria, these
strategies were part of a stance toward nationalist appeals decided upon by elites from the
established parties in the early post-war period. The placement of these factors based on
the schema I constructed above is presented in Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1: Variables Influencing Nativist Party Success in Austria and Germany
Growth Persistence
Demand Issue Environment
- Migration
- Patronage Politics
- German Reunification
Supply Party Organization Party Organization
- Capacity - Functionary Recruitment
(Funding, Activists) Opponent Strategy
- Policy Opportunities
- Functionary Opportunities
The chapter is divided into four sections. The first three discuss each factor as it
appeared in Germany and Austria in the 1980s and 1990s. The fourth analyzes the
relationship between two of these factors and argues that a party's organization in one
period is partly a legacy of opponent strategies in the past, taking the Radical Right in
Germany and Austria in the 1950s and 1960s as an example. The conclusion considers
about the generalizability of these factors beyond the German and Austrian cases.
Critical Issues: Patronage Politics and German Reunification
Chapter 3 presented a model in which changes to an environment caused by some
triggering event or process alter the importance given to an issue or identity in political
and social decisions. Political systems are complex, and multiple aspects of the
environment might change simultaneously, for example a country facing an economic
crisis and a foreign policy crisis at the same time. For a niche party, the simultaneous
variance of multiple aspects of the environment during a period of growth might hamper
or augment their fortunes. It might hamper their fortunes if a voter considers different
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parties the most competent (or the best signal) to address different issues, with one event
muting concerns with the other. It might augment their fortunes if the same party is
considered competent on different issues by non-overlapping sets of voters, giving them a
greater increase in support than if either event had occurred in isolation.
This section argues that in addition to immigration, two factors associated with
their early post-war legacies affected nativist fortunes in Austria and Germany,
facilitating the growth of the FPOe and hampering the growth of its German counterparts.
The augmenting event was the accelerated decline of an entrenched system of patronage,
which Austria had and Germany did not. The dampening event was the sudden
reunification of territories divided in the early post-war period, which affected Germany
but not Austria.
The FPOe and Proporz
In Chapter 4 I presented evidence on the FPOe's perceived issue competence in
the 1990s; in addition to immigration policy the FPOe was considered the most
competent to combat patronage and government waste. Throughout the 1990s, between
30% and 40% of the population considered the FPOe the party most qualified to deal
with immigration and corruption.358 In terms of issue salience, discussions of Austria's
patronage system and a "culture of scandal" dominated Austrian politics from the mid- to
late-1980s, and early on these issues were seen as augmenting the FPOe's chances. 359
Austria's system of patronage dates back to the initiation of the Proporz
(proportionality) system in the early post-war period, intended by domestic elites to
358 Mueller, pp. 36-7 in Plasser et al (eds) (2000), taken from FESSEL-GfK's "Representative Surveys."
359 Plasser and Sommer, pp. 44-46 OJP 1989.
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ensure social stability.360 Under Proporz, public posts were apportioned according to the
relative strength of the Christian-democratic OeVP and the social-democratic SPOe to
reduce interparty competition and conflict. The system was intended to ensure consensus
on the most important decisions; for example, the national cabinet was assigned
proportionally and each minister given an undersecretary from the other party.361 In
reality, Proporz was omnipresent and regulated appointments to the judiciary, the banks,
the national radio and television companies, and even teaching posts. In addition, the
National Socialist regime built a great deal of heavy industry that was nationalized by the
state after the war, giving the government control of the country's manufacturing jobs. In
1972, 20% of Austria's GNP was produced by the public sector, employing 29% of its
labor force and 2/3rds of its manufacturing jobs. 362 Qualifying for a public sector job in
Austria often required formal party membership (the Parteibuchwirtschaft or "party book
economy"). In a 1980 survey, 37% said they joined a party to gain "professional
benefits" and 24% to gain subsidized housing.363 Though much of the adult population
was a member of one of the two major parties, some Austrians were unsympathetic to
either ideology and resented the barriers to advancement, and these voters formed the
FPOe's base in its first decades.
A major shift came in the late-1970s and early-1980s, as structural
transformations across advanced industrial countries threatened the manufacturing sector.
In Austria, these problems were particularly acute as the threatened industries, such as
VOEST-Alpine (then the United Austrian Iron and Steel Works, Austria's largest
360 Lijphart (1977) identified Austria as a case of consociationalism.
361 Jelavich (1987), pg. 274.
362 Jelavich (1987), pp. 277-8.
363 Kraeh (1996), pg. 50.
198
employer), were publicly owned and played a role in the distribution of patronage. The
government was more interested in VOEST's ability to ensure social peace than its
profitability and responded with deficit spending, delaying rationalization and increased
the pressure on the Austrian taxpayer. 364 In addition, the benefits (or abuses of power)
granted the elites who controlled Proporz became harder to dismiss as the system's
benefits failed to trickle down to the average Austrian. By putting a strain on the Proporz
system, deindustrialization reduced the opportunities for patronage, increased the
disconnect between elites and the public and left more Austrians receptive to an
alternative system of distributing public spoils. 365 Back to the late- 1970s, surveys by
FESSEL-GfK found that preventing the waste of public funds was named a top priority
by 3 /4ths of the population.366
The FPOe's major rhetorical and ideological shift in 1986 was to attack Proporz,
with new leader Joerg Haider championing the "little man" against the "old party bosses"
that ruled the country.367 Excluded from the Proporz system over the past 40 years, the
FPOe was best situated to assume this role. In the early going, the FPOe promised above
all fewer abuses of power, lower taxes and less bureaucracy. 368 This move had already
been attempted with some success under the brief Chairmanship of Alexander Goetz in
1979, but it was more successful in the mid-1980s, as more voters felt excluded from the
Proporz umbrella. 369 The opposition to Proporz was not something that Haider invented,
364 Jelavich (1987), pg. 313. Chancellor Kreisky famously proclaimed that he "preferred deficits to
unemployment"; Rauscher, pg. 31 in Scharsach (2000).
365 Kraeh (1996), pg. 55; Plasser and Ulram, in Plasser and Ulram (eds) (2002), pp. 22-24.
366 Based on data from FESSEL surveys since 1976, provided by Prof. Dr. Peter Ulram. By the early-
1990s, these numbers had dropped below 40%.
367 Plasser and Ulram, pg. 130 in Scharsach (ed) (2000).
368 Hoebelt (2003), pg. 50.
369 When Goetz took over the FPOe in 1978, he oriented the party toward a coalition with the OeVP and a
smaller bureaucracy during the 1979 election, making an enemy of SPOe Chancellor Kreisky. As the
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but rather an increasingly salient issue unaddressed by the established parties or the
previously dominant faction in his party.
For challenging the system, the major parties excluded the FPOe from national
decisions, a policy of Ausgrenzung. The SPOe ended the three year-old SPOe-FPOe
government and formed a Grand Coalition, which would last the next 13 years. Haider
traded immediate government access for the prospect of increased support from the
growing resentment toward Proporz. If the goal of the Ausgrenzung was to wait Haider
out, the Grand Coalition failed for two reasons. First, it was perceived as a perpetuation
of the cartel politics the FPOe was railing against, reinforcing the "party boss"
narrative.370 Second, in times of crisis Grand Coalitions might be advantageous to create
consensus on the most important political decisions, such as Britain's Grand Coalition
from 1931-45. In a time of peace in Austria, the Grand Coalition was associated with
gridlock and ineffective government, increasing voter dissatisfaction and strengthening
the support for the FPOe in opposition.3 71 In short, the FPOe was able to gain support
from the mid 1980s by drawing on the increased demand for anti-patronage appeals.
In the late-1980s, the FPOe attracted self-employed and well-educated voters who
were upset with the system, mainly taking votes from the OeVP.3 72 In Vienna, Haider
excelled in the well-off 1st and 4 th districts, but lost votes in the city's low-income public
housing.373 Some (Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Betz and Immerfall 1998) argue that the
Mayor of Graz he was reluctant to spend more time in Vienna and gave up his post in 1979, with his
follower Norbert Steger preferring to maintain strong ties with the SPOe; interview, Lothar Hoebelt,
12/22/06.
370 Kraeh (1996), pg. 47.
371 Plasser and Ulram (eds) (2002), pg. 85; Stoess (2005), pg. 120.
372 Kraeh (1996), pg. 220.
373 Hoebelt (2003), pg. 50.
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FPOe's growth was the result of this resentment, or some sort of values realignment
toward neo-liberalism, and that migration played little or no role.
However, beginning in 1990 the FPOe attracted large numbers of blue-collar
workers, especially in working class urban areas like Vienna's 10 th, 1 Ith and 15 th districts,
as the party made immigration its primary campaign theme. From 1990-1999, the FPOe
gained approximately 500,000 blue-collar voters but only 100,000 self-employed. 374 By
1999 the FPOe were the number one party among blue-collar voters (with 45-50%
support), but were only the second party among white-collar workers (with 33%). Blue-
collar voters are the least receptive to calls for less market regulation, though this does
not preclude opposition to a patronage system that they feel excludes them. 375 In
elections in the 1990s approximately 2 /3rds of those switching to the FPOe called
scandals and patronage a motivating factor (but not taxes, the economy, or deregulation),
50% said they were interested in "teaching [the Government] a lesson" (Denkzettel) and
1/ 3rd said they were switching out of concerns over immigration. 376 Migration played the
greatest role in Vienna, the state most affected by the new arrivals; in the 1991 Viennese
374 Luther, in Plasser and Ulram (eds) (2007).
375 Ivarsflaten (2005) found that nativist voters in Denmark and France are less economically liberal than
members of other parties of the right but far more exclusionary with regard to immigration, and that small
business owners are significantly more economically liberal than blue-collar workers, though both
disproportionally supported nativist parties.
376 Plasser et al., in OJP 1990; Plasser and Ulram, in OJP 1990; Plasser et al., in OJP 1994; Plasser et al., in
OJP 1999. There are two difficulties when interpreting data on motivation. The first is ecological;
respondents were allowed to report more than one justification for switching, so it is unclear how much
overlap there is between the three categories and how voters would rank them in importance. Second,
"teaching a lesson" is a highly ambiguous term; some or all voters might have been sending their signal
based on their dissatisfaction with immigration policy, but were reluctant to express open nativism in the
survey. In short, anywhere from 0% (all those answering immigration also answered scandals, but ranked
immigration lower) to 85% might have been voting for the party primarily out of immigration.
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state election approximately 60% of those switching to the FPOe called immigration an
important factor in their decision.377
German Nativists and Reunification
In contrast to Austria, Germany did not establish a consensus system in the post-
war period and patronage never became a major theme in elections. In Politbarometer
surveys, corruption was considered an important issue by less than 5% of the population
from 1986 through 1992 and less than 10% from 1993 to 1999, similar to the lack of
concern with crime.3 " While there were individual scandals, there was no broad
perception that the system was broken and no reservoir of discontent for nativist parties
to latch onto. Nativist parties in Germany instead concentrated on immigration, crime
and an aggressive anti-Communist foreign policy, including strong support for German
reunification. Indeed, the Republikaner were founded over the question of reunification.
For German nativist parties, defacto reunification with the fall of the Berlin Wall
in November 1989 was a double blow to their fortunes. First, the end of the Cold War
robbed anti-Communism of its power as a political appeal.379 Second, reunification came
at a time when the major issue nativist parties drew support from, migration, was highly
salient. West Germans from the beginning were concerned about Reunification's costs;
the country's population was increasing by 25%, with many of those newcomers
requiring social insurance. All issues but Reunification receded in importance...shortly
before a national election.380 As Figure 5.2 indicates, concerns about Reunification was
377 Plasser and Ulram, in OJP 1990.378 Politbarometer 1977-2002.
379 Stoess (2005), pg. 61.
380 Cheles et al. (1994), pg. 304.
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inversely correlated with concerns about migration on a monthly basis between August
1989 and December 1993 (r- .72).381
Figure 5.2: The Salience of Reunification & Immigration, Germany 1989-93
Through the summer of 1989, before reunification became a pressing concern, the REP
averaged 5.5% in Politbarometer polls of vote intention, enough to enter the federal
parliament. 382 By January 1990 their support had declined to 2.5% and by the end of
1990 1.5%, not far from their final vote share. This suggests that without reunification,
the REP had a strong chance of entering the national parliament in elections originally
scheduled for 1991, assuming the new migration issue remained unresolved by the
established parties.
In addition to the emergence of immigration as a salient issue, the FPOe was able
to build on a second "owned" issue in the 1980s, its opposition to patronage. In contrast,
German nativist parties were hampered by the absence of patronage as a relevant issue, as
well as German reunification, which depressed their support at a crucial moment. This
configuration of issues in the late-1980s and early-1990s explains why the FPOe
experienced so much more growth than their German counterparts, but it leaves open the
question of why the FPOe was so much better at retaining their supporters. The next two
sections argue that the explanation for this phenomenon lies in the opportunity structures
present in both countries. Even if reunification had not been a theme and the REP had
entered the national parliament, other factors would likely have made their tenure brief.
Party Organization: Party Capture vs. Party Building
381 Calculations from Politbarometer 1977-2002; N=49.382 Politbarometer 1977-2002.
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Mudde (2007) suggests that two types of opportunity structures influence a
party's ability to grow or persist. He splits these factors into the internal supply-side (the
features of a party) and the external supply-side (the features of the political system). I
argue that two supply-side factors, one internal (party organization) and one external
(opponent strategies), contributed to the divergence in outcomes in Austria and Germany.
I focus on three comparisons, between nativist parties in Germany and Austria, between
iterations of the FPOe across time, and between nativist parties in the German states of
Baden-Wuerttemberg and Schleswig-Holstein. Three comparisons are necessary to parse
the effect of the hypothesized processes, as opponent strategies do not vary across
countries. The comparison between Baden-Wuerttemberg and Schleswig-Holstein
focuses on parties with different degrees of organization entering parliament at the same
moment in 1992, which controls for national contextual factors. The comparison
between iterations of the FPOe is attractive as that party was the only relevant nativist
actor in Austria, but its degree of organization varied over time.
By party organization, I mean the degree to which a party has systematized and
routinized its functions (campaigning, recruitment) and the resources (financial and
human) at its disposal. I argue that party organization can affect the ability to grow or to
persist, though a different mechanism is at work in each case. In terms of growth, parties
that are well-funded or have extensive networks of activists have the ability to easily
reach new voters when the issue environment is favorable, while parties that are
underfunded or understaffed spend their critical elections fighting for ballot access or
delegating their candidates to administrative tasks rather than rallies or constituent
outreach. In terms of persistence, strong organizations have established mechanisms for
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identifying and training competent, professional functionaries capable strengthening the
bond with supporters through legislation or constituent service in times when the issue
environment is unfavorable. Weak party organizations are unable to properly identify or
train functionaries and give power to the ineffective, incompetent, disloyal or corrupt.
Even if a party lacks a formal organization, there might exist a disciplined or well-funded
sub-culture that maintains organizations and socializes or trains functionaries who can
then make the jump into politics (Art 2008).
The FPOe: Party Capacity
Joerg Haider's ascension as party leader of the FPOe in 1986 provided access to
substantial resources with which to advance his agenda.383 Though a number of Haider's
high-level opponents left the party after the vote the result was legal and uncontested,
accomplished through backroom negotiations with the party's nationalist wing.384
Relative to other parties in Western Europe, Austria's traditional parties (the OeVP,
SPOe and FPOe) are very large and well-funded. The FPOe had approximately 37,000
dues paying members in 1986 and received 65 million Austrian Schillings ($6.25 million
in 1986 USD) in public support.385 In contrast, in 2008 the German FDP had 66,000
members and received $13 million (in 2006 USD), despite a vote share twice as large in a
country ten times as big.386 Permanent political parties also employ an administrative
middle stratum, the staff who handle the day-to-day business of constituent service,
383 Haider defeated the then-Chair Norbert Steger with 59.5% of the vote; Bailer et al., pg. 115 in Scharsach
(ed) (2000).
384 36 prominent party members left in the early period of Haider's Chairmanship; Stimemann, pg. 171 in
the OJP 1987. The Carinthian, Styrian, and parts of the Upper Austrian organizations were particularly
disaffected with Steger, who came up through the Viennese party organization and was a classical liberal
unsympathetic to their more conservative, nationalist views; Bailer-Galanda and Neugebauer (1997), pp.
33-35.
385 Membership: Hoebelt (2003); Finances: Bailer-Galanda and Neugebauer (1997), pg. 44.
386 "Freie Demokratische Partei [Deutschland]," de.wikipedia.org.
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election and executive administration. The FPOe's mid-level bureaucracy remained
essentially intact after Haider's election. 387
The FPOe: Functionary Recruitment
Haider's takeover did not (initially) compromise the FPOe's established channels
for identifying and training professional, loyal functionaries. As an established party, the
FPOe had a number of auxiliary organizations (two youth organizations; a business
association; a farmer's association) and was entrenched in state and local politics across
Austria, meaning that they were in a position to choose the most promising or competent
functionaries for higher office. Despite his image as an "outsider," Haider was a
professional politician. Between 1970 and 1986, the 36-year old Haider had spent 14
years in politics: four as chair of the RFJ, the FPOe's youth movement, followed by
seven as a state party functionary (Landesparteisekretaer) overlapping with four as a
national MP and finally three as the head of a state party organization and member of a
state cabinet (Landesregirung).8 Many of the party's national MPs after the 1986
national election had a long background in the party, and several had served in the
outgoing SPOe-FPOe government. The median incoming FPOe MP in 1986 had 11
years of political experience: a term in the national parliament, a term at the state or local
level and several years as a member of a state or local party organization.
Haider used the party's continued success in the late-1980s to centralize his
authority, with the selection of the party's higher functionaries relying less on established
387 Interview, Lothar Hoebelt, 12/22/06.
388 Austrian National Parliamentary Biography System, "Joerg Haider," http://www.parlament.gv.at.
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channels than his personal decisions. 389 Haider moved away from promotion through the
ranks in favor of the big splash, finding prominent public advocates (Heide Schmidt),
industrialists (Thomas Prinzhorn), journalists (Hans Pretterebner) and athletes (Patrick
Ortlieb) and immediately granting these "career jumpers" (Quereinsteiger) positions of
great authority. Heide Schmidt, a television personality through her work with the
national Ombudsman (Volksanwaltschaft), was brought directly into politics as a member
of the national upper chamber of parliament (the Bundesrat) and a year later became the
party's General Secretary. Industrialist Thomas Prinzhorn was a national MP for two
years before he was a member of the party. Haider also had a penchant for promoting
young, handsome men, and the FPOe came to be known as the "boys' party"
(Buberlpartie). Peter Westenthaler became the parliamentary club's press secretary at
22, after a year in the party. Karl-Heinz Grasser became the 25-year old deputy
Governor of Carinthia in 1994, after two years in the party.
Haider's overall method was to create a party structure dependent on and
beholden to him. But his centralization of the recruitment and promotion process also
allowed less competent and (ironically) less loyal individuals into the party's upper
echelons. Routinized channels of recruitment and promotion ideally identify
functionaries who are incompetent or disagree with the party line early and prevent them
from advancing further in the party. Ignoring these channels increases the risk that more
prominent scandals or rifts will occur high up in the party, where they will receive more
media attention and have a greater ability to disrupt the party. For example, of the seven
389 "I thought we could wait out his breakthrough, but Haider brought his own people with him. Haider
made sure that only people close to him kept their positions. People became dependent on him.... Haider
became the sole leader through his success. It's hopeless to oppose him internally when he wins elections."
Interview, Friedhelm Frischenschlager (former FPOe MP), 12/1/06.
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MPs who left the FPOe for the Liberal Forum in the early- 1990s, three had no political
experience before the 1990 election and two more were Quereinsteiger placed directly
into the Bundesrat in the late-1980s. The Liberal Forum defectors supported the FPOe's
liberalism but not its nativism, and for the FPOe's anti-immigrant "Austria First"
initiative in 1992 represented the transformation of the party into a nationalist force with
a liberal facade. 390 Functionaries who came up through the party were opponents of
Proporz because it excluded their sub-culture, but had to be willing or eager to accept
nationalism and ethnic chauvinism to advance through the party. Similarly the
functionaries who left the FPOe for the BZOe in 2005, such as Westenthaler or Grasser
(who became an independent) had few connections to the party sub-culture itself, or a
connection with Haider or his Carinthian organization. 391 Of the 18 FPOe MPs in 2002
legislative session, 16 left for the BZOe. Of those, 13 joined the party after Haider
became leader. Two of the three pre-Haider MPs were part of a Carinthian party
organization that Haider had controlled for 20 years; nearly the entire Carinthian party
defected to the BZOe.392 Some of Haider's selections were simply not qualified for
political life. In 1991 Haider recruited his personal bodyguard for the upper house;
unable to deal with position's responsibilities, he committed suicide after resigning in
1993. 393
What distinguished the functionaries who stayed with the FPOe in 2005 were
their roots in Austria's nationalist sub-culture and a lack of connection to Carinthia.
Federal MP Barbara Rosenkranz's husband Horst was a member of the National
390 Interview correspondence, Dr. Heide Schmidt (founder of the Liberal Forum), 12/12/06.391 Interview, Dr. Kurt Richard Luther, 3/14/07.
392 Austrian National Parliamentary Biography System, http://www.parlament.gv.at/WW.
393 Bailer-Galanda and Neugebauer (1997), pg. 115; Austrian National Parliament, "Bernhard Gauster,"
http://www.parlament.gv.at.
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Democrats (NDP), a party banned in the late-1980s as a successor to the NSDAP. The
other federal MP who stayed, Reinhard Boesch, was prominent in the fraternal
association (Burschenschaft) "Teutonia." 394 Heinz-Christian Strache, head of the
Viennese party and Haider's eventual replacement as party chair, is prominent in the
"Vandalia" Burschenschaft in Vienna and to a daughter of Norbert Burger, the NDP's
founder. Andreas Moelzer, the FPOe's chief ideologue during the height of its nativist
appeals in the early-1990s and now the party's European MP, was a member of the
"Corps Vandalia" Burschenschaft in Graz. Though he controlled appointments to the
cabinet, the federal parliamentary group, the national steering committee and (at times)
the state party heads, Haider was unable or unwilling to completely purge the party of
potential opponents. It was these local- and state-level functionaries, professionalized
through local and state parliaments and below Haider's field of vision, that opposed
Haider in 2005 and returned the FPOe to success when he left the party.
The effect of Haider's centralization of power was evident more generally in the
composition and stability of the party's parliamentary and cabinet groups. Using the
Austrian National Parliament's biography system (www.parlament.gv.at), which posts a
resume for every Austrian politician since 1918, I have constructed a database collecting
the political experience of every legislator or cabinet member for the FPOe or its
predecessor party, the VdU, who began a parliamentary session in office.39 5 During the
394 In contrast to fraternities in the United States, membership in certain Burschenschaften in Austria is a
symbol of a conservative or nationalist socialization. Some have longstanding connections to national-
liberal and German-national circles; many of the more nationalist Burschenschaften were banned in
Germany after World War II. Certain Burschenschaften are prominent recruitment centers for the FPOe
and members of these societies overwhelmingly stayed with the party after the BZOe split.
395 The 1994-95 session was excluded due to its brevity. "Political Experience" includes time in elected
office, but also time as an official functionary in a national, state or local party organization. I count as a
failure any MP who defected from the party, who was thrown out of the party, or who rotated out of the
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four parliamentary sessions where Haider had complete control of the functionary
selection process (1990, 1994, 1999 and 2002), the political experience of the FPOe's
average parliamentary was 30% lower than the four sessions before or the one session
after (8.4 years vs. 12), as Haider rotated untested functionaries into the parliamentary
group. Moreover, the percentage of FPOe MPs who failed to complete their term in
office, because they defected to another party, were caught in a scandal, or were demoted
or stripped of their power in an internal struggle, markedly increased to an average of
30.4% in those four sessions, compared to 9.2% in the four sessions below and the one
session after.396
The de-routinization of the recruitment process was especially noticeable during
the FPOe's first coalition with the OeVP. After entering government, the professionalism
of the FPOe's electoral campaigns receded in importance and its administrative capacity
came to the fore. Yet, Haider populated the cabinet with relatively untested
functionaries; Haider's average cabinet choice had less office-holding experience than the
average MP (5.5 years vs. 7).397 Though there were a number of MPs with 15 or even 20
years of office-holding experience in the party, the most experienced appointee had 9. In
contrast, the OeVP's average cabinet appointee had spent 10 years in office. Of Haider's
eight appointees, three had to be replaced during the first session (all in the first year) as
parliament or the cabinet for a significantly worse post. Legislators who died in office were not counted as
failures, nor were legislators who left the parliament for a roughly lateral post (to lead a state party or
parliamentary group; to become a federal appointee, etc.).
396 Functionaries were coded as demoted if they left parliament before their term expired, but failed to take
a post of equal or greater value, such as a position in a state cabinet, the leadership of a state party, or an
appointed role in the federal government. Functionaries who died were coded as completing the session.
Changes in party membership are available as part of the biography, and scandals were established through
outside media searches.
397 Though Susanne Riess-Passer was the dejure chair of the FPOe in 2000, there was no doubt that Haider
remained in charge of the party.
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did one of their replacements. 398 All four were placed into positions of importance by
Haider without rising through the party ranks.399 Additionally, Vice-Chancellor Susanne
Riess-Passer and Finance Minister Karl-Heinz Grasser had a falling out with Haider, the
so-called "Knittelfeld Putsch," that led to the fall of the first government and their
separation from the party after the 2005 election.40 0 Of the 18 FPOe-backed ministers
who served in the two FPOe-OeVP governments, 10 left their post over a scandal or due
to inner-party strife, or left the party over an ideological disagreement or power struggle.
Of the 15 OeVP-backed ministers who served in the two OeVP-FPOe governments only
one, Interior Minister Erwin Strasser, left his post over the reorganization of the national
police. During the FPOe's last term in Government (1983-6), the average cabinet
member had 7 years of office-holding experience, and only one of six failed to survive
the term.401
German Nativists: Organizational Resources
While Joerg Haider captured a party with many resources and an initially strong
functionary base, nativists in Germany in the late-1980s needed to divide their attention,
building party organizations during the period most favorable for growth. Though the
three major nativist actors in Germany (the NPD, DVU and REP) faced a similar
challenge, the parties varied in their ability to generate a party capacity, affecting their
398 After 25 days in office, Justice Minister Michael Krueger was replaced in part over a sexually explicit
interview with the news magazine profil. Krueger resigned for "health reasons"; Falter 33/02, 8/14/02.
Michael Schmid (Transportation) and Elisabeth Sickl (Social Security) left at the request of the party;
during Schmid's tenure the Austrian rail service (OeBB) went on strike for the first time in 35 years.
399 Krueger's first position was as a federal MP in 1994, Schmid's as the head of the state party
organization in Styria, and Sickl and Monika Forstinger (Schmid's replacement) were placed directly into a
state parliament with no prior experience.
400 Grasser would go on to be a defacto OVP member and Finance Minister in the second Schuessel
government.
401 Defense Minister Friedhelm Frischenschlager was replaced over the "Reder Affair," in which
Frischenschlager was forced to resign his cabinet post after shaking hands with convicted war criminal
Walter Reder upon his return from prison in Italy in 1985.
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ability to grow, and in their willingness to recruit a professional functionary base,
affecting their ability to persist once in parliament.
Of the three parties in West Germany in the late-1980s, only the NPD lacked the
funds and activist base necessary to make a serious push for growth. Under surveillance
by German authorities as a potential extremist group and banned in Berlin by the Allied
authorities, the NPD was only relevant in the communities where individual personalities
had retained local mandates since the 1970s.40 2 Though these functionaries, such as
Chair Martin Mussgnug or his successor, Guenter Deckert, had been active in the party
since the 1960s, the party's collapse (from 28,000 members in 1969 to 6000 in 1987)
meant that those who remained were the residue of the movement's formation and not
part of a functioning, regenerating party structure.
In contrast to the NPD, the DVU and REP each had something resembling a
functioning organization in the 1980s, though both were far weaker than the FPOe and
the strengths of the two parties were very different. Though the DVU claimed more than
20,000 members in 1989, most were official (subscribers to founder Gerhard Frey's
newspapers) rather than active.403 While political parties in Germany and Austria have
state and local organizations that hold monthly meetings and special events throughout
the year, the DVU's only real structure was the party headquarters in Munich, and the
only outreach the few rallies held before elections. 40 4 The DVU was for all intents and
purposes a one man show, with leader Gerhard Frey in control of every decision at every
402 Office of Constitutional Protection, Verfassungsschutzbericht 1987.403 Office of Constitutional Protection, Verfassungsschutzbericht 1989.
404 Schmidt (1997), pg. 59.
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level of parliament.4 05 The DVU's organizational strength was financial; a multi-
millionaire, Frey readily "donated" millions to the DVU's election campaigns. In the
1987 local election in Bremen, the DVU spent 1.9 million DM to obtain 3.4% of the vote
and one seat...more than the Greens (440,000 DM, 10.2%, 10 seats) and the FDP
(275,000 DM, 10%, 10 seats) combined.40 6
Originating in Bavaria in 1984, the REP established organizations in every state
within its first four years, though they were not sufficiently organized to contest the 1987
federal election. While there were constant leadership disputes in its first decade of
existence, as a party not yet under the microscope of domestic authorities the REP were
the most attractive movement for conservative-national functionaries interested in a
respectable yet aggressively nativist and nationalist party.407 The REP were especially
successful at recruiting from the police and military, from disaffected CSU functionaries
(in Bavaria) who felt that party had become too moderate and from the expellee sub-
culture (East German Uebersiedler and Vertriebene from Poland and the Czech
Republic). At their height in 1989 the REP had approximately 25,000 members,
compared to 45,000 for the Greens in 2008. 408 Activists from the NPD switched to the
REP in the late-1980s in such numbers that the REP banned further defections in October
1989 to counteract the perception that they were the extremists' new flag bearer.40 9 High
rates of defection in the other direction did not occur until the 21 st Century, when the
405 Schmidt (1997), pg. 52.
406From German federal campaign finance reporting for 1987.
407 In the REP's early years, the "triumvirate" of Franz Schoenhuber, Franz Handlos and Ekkehard Voight
had a leadership struggle in the first two years that resulted in the later two leaving the party. The party's
current chair, Rolf Schlierer, left the party briefly in the late-1980s over concerns that the party was
becoming too extreme.
408 Neubacher (2001 Dissertation), pp. 49-51. The REP's membership at the beginning of 1989 was closer
to 8500.
409 Veen et al. (1993), pg. 22. In 1993, 15 of the REP's 26-member national committee had some past
association with a party or social group to the "right" of the REP, including the NPD.
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NPD's organizational base in eastern Germany and its alliance with the DVU allowed it
to supplant the REP as Germany's chief Radical Right party, suggesting that nativist
activists tended to gravitate toward the most promising organization. In the late-1980s,
this meant the REP.410
Did the degree of party organization give some parties an advantage? Within
western Germany, the NPD was certainly the least organized party and the only party not
to enter a state parliament. While their skeletal organization did comparatively well in
state elections in Baden-Wuerttemberg and Schleswig-Holstein in 1988, where they were
the only or most organized nativist party on the ballot and migration was starting to
become salient, with the REP's emergence in 1989 they were distinctly the third
preference; the NPD received 1/7th the votes of the REP in the 1990 national election.
Between the DVU and REP it is more difficult to draw a distinction. The DVU was
strong where the REP was weak (Bremen and Schleswig-Holstein), and failed to contest
states (Baden-Wuerttemberg and Bavaria) where the REP was strong. The REP's ceiling
when they had a strong activist base but not a great deal of funding (7.5% in Berlin in
1989) was nearly identical to the DVU (6.3% in Schleswig-Holstein in 1992), who had
the funding but never the activist base.
Cross-nationally, the effect of party organization faces a "degrees of freedom"
problem; the FPOe might have benefitted from a better organization, but Austria also
received more migration per capita and had a reservoir of dissatisfaction with the Proporz
system. Nativist functionaries in Germany certainly felt that their weaker party structures
410 Franz Schoenhuber, Chair of the REP for its first 10 years, ran on the NPD-DVU's joint ticket during
the 2005 national election. Members of the REP did defect to the DVU in the late-1980s, primarily in
Bremen where the party held a seat in parliament; Fascher (1994), pg. 135.
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made campaigning difficult. Some Kreis-level organizations (equivalent to a county)
would have four to six volunteers, including the candidate, for a population of 250,000.
Candidates often found themselves not only campaigning, but personally devoting energy
to basic administrative tasks like collecting signatures to qualify for the ballot or putting
up election posters.411 Despite their organizational weakness, however, the REP and
DVU achieved growth in elections surpassing other, better organized minor parties in
Germany. Before German reunification the REP were polling 5-7% in 1989, which put
them above the Greens. The DVU in 1992 received more votes than the FDP or Greens
in Schleswig-Holstein, as did the REP in Baden-Wuerttemberg. Both succeeded despite
being heavily downplayed by the media, a form of free funding available to most parties
in a political system.412 This suggests that a wide variation in party organization was
sufficient for growth. Moreover, no one aspect of party organization seemed to
dominate; while the DVU's successes came from their campaign expenditures, the REP
in Berlin (1989) and Baden-Wuerttemberg (1992) spent the least per voter of any party
entering parliament.41 3
German Nativists: Channels of Recruitment
While underdeveloped organizations did not appear to infirm the ability of
nativist parties to grow in Germany, the evidence suggests that underdeveloped
functionary channels hampered the ability of one party (the DVU) to persist. Compared
to their counterparts in Austria, nativist functionaries in Germany were relatively
411 Interview, Guenter Deckert (former Federal Chair of the NPD), 10/21/05. Interview, REP (Gross-
Gerau, Hessen), 5/26/06.
412 While the REP were treated as something of a newsworthy oddity in Berlin in January 1989, by the
European Elections later that year the media had reached an explicit or tacit consensus that the party was
dangerous and would not receive positive coverage; Albes (1999).
413 Calculated by federal campaign finance reports.
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inexperienced. As essentially new parties that convinced few functionaries from the
established parties to join their cause, nativist parties in Germany usually seated
candidates who had only been in the party for a handful of years and who had little or no
office-holding experience. Unlike the FPOe, the REP and DVU had no inner-party
mechanism for selecting promising functionaries and unlike a party like the Belgian
Vlaams Blok no extra-party sub-culture for identifying new functionaries. While all
three parties had official auxiliary organizations (for youth, women and seniors), they
were shell organizations incapable of attracting new members or reliably identifying
promising functionaries.414 The REP was so successful in the early going that they
frequently had more mandates to fill than candidates contesting the election and in many
cases this lack of political experience led to the rapid collapse of their parliamentary
groups through in-fighting or a lack of competence. 415 Of the 163 REP parliamentary
groups in existence in 1990, 63 (39%) had collapsed by the end of 1992.416
Not all nativist parliamentary groups were equally inexperienced. In Baden-
Wuerttemberg and Schleswig-Holstein, two nativist parties were elected to the state
legislature on the same day in 1992. The REP entered the Baden-Wuerttemberg
parliament in 1992 with 15 parliamentarians. Having secured office in local elections in
1989, state party leader (and future national party leader) Rolf Schlierer had an
opportunity to select the most promising local functionaries for the state parliamentary
group. While not as experienced as the FPOe, the average REP functionary in Baden-
414 For example, the REP's youth organization in Baden-Wuerttemberg constantly faced internal divisions
and undependable functionaries; in March 1993 the Land Chair had to give up his post after being indicted
for a "politically motivated crime," Verfassungsschutz Baden-Wuerttemberg, Verfassungsschutzbericht
1993, pg. 51.
415 Bergsdorf (2001), pg. 208.416 Neubacher (Dissertation 2001), pg. 89.
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Wuerttemberg in 1992 had 5.6 years of political experience; two (Lothar Koenig and
Karl-August Schaal) had spent more than a decade in local parliaments for the FDP and
the Free Voters (Freie Waehler) respectively.417 Only one REP MP (Wili Auer) failed to
finish the first term, resigning for "health reasons" after being accused of shoplifting in a
perfume store.418 The REP remained in parliament after elections in 1996 with the loss of
one mandate (to 14), before losing half their votes and falling out of parliament in 2001.
Despite a leadership struggle between Schlierer and deputy leader Christian Kaes (who
preferred cooperation with the DVU) during the second term, Kaes kept his seat and the
REP group remained intact until 2001. Indeed, the conflict was a consequence of the
REP's fading fortunes rather than its cause; Kaes saw the DVU's resources as the only
way to keep the party relevant.
In contrast, the DVU essentially picked its functionaries in a contest. A call for
candidates was sent through Frey's National-Zeitung, with applications reviewed by the
national office. 4 19 Of the six MPs who entered parliament in Schleswig-Holstein in 1992,
none had any political experience. Unlike the REP or FPOe, not even the past careers of
the DVU MPs signaled promise. Schlierer was trained as a doctor and both Schlierer and
Kaes were lawyers, whereas the candidates for the DVU were predominantly non-
descript blue-collar workers. The DVU's time in parliament was a catastrophe and the
parliamentary group disintegrated within a year, with half the parliamentarians defecting
to another party (the German League for Nation and Homeland, DLVH). The defections
417 Freie Waehler refers to a list of independent candidates who associate with one another in local or state
elections but do not officially form a party.
418 Neubacher (2001 Dissertation), pg. 129. Auer's replacement, Bernhard Amann, would himself leave the
parliamentary group in 1994 over the leadership struggle between Schlierer and party Chair Franz
Schoenhuber; Verfassungsschutz Baden-Wuerttemberg, Verfassungsschutzbericht 1994.
419 Schmidt (1997), pg. 87.
217
came over the faction's bitter fights with the central office in Munich over autonomy, and
accusations on the party of the national office of abuse of party funds by faction leader
Ingo Stawitz. 420 In 1993, the defection of half the DVU's parliamentarians in Bremen
over similar conflicts destroyed that party's faction after two years in parliament.421
When the nationalist wing of the FPOe captured the party in 1986 and instituted
an anti-system (later a nativist) agenda, they inherited a robust and credible party
organization with significant resources. Capturing a party organization provided these
activists (at least initially) with a reservoir of proven functionaries, allowing them to
maintain their support when the issue environment became less favorable in the mid-
1990s. Only Haider's change to the FPOe's system of recruitment eroded this capacity,
compounded with a shift in responsibility from a party in opposition to a party in
government (which the FPOe's functionaries were unprepared for). As an opposition
party in the government, the FPOe's leaders realized that some decline was inevitable,
though they could not anticipate falling from 27% to 10% of the vote.422 However, the
FPOe's strong reservoir of state and local functionaries prevented the party from
completely disintegrating.
In Germany, nativist elites were forced to build party infrastructure and establish
their credibility even as they waged elections. Of the three nativist parties operating in
Germany, the NPD was the only one that failed to generate a new stream of functionaries
or a source of funding, and ultimately was the only party not to enter parliament. In
420 Schmidt (1997), pg. 135. Frey also accused Stawitz of making statements that crossed the line into
right-extremism and threatened the party with a ban, though ironically those statements were made in
Frey's own paper.
421 Schmidt (1997), pg. 179.
422 "We knew that we couldn't maintain our high vote level. You can't keep protest votes in a government.
We knew that we'd lose 6-7% no matter what. We saw 18-20% as our stabilization point." Interview, Peter
Westenthaler (head of the FPOe parliamentary faction, 1999-2002), 5/31/2007.
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contrast, the REP and DVU showed that a new party without an entrenched organization
could succeed in individual elections. Furthermore, all three parties lacked a stable of
competent functionaries or the mechanisms to select them, and much of the
representation they secured subsequently fell apart over personality conflicts and or
incompetence. This failing was particularly evident in the DVU, which made no effort to
recruit promising functionaries, or REP factions in places like Berlin, where the party
was not able to identify its best functionaries through lower-order elections.
The most successful nativist parliamentary group in Germany, the REP in Baden-
Wuerttemberg, persisted as long as they did largely due to the professionalism of their
parliamentarians, who were selected with an eye toward performance after a trial period
in local parliaments. But despite their relative stability in Germany, the REP in Baden-
Wuerttemberg only remained in the legislature for two sessions. The next section will
argue that no matter the competence of the incoming parliamentary group, conditions
external to the party were such that it was likely to fail not long after its motivating issue,
migration, disappeared from the public consciousness.
Opponent Strategies: Outside Allies vs. Mortal Enemies
One way to interpret vote choice is that voters support parties with the expectation
of representation (Fiorina 1981; Przeworski et al. 1999). In the short run the link
between support and representation might be direct, the expectation that a party enact
some desired change, or indirect, the expectation that signaling support for a particular
change will spur the legislature or Government to action. In the long run, however, the
parties that survive have should be those that consistently display an efficacy in
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representing their supporters. 423 In this section I argue that if a nativist party in Germany
or Austria, with little expectation of forming a Government and implementing change on
their own, hopes to persist by displaying efficacy, it is crucial to have a larger, established
political ally willing to trade nativist support for the implementation of some nativist
goals through legislative agreements, seat-sharing arrangements or a coalition
government. Other parties in the system can therefore implement at least two strategies
with respect to nativist parties. Established parties could ally with a nativist party for
their own purposes, enhancing their efficacy, or they could seek their destruction through
non-cooperation designed to minimize nativist efficacy.
The effect of an opponent's strategy on party growth when conditions are
favorable is theoretically minimal, as supporting a nativist party in this environment can
still have an indirect impact if established actors are convinced that their refusal to
change their behavior will result in further electoral punishment. But opponent strategies
should have a strong effect on a nativist party's ability to persist. When a favorable
environment for growth is absent, sympathetic allies facilitate a nativist party's ability to
establish their competence on everyday issues or to build longstanding relationships with
particular interests by granting them greater access to public resources in exchange for
their continued support. For nativist parties operating in environments where only
opponents are present, other political actors signal to voters that the nativist party will
have no effect on everyday decisions about policy or the distribution of spoils. Without
allies willing to give them responsibility or access to public resources, the nativist party
cannot establish their efficacy and will be abandoned in short order once the initial
423 Lawson, in Lawson and Merkl (eds) (1988).
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motivation for supporting them fades. Franz Pappi refers to this dynamic as "rational" or
"directional" protest, whereby voters temporarily and strategically support a party over a
specific issue.424
Just as there is a logic informing voter decisions, opponent strategies affect the
calculations of prospective functionaries. Functionaries presumably support a party
because they expect it to meaningfully advance their interests, whether those interests are
office-seeking or ideological. In systems where they know they will have willing allies,
functionaries who prefer to join a nativist party have no disincentive to do so. In contrast,
functionaries in systems where nativist parties have nothing but opponents have a
significant disincentive (professionally and potentially personally) to joining a nativist
party. More office-seeking functionaries might prefer to join an ideologically-close party
where they know they can succeed, while all but the most ideological functionaries might
prefer to stay out of politics entirely. Opponent strategies can therefore hamper a nativist
party's ability to persist directly, by reducing their efficacy, and indirectly, by reducing
the quality of the functionaries willing to join the party.
Opportunities for Cooperation: 1986-1999
To begin, I turn to state and federal elections from 1986 to 1999 where parties of
the Center-Right (the CDU-CSU in Germany; the OeVP in Austria) could have allied
with a nativist party to secure the most optimal outcome for themselves. Following a
literature which finds that parties prefer to form coalitions that 1) minimize the size of the
coalition and 2) minimize the policy distance of the coalition partners (Budge and Laver
1986, 1993), I assume that the Center-Right prefers to govern alone with a single-party
424 Holtmann (2002), pg. 70.
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majority, followed by a Center-Right "minimum connected winning coalition," followed
by all other coalition possibilities.425 In Germany, state and federal governments are built
through legislative coalitions. In many Austrian states during this period only the
Governor (Landeshauptmann) was chosen by the legislature, with the remainder of the
cabinet assigned by the Governor proportionally, though there was still some bargaining
necessary to determine which parties received which portfolios. I assume that nativist
parties prefer a Center-Right minimum connected winning coalition, followed by a
Center-Right single-party majority, followed by all other outcomes.
Based on the initial distribution of seats in state and national elections, there were
thirteen instances where cooperation would have been optimal in Austria and one in
Germany.426 Table 2 presents the Government outcome and the degree of cooperation
between nativist parties and the Center-Right. There were three possible outcomes in
each instance: cooperation, aborted cooperation and conflict. In instances of cooperation,
the Center-Right and the nativist party engaged in some explicit or tacit exchange. In
instances of aborted cooperation, the Center-Right and the nativist party attempted
coordination but failed. In instances of conflict, the Center-Right refused to cooperate
with the nativist party and accepted a less optimal outcome. While tacit cooperation
might seem like stretching the concept, the argument is that in cases in conflict, the
Center-Right would rather give up its ability to form a government than rely on a nativist
opponent for support, as the OeVP did at the national level on four occasions from 1986
to 1995.
425 In Germany, the smaller coalition between the CDU-FDP and CDU-REP was considered the more
optimal, with ties going to the FDP.
426 The REP and FDP tied with 14 seats in the 1996 Baden-Wuerttemberg election.
Table 5.2:
Election
Austria (1986)
Burgenland (1987)
Carinthia (1989)
Austria (1990)
Burgenland (1991)
Carinthia (1994)
Salzburg (1994)
Austria (1994)
Styria (1995)
Austria (1995)
Burgenland (1996)
Carinthia (1999)
Austria (1999)
Baden-Wuerttember
As Table 5.2 indicates, the OeVP and FPOe cooperated or attempted to cooperate
in almost half the instances where such cooperation would have been optimal, while the
Center-Right in Germany refused to use a nativist party to achieve a more optimal
outcome. The best known instance of cooperation in Austria was the Carinthian state
election in 1989, when the OeVP supported Haider for Governor to break nearly 45 years
of SPOe control. The coalition only fell apart when the major parties used Haider's 1991
remarks praising the "orderly employment policies" of the National Socialist regime to
replace him with the OeVP's Christoph Zernatto.429 Later elections suggest the OeVP
was only interested in improving their position and punishing Haider personally. After
427 "Government outcome" refers to the cabinet at the national level in Austria and in Germany, and the
Governor at the state level in Austria.
428 The Burgenland election was seen as an important step toward legitimizing Haider's version of the party
in the Austrian political system. The FPOe agreed to vote for the OeVP in return for a seat in the state
cabinet. One FPOe legislator, Gregor Munzenrieder, voted for SPOe candidate Johann Sipoetz instead,
making him Governor of Burgenland. Munzenrieder was expelled from the FPOe for his action; Kurier,
"VP stellt bald einen siebenten Landeschef," 10/21/87; Kurier, "FP-Hirnschall: Markierte Stimmzettel als
'Selbstschutz der Mandatare," 11/1/87; Kurier, "Munzenrieder kaempft um Wahlwiederholung," 11/3/87.
429 Hoebelt (2003), pg. 72.
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I
Nativist Coalition Opportunities, 1986-1999
Government Outcome4 27  Cooperation?
Austria
SPOe-OeVP No
SPOe Aborted 428
FPOe Yes (Explicit)
SPOe-OeVP No
OeVP No
OeVP Aborted
OeVP Likely (Tacit)
SPOe-OeVP No
OeVP Yes (Explicit)
SPOe-OeVP No
OeVP No
FPOe Yes (Tacit)
OeVP-FPOe Yes (Explicit)
Germany
g (1992) CDU-SPD No
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the 1994 election, Zernatto proposed a deal to remain Governor in exchange for giving
the FPOe most of the prime cabinet positions, but opposition at the federal level and
within the state OeVP forced him to abort the agreement and form a coalition with the
SPOe.430 The next year, the FPOe agreed to support Waltraud Klasnic, the OeVP's
candidate for Governor in Styria, in return for supporting the FPOe's Wilhelm Brauneder
as 3 rd President of the Austrian National Parliament. 431 By 1999, even Haider's exclusion
had ended. Despite promising not to support his bid to return as Governor, federal OeVP
leader Wolfgang Schuessel tacitly supported the FPOe by allowing his party to abstain
from the vote, giving the FPOe control of Carinthia and serving as a preview of the 1999
national coalition.432
In contrast, nativist parties in Germany clearly had no allies they could rely on for
access to power or policy, and any actors who suggested cooperation were heavily
sanctioned by their party.433 In the 1992 state election in Baden-Wuerttemberg, the
Christian-democratic CDU had three choices. The party could form a Grand Coalition
with the SPD, receiving half the portfolios but risking significant ideological disputes, or
form a coalition with the FDP and Greens (a Black-Yellow-Green "Jamaica" coalition),
getting most of the portfolios but even more significant ideological divisions that threaten
the Government's stability. Finally, the CDU could form a minimum connected winning
coalition with the REP, getting nearly all of the portfolios with minimal policy
divergence, considering the CDU and REP fought the election on the same issue
430 Riedlsperger, "Haider's Reach for Power," Prepared for the 1999 meeting of the German Studies
Association.
431 Bailer-Galanda and Neugebauer (1997), pg. 134. The President of the Nationalrat (National Council)
and their two deputies (the 2 nd and 3rd President) oversee the business of the parliament, akin to the
American Speaker of the House.
432 Rauscher, pg. 26 in Scharsach (ed) (2000).
433 Veen et al. (1993), pg. 5.
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(immigration). The CDU's strategy before and after the election is indicative of its
thinking. State party leader Erwin Teufel stated before the election that they would speak
to every party about a coalition but the REP.434 After the election, the party formed a
Grand Coalition with the SPD, though it meant a less optimal outcome. The REP's
chances were not much better at the local level. For example, in one Kreis (county)
parliament in eastern Baden-Wuerttemberg, the CDU gave up a governing majority rather
than rely on the REP's support.435
Without being able to hold out the hope of forming a majority coalition, there was
little opportunity for nativist parties in Germany to display their legislative competence.
With the exception of joint proposals, opposition proposals in national parliaments are
generally rejected. This dynamic is less pronounced at the state level and even less so at
the local level, as "street cars and swimming pools aren't ideological matters." 436 In
Austria, the FPOe faction was able to pass initiatives in the SPOe's stronghold of Vienna
in the early-1990s. Some of these initiatives were proposed alone and others with
coalitions of other parties, including the SPOe.437 The FPOe was able to achieve some
legislative success at the state level even during the height of their national exclusion in
Austria, signaling that they were a party that would be treated as a legitimate actor by
other members of the political system.
434 Stuttgarter Zeitung, "Fiasko fuer CDU - Triumph der "Republikaner'," 4/6/92.
435 Interview, CDU (Ostalb Kreis, Baden-Wuerttemberg), 11/24/05.
436 Interview, BZOe (Schaerding, Upper Austria), 3/17/07. A national FPOe MP with experience at both
levels described it this way: "Media interest is higher at the national level. In local parliaments decisions
are almost always unanimous. In the national parliament it's almost never the case. It's rare that our
proposals are supported. If they aren't unanimous, 90% are rejected. At the local level, 90% are passed,
depending on the ideological basis of the proposal. Other opposition parties are treated the same";
interview, FPOe (Knittelfeld, Styria), 3/26/07.
437 Based on a search of the parliamentary archive held in the Informationsdatenbank des Wiener Landtages
und Gemeinderates. www.wien.gv.at/infodata/advgliwww.
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In contrast, legislative for the REP was endemic at the state level and even in
local parliaments. While a few REP MPs had individual, isolated successes at the local
level, as a rule their proposals were rejected by the other parties automatically and
without discussion.438 At best, an identical proposal would be made weeks or months
later by another party and passed.439 The pressure not to support REP initiatives was
intense; one local functionary noted that "one time years ago CDU voted for us. We
didn't get a majority. The next day the CDU was killed in the media.'""440 For local
parliamentary factions, the prospect of needing the REP to pass their own legislative
agenda was just as bad; one REP MP in a local parliament noted that "when we are
necessary for a majority they pull the proposal." 441 Even basic legislative courtesies were
denied the REP. In state and national parliaments, the FPOe was included on pieces of
legislation jointly presented by members of every party, some of which were procedural.
In Baden-Wuerttemberg, the REP was the only party excluded from such proposals,
suggesting that they were not seen as a legitimate part of the legislature. 442 Generally, the
REP's role in legislatures was as a signaling mechanism. The only REP proposals the
other parties would take were those they thought had enough widespread support that
inaction would result in electoral punishment.443 The most obvious example was in
438 One REP functionary noted that he could periodically pass a local initiative, but only after a significant
fight; REP (Aachen, Nordrhein-Westfalen), 5/17/06. Another noted that "we've had two proposals rejected
but taken up by the [city] administration.... We theoretically have good proposals. It isn't about the
content, but the fight against the Republikaner. I would say 70% are rejected and 30% are stalled in
committee"; interview, REP (Mainz, Rheinland-Pfalz), 5/26/06.
43" "When it's [about] security, S-Bahn [streetcar] issues they try and have a compromise. We'll take our
proposal back, they bring the same forward"; Interview, REP (Stuttgart, Baden-Wuerttemberg), 10/25/05.440 Interview, REP (Offenbach, Hessen), 5/10/06.
441 Interview, REP (Frankfurt am Roemer, Hessen), 3/26/06.
442 Based on a review of the parliamentary proposals passed in the 1 1th and 12th legislative periods (1992-
2001) of the Baden-Wuerttemberg state parliament, www.landtag-
bw.de/dokumente/parlamentsdokumentation.
443 Interview, REP (Wiesbaden, Hessen), 4/13/06.
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revisions to the laws governing foreigners and asylum, which followed significant
nativist victories in 1991 (Austria) and 1992 (Germany).
The degree of cooperation at the national level in Austria tended to be a function
of who was in charge of the OeVP at the time and what their motivations were, though
expressing a desire to cooperate with the FPOe carried no tangible penalty. Erhard
Busek, Vice-Chancellor and the OeVP's leader from 1991 to 1995, was a staunch
opponent of the FPOe and feared what its inclusion in a government could mean for
Austria's standing in Europe and the international community.444 In contrast Josef
Hoechtl, a member of the national leadership who knew Haider from in the 1970s as head
of the OeVP's youth wing, supported a governing coalition. 445 In the late 1990s OeVP
parliamentary club leader Andreas Khol stated that while he did not consider the FPOe an
acceptable governing partner, "that doesn't have any influence on parliamentary
cooperation."446 For Wolfgang Schuessel, who replaced Busek, the strategic calculus had
shifted by 1999: the OeVP could re-enter the Grand Coalition and possibly disappear as a
relevant political force, or it could form a Center-Right coalition with FPOe and be a
clear alternative to the Center-Left.44 7
In Carinthia, Zernatto's attempt to work with the FPOe three years after the most
shameful public statement in Haider's career only resulted in a rebuke and a minor revolt,
but no lasting sanctions. In Germany, Center-Right functionaries who openly suggested
444 "It was never formally decided that we would not work together. But there was always an eye toward
our international standing. At lower levels, the personal ties allowed for cooperation. At the federal level
no.... In 1994 [after the elections], there was no discussion. We were about to enter the EU and it would
have looked terrible [to have an anti-EU part in the government]." Interview, Dr. Erhard Busek (former
federal Chair of the OeVP), 1/9/07.
445 Hoebelt (2003), pg. 28.
446 Profil, 1.7.1997, as cited by Bailer-Galanda and Neugebauer (1997), pg. 135.
447 Rauscher, pg. 26 in Scharsach (2000).
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cooperation with the REP were pulled from their position or removed from the party.
Rudolf Krause, a federal CDU MP from Sachsen-Anhalt, joined the REP in 1993 after he
was thrown out of the CDU for suggesting an alliance.448 As one CDU functionary put it:
"If [a CDU functionary] starts to support [the REP's] positions, we talk about sanctions,
with the strongest being expulsion.'449
The rejection of collaboration was just as strong in the FDP. In 1992 the FDP's
district head in Bad Cannstatt, a Stuttgart neighborhood and REP stronghold, invited
Haider to speak, but the national leadership killed the event and the functionary was
expelled from the party; national leader Otto Graf Lambsdorff stated that Haider had no
business with the FDP or their campaigns. 450 The Bad Cannstatt invitation reflected a
historical conflict between the FDP's liberal and national wings. 451 This debate took on
new life in the 1990s as the FDP entered an electoral trough. The nationalist elements in
the FDP hoped to appropriate the FPOe's appeals not only to survive, but to create a third
major party. The pushback from the FDP's liberals was intense and definitive. Members
of the FDP in Berlin, where the nationalists made some of their greatest advances, were
unwilling to trade their principles even for political survival.4 52 These "principles" were
not idiosyncratic. In Germany, functionaries in the post-war period were conditioned to
see certain forms of politics as entirely unacceptable; in Austria the liberal elites in the
FPOe went along with Haider's ascension because the only relevant factor was the
448 Bergsdorf (2001), pg. 209.
449 Interview, CDU (Ludwigsburg, Baden-Wuerttemberg), 10/4/05.450 Stuttgarter Zeitung, "Joerg Haider als Wahlkaempfer fuer Cannstatter FDP," 3/10/1992.
451 There had long been disagreements about the FDP's direction. From 1952-3 the "Naumann Circle" of
former National Socialists attempted to capture the Nordrhein-Westfalen FDP. Members of the FDP were
among the founders of the NPD; Fascher (1994), pg. 37. Siegfried Zoglmann, a Sudeten German and
eventual defector to the CSU and later the REP, left the party in 1970 over its decision to enter into a left-
liberal coalition with the SPD and remained committed to a more aggressive foreign policy (including the
return of lands beyond East Germany); Neubacher (2001 dissertation), pg. 49.
452 Art (2006), pp. 171-173.
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electoral costs and benefits for the party.453 The major functionaries in the FDP's
nationalist movement were removed from their posts, and left to form minor parties or
retired from politics. 454
Opportunities for Nativist Functionaries
Just as nativist parties in Germany faced greater obstacles in parliament, the norm
against nativist cooperation in Germany meant that functionaries faced much greater
disincentives to joining nativist parties out ofparliament. These disincentives did not
necessarily vary at the level of party life. Functionaries from all four nativist parties
interviewed (the BZOe, FPOe, NPD, and REP) described difficulties in the conduct of
election campaigns that exceeded what was normal in politics. The most ubiquitous
complaint was the destruction of campaign posters and the disruption of rallies or
information stands by protesters; small informational posters (Plakate) and personal
party/voter interactions are important components of European campaigns. A REP
functionary stated that their Plakate would be destroyed the next day; an FPOe
functionary said that sometimes it only took an hour.455 Several functionaries from the
FPOe and the REP described disturbances during rallies, mostly thrown objects but
occasionally physical altercations. The FPOe felt that their situation improved markedly
during their time in government, despite hundreds of thousands marching against the
453 "Haider was the only successful leader in the party (through his results in Carinthia), so these [party]
careerists gravitated to him. I thought Haider was at least smart, a good speaker...populist, but smart
enough to be pragmatic"; Interview, former FPOe national MP, 12/1/06.
454 Manfred Brunner, former chair of the Bavarian party organization and Heiner Kappel, Vice-Chair of the
FDP faction in the Hessen parliament, left the FDP in the 1990s for the Bund Freier Buerger (League of
Free Citizens). Kappel later re-founded the German Party (Deutsche Partei).
455 I observed the 2005 national election from the city of Mannheim. Taking a street car to the University
in the center of town, one could see a row of Republikaner Plakate had been erected. The very next day
they had been torn to shreds, and were not replaced for the duration of the campaign. Similar events
occurred in Mainz during the 2006 state election in Rheinland-Pfalz; Plakate that had been hung on light
poles 15 feet off the ground to prevent easy access were destroyed using what looked to be paint-filled
balloons.
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party early 2000, then deteriorated again when the party returned to the opposition after
the FPOe/BZOe split in 2005 (though not to the same extent as the 1990s).456
Rather, the major difference in disincentives was the degree of social pressure
placed on functionaries in their personal and professional lives in Germany. Certain
disincentives were uniform across parties. Union members who ran for a nativist party
faced expulsion, civil servants found they had a harder time getting promoted and some
had difficulties finding a new job or suffering from lost business once their candidacy
became known. The difference was that in Germany established elites chose to reject the
radical nationalism of the previous period through the active defense of the "free
democratic order" (freiheitliche demokratische Grundordnung). Article 21 of the
German Basic Law banned any party found to threaten these principles by the Federal
Constitutional Court, while Austrian law only prohibited overt successor parties to the
NSDAP.4 57 In the 1950s German authorities established an "Office of Constitutional
Protection" (Verfassungsschutz) at the national and state levels to observe groups and
parties in preparation for sending a motion to ban; Austria first formed a
Verfassungsschutz in the late-1990s, after the major upsurge in Extreme Right activity.
Pressure from domestic authorities meant that members of nativist parties in
Germany had no future in the civil service, including teachers and police officers, cutting
off a major source of functionary recruitment.458 By 1992, all three German nativist
456 In Vienna's 3 rd district in early 2007, some individual put a brick through the window of the FPOe's
district headquarters (where party leader Heinz-Christian Strache got his start); the district head said that
this was the third such incident in a year.
457 First enshrined in Article 9 of the 1955 State Treaty.
458 Civil servants tend to become politicians in Germany and Austria because their posts are reserved for
them while in office, whereas members of the private sector have a much greater opportunity cost.
Additionally, campaigns in Germany and Austria are financed by the party, not the candidate, which allows
many more individuals who are not already wealthy to enter politics.
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parties were under observation by the Verfassungsschutz, though in 2006 it was decided
that observation against the REP was no longer necessary. 459 For NPD functionaries their
political activities meant expulsion from the civil service; Guenter Deckert (chair of the
NPD in the late-1980s and early-1990s) had been a high school teacher in Mannheim,
and one of his deputies stated that he had to leave the military.460 For the REP, this
meant that:
"...almost all civil servants have problems. Most were met with
disciplinary actions, though we won all the [court] cases. Eventually the
authorities stopped trying. People were suspended, no longer promoted.
Civil servants no longer come to us. It's hardest on the lower officials,
who would have problems if they couldn't get promoted. '"46
Herbert Bastl and Bernd Mayer, two REP functionaries in eastern Baden-Wuerttemberg,
kept their posts but spent several years in a military court after they were told that their
party activities were incompatible with military service.462 A REP functionary on a city
council in Hessen noted that he could no longer get public contracts for his printing
business.463 Most civil servants decided that their party membership was worth less than
their livelihood and left the party; whereas the functionary base in 1989 included a large
number of police and military, by 1994 it was filled with pensioners, small businessmen
and other individuals who could afford the professional costs.464
The pressure from above was met by pressure from below. Petersen's (2001)
work on social resistance argues that certain actions become more likely when as the
potential for punishment from above declines; an explicit or implicit official sanction
459 National Office of Constitutional Protection, Verfassungsschutzbericht 2006, pg. 52.
460 Interview, NPD (Rhein-Neckar, Baden-Wuerttemberg), 10/11/05.
461 Interview, REP (Frankfurt am Romer, Hessen), 3/26/06.
462 Junge Freiheit, "Treu zur Verfassung," 12/7/01.
463 Interview, REP (Hanau, Hessen), 4/18/06.
464 Interview, REP (Aachen, Nordrhein-Westfalen), 5/17/06.
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should have a similar effect. With nativist parties in Germany treated as outside the
democratic system, they became the target of behavior that would not be socially
acceptable when used against other political actors. Nativist functionaries described their
difficulty getting advertisements for the party in newspapers, 465 and open members of
nativist youth organizations found that they had trouble at university.466 At the extreme,
vandalism and violence against nativist functionaries in their everyday lives was a
possibility. One REP functionary in Hessen had his house vandalized with paint-filled
balloons.467 Another described how in 1998 "my car was set on fire with gasoline... [the
state party chair's] car was burned by a Molotov cocktail that just missed it. Since then
I've been rejected by three or four car insurance agencies as 'high risk'."468 Another
functionary in the REP state party in Hessen, 62 years old, was beaten unconscious by
two men that allegedly referred to his political activities during the attack.469 Asked in
my semi-structured interviews whether they or their colleagues had had personal or
professional difficulties as a result of their party membership, 33% of the FPOe asked the
question said yes (N=18), compared to 77% of the REP (N= 11).
Like the unwillingness to cooperate with nativist parties in parliament, the
personal pressure placed on nativist functionaries in Germany was generated by a social
consensus that nativist parties were "beyond the pale"; such actions were either legally
mandated or considered beyond the reproach of legal authorities. The unwillingness to
cooperate with nativist parties created the perception that they were ineffective as a
465 "We get a rejection from somewhere up the chain when they find out it's from us. They would give us
no grounds so we can't take them to court"; interview, REP (Offenbach, Hessen), 5/10/06.466 Interview with the Junge Nationaldemokraten (Young National Democrats, the NPD's youth
organization) (Rhein-Neckar, Baden-Wuerttemberg), 5/18/06.
467 Interview, REP (Hanau, Hessen), 4/18/06.
468 Interview, REP (Gross-Gerau, Hessen), 5/26/06.
469 Junge Freiheit, "'Jetzt erst recht!'," 12/20/02.
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signaling mechanism, which facilitated their abandonment by voters when migration
faded as an issue. At the same time, social pressure made it more attractive for
functionaries who thinking about a nativist party to stay out of politics or look to other
parties where they could still succeed. This ultimately reduced the overall quality of
nativist functionaries and reinforced the perception that they were political "nobodies."
Opponent Strategies and Party Organization: 1948-1970
One could argue that the Center-Right in Germany only excluded the REP
because they were too small to be a useful ally, whereas the FPOe was too successful to
ignore. In this world, opponent strategies and nativist party persistence are driven by
party organization. But Radical Right parties in Western Europe are nothing new, and
this section argues that party organization in the 1980s was driven in part by opponent
strategies in earlier periods. Opponent strategies therefore have a direct effect on party
persistence, by signaling a party's efficacy, as well as an indirect effect by minimizing
the opportunity for nativist functionaries to maintain stable organizations. In Austria and
Germany, party organization and opponent strategies were both legacies of courses of
action chosen by domestic elites in the early post-war period.
Though the overt racism and authoritarianism of National Socialism was
ideologically delegitimized by the war and outlawed by Allied authorities, in the early
post-war period there was an interest in both countries in some continuation of an
alternative, German-nationalist appeal. In Austria, this resulted in the formation of the
Federation of Independents (VdU) in 1949, which sought to represent the 500,000
Austrians (15-20% of the voting population) temporarily disenfranchised during de-
Nazification, but also those in society favoring economic and social liberalism and
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opposed to Socialism, Clericalism and Proporz.470 The disintegration of the VdU in 1955
over a leadership struggle led to its re-founding as the FPOe the next year. While the
VdU drew 12% of the electorate in 1949, by the mid-1960s the FPOe was at the cusp of
the electoral threshold and in dire financial straits.
In Germany two noteworthy parties formed in the early period, the Social Empire
Party (SRP) and the German Empire Party (DRP). While neither secured national
representation, the SRP entered parliament in the two elections it contested (Lower
Saxony and Bremen, in 1951), and the DRP entered parliament in Lower Saxony in 1951
and 1955 and gained one seat in Rheinland-Pfalz in 1959. Both parties received votes
primarily from the Protestant northwest, an NSDAP stronghold before the war, but also
found support among the Vertriebene, former prisoners of war and individuals affected
by de-Nazification. 471 The DRP would go on to provide the main reservoir of
functionaries for the NPD upon its formation in 1964. Between 1966 and 1968, the NPD
entered seven state parliaments and looked likely to cross the 5% threshold and enter the
national parliament in the 1969 election. Unlike the SRP or DRP, the NPD did well
throughout West Germany, especially among farmers, blue-collar workers and the self-
employed.472 The NPD's voters were disaffected with the Grand Coalition, nervous
about student unrest on the Left and angry about the Government's failure to provide
agricultural debt relief.473
470 Jelavich (1987), pg. 253.
471 Stoess (2005), pg. 119.
472 Stoess (2005), pg. 120; Fascher (1994), pg. 66.
473 Stuttgarter Zeitung, "Bauernproteste haben Einfluss auf die Parteien," 3/25/68; Stuttgarter Zeitung,
"Was von der Wahl zu erwarten ist," 4/23/68; Stuttgarter Zeitung, "Starke Stimmenverluste der SPD bei
der Landtagswahl in Baden-Wuerttemberg," 4/29/68.
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As Table 5.3 indicates, there were ten elections from 1945 through 1970 where
Center-Right elites in Austria could have used the Radical Right to secure a more optimal
outcome for themselves, and two in Germany (both in Lower Saxony). As in the 1980s
and 1990s, elites cooperated with the Radical Right in Austria but not Germany. The
early history of the relationship with the VdU is a classic example of parties motivated
primarily by their electoral interests. The SPOe supported the formation of the VdU in
1949, with the expectation that it would split the conservative vote.474 Once the VdU
formed, it was the OeVP who spoke with the VdU over the SPOe's opposition; after the
1953 election the OeVP attempted to bring the VdU into the Grand Coalition to weaken
the SPOe, but they were overruled by the Austrian President (formerly of the SPOe) and
the Allied Council.4 75
Table 5.3:
Observation
Austria (1949)
Carinthia (1949)
Styria (1953)
Austria (1953)
Austria (1956)
Austria (1959)
Austria (1962)
Upper Austria (1967)
Salzburg (1969)
Austria (1970)
Lower Saxony (1951
Lower Saxony (1967
Nativist Coalition Opportunities, 1948-1970
Government Outcome Evidence of Cooperation?
Austria
OeVP-SPOe No
SPOe Aborted4 76
OeVP Unknown
OeVP-SPOe Aborted
OeVP-SPOe No
OeVP-SPOe No
OeVP-SPOe Yes (Explicit, SPOe)
OeVP Likely (Tacit)477
OeVP Likely (Tacit)
SPOe (Minority) Yes (Explicit, SPOe)
Germany
) SPD-GB/BHE-Zentrum No
) SPD-CDU No
474 Bailer-Galanda and Neugebauer (1997).
475 Barker (1973), pg. 210.
476 The OeVP and WdU attempted but failed to agree on a joint candidate for Governor; Dr. Hellwig
Valentin, "Kaerntner Landesgeschichte: Kaernten 1918-2000,"
http://www.verwaltungsakademie.ktn.gv.at/ 2 5 9 2 7 -DE--Kaernten-1918-2000_Valentin.pdf.
477 Likely in that an OeVP outcome was impossible without the support of the FPOe, based on the
distribution of seats.
o
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Even more persuasive is the FPOe's relationship with the SPOe during this
period. By the mid-1960s, the OeVP had led the federal government since the founding
of the Second Republic. The SPOe saw the FPOe as a potential coalition partner or a
vehicle to weaken the OeVP by creating a viable conservative alternative. 478 Cooperation
between the two parties seemed highly implausible. The leader of the FPOe, Friedrich
Peter, was a former Waffen-SS officer. Bruno Kreisky, head of the SPOe from 1967,
was Jewish and spent the war in exile in Sweden while Franz Olah, head of the
Federation of Trade Unions (OeGB) in the early-1960s, was confined to the Dachau and
Buchenwald concentration camps. Both men nonetheless attempted to coordinate with
the FPOe. During the 1962 election Olah secretly "donated" one million Austrian
Schillings to the FPOe's campaign using OeGB funds, which kept the cash-strapped
party solvent and possibly ensured their survival as a national force. 479 Functionaries in
the SPOe heavily protested the action, and Olah was eventually expelled from the party
and placed on trial for abuse of funds.
The second attempt at cooperation was more successful. In return for supporting
his minority Government after the 1970 election, Chancellor Kreisky increased the
number of seats in the legislature and reformed the electoral system to strengthen the
representation of small parties...which only the FPOe stood to benefit from. Kreisky
preferred to form a coalition with the FPOe in 1970, but the party publicly maintained it
would remain in opposition before the election. 480 Kreisky paved the way for a potential
coalition throughout the 1970s by minimizing his attacks on the FPOe, though the
478 Pelinka, pg. 53 in Scharsach (ed) (2000).
479While he was Minister of the Interior in the 1960s, Olah openly called for a coalition with the FPOe;
interview, Kurt Piringer (former FPOe member and party historian), 6/11/2007.
480 Jelavich (1987), pg. 302.
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SPOe's absolute majorities from 1971 to 1983 made negotiations unnecessary. 481 Indeed,
when famed Austrian Nazi-hunter Simon Wiesenthal revealed in 1975 that Peter's SS
unit had been implicated in widespread atrocities on the Eastern Front, threatening a
potential SPOe-FPOe coalition, Kreisky defended the FPOe chair and attacked
Wiesenthal for his "mafia methods."
In Germany the established parties signaled that any party of the Right perceived
as threatening Germany's liberal-democratic system would be excluded from political
life. The decision to ignore the SRP in 1951 was not difficult; they were an avowed
successor to the NSDAP and their slogans, which netted them 16 seats in Lower Saxony
and 8 in Bremen, included "True to the Empire (Reich)" and a call for solving the
"Jewish Question." The party was banned in 1952.482 The DRP, while never banned,
was also too small to be seen as a relevant coalition partner.
The NPD was different. Their anti-Communist, socially conservative appeals
enjoyed strong support in the late-1960s. 483 But in the four years (1966-1969) where the
NPD looked like a relevant political force, established actors on the Center-Right and
Center-Left reacted with nothing but hostility. Hans Filbinger, head of the Baden-
Wuerttemberg CDU, stated that no democratic party could work with the NPD, and
Chancellor Hans-Georg Kiesinger (CDU) refused cooperation in the run-up to the 1969
election.484 The only concession the CDU made to the NPD was to incorporate its harsh
481 Barker (1973), pg. 263.
482 Article 31 of the German Basic Law permits the Federal Constitutional Court to ban parties or groups
opposed to the "fundamental democratic consensus."
483 Fascher (1994), pg. 104.
484 Stuttgarter Zeitung, "Starke Stimmenverluste der SPD bei der Landtagswahl in Baden-Wuerttemberg,"
4/29/68; Stuttgarter Zeitung, "Kiesinger bekraeftigt Fuehrungsanspruch der CDU," 8/18/69.
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criticism of the SPD's foreign policy.485 Both major parties spoke of banning the NPD,
as they would with the REP and DVU in the 1990s, though no case was brought against
them until 2001.486 Along with the pronouncements of non-cooperation by the
established parties, the threat of a ban was used to signal that the NPD's voters were
supporting an ultimately ineffective party. Support for the NPD collapsed shortly after
the 1969 election, but some of their demands (the end of the Grand Coalition; a more
anti-Communist foreign policy on the part of the CDU) had been met.487
The FPOe survived into the 1980s and ultimately benefited from the weakening of
the Proporz system and emergence of immigration as a crucial issue because established
political actors chose not to attack them at a vulnerable moment in the 1960. Established
parties, particularly the SPOe, allowed the FPOe to survive because the early post-war
consensus dictated that it was legitimate political actor and a useful strategic partner,
despite the background of its functionaries. In contrast, the NPD failed to survive
because established actors chose to attack them even though they were on the rise. The
early post-war consensus in Germany dictated that the established parties consistently
attack Radical Right organizations as they appeared. Consequently, there was no
organization capable of producing professional nativist functionaries when immigration
became a salient issue, which ultimately constrained their ability to grow. Moreover,
opponent strategies in Germany signaled to opportunistic elites inside the established
parties, like the FDP, that switching to a nativist strategy would result in significant
political (and personal) costs.
485 Jaschke (1990), pg. 17.
486 Stuttgarter Zeitung, "Ahlers: NPD-Verbotsantrag kommt," 9/25/69.
487 Cheles et al. (1994), pg. 295.
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Conclusion: Looking Beyond Germany and Austria
This chapter explained variation in the growth and persistence of nativist parties
in Austria and Germany in the late-1980s and early-1990s, despite similar levels of net
migration. Nativist parties grew depending on the interaction of three prominent issues
during this period, including migration but also two tied to decisions made in the early
post war years. While Austrian nativists were able to attack a failing patronage system,
German nativists had no system to rail against and were further hampered by public
concerns over German reunification, which supplanted migration as a salient issue at a
critical moment. In addition, nativist parties were constrained or facilitated in their
growth by the degree of organization prior to the critical moment. Parties with a strong
activist base (the REP) or with a strong source of funding (the DVU) were capable of
besting fully organized parties in elections where conditions were favorable, while parties
without either (the NPD) were hampered by their lack of organization. Table 5.4 displays
the variation in the factors conducive to growth, as well as the outcome for each party.
In terms of party persistence, two factors played a role in the ability of some
nativist parties to retain voters once their popular themes receded. First, the competence
of a party's functionaries, established through routinized channels of recruitment and
promotion, heavily influenced nativist fortunes. Haider's abandonment of
institutionalized recruitment and promotion contributed to the FPOe's major setbacks
during his tenure, and the reliance on past experience for identifying functionaries for
higher office contributed to the greater persistence of the REP in Baden-Wuerttemberg
when compared to the DVU in Schleswig-Holstein. Second, the FPOe could count on
other parties in the system as tactical allies when pursuing their goals and were able to
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develop a reputation as an effective alternative to Austria's major parties. In contrast, the
REP were shunned by all other political actors, unable to pass legislation or acquire
executive power, and acquired a reputation as parties useful only as a signaling
mechanism when specific issues were salient. This variation in perceived efficacy
explains the FPOe's ability to persist in Austria (despite their setbacks) and the REP's
failure after two terms in parliament in Baden-Wuerttemberg; the REP were riding the
wave of opposition to immigration and when that wave subsided, the party's momentum
was irrevocably stalled.
If the explanation in this chapter so deeply rooted in particular events in German
and Austrian history, how applicable can it be to a broader explanation of nativist party
behavior? While the factors here were directly or indirectly the result of a specific set of
decisions at a specific point in time, I have tried to emphasize that these processes can be
thought of in terms of explanatory variables. The degree of party organization or the
degree of dissatisfaction with patronage or corruption might be the result of very different
processes in Austria, Finland or Spain, but it should be possible to measure the presence
and degree of each in all three cases and make claims about their causal effect.
Consider two well-known examples of Radical Right growth in the early-1990s.
First, in 1992 Judge Antonio Di Pietro began the Mani pulite (clean hands) investigations
into domestic political corruption in Italy. Throughout 1992 and 1993 prominent
industrialists and political figures from the major parties were indicted, notably former
Prime Minister and Socialist party leader Bettino Craxi. With the constant stream of new
allegations and revelations, disaffection with corruption was so widespread that the three
largest parties in Italy collapsed as they were abandoned over their complicity in the
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system. The Radical Right, including the new regionalist, nativist Northern League (LN)
and the 45 year-old "post-fascist" Italian Social Movement (MSI), were largely
untouched by the investigations due to their historic exclusion from political power.
These parties gained a new legitimacy and new supporters from the old parties. 488 In
elections in 1992 and 1994, the LN and the MSI (rebranded the National Alliance or AN)
increased their collective share of the vote from 6.4% in 1987 to 13.2% in 1992 and
finally 21.9% in 1994. As in Austria, the increased salience of patronage and corruption
in Italy significantly benefitted parties that could credibly take an anti-corruption stance.
Second, six months before the 1991 Swedish national election two wealthy
entrepreneurs (Bert Karlsson, the prominent owner of a major theme park, and Count Ian
Wachtmeister) formed the party New Democracy from scratch. The founders believed
that their appeals, grounded in neo-liberalism and nativism, captured the Scandinavian
zeitgeist considering recent success by similar parties in Norway and Denmark.489 New
Democracy received 6.7% of the national vote in election, putting it on par with the
Christian Democrats and the Socialists. But the party's greatest advantage, its wealthy
founders, ended up the root of its downfall; Karlsson and Wachtmeister had a falling out
and the party collapsed without them in the 1994 election. The immediate parallel is the
DVU; a party with no organized base but tremendous resources captured the public mood
and then failed due to deficiencies in internal party organization. In sum, while the
differences in nativist success in Germany and Austria had deep roots in a particular time
period and set of circumstances, the processes identified using these cases can be
transported across countries and across time.
488 Gallagher, in Hainsworth (ed) (2000).
489 Andersen and Bjorkland, in Hainsworth (ed) (2000).
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Chapter 5 Figures and Charts
Figure 5.2: The Salience of Reunification &
Immigration, Germany 1989-93
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Chapter 6 - "You were Welcome Before You Came": The Effect of
Immigration on Nativist Party Support
In the last two chapters I constructed a narrative to explain the effect of changes
in migration and changes in the salience of immigration on support for nativist parties in
Germany and Austria. In Chapter 4 I argued that a rapid increase in net migration led to
a large, rapid increase in the salience of immigration and consequently significant
increases in support for nativist parties in both countries. In Chapter 5 I argued that the
failure of German nativist parties to benefit from changing immigration rates to the same
degree as their Austrian counterparts was due to variation in social priorities, party
organization and the strategies of non-nativist parties; all three factors benefitted the
FPOe and infirmed nativist parties in Germany.
This chapter broadens my inquiry into migration's effect on nativist party support
through a quantitative analysis that systematically expands the breadth and depth of the
data presented in Chapter 6 to answer the following question: What is the effect of
changes in native/immigrant heterogeneity on nativist party support in West European
elections? I argue that nativist parties in contemporary Western Europe grow in part due
to changes in immigration rates, which drive some subset of voters both opposed to and
concerned with immigration to support parties offering to address what they perceived to
be a salient threat.
Debates about the relative impact of migration on the fortunes of the Radical
Right, of which nativist parties are a crucial subset (Mudde 2007), remain an open
question. Much of this literature emphasizes the role of factors endogenous to the
political system, such as party competition (Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Meguid 2005),
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institutions and other opportunity structures (Carter 2005; Givens 2005; Norris 2005), or
attitudes (van der Brug et. al 2005; Carter and Arzheimer 2006). Exogenous explanations
tend to focus on economic dynamics like unemployment (Jackman and Volpert 1996),
globalization (Swank and Betz 2003) or the emergence of post-industrial economies
(Betz 1994; Kitschelt and McGann 1995). With a few notable exceptions, studies claim
that migration processes play no role in Radical Right growth, or that immigration
debates are a manifestation of underlying economic uncertainty or social frustration. In
contrast, I argue that even the studies that do recognize the role of immigration (Gibson
2002; Golder 2003) tend to misspecify the crucial causal relationship, emphasizing pre-
existing heterogeneity rather than how that heterogeneity changes over time.
The chapter proceeds in five sections. The first offers two hypotheses about the
relationship between changes in immigration and changes in nativist party support. The
second section provides coding criteria for identifying nativist parties, generalized from
Chapter 2 to reflect the reduced information available when conducting a cross-national,
cross-time analysis. The section also argues that by focusing on levels in nativist party
support, rather than changes, past studies have specified the dependent variable in a way
that misses important aspects of party competition. Section three argues that there has
been a disconnect between concept and measurement when trying to capture immigration
as an explanatory variable, and offers an advancement over past measurements by
accounting for 1) naturalization and 2) region of origin. The net effect is to more closely
measure the type of immigration that nativist parties mobilize against: "non-Western"
immigrants perceived by some in the host society as materially or culturally threatening.
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The final two sections represent the analysis. The first is a cross-national analysis
of approximately 150 national elections in 16 West European countries between 1974 and
2006. I find that changes in the size of the immigrant population, rather than their prior
level, have a significant effect on nativist party growth. The second analytical section
extends the identified cross-national relationships to the sub-national level by conducting
a state-level analysis of national elections in Germany and Austria between 1980 and
2000, as well as a local-level analysis of those elections in two states in each country.
The six sub-national datasets are wholly original, collected from local universities,
libraries and state agencies in Germany and Austria between 2005 and 2007.490
Hypotheses
I offer a general model of new or small party growth (so-called "niche" parties;
Meguid 2005) rooted in Black swan theory (Taleb 2007) and the American politics
literature on discontinuous electoral change (Key 1955; Schattschneider 1960; Burnham
1970; Sundquist 1973). In my model unexpected changes to some structural dynamic in
society unsettles an individual's expectations about some aspect of their environment,
resulting in an increase in the salience of a related dimension of political contestation.
The structural changes that lead to this increase will be those that are 1) relatively large,
2) relatively unanticipated and 3) perceived as threatening, meaning they hold the
promise of some negative material, physical or symbolic impact on the individual.
Classic examples this type of change include a defeat in war or significant economic
downturn, but might also include a major terror attack, change in oil prices, outbreak of
ethnic violence or environmental catastrophe. The increase in salience generated by
490 See the Appendix for the sources used in constructing these datasets.
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these events, which I term "Shocks," is sufficient to induce some individuals to switch
their vote in a subsequent election, increasing the support for a niche party in the
aggregate 1) when the dimension they emphasize becomes salient and 2) when the niche
party is an "issue owner" on the relevant dimension, that is public opinion establishes
beforehand that they are seen as the party most competent to deal with the emerging
issue.491
In the case of nativist parties in Western Europe, I contend that the structural
process which generated a Shock was a rapid change in native/immigrant heterogeneity
in the late- 1980s and early- 1990s, leading to an observable increase in the salience of the
native/immigrant dynamic and an increase in support for parties that promised to
champion of native interests. While the direct causal relationship in this story is between
issue salience and party support, there is not enough systematic data (cross-sectional or
cross-time) to build a dataset specifying salience as the explanatory variable.4 92
Therefore, I analyze the relationship between nativist party support and changes in the
size of the immigrant population. Events and salience are not perfectly correlated and the
prediction is therefore probabilistic; not every change in immigration will lead to the
equivalent change in the salience of immigration, for example because other events are
competing for an individual's attention. Any model using events as the explanatory
variable will therefore explain less than a model specifying issue salience, though such a
model can still identify a statistically significant relationship. Furthermore, only one
event that could trigger the increased salience of migration is being measured. It might
491 Petrocik (1996); Meguid (2005). One can conceive of multiple issue owners on a single dimension; for
example a religious dimension where one party is the owner of the Catholic position and another the owner
of the Protestant position.
492 Moreover, public opinion can be left-censored; unless open-ended, surveys only tend to ask about
native/immigrant issues once they have become salient.
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be that the salience of the native/immigrant dynamic is a function of migration, but also
inter-ethnic violence and hotly contested legislative debates, though only the first
processes is being systematically documented. By necessarily restricting the set of
processes that could trigger a Shock due to data constraints, the correlation between
events and salience is further reduced.
Keeping data constraints in mind, in this chapter I systematically test two
hypotheses. The first is a re-statement of the theoretical argument regarding the effect of
migration on nativist party support:
Hypothesis 1 (The Changes Hypothesis): Increases in native/immigrant
heterogeneity lead to increases in nativist party support.493
The explanatory variable is measured as the change between elections in the size of a
country's immigration population, as a percentage of the total population; for example, a
change in the immigrant population from 1% of the total population to 5% in one election
results in a value of"4."
While the first hypothesis considers the effect of changing distributions of natives
and immigrants on changes in nativist party support, I present a secondary hypothesis
which tests whether changes in support are contingent on the size of the immigrant
population. Unlike Hypothesis 1, there are theoretical mechanisms suggesting the effect
could run in either direction. In times of uncertainty individuals might be more prone to
reject ethnic groups they have no prior experience with (a "xenophobia" mechanism). 494
493 Net immigration is used rather than gross immigration, as net immigration is a better indicator of
immigration's actual impact. A situation where 400,000 immigrate and 800,000 emigrate has far different
effects than a system where 400,000 immigrate and none emigrate, if immigrants are perceived as
essentially interchangeable.
494 Triandafyllidou (2001).
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On the other hand, high native/immigrant heterogeneity increases the frequency of
cursory contact, such as interactions in a market or neighborhood, without necessarily
increasing the sorts of contact (friendship, marriage) thought to facilitate inter-ethnic
understanding. 495 High heterogeneity could therefore generate economic and social
friction (a "fertile ground" mechanism):
Hypothesis 2 (The Levels Hypothesis): Increases in nativist party
support are greater when native/immigrant heterogeneity is high or low.
In sum, natives are hypothesized to make two evaluations about the native/immigrant
dynamic when determining its importance in their voting decisions; one regarding the
native/immigrant distribution, and one regarding the perceived change in that
distribution.
Measuring Changes in Nativist Support
The next two sections aim to generate consistent, valid coding rules and
justifiable operationalizations of the key concepts I have presented. This section
considers the dependent variable, which I operationalize as the change in vote share for
all parties making nativist appeals since the last election, whether or not they were
nativist parties in the last election.
Operationalizing the dependent variable as changes in support for nativist parties,
rather than all Radical Right parties, rests on a fundamental lack of agreement about
which parties make up the Radical Right, or whether the growth of every party in the
hypothesized party family is driven by the same causal process (Mudde 2007).
Following recent scholarship (Golder 2003; Carter 2005), I focus the analysis on my
495 Allport (1954).
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analytically coherent sub-category of the Radical Right: nativist parties. Nativist parties
a) make appeals that are central to their mobilizing strategy which b) explicitly promise
to champion the interests of "natives " as an ethnic group.496 This creates four relevant
conceptual categories: 1) nativist parties, 2) non-nativist Radical Right parties, 3) non-
Radical Right nativist parties and 4) non-nativist, non-Radical Right parties. Nativist
parties include the anti-immigrant Radical Right, but exclude authoritarian or neo-fascist
parties making no reference to immigration. For cultural and historical reasons, the third
category is an empty set in Western Europe, though a Leftist nativist party is theoretically
possible. 497
I code a party as nativist in a particular election if their campaign or platform was
described as "heavily" (centrally) focused on "anti-immigrant" or "xenophobic" appeals
(explicit). I coded parties in three rounds. First, I consulted party descriptions in the
annual Political Handbook of the World (PHW) since 1973. As a yearly volume, the
PHW avoids retrospective bias by identifying contemporary programmatic changes.
Second, I referred borderline cases to the excellent historical country surveys in
Hainsworth (1992, 2000). Again, the inquiry was to determine if and when the
native/immigrant dynamic became central to a party's campaigns or program. Finally,
for exceptionally small parties I consulted the "Elections Wiki" section of
wikipedia.org.49 8 Though the source quality drops in this round, the parties captured
generally received less than 0.5% of the vote. Any measurement error will be small,
496 Nativist parties are therefore a subset of ethnic parties; Chandra (2004).
497 For example, an indigenous movement in South America could mobilize against moneyed interests by
arguing that as the descendents of immigrants, their control over the State's resources are illegitimate.
Historically parties of the Left in Western Europe have attempted to minimize ethnic differences in their
olitical appeals.
98 Formerly Wilfried Dierksen's "Elections Around the World" website (www.electionworld.org).
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compared to the benefit of efficiently surveying a number of parties across multiple
elections. 499
Specifying the dependent variable as changes in support, whether or not they were
nativist in the last election, has two advantages over the established strategy, which
measures the level of support for all declared nativist parties at each election. First, this
method is sensitive to changes in a party's message or ideology, whereas most studies
code parties as having one fixed ideology. Unlike Christian-democrats or social-
democrats, a number of parties in Western Europe have adopted or shed radical and
nativist appeals. For example, the Austrian Freedom Party (FPOe) presented itself as a
Liberal party under the leadership of Friedrich Peter and Norbert Steger from the mid-
1960s until the mid-1990s, an anti-statist, non-nativist Radical Right party under Joerg
Haider from 1986 to 1989 and an anti-immigrant, nativist party under Haider from 1990.
After being rehabilitated by the Center-Right in the early 1990s as a potential coalition
partner, the leaders of the Italian Social Movement (MSI; later the National Alliance, or
AN) saw an opportunity to broaden their support base. In 1995 the party severed ties
with their neo-Fascist roots (a non-nativist Radical Right strategy) in favor of a more
traditional conservative profile focusing on crime or family values (a non-Radical Right
strategy).
Furthermore, measuring levels of nativist party support conflates changes in
support with changes in strategy. For example, a stagnating Liberal party (15% of the
vote) adopts nativism between elections in an attempt to attract new supporters. In the
next election, their support declines to 10%. Depending on the measurement used, the
499 A country-by-country list of nativist parties can be found in the Appendix.
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change looks like a stunning success or a relative failure. In a dataset only interested in
declared nativist parties at each election, nativist support grew from 0% to 10%. Using a
measure sensitive to parties entering and exiting the dataset, however, all else being equal
the new nativist party was unsuccessful.
Second, party growth and party size are not equivalent concepts, especially for
parties drawing on multiple, unrelated appeals over the course of their existence. In the
case of nativist parties, some began with a significant established vote base, generated
through campaigns unrelated to nativism, while others were nativist parties constructed
from scratch. The Swiss People's Party consistently recorded vote shares of 11-12%,
mainly attracting conservatives in rural areas, before adopting nativist appeals, while
Sweden's New Democracy was six months old at their point of takeoff. It is not a puzzle
that the People's Party's was larger than New Democracy. It is puzzling that New
Democracy experienced significant growth in 1991 (+6.7%) while the People's Party was
essentially stagnant (+0.9%).
My coding strategy for the dependent variable has its deficiencies. A lack of
detailed information on party programs and appeals makes it impossible to make finer
distinctions than nativist and non-nativist. A nativist coding only captures parties that
make the immigration central and explicit in their appeals, but not every party that takes a
position on immigration is a nativist party. If non-nativist parties of the Center-Right
(such as the French UPM or the British Conservatives) win voters by making coded
appeals designed to capture nativist voters ("immigration reform"), my strategy does not
capture their growth. Moreover, this method is better at capturing large changes in
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strategy than multiple switches; party reputations might prove sticky even for sources
considering only contemporary programs or appeals.
Conceptualizing and Measuring Immigration
My main explanatory variable is the change in the size of immigrant population
between elections. When measuring immigration, past studies of the Radical Right have
employed one of two measurement strategies. In this section I argue that both are flawed
and a more conceptually valid alternative measurement exists.
The first strategy measures the number of asylum seekers entering the country.500
While this captures a group targeted by nativist parties in their electoral appeals, nativists
also run campaigns against East European labor and the social and cultural concerns
about Islam. Furthermore, while the number of asylum seekers varies widely across time,
even at its peak in the early 1990s they never represented a majority of the immigrant
flow to Western Europe. 50' Far more important, at least numerically, were processes
such as family reunification.
The second strategy measures the size of the foreign population, which captures a
country's non-naturalized resident immigrants. 502 While the foreign population captures
changes in the entire migrant population, it suffers from two conceptual deficiencies.
First, focusing on levels of heterogeneity rather than changes runs into similar conceptual
difficulties as the dependent variable. Scholars tend to treat all immigrant populations as
the same, but these populations can be generated through very different processes. Some
migrant populations accrue through slow, controlled colonial migration (the Netherlands,
500 Swank and Betz (2003); van der Brug et al. (2005); Carter and Arzheimer (2006).
501 Asylum-seeking was 40% of all flows in 1992 and 30% by 2000; OECD (2002).
502 Knigge (1998); Golder (2003); Gibson (2004).
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the UK) or solicited guest worker programs (Germany). Other migrant populations are
generated by rapid, significant increases in unsolicited refugees (Austria, Norway, or
Denmark).50 3 If the level of heterogeneity is the key variable, then countries in the first
case should be at risk of nativist growth as inter-ethnic tensions boil over, similar to the
argument made by Allport (1954). In contrast, if changes in heterogeneity are the key
process, then countries in the second case should be at greater risk regardless of their
preexisting heterogeneity, similar to the argument made by Olzak (1992). Studies of the
Radical Right consistently conflate these very different concepts.
Second, the foreign population as a measure suffers from "false negatives" and
"false positives." Positives and negatives refer to the ability of a measurement to
accurately capture how individuals identify one another, in this case as natives or
immigrants. The problem of false positives reflects the disconnect between concepts of
citizenship and "nativeness." Specifically, being or becoming a citizen is frequently
insufficient to erase a legacy of immigration, which skin tone, language, mode of dress or
custom can all quickly betray. Nativist parties are quick to point out that naturalization
does not make an immigrant "native" and indeed frequently oppose relaxing
naturalization restrictions on the ground that citizenship grants access to political and
social benefits which can only be earned through ethnic belonging. Measures of the
foreign population therefore consistently underestimate heterogeneity and changes in
heterogeneity by counting naturalized immigrants as natives. For example, the foreign
population in France decreased from 6.3% in 1990 to 5.6% in 1999, despite 900,000 new
immigrants (OECD 2002). In the French case, the relatively high rate of naturalization
503 The correlation between the size of the foreign population and changes in the foreign population in the
cross-national dataset, described below, is only a moderate .53.
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masked an increasing immigrant population. In France or the United Kingdom,
measuring the foreign population can also miss immigration where a colonial subject
begins as a citizen despite being readily identifiable as an immigrant.
Moreover, rates of naturalization vary across countries and across time, making it
impossible to factor in the discrepancy based on data from one year or country.
Countries with relatively relaxed naturalization laws or legacies of colonial migration
have far more naturalized citizens relative to their foreign population than countries
where large-scale migration is a new phenomenon. This disparity becomes larger over
time as more immigrants naturalize. For example, the ration of foreign to foreign-born
went from .76 to .6 in Norway between 1990 and 2000; roughly 15% of the Norwegian
immigrant population disappeared from the sample in one decade.
Figure 6.1: Ratio, Foreign to Foreign-Born Population
False negatives are created by a similar disconnect between measurement and
reality: for some individuals, such as an Austrian in Germany, the probability of passing
for native is so high that regardless of their legal status other natives will tend to perceive
them as a native based on cursory ascriptive cues. This distinction is quite important, as
nativists consider some immigrants distinctly more "threatening" than others. Both my
and Gibson's (2002) surveys of anti-immigrant elites found that "Western" immigrants
were thought of as economically and socially unproblematic. Western refers to
immigrants from countries with 1) similar socio-economic characteristics and 2) some
minimal shared culture, here including Western Europe (as defined below) and the
former British settler colonies. Western migrants pose none of material or symbolic
threats nativist parties associate with immigrants. Parallel standards of living suggest that
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citizens of other Western countries have no incentive to migrate in large numbers and
compete with natives by accepting lower wages. At the same time, shared traditions and
norms suggest that the social and cultural disruptions natives associate with immigrants
(such as increased crime or religious conflicts) are minimized.
If distributions in the country of origin were equivalent across Western Europe,
false negatives would not be an issue, but these distributions vary significantly between
countries and across time. The OECD's Database on Immigrants and Expatriates
(2006), which disaggregates immigrants and natives based on country of origin for the
latest census round, captures the variation in the relative size of the non-Western
immigrant population:
Figure 6.2: Non-Western Immigrants as Portion of Foreign-Born
There is a large disparity between Austria or the Netherlands, where 80% of the
immigrant population is non-Western, and Ireland, where that population is closer to
20%. This occurs because different legacies of immigration alter the composition of
immigrant populations. In France, where migration was largely colonial, or Austria,
where migrants were mainly guest-workers and refugees from Yugoslavia, the resultant
immigrant populations have been predominantly non-Western. In contrast, immigrants to
Ireland have been predominantly American or British, as that economy grew in the late-
1990s. In short, though the Netherlands and Ireland both had a foreign-born population
of 10% at their last census, the perceived threat generated by those immigrant populations
should be significantly different.
The Western/non-Western ratio also changes over time. Since the 1970s the
percentage of non-Western immigrants has risen sharply with the collapse of the Soviet
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Union and a general increase in South to North asylum seeking. Concurrently, Western
guest workers returned in large numbers as their host economies contracted and their
home economies expanded, a less attractive option for guest workers from politically or
economically unstable countries like Turkey.504 A country's 5% immigrant population in
1970 looked much different than its 10% immigrant population in 2000. For example,
the percentage of non-Western immigrants as a share of all immigrants in Denmark
increased from 37.5% in 1980 to 73% in 1995. These shifts from Western to non-
Western also varied across countries; the composition of immigrant populations in the
United Kingdom or France, with long post-war histories of non-Western immigration,
changed much more gradually than Austria or Denmark, where non-Western migration
was far more recent and rapid.
Admittedly, the Western/non-Western distinction ignores mixed cases: is it more
threatening to be perceived as materially or symbolically disruptive? What of culturally
similar cases that converged with the economic core of Western Europe over time, such
as Italy, Portugal, or Ireland? What of Eastern Europe or South America, with shared
traditions but significant economic disparities? As a coarse rule, I code immigrant flows
as non-Western, or threatening, using an "or" operator. An immigrant is perceived as
threatening if they come from a different culture, meaning any country that is not
geographically Europe or not settled predominantly by Europeans (such as the United
States). Or an immigrant is perceived as threatening if there is a significant disparity in
real GDP per capita, opreationalized as 50% of the receiving country's real GDP in 1973.
A 50% distinction includes countries such as Italy or Spain, which were not substantially
504 Messina (2007).
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poorer Germany or Belgium even in the 1970s, while excluding countries like Japan
(economically similar but culturally distant) or Argentina (culturally similar but
economically distant).50 5 The threatening/non-threatening distinction is dichotomous due
to information constraints. For a host of factors some inflows might be perceived as
more threatening than others, but weighting the level of threat posed by each group in
each country for each election is beyond the capacity of this project.
Despite failing to capture illegal migration, a measurement capturing only
individuals who are non-Western foreign-born is a significant conceptual advance in its
sensitivity to variation across time and countries and because it minimizes false negatives
and false positives, thereby capturing only those immigrants that nativist parties mobilize
against. 5°6 This measurement was constructed in two steps. First, I measure the foreign-
born population, capturing all 1st generation immigrants and consequently eliminating
false positives. 507 For some countries, sufficient reporting was available to provide
yearly data or data at 5 to 10 year intervals, with interpolation possible.50 8 For the
remaining countries, the data comes from the UN Population Division's World Migrant
505 An exception is made in the case of Spain, which received substantial political migration from
Argentina and Chile in the 1970s and 1980s, when those countries were economically more advanced.
Immigrants to Spain from these countries were coded as "non-threatening."
506 No 35-year, cross-national measurement of illegal immigration exists. Moreover, there is no obvious
way to impute illegal immigration; it affects the eastern borders of Western Europe as well as the South and
unlike the United States, the country of entry is not always the final destination. To the extent that illegal
immigration almost certainly increased as large-scale economic migration was ended in the 1970s and
asylum restricted in the 1990s, any migration measure becomes increasingly inaccurate over time.
507 While the foreign-born population fails to capture second or even third generation immigrants who
might register as "positives" to the Subject, the data on such individuals is exceptionally poor across
countries.
508 Country-by-country procedures are available in the Appendix.
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Stock reporting series, which measures the foreign-born population (in percent) at five-
year intervals based on their review of national sources. 509
As the UN does not measure immigrant populations by country, the Western/non-
Western distinction was based on OECD sources on the origin of the foreign population
and imputed to the foreign-born population. The OECD collects this data at 5 to 10 year
intervals and a constant rate of change was assumed within periods. Where only one
anchor point was available, with no data before 1980 the most common issue, changes
were estimated using a function generated by observed migration patterns in countries
where data was available. 510 In most cases the potential for error is minimal; a difference
of .1% or .2% is a minor distinction considering the empirical range of the explanatory
variable. Of course, there might be a systematic bias. Many non-Western immigrants
have significantly less attractive exit options than their Western counterparts and should
have a greater incentive to secure their situation, or even physical safety, through
naturalization, and consequently the non-Western foreign-born population should be
larger than its share of the foreign population. As non-Western migration and changes in
support for nativist parties are both higher in later periods, any bias on the effect of
immigration on nativist support will be downward.
Figure 6.3: Competing Concepts for Measuring Immigration
Scope and Data
509 The UN figures usually capture the foreign-born (and not foreign) population. Where possible OECD or
national sources were consulted to ensure that the available foreign-born data matched the UN figures.
510 Specifically, 1) with few exceptions, the non-Western population increased over time; and 2) the non-
Western population was generally 20-80% of all immigrants. This generated a "20/80" rule; if the non-
Western portion was between 20% and 80% and only one anchor point was available, an absolute increase
of 1% yearly was assumed (for example, 26% to 27%). If the non-Western proportion was outside this
range, a yearly .1% increase was assumed.
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Inquiry Scope
The cross-national data covers all West European national elections from 1974 to
2000, as permitted by data quality.511 Western Europe includes all countries 1) with the
majority of their landmass in the geographic area commonly associated with "Europe"
(excluding Turkey or Israel, but including Ireland); that 2) remained free of Communist
control from 1945 to 1990 (excluding Ukraine or the former East Germany, but including
formerly authoritarian Spain or Greece); 3) with more than 1 million inhabitants
(excluding the "micro-states" of Iceland, Luxembourg, Malta).512 The goal of these
decision rules was to maximize comparability across cases.
A breakpoint of 1973 was chosen as it was the last year West European countries
allowed large-scale guest worker migration. The guest workers were perceived as
necessary, temporary economic inputs and consequently as non-threatening. 513 Post-
1973 migration, however, was a mainly function of two more or less permanent
processes: family reunification (uncontrolled, politically invisible and large) and asylum-
seekers and refugees (uncontrolled, politically salient and moderate). 514 If individuals
perceive permanent or unsolicited migration as threatening, virtually all non-Western
migration after 1973 would fall into this category, while most non-Western migration
before 1973 would be considered non-threatening.
Explanatory Variables
511 There instances (the UK in 1974, Greece in 1989 and Ireland in 1982) where multiple elections were
held in the same year. In each case, the elections results were averaged and treated as a single observation,
as there was no data on the change to the independent variables for periods of less than one year.
512 The first two rules are implicit in Golder (2003).
513 See for example Messina (2007).
514 Countries also engaged in specific migration flows, such as colonial migration to the Netherlands or
United Kingdom, or the return of Eastern Europeans of German descent to Germany.
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The variables included in my analysis cluster alternative explanations into two
groups, loosely those exogenous structural changes that might increase the demand for
nativist parties and those opportunity structures that might improve the fortunes of
nativist parties as a result of actions or decisions endogenous to the political system (the
political "supply side").515
Structures represent those socio-demographic processes hypothesized in the
literature to have an effect on Radical Right support, including immigration but also
changes in unemployment, crime rates, globalization (measured as the ratio of trade to
GDP) and de-industrialization (measured the changes in proportion of the workforce
employed in manufacturing).516 Though an important component of Radical Right
appeals crime rates, with the exception of Gibson's (2002) analysis (limited in the
number of countries and years considered), have never been systematically tested as a
determinant of nativist or Radical Right support.5 7 In addition, certain parties combine
nativist appeals with regionalist appeals (in Italy and Belgium); these parties might be
generating support from either appeal, and a regionalist dummy variable was included in
these two cases. Further structural explanations, such as the size of the welfare state
(Betz and Swank 2003) or the degree of corruption or anti-statist sentiment (Kitschelt and
McGann 1995) present during the election, were not included due to data limitations.
The second cluster of alternative explanations captures opportunity structures
related both to party competition in general and factors specific to nativist parties in the
515 The sources for each variable can be found in the Appendix.
516 European crime rates are not standardized, though when possible traffic offenses were excluded. Re-
running the analysis without crime rates does not alter the findings. Betz and Swank (2003) privilege
globalization, while Kitschelt and McGann (1995; 2005) and Inglehart (1997) privilege changes in the
sectoral makeup of the economy.
517 Crime reporting changed significantly between 1993 and 1995 in Belgium, and this change is
represented by a dummy variable for the 1995 election.
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system. 18" First, following a long literature on party competition (Duverger 1959; Cox
1997) I expect voters to be more willing to support new or small parties in systems with
more proportional electoral rules, where smaller parties are more likely to survive the
initial vote (gaining seats or moving on to the next round of a multi-round election). I
initially measure electoral rules by taking the mean district magnitude. 5 19 However, it
might be that voters are more interested in large than small differences in electoral
systems; they might worry about the effects of single- versus multi-member districts on a
small party's chances, but might not distinguish between systems using different forms of
proportional representation, for example multi-member districts versus a country-wide
list. I therefore create a second, coarser measurement: the proportion of contests that
send only one party to the next round for seat apportionment; elections with multiple
rounds are not treated as "majoritarian" by this measure when using first-round election
results. 520 Second, I capture the presence of an incumbent Grand Coalition using a
dummy variable. As Radical Right parties are thought to generate support in part from
amorphous protest, they should be particularly likely to gain support during Grand
Coalitions, which I expect to benefit all opposition parties by increasing the frustration
with the regime through an increase in gridlock, while at the same time reducing a
frustrated voter's options for punishment. 52'
518 Mudde (2007).
519 Measured as the number of seats divided by the number of districts. France is measured using the first
electoral round (where two candidates advance) rather than the second (where one receives a seat).
Scholars often assign France a district magnitude of "1" but use the first round results, when voters have
less of a disincentive to support small parties.
520 As a result, France's "majoritarian" score is a "0" throughout the dataset.
521 No Grand Coalitions in this sample were constructed during times of significant crisis (as in the United
Kingdom in the 1930s and 1940s). I do not expect incumbents to be punished for cohering in times of
crisis.
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While I would have liked to have captured the willingness of mainstream parties
to cooperate with nativist parties in the same political system to measure the degree to
which nativist strategies of exclusion harm nativist fortunes (Art 2006), collecting that
data was beyond the scope of this project. I do however include two variables designed
to capture features specific to a country's nativist parties. First, the presence of nativist
parties as incumbents (Responsibility) was measured as the maximum percentage of
government portfolios held by nativist parties during the previous electoral period, if any.
A percentage was used rather than a dichotomous variable as while voters might
generally punish incumbents, parties in a coalition have the option of blaming their
partners, with less responsibility serving as additional political cover. 522
Second, I measure party organization with the intention of constructing a finer,
less endogenous measurement than past studies. The best measure thus far comes from
Carter (2005), who treats party organization as a dummy variable based on whether they
are 1) well-led, 2) unified and 3) well-organized; Carter does find that party organization
has an effect on a Radical Right party's vote share. However, there are significant
endogeneity concerns when basing a party's strength on its leadership or unity. Andreas
Moelzer, the FPOe's MP in the European Parliament, described former party leader Joerg
Haider as a "pseudo-charismatic" leader, though he "used to leave out the 'pseudo'." 523
As Moelzer's statement suggests, leaders tend to be measured by their past success.
Similarly, the direction of causality between party size and factionalism is suspect.
522 Switzerland is a special case. Switzerland's executive has historically been a four-party Grand
Coalition that includes the nativist Swiss People's Party (SVP). However, factionalism within the SVP has
led to its "nationalist" wing running as a defacto opposition since 1995. Consequently, Responsibility for
Switzerland is coded as "0." No nativist party has served as a government'sformateur.
523 Interview, Andreas Moelzer, 6/25/07.
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Parties might fail because their leaders squabble, despite examples in Austria (1993),
Germany (1990), Denmark (1995) and France (1998) in which the defection of
significant functionaries or entire factions were followed by greater nativist success.
Party elites might also squabble because they are failing; when no successful strategy has
emerged, every elite might feel that they know what ails the party.
My strategy is to measure party organization based on the average of the last three
election results for declared nativist parties in an election, whether or not they were
nativist in those past elections. Though it does not delve into the intricacies of candidate
nomination or the delegation of authority, I find this measurement conceptually appealing
on two grounds. First, it is reasonable to expect that parties which were larger in the past
should have greater resources (activists, funding) at their disposal when contesting the
current election. The Swiss People's Party or Austrian Freedom Party, with an
established presence in the popular eye through long tenures in parliament and dues-
paying activists in every locality, should have an easier time attracting voters than the
Irish Immigration Control Platform of 2007, which had three candidates and a handful of
activists to contest a national election. Furthermore, my measurement discounts the
sudden success of new parties, such as Sweden's New Democracy or the Dutch List Pim
Fortuyn. New parties might have less developed structures for functionary recruitment or
authority delegation, making them more susceptible internecine struggles or being
overwhelmed by their new responsibilities. One deficiency of this measurement is that in
basing it solely on vote share, I ignore the possibility that significant extra-political
organizations can cross over into electoral politics, for example the Belgian nationalist
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movement's transformation into the Vlaams Blok (Art 2008). Unfortunately, the data
necessary for a finder coding is beyond the scope of this project.
Cross-National Analysis
All models were run as a pooled time-series analysis using the xtreg function in
STATA 9, specifying random effects and Huber-White robust standard errors clustered
by country to address within-country correlation. 524 Standard errors are rounded to the
nearest one-hundredth, unless otherwise indicated. I have added a lagged dependent
variable to control for regression to the mean after exceptionally large successes or
failures. Before undertaking the analysis, all explanatory variables were analyzed to
identify potential outliers; an outlier was any observation more than five standard
deviations from the variable mean. Table 6.1 summarizes the identified observations.
Dummy variables were included when the relevant explanatory variable was specified in
a model.
Table 6.1: Identified Cross-National Outliers
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Outliers
A Foreign-Born Population .60 .71 Spain, 2004 (5.7)
Responsibility .01 .05 Austria, 2002 (.5)
The first test evaluates the effect on nativist support of the three competing
measures immigration discussed earlier: the foreign population, the foreign-born
population and the non-Western foreign-born population. 525 The expectation is that the
non-Western population will have a strongest effect on nativist party growth, even. Data
on the foreign population was taken from the OECD's Trends in International Migration
524 Hausman tests on each model suggest random effects are an appropriate specification.
525 A t-test of means finds that the foreign-born and non-Western foreign-born populations are significantly
different than the foreign population, though the foreign-born and non-Western populations were not
significantly different.
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series and when necessary Golder (2003). As data on the foreign-born and non-Western
populations were generated using additional sources, additional observations are included
in those models.
Table 6.2: Cross-National Results, Competing Measures of Immigration
The results presented in Column 1 of Table 6.2 suggest that changes in
immigration generally have a significant, positive effect on support for nativist parties
regardless of the measurement used, and explain roughly the same variance in outcomes.
However, the strength of the effect of immigration, represented by the coefficient, varies
with the measurement used.526 On average, every one percentage point increase in the
non-Western immigrant population between elections leads to in a 1.2 percentage point
increase in nativist party support, compared to a .7-.75 percentage point increase on
average for the other measurements. 527 The main intuition is that alternative measures of
immigration have different "signal-to-noise" ratios which make some better than others at
capturing the effect of immigration, though all three correctly identify the broader
relationship. Here, the signal is the increase in immigrants seen as threatening, while the
noise is the false negatives the alternate measures capture and the false positives they
ignore.
Figure 6.4: Plot, Cross-National Changes in Immigration and Nativist Support
In the second stage of the analysis I specify a series of models which include the
alternate explanations discussed above. The findings are presented in Table 6.3. Several
526 Though changes in migration explain less than 10% of the variance in outcomes on their own, changing
structures are assumed to be an imperfect proxy for changing salience, which should have a direct effect,
and it is further unclear how much of changes in vote support should be thought of as random error.527 Without the Spain 2004 dummy variable, the effect of changes in the non-Western population remains
significant at the 10% level (B=0.8; P=.076) though changes in the foreign-born population falls outside
conventional tests of significance (B=.46; P=. 142)
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observations are lost at this stage of the analysis due to missing data. In addition to the
two outlier dummies specified above, I include a dummy for the Dutch 2002 election, the
only instance in which a nativist leader (Pim Fortuyn) was assassinated during an election
campaign, and the assassination possibly improved the fortunes of the party in the
subsequent election.
Table 6.3: Cross-National Results with Alternate Explanations
First, I note that the finding regarding changes in native/immigrant heterogeneity
is replicated from Table 6.1: a one percentage point increase in the non-Western
population increases nativist party support by 1.25 to 1.3 percentage points on average. 528
None of the alternative structural explanations are significant. That some issues
(immigration) seem to benefit nativist parties while others (unemployment) do not is
consistent with a model of issue ownership (Petrocik 1996; Meguid 2005), in which
voters support a party when the issues they care about match the issues the party is
perceived as competent to address. Specifying the dependent variable as the change in
Radical Right support, using Golder's (2003) list of Radical Right parties and including
the Swiss People's Party (from 1999) and the new parties I identified for the post-2000
elections not included in the Golder study, does not infirm the significance of changes in
the non-Western population (B= 1.61; P=0.003). In sum, my methodology for coding a
party as nativist is not driving my main finding.
In contrast to the weakness of alternative structural explanations in Column 1,
several of the opportunity structures report significant coefficients in the expected
528 Removing the three outlier controls from Column 1, the P-values of the significant variables increase,
though they all remain significant at least at the 10% level (for example, the coefficient for the non-
Western .85 with a P-value of .07). Without outlier controls the R2 in Column 1 drops to .40.
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direction. As expected, parties with a regional focus in addition to a nativist focus gained
an additional 1.37 percentage points on average, suggesting that regionalism was drawing
additional voters to these parties. My variable for party organization was significant and
in the expected direction, suggesting that an established party with 7% of the vote in the
past three elections would have gained on average an additional one percentage point in
vote share, all other factors equal. The variable capturing nativist incumbency is highly
significant in the expected direction, suggesting that nativist parties are heavily punished
for their time in parliament even accounting for drastic losses by the incumbent Freedom
Party in 2002. However, the presence of a Grand Coalition was not significant. 529
Even more surprising, the effect of mean district magnitude was significant and
ran in the opposite of the expected direction. This result is due to the presence of the
Netherlands, with some of the world's most proportional electoral rules (one nationwide
district with 150 seats) and historically unsuccessful nativist parties; removing the
Netherlands flips the sign but the coefficient is fairly weak and just fails conventional
tests of significance (B=.03 with a P-value of .113). One possibility is that the effect of
electoral rules is instead captured by past party organization, but even without the
Netherlands there is no relationship between the two variables (r- -. 16). Another
possibility is that voters are more concerned with large than small differences in electoral
rules. Column 2 integrates my broader measure of the total share of contests that are
immediately resolved through single-member districts and finds a coefficient that is
significant and in the expected direction. In general, I find that nativist parties tend to
gain more support in systems that are more proportional, but their voters do not appear to
529 Whether the Government in the past legislative period was led by the Right or Left was also considered.
No significant effects were found, nor did the variable influence the other findings.
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discriminate between forms of proportionality. Normalizing the immigration and party
organization variables from Column 2, so that all of the significant variables run from 0
to 1, allows us to compare the relative effect of the significant coefficients. Doing so
reports coefficients of 5.71 for changes in immigration and 3.64 for the degree of prior
party organization, suggesting that objective changes in demography have the greatest
significant positive effect on nativist growth.
Column 3 in Table 6.3 tests my second hypothesis, that the level of immigration
or my alternative structural variables have a significant effect on changes in nativist
support.530 Surprisingly, I find no statistically significant relationship between changes in
nativist support and the level of immigration, or any other structural variable, though
most of the structural variables run in the expected direction and the opportunity
structures that were significant in Column 1 remain significant in Column 3. To account
for the possibility that both the xenophobia and fertile ground mechanisms are at work, I
re-measured my immigration variable as the squared difference of the mean level of non-
Western immigration. Re-running Column 3, the coefficient was negative (-.004) but not
significant. These results suggest that nativist voters at the national level are reacting to
changes in immigration (confirming Hypothesis 1), but not levels (disconfirming
Hypothesis 2).
Sub-National Analysis
Scope and Data
I now switch to a sub-national analysis that considers trends at the state- and
local-level, restricted to the countries where I have undertaken major fieldwork. The
530 Four additional observations are gained by not taking first differences.
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state-level analysis consists of national elections results by state in Austria and Germany.
The former East Germany is excluded, as they are not Western Europe by my definition;
the tremendous and enduring post-war differences in political socialization and economic
development lead me to treat the former East and West Germany as two separate
countries. As the major German party in the 1970s and 1980s (the NPD) was banned
from participating in elections in Berlin until 1989, Berlin's observations before 1990
were dropped from the dataset.
The local-level analysis consists of national election results at the district level for
two states each in Germany and Austria. 531 Due to the necessity of on-site data
collection, local-level data was only collected for states where I conducted fieldwork. 532
Each dataset considers elections from roughly 1980 until 2005-6, as data quality below
the national levels drops significantly when compared to the national level. Most of the
competing explanatory variables are not included in the sub-national analysis, either
because there was no meaningful sub-national variation (electoral rules) or there was
insufficient data (globalization). The main alternative explanations I explore are
unemployment and crime. In Austria, I include variables capturing nativist incumbency
(in 2002 and 2006) and the presence of a Grand Coalition (from elections in 1990
through 1999) as are relevant. I have also included a dummy variable for the Baden-
Wuerttemberg district of Rastatt in my local analysis for elections in 1994 and 1998.
Rastatt temporarily housed a temporary processing center for incoming East European
531 In Baden-Wuerttemberg, the electoral district; in Rheinland-Pfalz and Styria, the county (which overlaps
with the electoral district); in Vienna, the ward or neighborhood.532 The national and state observations were initially selected with an interest in identifying causal
processes and generating plausible causal mechanisms (Gerring 2007). In each case, data was collected
through country or state statistical yearbooks, national or state statistical websites and when necessary
onsite research at state statistical offices; see the Appendix.
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and post-Soviet migrants of German descent (the Aussiedler) and was an outlier on all
measures of changes in immigration. 533
The sub-national analysis serves two purposes. First, additional tests of the same
variables using new data can strengthen support for the initial findings. Second, a meso-
level analysis is a means of addressing ecological fallacy. It might be that immigrants are
attracted to wealthy societies but nativist voters are actually reacting to the emergence of
post-material politics, a process concentrated in wealthier, post-industrial societies. Or it
might be that individual concerns about immigration are largely perceptual and driven by
national processes (media effects or elite issue frames), which are triggered by changes in
national heterogeneity. In either case, I would not expect changes in immigration to have
a significant effect on nativist support. However, there might be an objective link
between demographic changes and nativist support... nativist voters might be reacting to
an increase in immigrants in their geographic space.
Results
Tables 6.4 (state-level) and 6.5 (local level) report the findings for the sub-
national analysis, which focuses on changes in the non-Western immigrant population.
The basic finding regarding immigration is confirmed: changes in native/immigrant
heterogeneity at the state and local level have an effect on support for parties
campaigning on explicitly nativist platforms. The effect in each of the six geographic
contexts (two countries, four states) was significant at the 1% level.
Tables 6.4-6.5: Sub-National Results (State and Local Level)
533 Based on an e-mail exchange with the Statistical Office of Baden-Wuerttemberg.
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In Austria, both the percentage of government portfolios held by nativist parties
and the presence of a Grand Coalition were significant and ran in the expected direction,
with nativist incumbency having a particularly strong negative effect. As Figure 6.5
displays, the 2002 Austrian election displayed exactly the opposite relationship between
changes in immigration and changes in nativist support. One possible explanation for
this result is that nativist voters will express their disapproval with a party that promises
and fails to control immigration. The Grand Coalition finding contradicts the cross-
national results. One possible interpretation is that voters in Austria are reacting to
another variable correlated with the presence of a Grand Coalition, such as the degree of
voter dissatisfaction with Austria's system of patronage, which reached its peak in the
late-1980s and early-1990s (Kitschelt and McGann 1995, or Chapter 5 of this volume).
While the Grand Coalition variable, as well as changes in unemployment in Vienna, are
significant and initially seem to have a larger effect (report a larger coefficient) than
changes in the size of the immigrant population, normalizing all three variables reverses
the effect; moving from the smallest change in the size of the immigrant population to the
largest change has an effect between two and four times as great as the other factors. For
example, normalizing changes in immigration and unemployment in Vienna generates
coefficients of 17.24 and 8.18, respectively.
Figure 6.5: Nativist Party Support in Austria, 1970-2006
In the second portion of my sub-national analysis, I consider the effect of the level
of immigration, unemployment and crime on changes in nativist support at the state and
local levels. As Tables 6.4 and 6.5 indicate, none of the three variables are consistently
significant. In terms of the level of migration, there is some evidence to suggest that sub-
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nationally the xenophobia mechanism I specified in Hypothesis 2 is operating. Squaring
the term to determine whether both mechanisms might be operating does not return a
significant coefficient. While nativist voters primarily respond to changing
native/immigrant heterogeneity in their immediate geographic area, they seem to be more
willing to do so in areas where heterogeneity is low.
Conclusions
In this chapter I have tested two hypotheses concerning the relationship between
immigration and changes in nativist party support. In addition, I have addressed
significant theoretical deficiencies in past measurements of the dependent variable and
the relevant explanatory variable, while offering an analytically defensible coding for the
former and two advancements over conventional measurements of the later by accounting
for naturalization and region of origin. Finally, I have engaged in a data collection effort
that represents a significant advance in the knowledge available to the sub-field. Radical
Right parties are consistently associated with law and order appeals (Mudde 2000; Carter
2005) but crime rates are almost never included in empirical analyses.
First and foremost, my analysis found that objective changes in the size of the
immigrant population have a consistent, positive effect on the growth of nativist parties,
cross- and sub-nationally. Furthermore, how migration is measured affects the strength
of this relationship; as the measure used more closely approximates the population
nativist parties mobilize against, the strength of the effect on nativist support increased.
However, there was no evidence to suggest that nativist growth was being driven by the
size of the immigrant population. Indeed, there is some sub-national evidence that less
heterogeneous areas that see large changes in the size of the immigrant population react
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more strongly to those changes. Contrary to the findings of past scholars, countries with
some immigrants but large changes to their immigrant population are much more likely
to see nativist growth than countries with many immigrants but a stable native/immigrant
distribution.
In addition, I found that certain opportunity structures, such as the proportionality
of the electoral system or the ability of a party to bring to bear an established party
organization to bear in critical elections facilitate nativist growth. In contrast another
opportunity structures, the presence in Government, has a strong negative impact on
growth. I would note, however, that of the variables which have a significant effect on
nativist party growth, none is stronger than objective changes in immigration.
While the analysis suggests that some alternative explanations (such as the role of
unemployment) are highly implausible, it does not eliminate others, for example those
variables that could not be collected due to data constraints. For example, future analyses
will need to develop a coding strategy for identifying the historical degree of cooperation
between nativist and mainstream actors, or the degree of discontent with corruption.
Both of which have been identified by past scholars as affecting Radical Right support,
though neither has been systematically measured across Western Europe. Moreover, the
sub-national results presented thus far do not completely eliminate concerns about
ecological fallacy. For example, it may be that areas with more immigrants also contain
more natives with attitudes pre-disposing them toward nativist parties. However, while
multi-level models can test structural- versus individual-level arguments, the lack of
cross-sectional, cross-time individual-level data creates a tradeoff between inquiry scope
and inquiry depth. Despite these reservations, my findings strongly suggest that nativist
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parties in contemporary Western Europe benefited greatly from increased migration
flows in the late-1980s and early-1990s, a process that fundamentally challenged the
notion that Western Europe would continue to be a series of homogenous nation states.
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Chapter 6 Figures and Charts
Figure 6.1: Ratio, Foreign to Foreign-Born Population
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Source: Calculated from OECD, Trends in International Migration (2006).
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Source: Calculated from OECD, "Database on Foreign-born and Expatriates" (2006).
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Figure 6.3: Competing Concepts for Measuring Immigration
All First Generation Immigrants
Western, Western,
Not Naturalized Naturalized
(2, 3) (3) Origin
("False Negative") ("False Negative") (Western Y/N)
Non-Western, Non-Western,
Not Naturalized Naturalized
(2, 3, 4) (3, 4)
("False Positive")
Asylum-Seekers
(1, 2, 3, 4)
Legal Status
(Naturalized Y/N) Groups Nativists
Mobilize Against
Groups Captured by
Measurement:
1. Asylum-Seekers
2. Foreign Population
3. Foreign-Born Population
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Table 6.2: Testing Competing Measures of Immigration
Dependent Variable: A Nativist Party Support
Unit of Analysis: Country-Election Year
A Foreign Pop. .69**
(.30)
A Foreign-Born Pop. .76*
(.36)
A Non-Western Pop. 1.22**
(.50)
R2  .02 .02 .04
N 141 145 145
Significance Level: *10%; **5%; ***1%/. Standard errors
are in parentheses. All tests for significance are two-tailed.
Additional Controls: Spain 2004 outlier dummy (foreign-
Born population and non-Western population).
- -
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Table 6.3: Cross-National Results with Alternate Explanations
Dependent Variable: A Nativist Party Support
Unit of Analysis: Country-Election Year
(1) (2) (3)
Changes Changes Levels
Non-Western Pop. 1.27*** 1.24***
(.39) (.39)
Non-Western .11
(.12)
Unemployment .01 .008 -.01
(.07) (.07) (.06)
Crime Rate .0003 .0003 .0000
(.0002) (.0002) (.0000)
Manufacturing -.08 -. 12 -.04
(.17) (.17) (.05)
Globalization -.03 -.03 -.01
(.03) (.03) (.01)
Mean District Mag. -.008***
(.002)
Prop. Majoritarian -.88** -.81*
(.43) (.43)
Party Org. .15** .15** .14*
(.07) (.07) (.08)
Regionalism 1.37*** 1.48*** 1.72***
(.30) (.26) (.45)
Responsibility -17.17** -17.93** -17.84**
(7.25) (8.32) (7.19)
Grand Coalition -. 18 -.23 .23
(1.35) (1.36) (1.38)
R2  .59 .59 .55
N 144 144 148
Significance Level: *10%; **5%; ***1%.
Additional Controls (all): lagged dependent variable.
Outlier Controls: Austria 2002 (government responsibility);
Holland 2002 (assassination); Spain 2004 (column 1).
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Table 6.4: Sub-National Results (State Level)
Dependent Variable: A Nativist Party Support
Unit of Analysis: State-Election Year (National Elections)
Austria Austria Germany Germany
(Changes) (Levels) (Changes) (Levels)
A Non-Western 1.45*** .49***
(.32) (.08)
A Unemployment -.02 .06***
(.25) (.02)
A Crime Rate .0001 -.0001
(.0003) (.0001)
Non-Western -.09 -.03***
(.12) (.01)
Unemployment .19* .02
(.10) (.02)
Crime Rate .0002 -.00001
(.0002) (.0ooo0001)
Responsibility -30.00*** -27.76***
(1.62) (2.38)
Grand Coalition 4.70*** 5.95***
(.49) (.63)
R .92 .90 .53 .27
N 72 72 84 84
Significance Levels: *10%; **5%; ***1%.
Additional Controls: lagged dependent variable.
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Table 6.5: Sub-National Results (Local Level)
Dependent Variable: A Nativist Party Support
Unit of Analysis: District-Election Year (National Elections)
Austria Germany
Vienna Styria Baden- Rheinland-Pfalz
Wuerttemberg
A Non-West 1.46*** .89** .95*** .33***
(.09) (.36) (.11) (.06)
A Unemp. 1.62*** .44** -.02 .02
(.24) (.18) (.04) (.02)
A Crime .00005* .0008** -.0003** -.0002***
(.00002) (.0003) (.0002) (.00007)
Non-Western -.02 -.09 -.07*** -.004
(.04) (.09) (.008) (.02)
Unemp. -.22 -.12* -. 18*** -.02
(.14) (.07) (.04) (.03)
Crime Rate -.00001** -.00007 .00008** -.00002
(5.67-6) (.0001) (.00003) (.00002)
Responsibility -25.00*** -24.17*** -31.51*** -29.44***
(1.34) (.83) (.62) (.94)
Grand 4.34*** 6.29*** 6.10*** 6.90***
Coalition (.35) (.47) (.44) (.24)
R2  .89 .76 .93 .91 .49 .31 .35 .19
N 161 161 119 119 222 222 216 216
Significance Levels: *10%; **5%; ***1%.
Additional Controls: lagged dependent variable; Baden-Wuerttemberg immigration dummies (Rastatt 1994,
1998).
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Chapter 7 - Conclusions and Implications
Explaining Niche Party Growth
The central aim of this project has been to offer insight into the rapid and significant
growth of Radical Right parties in post-war Western Europe. No group of political actors has
generated a greater interest among European scholars or politicians over the past 25 years. As
parties stridently opposed to immigration and multiculturalism, critics fear that Radical Right
reflect, or lead to, increasing legal or social discrimination or even violence against Europe's
ethnic minorities. 534 As parties that are stridently nationalist and have moved toward economic
protectionism, critics fear that the Radical Right threatens European integration and economic
globalization. Radical Right parties were the primary opponents of the EU's expansion into
Eastern Europe in 2004, arguing that it would lead to uncontrolled migration, wage dumping and
significant transfers to the developing east, money better spent dealing with problems at home.535
In explaining the growth of the Radical Right, I have focused on the most important
subset of this loose party family: anti-immigrant or "nativist" parties, parties that champion the
interests of an ethnic group delineated by their relationship to a particular territory. In Chapter 2
of this volume I argued that the major development in the Radical Right from the late-1970s
onward was the adoption of nativist appeals in their campaigns and programs. In some cases
(such as the German NPD), parties that were already Radical Right shifted their focus from
extreme nationalism and anti-Communism to nativism. In others (such as the German DVU or
534 For example in the "Three Wise Men" report (2000) examining the OeVP-FPOe government and the FPOe's past
behavior, in light of the decision by Austria's fellow EU members to levy sanctions over the FPOe's inclusion in
government, "the commitment of the Austrian Government to the common European values, in particular
concerning the rights of minorities, refugees and immigrants" was the main thrust of the commission's inquiry.
535 For example, the FPOe's made opposition to eastward expansion one of its key themes in the 2002 national
election, calling itself (in the party paper, the Neue Freie Zeitung) the only party putting the interest of Austrians
first; NFZ, "FPOe bleibt 'Oesterreich-Partei'," 10/30/02.
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Sweden's New Democracy), new parties formed to take advantage of what they saw as an
emerging social issue. Still other parties (such as the Austrian FPOe or the Scandinavia Progress
parties) were initially liberal, neo-liberal or anti-statist but joined the Radical Right by adopting
nativism in the late-1980s. I further found that while the appeals made by Austria's very
successful nativist parties and German's very unsuccessful nativist parties varied little, there was
a significant difference in the appeals made by these parties when compared to other parties of
the Right; while the extremity of a nativist party's appeals cannot account for its success, the
presence of these appeals distinguishes parties we think of as "anti-immigrant Radical Right"
from all others.
In explaining the growth of the Radical Right, however, my project speaks to more
general questions about how party systems and issue agendas in advanced industrial democracies
change. How do new issues emerge? When do they result in the growth of new or small "niche"
parties, when do they durably alter the support bases of the established parties, and when are they
ignored entirely?
In Chapter 3 of this volume, I suggested a tension between two schools of thought
regarding issue evolution and political change in established industrial democracies. The first
focuses on long, slow changes to a country's social or economic organization, which translates
over time into changing political preferences across an entire population and the emergence of
new parties to represent those preferences. The clearest expression of this school is
Modernization Theory (and later "post-Modernization Theory"), in which political preferences
and issues are organized around the major sector of employment (agricultural, industrial or
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service-based). 536 But long, slow theories seem inadequate to explain changes driven by largely
exogenous events, such as the September 11th terrorist attacks. My research has shown that the
emergence of immigration as an issue and anti-immigrant parties as a force in Austria and
Germany in the late-1980s and early-1990s was essentially spontaneous, occurring within a few
months or years. Moreover, the refugees who fled to Germany and Austria in the 1980s and
1990s from Sri Lanka, Yugoslavia, or Iraq, in part triggering the emergence of immigration as an
issue, were not driven primarily by economic motives spurred by differential modernization, but
by a desire for physical safety.
A second school of thought represents a "punctuated equilibrium" view of political
change, in which rapid shifts in issue priorities or political preferences brought on by some event
or process reweight the aggregate support for various political appeals, to the benefit of an
already established party or a new or minor political actor. This school shares the most in
common with the "Realignment" literature of the American politics subfield, in which a new
issue or issue dimension comes to the fore (within a few years or a few generations) and the
Government, unable or unwilling to deal with the new issue, is swept out of power in favor of the
established opposition or an entirely new party. 537 Though the basic concept behind
Realignment Theory is attractive in the flexibility with which it can describe rapid or gradual
political change, which may or may not be related to processes of Modernization and may or
may not affect an entire society, the literature it is not without problems. Mayhew's (2002)
critique notes that most of the specific claims made by the literature, particularly the periodicity
536 The core concepts driving Modernization Theory date back at least to Marx (1867 [1978]) and Durkheim (1893
[1984]). Modem expressions of Modernization Theory in political science include Rostow (1960) or Deutsch
(1966). Lipset and Rokkan (1967) see industrialization (synonymous with modernization) as an essential
determinant of European party systems. The main statements of post-Modernization Theory are Bell (1973), who
focuses on "post-industrial society," or Inglehart (1977, 1997), who focuses on "value change."
537 See Key (1955); Key (1959); Schattschneider (1960); Burnham (1970); or Sundquist (1973).
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of realignment in American politics, cannot be substantiated. I would further suggest that
Realignment Theory offers no causal mechanisms and no systematic approach to identifying
realigning issues. How can we identify events or processes capable of realigning priorities or
party systems in a manner that is not ad hoc, and why do certain individuals choose to shift their
political priorities and preferences, but not others?
I have proposed a "Shock Theory" of political change and niche party growth to fill this
gap, which can be summarized in two stages. In the first stage some unanticipated triggering
event, deviating from established structural or social patterns, unsettles individual expectations
for some part of the population. This unsettling represents a threat (the prospect of negative
consequences) and leads individuals to increase the weight, or salience, placed on a related issue
or identity dimension. In the second stage, some subset of the population finds their priorities
sufficiently altered to engage in acts of threat reduction. This might mean forming or joining a
social group, engaging in violence against a group perceived as the threat's cause, or switching
their vote in an election to a party that better matches their new distribution of priorities. I argue
that re-weighted priorities result in increased electoral support for a niche party in the aggregate
when 1) the salience of the issue dimension they emphasize increases and 2) the niche party is
seen by voters affected by the Shock as most competent to deal with the emergent threat...they
are an "issue owner" on the relevant issue or identity dimension.
I do not argue that changes in issue salience generated by Shocks inevitably improve the
fortunes of niche parties, or even that they necessarily alter the balance of power among the
established parties. Consider two examples of prominent crises from modem American history.
At the beginning of 1929, few in the industrialized world believed they were on the precipice of
the world's greatest modem financial crisis. In late 1929, Yale economist Irving Fisher declared
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that stock prices had "reached what looks like a permanently high plateau." 538 After a slowdown
in employment and growth in the summer of 1929 investors began selling their stocks at the
beginning of October, with a panic that accelerated suddenly from late October ("Black
Tuesday") until mid-November, when the American stock market lost 40% of its value; by late
1930 it was clear that the United States economy faced an economic crisis far beyond a
recession. 539 From late-1929 through 1933, the American stock market lost 70% of its value, the
United States 30% of GNP, wholesale goods deflated by 30%, and unemployment increased
from 3.2% to 24%.540 While this period predates modem public opinion polling by several
years, the Great Depression was a negative, unpredicted, significant deviation from established
economic trends that rapidly refocused the priorities of voters not only in America, but across the
industrial world.541
In the United States, the varied response to the onset of the Depression significantly
affected the fortunes of the major parties. A Republican-controlled government did not just
preside over the worst of the Depression and fail to resolve it; they approached the crisis with the
same laissez-faire economic policy of the 1920s. In December 1929 President Hoover
successfully pushed through a tax cut, and when the crisis deepened in the early-1930s he raised
taxes and cut spending with an eye toward balancing the budget, rather than increasing spending
to stimulate demand. 542 While they offered no consistent program in the 1932 presidential
campaign, the Roosevelt-led Democrats promised a consistent economic philosophy that
included using the government to generate demand or provide relief.543 By 1932, the Republican
538 Galbraith (1961).
539 Garraty (1986).
540 Chandler (1970).
541 Berman (1997).
542 Garraty (1986), pp. 32-5.
543 Galbraith (1961), pp. 132-4.
285
competence to deal with the economy had been thoroughly delegitimized in the eyes of voters.
In two elections from 1928 to 1932, the Democrats increased their legislative vote share from
37.7% to 71.9%, a net seat gain of 197 in a legislature of 435. The Presidential election of 1932
resulted in nearly a 17-point swing (40.8% to 57.4%) for Roosevelt's Democrats.
The realignment of interests generated by the Great Depression not only gave the
Democrats a significant temporary boost in support, it created a political coalition of urban labor
unions, progressive farmers, ethnic and religious minorities and Southern Whites that dominated
the United States legislature for 56 of the next 60 years. 544 Moreover, the Great Depression left a
lasting imprint on American domestic policy through the significant expansion of the federal
government. For example, Roosevelt's policies let to the creation of America's first widespread
social insurance system (Social Security), which remains an issue in American politics 80 years
later.
In a Gallup poll taken from September 7th- 10 th 2001, where respondents were asked to
name the most important problem facing the country, less than 1% replied terrorism and national
security. On September 11 th an essentially random, significant deviation from the United States'
recent experience with terrorism and domestic security radically altered the issue priorities of its
citizens. In polling from October 1 1th- 14 th, 4 6 % called terrorism the most important problem and
a further 8% national security more generally.545 Historically, the American public had rated the
Republican Party the more competent to deal with issues of national security.546 For example, in
an October 2000 CBS News poll, 43% believed that George W. Bush would strengthen the
544 Though Southern whites increasingly defected to the Republicans beginning in the 1960s over their opposition to
Civil Rights legislation.
545 Gallup, "Terrorism Most Important Problem, But Americans Remain Upbeat," 10/18/01;
www.gallup.com/poll/4996.
546 Petrocik et al. (2003/2004).
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United States' defenses against international terrorism, while only 19% believe the same of
Democratic candidate Al Gore. 547 The immediate response by the Republican-led government
did nothing to dampen this advantage; a January 2002 CBS News Poll found that 57% believed
the Republican Party was better able to deal with terrorism, compared to 15% for the
Democrats. 548
Cursory evidence suggests that the Shock generated by the September 1 1th attacks
improved the immediate fortunes of the Republican Party, seen as the most competent to deal
with a new, highly salient issue. Between polling ending on September 10 th 2001 and beginning
on January 11th 2002, the Republicans' favorability rating improved from 47% to 61%, while the
Democrats' rating remained unchanged (moving from 56% to 55%).549 In elections in 2002 and
2004, the Republicans gained an aggregate 3% at the Presidential and legislative levels. While
the major parties were seen as equally competent in Gallup surveys to deal with the economy and
the Iraq War in the 2002 legislative elections, 81% of voters who called terrorism the most
important issue (14% of all voters) intended to vote Republican.5 50 Hillygus and Shields (2005)
find that concerns with terrorism played a significant role in the 2004 Presidential election, and
voters concerned with terrorism overwhelmingly supported George W. Bush. Though many of
these voters may already have been Republicans for other reasons (national security; taxes), it is
likely they gained undecided voters or Democrats who became concerned with terrorism.
The failure of the Republicans to consolidate their national security advantage, as
evidenced by the loss of the Presidency and both houses of the legislature between 2006 and
547 CBS News/New York Times, 10/18/00-10/21/00; taken from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research's
"iPoll" polling database. In a CNN Poll from the same period, 62% believed Bush was the better candidate when it
came to maintaining military preparedness, compared to 33% for Gore.
548 CBS News/New York Times, 1/21/02-1/24/02; taken from iPoll.
549 Gallup, "Party Images," www.gallup.com/poll/24655.
550 Gallup, "Keys to the Midterm Elections, Part II," 12/24/02; www.gallup.com/poll/7465.
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2008, is not a repudiation of the claim that the September 1 lth attacks durably altered political
priorities in the United States. As with immigration in Austria and Germany, the salience of
terrorism declined slowly in the United States. Terrorism remained one of the 10 most important
problems until March 2008, and seven years after the September 11th attacks, 38% of the
population was worried that someone in their family would be affected by a domestic terrorist
attack ... up from 24% in April 2000 but down from 58% in the immediate aftermath of
September 11th 551 In terms of policy output, the attacks led to significant and durable increases
in the power of the federal government, particularly in respect to its ability to surveil and detain
US citizens (the PATRIOT Act), that remain a point of political contention.
Despite a durable change in political priorities, the Republicans failed to maintain a hold
on power for two reasons. First, by 2006 the Republican competence edge had been erased, with
46% in an October Gallup poll calling the Democrats the most capable of dealing with terrorism
(compared to 41% for the Republicans). 552 Moreover, by 2008 issues of national security had
been replaced by a rapid increase in concerns with the economy, with the Republicans again
losing the debate about how to deal with a major economic crisis to the more interventionist
Democratic Party in the 2008 Presidential election.553 In short, concerns with national security
and terrorism were overwritten by concerns with a global economic Shock that some have
argued is "every bit as big as the Great Depression shock of 1929-30." 554
Both the September 11th attacks and the onset of the Great Depression represented
archetypal Shocks...large, unanticipated events that reframed a society's political priorities. In
the first case, the de-legitimation of the incumbent's stance on the economy, combined with the
551 Gallup, "Economy Widely Viewed as Most Important Problem," 3/13/08; www.gallup.com/poll/104959.
552 Collected from 10/6/06 to 10/08/06; taken from iPoll.
553 Gallup, "Fuel Prices Now Clearly Americans' No. 2 Concern," 6/17/08; www.gallup.com/poll/108067.
554 Eichengreen and Kevin O'Rourke (Working Paper 2009).
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presence of an opposition offering a popular stance and the lack of a viable 3 rd party alternative,
led to a re-weighting of the electoral balance between the established parties. In the second case,
the established distribution of perceived party competence temporarily reinforced the position of
the incumbent established party.
This is not to say that the Shock I identify in this project is the only instance of a Shock
improving the fortunes of a niche party, or even that the same Shock affects all countries in the
same way. As in the United States, the Great Depression was the worst economic crisis in
modern German history. As in the United States, the established Right lacked answers to the
crisis, at a time when German unemployment had shot past 40%, focusing instead on nationalism
and the construction of an authoritarian state.555 However, unlike the United States the
established Left's economic policy also suffered a legitimacy deficit; the German Social
Democrats proposed no additional role for the State during periods of economic crisis and saw
capitalism as a flawed but self-regulating system.556 Combined with the Weimar Republic's
highly proportional electoral rules, facilitating the formation of new parties and the perpetuation
of very small parties, there was ample opportunity for a party with new ideas to come to the fore.
That party was ultimately the previously marginalized National Socialists, who received
just 2.6% of the vote in 1928 making highly nationalist, anti-Semitic and anti-Communist
appeals. Of the parties contesting the last democratic parliamentary elections in Weimar
Germany from 1930-1932, it was the National Socialists who were the most successful in
advocating an economic policy designed to create work and alleviate the suffering of the
Depression (especially for the hard-hit agricultural sector) through government intervention. 557
555 Hamilton (1982), pp. 232-240.
556 Berman (1998).
557 Hamilton (1982); Berman (1998), pg. 394.
289
By the end of 1932, the National Socialists had increased their vote share to 38%; Hamilton
notes that voters in one German town were supporting the party's economic policy despite their
continued use of anti-Semitism, which they "ignored or rationalized...just as they ignored other
unpleasant aspects of the Nazi movement."558
Explaining Nativist Party Growth
Following from my general theory, I advance a "punctuated equilibrium" or "crisis"
explanation (Mudde 2007) for the growth of nativist parties in Western Europe. I argue that
nativist parties grow when changes to the established relationship between natives and
immigrants unsettle individual expectations about political, economic, social, or demographic
outcomes, triggering feelings of threat among some in the native population and increasing the
salience of issues or identities related to the native/immigrant dynamic. In Western Europe a
large, unanticipated and unsolicited wave of non-Western migration in the late-1980s and early-
1990s made immigration a highly salient political and social issue in a number of societies.
Through their appeals and the failure of established parties to deal with this new migration,
nativist parties positioned themselves as the issue owners of the pro-native, anti-migration stance
and attracted new voters who both agreed with their position and felt migration was a pressing
concern. I explore the dimensions of this migration and its effects on both the public and the
party system in Austria and Germany in Chapter 4, before testing the effect of migration on
nativist party support across Western Europe more generally in Chapter 6.
While my explanation is straightforward, it has not been systematically advanced in the
previous literature and therefore represents a significant advance in our understanding of the
Radical Right. As with the broader literature on political change in advanced industrial societies,
558 Hamilton (1982), pg. 377, quoted from Allen (1965).
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the major theories of Radical Right success focus on the role of high or increasing economic
insecurity caused by unemployment, deindustrialization or globalization (Betz 1994; Swank and
Betz 2003) or an evolution in preferences brought on by changes in the composition of advanced
industrial economies from industrial to post-industrial (Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Inglehart
1997).
In contrast, I argue that the health or composition of European economies was irrelevant
when it came to the growth of nativist parties. While electoral dealignment in the 1970s and
1980s, seen as one consequence of a post-modem capitalist society (Dalton et al. 1984), may
have facilitated the switch to nativist parties by weakening traditional bonds between the major
parties and their voters, dealignment cannot explain why voters across a number of countries
switched to similar parties within a relatively short time frame (1986-1999). Moreover, though
significant migration in the 1960s did not trigger a nativist reaction during a period of economic
prosperity, suggesting that migration was necessary but not sufficient to induce nativist growth,
this migration was in fact solicited to maintain the exceptionally high growth of the period
(Messina 2007). Once full employment ended with the 1973 oil crises, the perceived costs of
migration (competition for low-skilled jobs, social welfare and housing; social instability through
increased crime; the construction of parallel societies through integration failures) outweighed
the perceived benefits of a cheap labor force that could (theoretically) be sent back as necessary
and were willing to undertake the most undesirable jobs, and further newcomers were rejected.
Though full employment and high growth may have been enough for West European societies to
willingly take in new migrants, these conditions have been the exception rather than the rule.
Nativist parties made electoral gains in a period of strong growth (nearly 4% in Austria and
Germany) and low unemployment (3-6%) in the late-1980s and early-1990s, while the weakest
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economies (such as Ireland, Spain, or Finland) saw the least nativist growth, as they were passed
over in favor of countries where migrants, even political refugees, could eventually find
employment. My research suggests that the emphasis on economics and the long-term
composition of economies in explaining political processes cannot account for significant
developments in recent European political dynamics, and scholars should be more open to
explanations privileging short-term social, cultural or demographic dynamics.
The recent failure of nativist parties to emerge in Western Europe's new migration states
(such as Ireland, Portugal or Spain) can be interpreted in this light. With rapid economic growth
in the late-1990s, these countries received net migration for the first time in the post-World War
II era. Though asylum seeking increased, by and large this new migration was driven by
improved economic opportunities. Ireland's spectacular economic growth in the 1990s
(averaging 8.4% from 1994 to 2000) created a tremendous demand for new labor, and Ireland
was one of three EU countries not to place restrictions on labor market access for the EU's new,
East European member states in 2004. 559 Drawing on the experiences of their workers in the
1960s, over the past decade both Portugal and Spain implemented guest worker programs to
meet labor shortages in construction, agriculture, fishing and domestic help.56° My research
suggests that the real challenge for these countries is yet to come: how will they react when their
demand for labor subsides, but their economies make further migration attractive?
In addition, my research represents a conceptual advance in its measurement of both the
dependent and independent variables. Past scholars, even those who attribute the success of the
Radical Right to immigration (Gibson 2002; Golder 2003), focus on the level of support and
559 Ruhs (Working Paper 2004).
560 Inter Press Service, "Portugal Opens Doors, Bucks EU Trend," 8/10/06; Christian Science Monitor, "Spain's
new want ad: Moroccan mothers to pick strawberries," 3/29/07.
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privilege the size of the immigrant population; these parties are large where immigrant
populations are large. But immigrant populations are generated through many processes, which I
argue are not equivalent in the reactions they generate. Instead, I argue that we should focus on
how and why immigrant populations are changing to look for signs of a favorable environment
for nativist parties to grow. I expect that large immigrant populations generated slowly and
consensually are less likely to display nativist growth than smaller populations generated through
rapid, unexpected and unsolicited growth. Furthermore, by focusing on the size of a Radical
Right party, scholars tend to confuse changes in support with changes in strategy. Nativist
parties can have many supporters for reasons unrelated to their current strategy or growth, for
example because a non-nativist party retained its old supporters after adopting nativist appeals.56 1
I argue that what is most important is to understand how a party's immediate strategy and
environment influence its fortunes if we hope to understand why some parties grow and others
do not.
My argument is by no means a complete explanation of nativist growth. All else equal, I
expect significant increases in the size of the immigrant population to lead to increases in support
for nativist parties, but in Chapters 3 and 5 I point to three additional factors that I believe
influence nativist growth. First, though their appeals and programs heavily focus on threat posed
by migration and immigrants, nativist parties can benefit from "owning" multiple issues. For
example, as I note in Chapter 5 the FPOe (as well as Radical Right parties in Italy) benefitted
from concerns with patronage and corruption, though not all of these voters were necessarily
interested in nativism. At the same time, competing issues can blunt the urgency of immigration,
as reunification did in Germany in 1990 and 1991.
561 On this point Kitschelt and McGann (1995) are correct: the largest nativist movements are those that mobilize
coalitions of voters. The FPOe/BZOe successfully combined anti-statism and nativism, while the Swiss People's
Party combined their traditional rural conservative support with a new, urban nativism.
293
Second, I argue that for a nativist party to take advantage of a favorable issue
environment they need some organizational resources, either a base of established activists or a
significant funding source. Parties like the FPOe, Swiss People's Party or Danish Progress Party
benefitted from co-opting an established organization; nativist activists simply took over existing
structures and changed the party's strategy. Parties like the Vlaams Blok had a more difficult
challenge, laying the foundations for success over 10 or 15 years of organization building and
identifying promising functionaries through connections to local social organizations (Art 2008).
Parties like the German DVU or Sweden's New Democracy were able to grow despite having no
functionary base by counting on the significant resources of their founders. It was parties like
the German NPD or Sweden Democrats, which lacked a significant activist base or source of
funding, that were the least successful in the late-1980s and early-1990s, despite operating in an
environment where their issues were highly salient.
Third, my argument is sensitive to the role of electoral rules, which influence the number
and type of parties contesting elections especially at the district level (Cox 1997). Nativist
parties, which in Western Europe uniformly began as smaller (<15% of the vote) parties with
focused appeals, should be at a disadvantage in single-member district systems, where the
electoral politics literature expects them to be strategically abandoned for parties with a greater
chance of winning a seat.
The failure of significant (>1% of the vote) nativist parties to emerge in the United
Kingdom or the United States (or, going back to my earlier discussion, the lack of a credible 3r
alternative during the Presidential election of 1932) were almost certainly due to restrictive
electoral rules. In the early- 1990s and again in the early-2000s the United States experienced a
sharp increase in unsolicited net migration, particularly illegal migration. In both instances this
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increase generated intense public debate, a rash of local ordinances denying illegal immigrants
access to jobs, housing or public services, the formation of social movements (the Minuteman
Project) and the transformation of politicians in one major party (former Colorado
Representative Tom Tancredo; former California Governor Pete Wilson) into defacto
nativists. 562 Yet the US Constitution Party, with the largest number of registered members
outside the two major parties, managed just 0.2% of the vote in the 2006 legislative elections. 563
In the United Kingdom, the British National Party has never reached 1% of the national
vote, though it has done markedly better in local elections where multi-member districts are used
to elect representatives. 564 As in the United States, some of the most prominent opponents of
immigration in the United Kingdom have come from the mainstream right. Conservative MP
Enoch Powell's famous "rivers of blood" speech in 1968 arguably initiated the modem
immigration debate in the UK and preceded the growth of British nativist parties; in 2008 the
British National Party still sold Enoch Powell t-shirts. 565 In the run up to the 1979 election,
Prime Minister candidate Margaret Thatcher played to immigration opponents by claiming that
there was a fear of being "swamped" by people of different cultures. 566
In both the United States and United Kingdom, some of the most vocal expressions of
nativism are found inside the mainstream conservative parties, as their electoral rules have made
parties that focus on a specific issue dimension a losing proposition. At the same time, these
562 Tancredo's minor candidacy for the Republican Party was intended specifically to raise the immigration issue,
which he said threatened job losses, an increase in violent crime and the prospect of terrorist attacks. During a
televised June 2007 debate among Republican Presidential candidates, Tancredo was the only participant to support
an end to all legal immigration; The Moderate Voice, "Tancredo Says: Stop All Legal Immigration," 06/05/07,
http://themoderatevoice.com/13281. Wilson based his 1994 gubernatorial campaign on two issues (one nativist and
both ethnic) an end to social services for illegal immigrants and an end to "Affirmative Action" programs for ethnic
minorities; Tolbert and Hero (1996).
563 Minuteman co-founder Jim Gilchrist managed 14.8% of the vote in a 2005 House of Representatives by-election
in San Diego, a border area heavily touched by issues of illegal immigration.
56 In 2008, the BNP held 56 local council seats.
565 British National Party, bnp.org.uk/2008/07/enoch-powell-t-shirts.
566 Eatwell, pg. 182 in Hainsworth (ed) (2000).
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mainstream parties are not nativist; their nativist factions have to struggle against other internal
factions to control the party's direction (nativism is not central to their message, though it can be
explicit), including a business-first faction that wants immigration to reduce the cost of labor
(Money 1997).
I do not argue that large, rapid events that re-weight issue priorities or introduce
essentially new dimensions of politics are the only mechanism by which party systems change.
Change can conceivably come from a gradual shift in preferences brought on by generational
replacement, through changes to the composition of the electorate through addition
(enfranchisement, unification) or subtraction (disenfranchisement, secession), or through
changes to a polity's electoral rules that make certain strategies more or less successful. Rather,
I argue that party systems can change as the result of large, essentially random events that
rapidly alter the salience of certain issues or identities. In the case of nativist parties, this version
of events is more compelling than theories relying on slower generational changes, as the
German and Austrian publics were simply not concerned with immigration until specific events
triggered a discussion.
Moreover, my theory does not suggest that political elites are unimportant in mediating
changes in issue salience. The FPOe's decision to mobilize against the Proporz system when
they did depended on the ascendency of the anti-statist wing of the party under Joerg Haider in a
closely contested leadership election. Similarly, the American response to the September 1 1th
terrorist attacks, particularly with regard to the decision to link a war in Iraq to the broader war
on Islamic terrorism, depended heavily on who won the razor thin 2000 Presidential election.5 67
567 In a speech given to the Commonwealth Club on 9/22/02, before the outbreak of hostilities in Iraq, Gore was
highly critical of the President's decision to pursue an invasion of Iraq, and endorsed Howard Dean in the 2004
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I find, however, that actors are also highly constrained by exogenous events, both in their ability
to bring new issues or identities into the public discourse. While Joerg Haider effectively used a
Shock to increase his support, he only did so in response to major events, and was not the only
prominent member of his party to share his views. Haider adopted new appeals strategically,
looking for issues that were already in the public sphere but unexpressed by the established
parties. Parties that adopted nativism early, like the Belgian Vlaams Blok, tellingly failed to see
their vote share increase until structural conditions became more favorable in the late-1980s.
I also find that during a Shock actors are significantly constrained in the policies they can
propose once new issues or identities become salient. A "windows of opportunity" theory
(Cortell and Petersen 1999) would argue that policy change occurs when 1) some event leads
political elites 2) with enough institutional influence to 3) enact a preferred policy. I note that
this theory excludes an important actor: the public, and how their preferences and priorities
constrain what political elites can propose and what they can enact. In Austria and Germany,
immigration policy changed despite the wishes of most established actors in the system, because
they recognized the risk of further lost support by retaining their current policy. In both
Germany and Austria the Center-Left could have used its position to block a more restrictive
policy indefinitely, but caved out of the fear of further electoral punishment. The only actors to
support the change in policy direction, the nativist parties themselves, had no institutional
position from which to push their claims and could only exert pressure through elections.
Moreover, parties in both systems were limited in the proposals they could make if they hoped to
retain voters. With the exception of the Greens, who were possibly trying to carve out a clientele
among naturalized immigrants, none of the established parties in either country considered
Presidential election over his former running-mate, Joe Lieberman, over Dean's opposition and Lieberman's support
for the war; New York Observer, "Look Who's Back," 6/19/08.
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liberalizing immigration policy. Similarly, while George W. Bush or Al Gore might have had
some latitude in their response to the September 1 1th attacks, public opinion made some options
(such as ignoring terrorism or cutting counter-terrorism funding) impossible.
Explaining Nativist Persistence
While one aspect of party system change is the growth or breakthrough of new parties,
durable party system change requires newly emergent actors to retain their new supporters, to
persist. Empirically, most voters in established democracies vote for the party they supported in
the last election. Even in the volatile Austrian elections of the 1990s, on average 81% of the
electorate supported their old party.568 Perceived as reservoirs of protest, nativist parties were
not necessarily less adept at keeping their new voters. In 1999, the FPOe was as good at
retaining its old supporters as the established major parties, and better than other minor parties in
the system.569 By the late 1990s, the French National Front commanded the most loyal
supporters of any French party.570 Why then are some parties able to consolidate their gains
while others return to their previous level of support or disappear entirely?
In the 1990s there were 16 nativist parties that received at least 1% of the vote in national
elections. 571 Of those parties, nine remained above that 1% threshold in 2008 and all nine were
larger than they had been before they began growing in the late-1980s or early-1990s. Of the
seven instances of nativist failure, nearly half can be explained by intra-movement competition,
as multiple parties in the same system struggled to determine which would become the nativist
s68 Mueller, pg. 18 in Plasser et al. (2000). This accounting does not include individuals who moved in or out of the
"non-voter" category.569 Plasser et. al., pg. 58 in OJP 1999 (2000). The FPOe retained 70% of their previous supporters, the OeVP 75%,
the SPOe 70%, the Greens 59% and the Liberal Forum 51%. Calculated by taking exit polls on the composition of
each party's support based on their support in the last election.
570 Schain, pg. 226 in Schain et al. (eds) (2002).
571 In West European countries with 1 million or more inhabitants.
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standard bearer. For example, once nativists co-opted the Swiss People's Party, which already
held 11% of the vote and perpetual access to the Swiss federal executive (due to Switzerland's
framework of consensual government), voters abandoned the smaller Freedom Party and the
Swiss Democrats for the larger party with better access to public resources and a greater capacity
to influence decision-making. Taking these trends into account, I believe the relevant question is
not why some nativist or niche parties persist, but what internal pathologies of those parties or
features of their political environment make persistence unachievable.
My comparison of nativist parties within and between Austria and Germany in Chapter 5
suggests that parties fail to persist for two reasons, one internal to the party and one internal to
the party system.572 I argue that both pathologies come back to a party's failure to convey its
efficacy to voters. Niche parties gain voters by persuading them that they are capable of
representing them on some emergent issue or representing some emergent identity, or at least
that they best signal the urgency of these issue or identity demands. Niche parties retain voters
by conveying that they are more than a signaling device...that they can continue to represent
their voters in day-to-day affairs after their critical issue fades from importance.
First, I find that some parties fail to routinize the processes by which new functionaries
are recruited, promoted, professionalized, or delegated authority, making them more likely to
implode through in-fighting or because they are unprepared to fulfill their functions in
parliament or government...the party is a victim of its own sudden success. The nativist parties
that survived their first electoral period followed one of three trajectories: they co-opted a party
with established, professional functionaries (the Austrian Freedom Party), they were a splinter of
another organizations with a stable of trained functionaries (the Belgian Vlaams Blok), or they
572 Following Mudde's (2007) typology.
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used previous elections to professionalize credible leaders (the REP in Baden-Wuerttemberg).
The nativist parties that failed, like the German DVU relied on a heavily centralized authority,
which then alienated the party's parliamentary leaders when they realized they did not control
their own factions. Both the DVU and certain factions of the REP in the late-1980s were unable
or unwilling to recruit or train functionaries before entering parliament, and this failure to
identify competent agents quickly resulted in gaffs, scandals, and in-fighting.
Second, as new or small parties that can join, but not form, a government, I argue that a
niche party's perceived efficacy depends on the presence of allies among other established
parties. When niche parties are part of the governing majority, they signal efficacy by acquiring
cabinet posts, policy concessions, or access to patronage in return for their continued support for
the government. When niche parties are in the opposition, they signal prospective efficacy by
maintaining strong ties to a potential majority, for example by forming alliances at the provincial
or local level. In Germany, the most professional REP organization (in Baden-Wuerttemberg)
was entirely cut off from executive and legislative access and treated from the start as an
illegitimate actor; even at the local level, the established parties agreed to block the REP's
proposals, no matter how innocuous. Consequently, the state faction survived only two elections
where immigration was named an important issue by more than 5% of the state's voters; when
the issue faded, so did the party. 573 In contrast, despite protestations by the national leaders of
the established parties in Austria the center-right OeVP continued to enter into agreements with
the FPOe at the state level throughout the 1990s and was willing to cooperate on legislation at
the national level.
573 Forschungsgruppe Wahlen (1992); Forschungsgruppe Wahlen (1996).
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The totality of the political exclusion faced by nativist parties in Germany exceeded even
that facing many Communist parties during the Cold War. Though the French Communist Party
(PCF) was isolated from the late-1940s (as part of Charles de Gaulle's unity government) until
1981 (when they were granted leadership posts by the Socialist President Francois Mitterrand),
this exclusion was limited to the national level. From 1967 onward, the PCF entered a general
seat-sharing agreement with the Center-Left, led by Mitterrand, and presented a joint presidential
candidate (Mitterrand) in 1965 and 1974. At the local level, relations between the Center-Left
and PCF were entirely normal. For example, in the 1965 local elections the PCF presented a
joint electoral list in 48% of France's cities, and the party still controlled nearly 1/3rd of French
cities with more than 30,000 inhabitants in the late-1970s. 574 Similarly, though the Christian
Democrats (DC) continuously blocked the Italian Communist Party (PCI) from joining a national
government, the PCIformed governments at the regional level and frequently collaborated with
the Socialists (PSI) at the local level on legislation and joint electoral lists. 575 Successful
cooperation at lower levels of government meant that the Communists could reliably provide
their supporters with benefits, while arguing that a similar outcome at the national level was
possible.
Whether the strategies designed to starve nativist parties of their support by denying them
the basic tools of representation are ultimately sustainable is an open question. In Germany, the
norms that have emerged to make nativism difficult to propagate were the result of an incredibly
powerful series of events (World War II; the Holocaust) that deeply influenced elite decisions
about which political appeals were and were not acceptable. As the memory of these events
fades, it may be that the norms that produced them also seem less self-evident, and that a nativist
574 Knapp (2004), pp. 66, 99.
575 Lange, pg. 264 in Blackmer and Tarrow (1975).
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party will be able to find a permanent niche in the political system in the wake of some future
spike in the salience of native/immigrant relations. I will argue briefly in closing that such a
spike is in fact likely.
Moving Forward: Prospects for Western Europe
While some who have written on the Radical Right expect these parties to fade with the
economic dislocations caused by post-industrial transformations or globalization, I am
considerably more pessimistic.576 In closing, I would like to offer two reasons why we should
not expect nativist parties in Western Europe to disappear in the near future.
First, trends in advanced industrial democracies suggest that Western Europe will
continue to be exposed to significant migration in the coming decades. Particularly as the "baby
boomer" generation ages, advanced industrial countries are faced with a dilemma: more
individuals are retiring and increasing European social insurance obligations, but low birthrates
mean their tax contributions are not being replaced in the workforce. A 2001 report by the UN
Population Division calculated that the portion of older Europeans out of the workforce (65 and
older) would essentially double between 2000 and 2050.577
In the absence of a revolution in the willingness of Europeans to reproduce, the main
alternative for stemming this process would be to engage in replacement migration. However,
the UN report found that just to maintain its population, Germany would need to increase its net
migration to half its 1988-93 "Shock period" average (600,000 per year) by 2015 (300,000 per
year) and two-thirds (400,000 per year) by 2030. To maintain a "potential support ratio" (the
proportion of workers 15-64 to non-workers 65 and above) of three to one in 2050, Germany
576 Inglehart (1997), pp. 38, 46-48.
577 UNPopulation Division (2001), pg. 8.
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would need to nearly triple even this maintenance migration. 78 My work suggests that unless
West Europeans are willing to deal with markedly increased social insurance pressures and a
decline in tax revenue brought on by declining populations, or unless they are convinced that
heavy replacement migration will be beneficial, Western Europe could be in for significant
nativist reactions if governments attempt the later without engaging in a debate about the costs
and benefits of immigration with their publics. Hopefully, this project will provide those
policymakers with a better understanding of the root causes of nativist concerns when
formulating migration policy.
Second, nativist parties in Western Europe remain parties focused on acquiring new
"niches" to increase their support, as opposed to "catch-all" parties interested in building the
broad, sometimes conflicting coalitions that give them the numerical edge necessary to win
elections and form governments. Consequently, I believe nativist parties will continue to be
flexible and innovative in their appeals in the coming years, to exhibit the capacity to out-
maneuver larger parties and take ownership of new or newly salient issues. Some nativists have
relied on their ability to repurpose new events to emphasize the conflict between natives and
immigrants. Part of the success of Pim Fortuyn's movement in 2002 was its ability to use the
September 11th attacks to play on concerns about the relationship between Christians/natives and
Muslims/immigrants. Some argue that Fortuyn introduced a new social cleavage, 579 while others
would argue that he just benefitted from the re-activation of an issue created by migration in the
early-1990s, which the defunct Center Democrats failed to capitalize on due to norms of
tolerance in Holland that thought to be comparable to Germany.580 Either scenario would
578 In 1995, the EU's PSR was 4.3 tol. All figures are taken from the Germany statistical annex; UN Population
Division (2001).
579 Pellikaan et al. (2007).
580 Van Donselaar (1995), as summarized by Mudde and Van Holsteyn, in Hainsworth (ed) (2000), pg. 163.
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indicate that multiple vectors (migration, but also events raising concerns about integration) can
increase the salience of the same issue or set of identities, to the benefit of nativist parties.
Other nativist movements have shown that they are by no means "single issue" parties,
that they are adept at taking new or unrelated issues to create a semi-coherent worldview. The
Austrian Freedom Party of the 1990s was successfully able to combine calls for a reduced role of
the state, by dismantling the established system of patronage, with greater state intervention and
more social protection for natives (welfare chauvinism). Each appeal was directed at a particular
clientele that the established parties had alienated or ignored... white-collar neo-liberals in the
former case and blue-collar nativists in the latter. As the 1990s wore on, nativist parties in
Western Europe abandoned neo-liberalism in favor of two emerging perceived threats: European
integration and the recognition of an accelerated economic and cultural globalization. By the
end of the century, one could accurately call nativist parties the only organized political
opposition to either process in Europe.581
While neither EU integration nor globalization was interpreted in terms of
native/immigrant relations (unlike September 1 1th), migration, integration and globalization all
spoke to the same complex of fears and resentments by the working class (and the shrinking
middle class) about the loss of resources and prestige at the hands of immigrants, Brussels,
multi-national corporations and Austria's unconcerned elites. 582 In the final Act of his political
career as head of the BZOe, the late Joerg Haider believed that particularly the increased
resentment with global capitalism held the promise of attracting new voters in the future. In the
581 Zaslove (2008).
582 Integration should not be confused with expansion; both EU expansion eastward and the prospect of Turkey's
addition to the EU have been discussed by nativist parties in terms of native/immigrant relations, particularly the
introduction of cheap East European labor and culturally non-Western Turkish immigrants.
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summer of 2007 Stefan Petzner, Haider's press secretary, summarized the BZOe's strategy going
forward:
"Globalization and capitalism are going to be the new big themes. Social justice.
Economic speculation. Money is going into the economy, but not getting back to
the People. The pendulum is swinging back to the Left now."583
The FPOe and BZOe used this strategy to great effect in attaining a combined 28% of the vote in
a national election in the fall of 2008, gaining back the voters lost by the then unified "third
camp" in 2002 as well as new support. During the campaign, both parties strongly attacked
immigration and multi-culturalism 584 and the EU585 while promising to protect the middle class
and Austria's social standards. 586
In closing, I would emphasize that the dynamics I explore are not historically or
geographically bounded. Migration is fundamental to the human condition (we are nearly all the
descendents of migrants) and ethnic mobilization, of which nativist mobilization is a subset, can
be found on all six inhabitable continents, at all stages of economic development. Though
processes of modernization and state-building were supposed to erase ethnic differences, they
have proven inadequate to the task in the United States, to say nothing of Yugoslavia or the
Ukraine. That much of Western Europe lacked what Americans might consider "racial" (or
Ukrainians "national") politics for much of the 2 0 th Century was the result of states deliberately
carved to be mono-ethnic, as Austria was in 1918. What migration in the late-1980s and early-
1990s did was make clear that West European countries were now ethnically heterogeneous
583 Interview, Stefan Petzner, 6/6/07.
584 An FPOe poster during the election stated that "Asylum fraud means flight back home," which was also used by
the NPD and DVU in the 2005 German elections; a BZOe poster called for "Austria for the Austrians!"
585 An FPOe poster called for "Representatives of the People instead of EU traitors." Both parties attacked the
OeVP-SPOe government for making policies at the expense of their population; Die Presse, "Hitzige Debatte ueber
neue EU-Linie der SPOe," 7/10/08.
586 FPOe posters: "Social security for our people" and "Homeland needs middle class"; BZOe poster: "Go the social
way! For your sake."
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societies, where different ethnic groups with sometimes competing material or symbolic claims
were expected to share a geographic space, a feature of political life much of the world has long
been familiar with. The persistence of nativist parties in the coming decades, or even their
emergence in European states where nativism generated no support or failed to take hold the first
time around, is a very real prospect. At the same time, political trajectories are not
unidirectional. It could be that in the coming decades European conceptions of what it means to
be a native gradually alter, blurring the lines that nativist parties try to draw, or that some new
Shock could come along, again refocusing the priorities of voters who identified as "workers" or
"businessmen" in the 1980s but "Germans" or "natives" in the 1990s.
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Appendix A - Nativist and Non-Nativist Radical Right Parties Contesting
National Elections, 1965-2006587
Nativist Parties The "conventional" Parties this Project Codes
(Included in Radical Right5 88  as Radical Right58 9
Columns 2 & 3)
Austria -National Democratic Party -Freedom Party (1986) -Foreigner-Stop Movement
(1970) (1983)
-Freedom Party (1990-) 
-Freedom Party (1986)
-Alliance for the Future of
Austria (2006-)
Belgium -Flemish Bloc/Flemish -Flemish Bloc (1978-81)'90 -Democratic Union for the
Movement (1985- ) Respect of Labor (1978-91)
-National Front (1985-) 
-Flemish Bloc (1978-81)
-New Belgian Front 
-Party of New Forces
(1999-) (1978, 1987-91)
Denmark -Progress Party -Progress Party (1973-84) 591 -None (see fn. 5)
(1987-2001)
-People's Party (1998-)
Finland -Finish People's Blue- -None -None
Whites (2003- )592
France -National Front (1978-) -National Front (1973) 9' -National Front (1973)
-"Other Far Right" (1997- )
-Movement for France
(2002-)
-National Republican
Movement (2002-)
587 Parties were only coded by election year, explaining gaps in coding for parties that switched from "Radical
Right" to "nativist" or were founded before they contested their first election.
588 Parties typically coded as Radical Right, using Golder's (2003) coding. These parties make up the "Radical
Right" variable in Chapter 6.
589 Returning to my definition in the Introduction, by "Right," I mean any party that is socially conservative for its
national context; economic conceptions of the Right fail to capture the ideologies or strategies of many parties
commonly associated with the Radical Right. By Radical, I mean any party that advocates permanently reducing or
eliminating the rights of its political or social opponents. In a liberal-democracy this includes parties that are
entirely anti-democratic (authoritarian; monarchist; fascist; totalitarian) or opposed to co-operation or co-existence
with some part of the population (religious fundamentalist; racist; exclusionary nationalist; anti-immigrant).
590 The Vlaams Blok did not begin emphasizing immigration until 1982; Husbands, in Hainsworth (ed) (1992).
591 Local politicians from the party began attacking immigrants in 1979, a position that party leader Mogens Glistrup
supported, though it does not appear to have been a prominent aspect of Progress Party elections until 1987. I code
the Progress Party for this period as neo-liberal and anti-statist, but not "Radical" as they were as a party not overtly
anti-system, anti-democratic or nativist; Andersen, in Hainsworth (ed) 1992.
592 Members of the True Finns, such as Tommy Halme of Helsinki, has shown nativist tendencies in local elections,
though they did not represent the party line as of 2006; Wikipedia, "True Finns," www.wikipedia.org.
593 "[I]ronically, in view of the party's successful mobilization around this issue, the early FN placed relatively little
policy emphasis on the theme of immigration. Anti-communism was a much more prominent component in the
Front's discourse." "In the late 1970s, immigration began to preoccupy the party more, especially with Jean-Pierre
Stirbois's recruitment to and ascent within the party." From Hainsworth, in Hainsworth (ed) (2000).
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Germany -National Democratic Party -National Democratic Party -National Democratic Party
(1980-) (1965-76) (1965-76)
-The Republicans (1990-)
-German People's Union
(1998, 2005-)
Greece -Golden Dawn (1996) -Greek National Political -Greek National Political
-Front Line (2000) Union; National Democratic Union; National Democratic
-Hellenic Front (2004) Union; National Union; National
-Popular Orthodox Rally Front/National Alliance; Front/National Alliance;
(2004- )594 National Party/Party of National Party/Party of
Hellenism; National Hellenism; National
Populist Party; Progressive Populist Party; Progressive
Party; United Nationalist Party; United Nationalist
Movement Movement
(1974-2000) (1974-2000)
Ireland -Immigration Control -None -None
Platform (2002-)
Italy -Lombard League/Northern -Italian Social -Italian Social
League Movement/National Movement/National
(1987-Present) Alliance Alliance
(1968-1994) 595  (1968-1994)
-Social Movement-Tricolor
Flame
(1996-Present)
-Social Alternative
(2006)
Netherlands -Dutch People's Union -None -Farmer's Party (1967-81)
(1977-81) -Political Reformed Party
-Center Party/Center Party (1967- )
'86 (1981-94) -Reformed Political Union
-Center Democrats (1967-2003)
(1986-98) -Reformed Political
-List Pim Fortuyn Federation (1977-98)
(2002-06) -Christian Union
-Party for Freedom (2006-) (2002-)
Norway -Progress Party (1989-) -Progress Party (1973-85) -None.5?
-Democrats (2006)
Portugal -Party of National Renewal -Christian Democratic Party -Christian Democratic Party
(2002-) (1976-87) (1976-87)
-People's Monarchist Party
(1976, 1983, 1987-1991,
1999-2002)
594 There is also a splinter of the Popular Orthodox Rally, the Patriotic Alliance, which is nativist but had not
contested national elections as of 2006.
595There is sufficient evidence that the National Alliance broke with fascism in 1995 to no longer categorize it as
"Radical Right"; Gallagher, in Hainsworth (ed) (2000).
596 See footnote 5 for a justification of the Progress Party's coding. The Norwegian Progress Party only adopted
nativist appeals in 1987; Andersen and Bjorklund, in Hainsworth (ed) (2000).
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Spain -Spain 2000 (2000-) -Falange (various) (1977-) -Falange (various) (1977-)
-National Democracy 
-National Alliance of June
(2004) 1 8th (1977)
-National Party of Union
(1979)
-Association of New
Political Forces (1982)
-Alliance for National Unity
(1996)
-Social Republican
Movement (2004)
Sweden -Sweden Democrats -None -None
(1988-)
-New Democracy
(1991-2002)
-National Democrats
(2002-)
-National Socialist Front
(2006)
Switzerland -Republican Movement -Swiss Auto Party/Swiss -Evangelical People's Party
(1975-79) Freedom Party (1987) (1967-)
-National Action for Nation 
-Swiss Auto Party/Swiss
and Homeland/Swiss Freedom Party (1987)
Democrats (1967- ) 
-Swiss People's Party
-Swiss Auto Party/Swiss (1995)
Freedom Party (1991- )
-Swiss People's Party
(1999- )597
United -British National Front -None -British National Party [I]
Kingdom (1970-83, 1992- ) (1966)
-British National Party [II] 
-Union Movement (1966)
(1983-) 
-National Democratic Party
-National Democrats (1997) (1970)
597 Golder (2003) does not consider the Swiss People's Party to be nativist.
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Appendix B - Coding Procedures for Chapter 6
General Rules
All electronic information is valid as of 11/01/07.
When possible, each independent variable was collected for the election year in question.
When that data was not available, 1) interpolation was used (for example, taking half the
difference between the crime rates in 1983 and 1985 for 1984), or 2) when anchor points were
not available, data within one year of the election year was used (for example, using 1985's
crime figures for 1984).
For specific inquiries regarding the original data or sourcing, contact the author.
Cross-National Coding
Coding Parties
The methodology for coding parties is described in the main paper. Party descriptions
were drawn from the following sources:
Council on Foreign Relations. Political Handbook of the World. New York:
SUNY Binghamton Center for Social Analysis. 1975-Present.
Derksen, Wilfried, "Electionworld" (formerly www.electionworld.org), http://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/User:Electionworld/Electionworld.
Hainsworth, Paul (ed). The extreme right in Europe and the USA. New York: St.
Martin's Press. 1992.
Hainsworth, Paul (ed). The politics of the extreme right: from the margins to the
mainstream. New York: Pinter. 2000.
Though the Political Handbook only goes back to 1975, it often contained information on
party programs from the previous election, and the Hainsworth edited volumes consistently
described those earlier elections.
Election Results
National election results were primarily drawn from two databases:
Derksen, Wilfried, "Electionworld" (formerly www.electionworld.org), http://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/User:Electionworld/Electionworld.
Nordsieck, Wolfram, "Parties and Elections in Europe," http://www.parties-and-
elections.de.
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Both accumulate election results from cited national statistical web-sites and election
offices. These sources were usually sufficient for all parties receiving more than 2% of the vote
in any national election; in most cases the primary sources themselves were used to capture
smaller parties. Some individual countries required additional sourcing to capture smaller
parties:
Austria 1966-1994: Plasser, Fritz, Peter Ulram and Guenther Ogris (eds). Wahlkampf und
Waehlerentscheidung: Analysen zur Nationalrat 1995. Vienna: Fessel. 1996.
Germany 1990: Forschungsgruppe Wahlen. "Bundestagswahl 1990: Eine Analyse Der Ersten
Gesamtdeutschen Bundestagswahl" (Report 61:2). Mannheim: Forschungsgruppe
Wahlen. 1990.
Greece 1974-1990: Dimitrias, Panayote. "Greece: The Virtual Absence of an Extreme Right,"
in Hainsworth (1992).
Ireland 2002: Anti-Fascist Action, Ireland, "Irish General Election - May 2002,"
http://www.geocities.com/irishafa/election.html (gives total in absolute votes).
Netherlands 1977-1998: Mudde, Cas and Joop Van Holsteyn. "The Netherlands: Explaining the
Limited Success of the Extreme Right," in Hainsworth (ed) (2000).
United 1966-1979: David Boothroyd, "United Kingdom Election Results,"
Kingdom www.election.demon.co.uk.
Immigration
All three immigration measures are coded by treating the % of the population as an
absolute value (for example, a 10% foreign-born population is a unit value of 10 for variables
that capture levels; a change from 10% to 12% is a unit value of 2 for variables that capture
changes).
Much of the data on the foreign and foreign-born populations (from 1980 onward) was
drawn national statistical agencies or one of the following sources:
Migration Policy Institute, "Migration Information Source: Country and
Comparative Data," http://www.migrationinformation.org/DataHub/
comparative.cfm.
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Trends in
International Migration. Paris: OECD. 1979-Present.
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division,
"World Migrant Stock: The 2005 Revision Population Database,"
http://esa.un.org/migration.
All three draw on national sources.
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Much of the data on the foreign population from 1970 to 1980, as well as data for the
Greek foreign population until 1996 was originally compiled and later made public by Matt
Golder:
Golder, Matt. Replication material for "Explaining variation in the electoral
success of extreme right parties in Western Europe," Comparative Political
Studies 36:4 (2003), pp. 432-466. Http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/mgolder.
The procedure for generating the three migration measures was as follows:
1. Data on the foreign and foreign-born populations were taken with a preference for
national sources, then UN sources, then OECD, then the Migration Policy
Institute, and finally the Golder data if necessary.
2. Where exact figures were not available, the non-Western foreign-born population
was generated by taking the known non-Western percentage of the foreign
population and applying that percentage to the foreign-born population.
3. For missing data, interpolation was used if two data points were known.
4. When data on the foreign or foreign-born populations for a particular year was not
available and interpolation was not possible, data from the year after was used. If
this was not available, the year before was used. If neither was available, the data
was treated as missing.
5. When all else failed, I employed a "20/80 Rule": if there was missing data on the
Western/non-Western distribution and interpolation was impossible, a simple
function was used based on known migration patterns. The known patterns were
1) that the non-Western portion of the population tended to increase from 1973
onward, even when the total immigrant population shrank and 2) these
populations grew much less rapidly when they were very low or very high.
Therefore, if the non-Western portion was between 20% and 80%, a 1 percentage point
yearly increase was assumed; otherwise a .1 percentage point yearly increase was assumed. If a
country crossed the 20/80 threshold within a period of extrapolation, the new coding year was
applied from the year after the threshold was crossed.
This method was most frequently used to determine the non-Western population before
1980. As non-Western immigrant populations were generally smaller in this period, even a
relatively large measurement error would only result in a .1 or .2 unit discrepancy (less than 1/3
of a standard deviation for these variables).
Country-by-country coding procedures are detailed below:
Foreign
Population
Statistics Austria.
Foreign-Born
Population
Generated using the
OECD's FBP data, working
backward based on the
known net migration rate,
collected by Statistics
Austria.
Non-Western
Foreign-Born
1971-2000: OECD data
based on FP by country
origin. Post-2001: based on
known rate of change in the
Western/non-Western ratio
from 1991-2001 as
provided by Migration
Information Source.
Belgium Migration Information 1995-Present: OECD. 1981-Present: OECD data
Source. 1960-1994: based on the based on FP by country of
known FBP in OECD origin. Pre-1981
(2002), working backward extrapolated using 20/80
rule.
using net migration
provided by Statistics
Belgium.
Denmark 1970-1979: Golder (2003); Statistics Denmark. Statistics Denmark.
1980-Present: OECD.
Finland Pre-1980: Golder (2003); World Migrant Stock. 1970-1980: extrapolated
1980-Present: Statistics using 20/80 rule; 1980-
Finland. Present: Statistics Finland.
France Census data. World Migrant Stock. 1970-1975 extrapolated
using the 20/80 rule; 1975:
Peignard, Emmanuel.
"Immigration in France,"
Embassy ofFrance in the
United States
http://www.ambafrance-
us.org/atoz/immigration. asp
July 2001; post-1975:
OECD data based on FP by
country of origin.
Germany Federal Statistical Office of Federal Statistical Office of Pre-1985: extrapolated
Germany. Germany. using 20/80 rule; 1985-
Present: OECD data based
on country of origin of the
FP.
Greece Golder (2003). World Migrant Stock. Pre-1990: extrapolated
using 20/80 rule; 1990-
Present: OECD data based
on FP country of origin.
Ireland 1973-1977: Missing data; World Migrant Stock. Pre-1995: extrapolation
1981-1982: Golder (2003); using 20/80 rule; 1995-
1983-Present: OECD. Present: OECD data based
on FP by country of origin.
Country
Austria
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Italy 1970-1979: With the FBP World Migrant Stock. Pre-1985: extrapolation
given, transformed using using 20/80 rule; 1985-
earliest known information Present: Italian National
about the ratio of FP to Statistical Institute.
FBP, assuming a constant
ratio over time.
Netherlands Statistics Netherlands. Generated using FP and Statistics Netherlands.
naturalization data from
Statistics Netherlands.
Norway 1973: Missing data; 1977: Statistics Norway. Statistics Norway.
Golder (2003); 1980-
Present: OECD.
Portugal Portuguese National World Migrant Stock. Pre-1980: extrapolation
Institute of Statistics. using 20/80 rule; 1980-
Present: OECD data based
on FP by country of origin.
Spain Pre-1985: Golder (2003); World Migrant Stock. Pre-1990: extrapolation
1985-Present: National using 20/80 rule; 1990-
Statistics Institute. Present: National Statistics
Institute.
Sweden Statistics Sweden. World Migrant Stock. OECD data on FBP by
country of origin.
Switzerland Swiss Federal Statistical World Migrant Stock. Pre-1980: extrapolation
Institute. using 20/80 rule; 1980-
Present: Swiss Federal
Statistical Institute.
United 1970-83: Transformed Census data. 1970-2000: OECD data on
Kingdom census data using earliest the FP by country of origin.
known information about 2001-Present: extrapolation
the FP/FBP ratio, assuming using 20/80 rule.
a constant ratio over time.
Unemployment
Levels and changes in unemployment are measured in the same fashion as immigration
(see above). Most data for the period 1973-1990 come from:
Layard, Richard, Stephen Nickell and Richard Jackman. Unemployment. Oxford:
Oxford University Press. 1991.
Data from 1992 onward collected through Eurostat, the source for the OECD's
standardized figures:
European Union, "Eurostat," http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu.
Data for Greece (1974-1981), Iceland (1971-1987), Luxembourg (1974-1990), Malta
(1971-1998) and Portugal (1975-1980) were taken from Golder:
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Golder, Matt. Replication material for "Explaining variation in the electoral
success of extreme right parties in Western Europe," Comparative Political
Studies 36:4 (2003), pp. 432-466. Http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/mgolder.
Crime
Crime is measured as the crime rate per 100,000 inhabitants. Figures from 1973-99 come
from Interpol's continuous reporting system:
Interpol. International Crime Statistics. Saint-Cloud, France: Secretariat General
of Interpol. 1950-1999.
From 2001, this data was collected from various national web-sites (generally the
national statistical office or national interior ministry).
Globalization
Globalization is measured as the ratio imports and exports to total GDP (with parity =
100) using the Penn World Table:
Heston, Alan, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, "Penn World Table v.6.2.,"
University of Pennsylvania Center for International Comparisons of Production,
Income, and Prices. Http:// pwt.econ..upenn.edu/php_site/pwt index.
Sectoral Employment
Sectoral employment is measured in the same fashion as immigration and unemployment
(see above).
In addition to the Irish National Statistical Office web-site, the following sources were
used to acquire figures on sectoral employment (the percentage of the workforce employed in
agriculture, manufacturing, and services):
Bank of Portugal, "Series Longas para a Economia Portuguesa." 2005.
www.bportugal.pt/publish/serlong/pdfs/serlong.
European Commission. Employment in Europe. Luxembourg: Office for Official
Publications of the European Communities. 1996-Present.
Godbout, Todd. "Employment change and sectoral distribution in 10 countries,
1970-1990," Monthly Labor Review. October 1993.
Hodne, Fritz. The Norwegian Economy 1920-80. Australia: Croon Helm. 1983.
International Labor Organization "Laborsta," http://laborsta.ilo.org.
Lu, Shu-shiuan. "How does arithmetic demystify growth success: the Taiwanese
case." Working Paper. 2006.
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OECD. "Civilian Employment: total & by industry," http://www.oecd.org/
statsportal.
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. "Comparative Civilian
Labor Force Statistics, Ten Countries, 1960-2006," http://www.bls.gov/fls/
flscomparelf.htm.
Electoral Institutions
The number of districts and seats were taken from:
Cox, Gary. Making votes count. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1997.
Golder, Matt. Replication material for "Explaining variation in the electoral
success of extreme right parties in Western Europe," Comparative Political
Studies 36:4 (2003), pp. 432-466. Http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/mgolder.
Nordsieck, Wolfram, "Parties and Elections in Europe," http://www.parties-and-
elections.de.
The mean district magnitude is measured as the division of total districts by total seats.
All seats are included in the calculations, whether or not the relevant parties contested them.
Sub-National Coding
The six relevant state and national statistical web sites were the primary source of sub-
national data, along with their annual national and state statistical yearbooks:
Bundesamt fuer Statistik. Statistisches Handbuch fuer die Republik Oesterreich.
Vienna: Oesterreichischen Statistischen Zentralamt. 1920-Present.
Land Steiermark. Statistische Mitteilungen des Landes Steiermark. Graz:
Statistisches Landesamt. 1947-Present.
Magistrat der Stadt Wien. Statistisches Jahrbuch der Stadt Wien. Vienna:
Magistrat der Stadt Wien. 1885-Present.
Statistisches Bundesamt. Statistisches Jahrbuch fuer die Bundesrepublik
Deutschland. Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt. 1952-Present.
Statistisches Landesamt. Statistik von Baden- Wuerttemberg. Stuttgart:
Statistisches Landesamt Baden-Wuerttemberg. 1952-Present.
Statistisches Landesamt. Statistisches Jahrbuch fuer Rheinland-Pfalz. Bad Ems,
Germany: Statistisches Landesamt. 1958-Present.
Additional sources are described below. For some variables in the late-1970s/early-
1980s, data had to be generated by taking aggregate changes at the State level and imputing
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based on the last known district level data. For example, doubling the unemployment rate from
1979 to 1983 in Vienna would double it in each Viennese district, though one district might go
from 4-8% and another from 8-16%; as the measurements were taken in terms of absolute
values, there is still variation on the relevant explanatory variables.
Additional sources are listed below:
Elections
Baden-Wuerttemberg
(district level)
Statistisches Bundesamt. "Wahl zum 9. Deutschen Bundestag am 5. Oktober
1980, 6." Wiesbaden: Statistiches Bundesamt. 1981.
Statistisches Bundesamt. "Wahl zum 8. Deutschen Bundestag am 3. Oktober
1976, 6." Wiesbaden: Statistiches Bundesamt. 1977.
Statistisches Bundesamt. "Wahl zum 7. Deutschen Bundestag am 19.
November, 6." Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt. 1973.
Immigration
Germany Statistisches Landesamt. Die Auslaender. Stuttgart: Statistisches Landesamt
(state level) Baden-Wuerttemberg. 1973-2000.
Rheinland-Pfalz Statistisches Landesamt. "Volks- und Berufzaehlung 1987, Band 332."
(district level) Mainz: Statistisches Landesamt. 1987.
Landesbeauftragte fuer Auslaenderfragen. Wir Leben in Rheinland-Pfalz:
Auslaendische Bevoelkerung. Mainz: Staatskanzlerei. 1995-2003.
Unemployment
Baden-Wuerttemberg
(district level)
Steiermark
(district level)
Statistisches Landesamt. Statistische Berichte: Erwerbstiitigkeit,
Arbeitsmarkt und Wirtschaftsstruktur in Baden-Wiirttemberg. Stuttgart:
Stuttgart: Statistisches Landesamt Baden-Wuerttemberg. 1979-1991; 1993-
2005.
Landesstatistik Steiermark. Steirische Statistiken. Graz: Statistisches
Landesamt. 1966-Present.
Landesstatistik Steiermark. "Steirische Statistiken, Bezirksuebersichten
1981-1991." Graz: Statistisches Landesamt. 1993.
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Crime
Landeskriminalamt Baden-Wuerttemberg. Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik
Baden-Wuerttemberg. Stuttgart: Landeskriminalamt Baden-Wuerttemberg.
1954-Present.
Baden-Wuerttemberg
(district level)
Rheinland-Pfalz
(district level)
Steiermark
(district level)
Landeskriminalamt Rheinland-Pfalz. Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik des
Landes Rheinland Pfalz. Mainz: Landeskriminalamt. 1957-2000.
Data provided by request to the Landeskriminalamt Baden-Wuerttemberg.
Landeskriminalamt Rheinland-Pfalz. Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik des
Landes Rheinland Pfalz. Mainz: Landeskriminalamt. 1957-2000.
2001-Present: Landeskriminalamt, "Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik,"
http://www.polizei.rlp.de.
Data provided by request to the Landeskriminalamt Steiermark.
Germany
(state level)
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Appendix C - Interviews and Event Observations
Interviews
Germany - 92
(6/04-8/04; 6/05-11/05; 2/06-
5/06)
Austria - 88
(9/06-6/07)
Politicians Nativist 22 Nativist 33
(NPD 8) (BZOe 11)
(REP 14) (FPOe 21)
Non-Nativist 43 Non-Nativist 36
(CDU 10) (Greens 13)
(FDP 6) (LiF 2)
(Greens 14) (KPOe 1)
(PDS/Left Party 4) (OeVP 11)
(SPD 9) (SPOe 9)
State/federal officials 9 1
(immigration authorities;
security services
[ Verfassungsschutz])
Social actors 11 9
(Unions; churches; immigrant
community organizations;
groups advocating ethnic
tolerance)
Journalists 2 1
Academics 5 8
(Professors; public opinion
researchers)
Event Observations (in which nativist actors took part or organized)
Germany - 14 Austria - 14
REP - 8 FPOe - 9
(Election rallies/infostands - 4) (Election rallies/infostands - 4)
(District party meetings - 3) (District party meetings - 4)
(Parliamentary sessions - 1) (International nativist conferences - 1)
NPD - 2 BZOe - 3
(Demonstrations - 1) (Election Rallies - 1)
(Counter-Demonstrations - 1) (Party Days - 2)
Unaffiliated Joint/Unaffiliated - 2
Social Movements - 4 (Conferences - 1)
(Demonstrations - 4) (Parliamentary sessions - 1)
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Appendix D - Coding Newspapers
Coding Volume
Newspapers included in the various media analyses were searched for a six-week period
before each relevant state or national election. Six weeks represents the outer boundary of the
"hot phase" of elections in Austria and Germany, the period when voters are most likely to pay
attention to campaign appeals.
For each election period, I collected all articles that included reference to parties that
were or would become nativist.
I also collected all articles with titles or sub-titles that made reference to migration and
issues related to migration, or that referred to domestic ethnic groups associated with immigrant
minorities. I collected this data to represent as a proxy for the salience of immigration in each
country for each election period. References to migration or ethnic groups were only included in
the count if they referenced events in the country in question; articles about Turks in Germany
were counted, but articles about Turkey were not.
A list of search terms (not necessarily comprehensive) is included below:
Migration Asyl/Asylbewerber (asylum/asylum-seekers); Einwanderer/Einwanderung
(immigrant/immigration); Zuwanderer/Zuwanderung (migrant/migration).
Issues Related Aussiedler/Spaetaussiedler (returnees/late returnees); Gastarbeit/Gastarbeiter (guest
to Migration workers); Grune Grenze (what Austrians call their border); Integration; Islam;
Moschee (mosque); Multikultural (multi-cultural); Schlepper (smugglers, referring to
human trafficking); Schwarzarbeit (illegal employment, which is limited to
immigrants).
Immigrant Bosnien (Bosnian); Fremde/Fremd (foreigner/foreign); Italiener (Italian); Kurd;
Minorities Minderheit (minority); Russen/Russendeutschen (Russians/Russian Germans);
Suedlaender (Southerners, usually referring to Yugoslavs); Ueberfremdung (over-
foreignization).
Coding Content
In addition to volume, I coded the content of the news stories to determine whether recent
migrants were being portrayed in a positive, negative, or indifferent light.
Broadly, positive stories focused on the material or social benefits of immigration or
successes in integration, negative stories on the problems or costs associated with immigration,
and indifferent articles offered statistics or statements without referencing costs or benefits. If
the article contained both statistics and a statement of costs or benefits, it was coded with a bias
against indifference. Instances of each type of article are included below:
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Positive "African saves German boy."
"Christians in dialogue with Muslims."
"Germany needs young foreigners."
Indifferent "Fire in asylum home."
"Foreigner discussion again becomes contentious."
"Host families sought for foreign students."
"2,000 asylum applicants in April."
Negative "Army stops refugee invasion."
"Counties protest federal law: communities refuse to accept burdens from
migration and social insurance."
"Muslims warn against spiraling violence."
"Jacket thief shoots passerby: 10 years prison for Czech."
Coding Political Content
Finally, I coded the articles to determine whether the stories were initiated by or heavily
emphasized political actors. I coded an article as "political" if it was written in response to an
action or statement made by a political actor. Articles seeking a politician's reaction to
immigration numbers or covering a scheduled report by a state or national agencies were not
coded as political. I coded articles this way to test the alternative hypothesis that domestic elites
were driving the change in immigration coverage in the late-1980s and early-1990s.
Political "The Union [CDU] wants 'consequential deportation' for all foreigners
without residence rights."
"Freedom Party proposes visa restrictions."
"Hessen's Interior Minister warns about Islamists."
Non-Political "Count of naturalizations doubles: 7.3 million foreigners in Germany."
"Female foreigners sprayed with gas."
"New citizens tend toward major parties."
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Appendix E - Electoral Support for Nativist and Radical Right Parties, 1965-2006
Each election is reported using up to three delimitations: support for nativist parties, support for parties "conventionally" coded
as Radical Right (using Golder's [2003] coding), and support for parties I would code as Radical Right. When all three codings would
likely agree, only one is presented. When the Radical Right columns would likely agree, only two are presented. Elections where no
parties contested have been excluded. For the sources used to accumulate the election results, see Appendix C.
Austria
1970: -; .07%
1983: .08%
1986: -; 9.73%
1990: 16.63%
1994: 22.5%
1995: 21.9%
1999: 26.91%
2002: 10.01%
2006: 15.15%
Greece
1974: -; 1.08%
1977: -; 6.82%
1981: -; 1.68%
1985: -;.6%
1989a5 98: -; .3%
1990: -; .13%
1993: -; .14%
1996:.07%;.49%
2000:.18%;.27%
2004: 2.3%
Belgium
1978: -; 1.4%; 2.29%
1981: 1.1%; 1.1%; 3.27%
1985: 1.51%; 1.51%; 2.65%
1987: 2%; 2%; 2.18%
1991: 7.68%; 7.68%; 7.75%
1995: 10.13%
1999: 13.67%
Italy
1968: -; 4.45%
1972: -; 8.67%
1976: -; 6.11%
1979: -; 5.26%
1983: -; 6.81%
1987: .48%; 6.39%
1992: 8.65%; 14.02%
1994: 8.4%; 21.9%
1996: 10.1%; 11%
2001: 3.9%; 4.3%
2006: 4.58%; 5.86%
Ireland
2002: .07%
Denmark
1973: -; 15.9%; -
1975: -; 13.6%; -
1977: -; 14.6%; -
1979: -; 11%; -
1981: -; 8.9%; -
1984: -; 3.6%; -
1987: 4.8%
1988: 9%
1990, 1994: 6.4%
1998: 9.8%
2001: 12.6%
2005: 13.3%
Netherlands
1967: -; -; 8.4%
1971: -; -; 5.3%
1972: -; -; 5.1%
1977: .4%; .4%; 5.1%
1981: .2%; .2%; 4.4%
1982: .8%; .8%; 5.5%
1986: .5%; .5%; 4.4%
1989: .9%; .9%; 5.1%
1994: 2.9%; 2.9%; 7.7%
1998: .6%; .6%; 5.6%
2002: 17%; 17%; 21.2%
2003: 5.7%; 5.7%; 9.3%
2006: 6.1%; 6.1%; 11.7%
Finland
2003: .2%
2007: .1%
France
1973: -; .5%
1978: .3%
1981: .4%
1986, 1988: 9.7%
1993: 12.4%
1997: 15%
2002: 13.4%
Norway
1973: -; 5%;-
1977: -; 1.9%; -
1981: -; 4.5%; -
1985: -; 3.7%; -
1989: 13%
1993: 6.3%
1997: 15.3%
2001: 14.6%
2005: 22.2%
Germany
1965: -; 2%
1969: -; 4.3%
1972: -; .6%
1976: -; .3%
1980, 1983: .2%
1987: .6%
1990: 2.4%
1994: 1.9%
1998: 3.3%
2002: 1%
2005: 2.2%
Portugal
1976: -; .05%; .1%
1979: -; 1.2%
1980: -; .04%
1983: -; .07%; .12%
1985: -; .07%
1987: -; .06%; .1%
1991: -; -; .04%
1999: -; -; .03%
2002: .01%; .01%; .03%
2005: .02%
598 TWO elections were held in 1989, though Radical Right parties only contested the first.
Spain
1977: -; .79%
1979: -; 2.21%
1982: -; .58%
1986: -; .22%
1989: -; .12%
1993: -; .04%
1996: -; .07%
2000: .04%; .13%
2004: .05%; .22%
Sweden
1988: 0.02%
1991: 6.83%
1994: 1.49%
1998: 0.52%
2002: 1.65%
2006: 3.02%
Switzerland
1967: .8%; .8%; 2.4%
1971: 7.6%; 7.6%; 9.7%
1975: 5.5%; 5.5%; 7.5%
1979: 2%; 2%; 4.2%
1983: 3.5%; 3.5%; 5.6%
1987: 5.5%; 5.5%; 7.8%
1991: 8.5%; 8.5%; 10.4%
1995: 22%; 7.1%; 23.8%
1999: 25.2%; 2.7%; 27.02%
2003: 27.89%; 1.16%; 30.17%
United Kingdom
1966: .03%
1970: .09%
1974a: .25%
1974b: .39%
1979: .61%
1983: .14%
1987: .01%
1992: .03%
1997: .15%
2001: .19%
2005: .76%
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Appendix F - Net Migration to Germany and Austria
Germany599
Year Net Per Capita 20 Year 20 Year Deviation
Migration Migration Per Capta Standard from 20 Year
Mean Deviation Mean
-37,722
-20,665
-9,056
26,971
48,736
222,887
-0.07
-0.04
-0.02
0.05
0.09
0.40
1951
1953
1955
1957
1959
1961
1963
1965
1967
1969
1971
1973
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
0.26
0.52
-0.35
0.91
0.62
0.57
-0.36
0.03
0.38
0.22
-0.22
0.09
0.32
0.03
0.09
0.12
0.15
0.13
0.22
0.28
0.31
0.28
0.29
0.31
0.27
0.21
0.20
0.12
0.18
0.19
0.20
0.23
0.33
0.32
0.32
0.35
0.35
0.35
0.37
0.40
0.39
3.21
0.99
2.09
-2.43
3.33
1.25
0.90
-2.10
-0.73
0.25
-0.26
-1.34
-0.30
0.31
U
U
U
U
iU~8
Uts
Ui~
U~tg
599 Total population data taken from the Federal Statistical Office (www.destatis.org); migration data taken from the
Bundesauslaenderbeauftragte, "Cross-border-migration of non-nationals."
600 The first mean averages the first 10 years, the second 11 and so on until 20 years of observations are available.
Afterward, the 20-year rolling mean is taken.
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Year Net Per Capita 20 Year 20 Year Deviation
Migration Migration Per Capita Standard from 20 Year
Mean60 1 Deviation Mean
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
593,962
602,523
462,096
397,935
93,664
201,975
272,723
142,645
0.96
0.75
0.57
0.49
0.11
0.25
0.33
0.17
0.24
0.24
0.28
0.30
0.37
0.37
0.34
0.37
0.41
0.39
0.39
0.43
0.42
0.37
0.37
0.38
0.36
0.30
1.85
1.31
0.69
0.45
-0.67
-0.32
-0.04
-0.56
-0.98
601 The first mean averages the first 10 years, the second 11 and so on until 20 years of observations are available.
Afterward, the 20-year rolling mean is taken.602 Migration Information Source, "Europe: Population and Migration in 2005," www.migrationinformation.org.
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Austria 603
Year Net Per-Capita 20 Year 20 Year Deviation
Migration Migration Per Capita Standard from 20 Year
Mean604 Deviation Mean
1962 1,521 0.02
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
r
i~ar~
r
r
r
r
a
~nra
r
g
r
I
r
r
r
3,246
19,049
-6,970
10,406
35,826
-16,550
7,766
-8,774
9,356
-23,410
2,830
6,223
13,207
58,562
71,480
3,012
3,880
8,451
17,272
33,507
50,582
27,477
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0.04
0.26
-0.09
0.14
0.47
-0.22
0.10
-0.12
0.12
-0.31
0.04
0.08
0.17
0.76
0.91
0.04
0.05
0.10
0.21
0.41
0.62
0.33
603 Austrian Federal Statistical Office, "Migration Balance in Austria and the States since 1961," www.statistik.at.
604 The first data point averages the first 10 years, the second 11 and so on until 20 years of observations are
available. Afterward, the 20-year rolling mean is taken.
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